

LIBRARY

Brigham Young University



DANIEL C. JACKLING LIBRARY
IN THE
FIELD OF RELIGION

Handwritten marks at the top left corner, including a stylized 'R' and other illegible characters.



139
5486h

THE
HARMONY OF PHRENOLOGY

WITH
SCRIPTURE:

SHEWN IN

A REFUTATION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL ERRORS

CONTAINED IN

MR COMBE'S "CONSTITUTION OF MAN."

BY WILLIAM SCOTT, Esq.

When men arrogantly abandon their guide, and wilfully shut their eyes on the light of heaven, it is wisely ordained that their errors shall multiply at every step, until their extravagance confutes itself, and the mischief of their principles works its own antidote. — ROBERT HALL.

SECOND EDITION.

EDINBURGH:

FRASER & CO. 54, NORTH BRIDGE:

SMITH, ELDER, & CO. AND H. WASHBOURNE, LONDON:

AND W. CURRY, JUN. & CO. DUBLIN.

1837.

EDINBURGH:

Printed by ANDREW SHORTREDE, Thistle Lane.

**THE LIBRARY
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY
PROVO, UTAH**

CONTENTS.

PREFACE,	Page vii
--------------------	----------

CHAPTER I.

EXAMINATION OF MR COMBE'S HYPOTHESIS, THAT THE WORLD IS CONSTITUTED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF SLOW AND PROGRESSIVE IMPROVEMENT—GENERAL VIEW OF THE SUBJECT.

Mr Combe's analogies in support of his Hypothesis—Analogies tending to prove the opposite of Mr Combe's doctrine—Evidence derived from History, and from Ancient Monuments, respecting the Condition of the Human Race in the Earliest Ages—Progress of Civilization over the World—Progress of Civilization in Britain, and the Causes which have given rise to the Improvement of its Inhabitants—Conclusion of the Argument.	1
---	---

CHAPTER II.

MR COMBE'S OPPOSITION TO THE DOCTRINE OF DIVINES, RESPECTING THE ORIGINAL PERFECTION, AND SUBSEQUENT DEGENERACY, OF THE HUMAN RACE.

Statement of the Doctrine of Divines—Mr Combe's Theory—Question, which of these accords best with the Evidence—Recent Origin of Man—State of man in Heathen Ages—Ruin of all the Ancient Empires,	46
---	----

CHAPTER III.

THE REMEDY FOR EXISTING EVILS.

First Propagation of Christianity, and its Effects—Moral and other Improvements derived from Christianity—On the Efficacy of Preaching as a Means of Improvement,	61
---	----

CHAPTER IV.

EXAMINATION OF MR COMBE'S VIEWS RESPECTING THE NATURAL LAWS.

I. General view of the subject—Views of the French Philosophers respecting the Natural Laws—Dr Spurzheim's views—Mr Combe's views	
---	--

—General Objection to the foregoing views — Bishop Butler's notion of a Divine Government — Bishop Butler's views quite opposite to Mr Combe's — Intuitive Knowledge — Case of the Bee — Paradoxical statement of the Benefits of Ignorance — New view of the Condition of Man — Transgression and Evil necessary — Infinite extent of the Natural Laws — Limited nature of the Human Faculties — How far the Natural Laws can be obeyed — Who are most likely to obey the Natural Laws.

II. On the principles stated by Mr Combe as affording a Key to the Divine Government — Superior Authority of the Moral Law — Cases in which Physical Laws may be disobeyed — Superiority of the Moral Law.

III. Considerations shewing that a Revealed Law was necessary — Conscience absolute and individual — Means of fixing the Rule of Right — All human Systems of Laws imperfect — Revelation necessary.

IV. Perfection and Invariableness of the Revealed Law — Morality of Old Testament compared with that of the New — Particular precepts of the Jewish Law — Laws of Benevolence — Law of Marriage — Faculties having reference to our Duties to God — The Revealed Law of our Duties to God — True Means of Improvement. Page 86

CHAPTER V.

ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE HUMAN FACULTIES, CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO THEIR RESPECTIVE OBJECTS.

Main defect of Mr Combe's System — His omission of a Future State — Present condition of Man — Phrenology assumed to be true — Scheme of the Faculties — Propensities — Sentiments — Scheme of the Intellectual Faculties — Position and grouping of the Cerebral Organs — General remarks on the system. 140

CHAPTER VI.

ON MR COMBE'S PRINCIPLE OF THE SUPREMACY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS AND INTELLECT, AND ON CONSCIENCE.

Bishop Butler's view respecting Conscience — Mr Combe's view — Supremacy of Moral Sentiments — Examination of Mr Combe's view of Supremacy — The Moral Faculties insufficient of themselves — Distinction between the Animal and Moral powers — Relative Dignity and Harmony of the Faculties — Office of the Intellect — Informing Moral Judgment — Moral effect of various Powers — Conscience, as explained by Dr Chalmers — Conscience premonitive, approving, or condemning — Illustration of the working of Conscience — Offences arising from the Higher Sentiments — All are conscious of Sin. 181

CONTENTS.

v

CHAPTER VII.

ON THE SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE OF HUMAN DEPRAVITY.

Theological view of Human Depravity—Phrenological view of the Fall and its consequences—Proofs of degeneracy—Means of Improvement—Probable Results of a Knowledge of the Natural Laws—Probable Abuses of the Natural Laws—The Natural Laws no Safeguards to Virtue—Phrenology affords no means of regenerating the World—True Remedy for Human Depravity, Page 214

CHAPTER VIII.

OBJECTION TO THE PARADISAICAL STATE OF OUR FIRST PARENTS CONSIDERED.

Mr Combe's Objections to the Paradisaical State—Unphilosophical Nature of Mr Combe's Objections—Hypothetical Answers to Mr Combe's Objections, 237

CHAPTER IX.

ON DEATH.

I. Objection to the Doctrine that Death was brought upon Man as the punishment of Sin, considered—Mr Combe's view of Death—Theological view of Death—Mr Combe transgresses the limits of Philosophical Inquiry—Reason affords no light as to the Primitive State of Man—Special Objections hypothetically answered—Mr Combe's views only apply to our Present Condition—Diseases, &c. attributed to Infringement of the Natural Laws—The Natural Laws will never be perfectly obeyed—Mr Combe's views of Death—Natural feelings of Man on the Prospect of Death.

II. On the omission of a Future State—Omission of a Future State inexcusable—Phrenological Argument for a Future State—Natural Anticipations—Partial views of Mr Combe—Natural Feelings coincide with Revelation—Mr Combe's System offers no Argument against Suicide, 246

CHAPTER X.

ON THE PAINS OF PARTURITION.

Scripture views of the Pains of Parturition—Mr Combe's Views answered, 273

CHAPTER XI.

ON THE RELATION BETWEEN SCIENCE AND SCRIPTURE.

Opposite views stated by Mr Combe — Gross Inconsistency of Mr Combe's views — Religion and Philosophy ought to be studied separately — Lord Bacon's rules for avoiding Heresy — Bacon's rules against mixing Divine and Human Knowledge — Proper spheres of Religion and Philosophy distinct — Meaning of Bacon's Rules, as applied by Mr Combe — Case of Galileo and the Cardinals — The Scriptures exhibit a Knowledge of Human Nature — On the means of Improving the Character — Spiritual Influence improves, but does not alter the Character — Characteristics of the Apostles — Sceptical Arguments — Diversities of Doctrine — Difficulties of Interpretation — Garbled Quotations from Bishop Taylor — Various Readings — Trials of Witches — Whether Science aids or is aided by Christianity — How Christianity promotes Science — On the Efficacy of Prayer — Case of Professor Leechman — His Explanations and Admissions — Decision of the Assembly — Doctrine of the Church on Prayer — Dr Gordon's Views on the Subject of Prayer — Dr Chalmers's Views of Prayer — Limitations to the Doctrine — Prayer for Spiritual Blessings — Phrenological View of Prayer — Phrenological Argument for the Efficacy of Prayer — On Spiritual Influence — Phrenology affects no Scripture Doctrine — Spiritual Influences inscrutable, Page 278

CHAPTER XII.

ON CRIMINAL LEGISLATION.

Mr Combe's View of Justice — Mr Combe's Views of Crime and Responsibility, considered — His objections to Retributive Punishment — Reasons for such Punishment — Punishment of the Criminal preventive of Crime — Punishment more benevolent than Deprivation of Liberty — Penitentiaries *versus* Transportation, 330

CONCLUSION.

Recapitulation — Laws of Propagation — Political views — Mr Combe's a Low System — Sciences generally misapplied at the first Discovery — Astrology — Alchemy — Cosmogonies — Premature Systematizing — Phrenology still in its Nonage — Rash Experiments deprecated — Conclusion, 340

P R E F A C E.

I SHALL shortly state the circumstances which have induced me to come before the public with the present work.

Mr Combe is now well known, not only in this country, but on the Continent, and in America, as the most able, zealous, and active supporter and propagator of the new Science of Phrenology, or the doctrine founded on the discoveries of Doctors Gall and Spurzheim. In the preface to the Essay which we are now about to consider, he says, that Phrenology appears to him "to be the clearest, the most complete, and best supported system of human nature which has hitherto been taught," and that he has "assumed it as the basis of his work."

No one certainly could blame Mr Combe for adopting, in a work on the Constitution of Man, that system of human nature which he believed to be the best, and for making it the basis of his speculations ; but, not contented with this, he has attacked our divines as guilty of a gross neglect of duty in not at once adopting the same views,

and following them out in all their consequences, in their instructions to the people.

Against this there appear, even at first sight, several very serious and cogent objections ; and one of them is, that even supposing it universally admitted, (which is at present very far from being the case,) that Phrenology is established on a perfectly solid foundation of facts, and that it affords a clear and perfect view of human nature, our divines are not, and cannot be supposed to be, so conversant with its principles and details, as to be able to teach them to their flocks, or to combine them in any satisfactory way with the doctrines of Christianity. It is only a very few years since Mr Combe, the chief living cultivator of this science, has adopted the views he now advocates. They have, since that time, undergone various modifications ; and as they are now taught and expounded by him, they are only to be found fully stated in Mr Combe's own writings.

It may farther be mentioned, that not only are our clergy, as a body, necessarily unacquainted with the doctrines of Phrenology, but most of them are even ignorant of the peculiar terms, or technical language, in which these doctrines are conveyed, as generally used by phrenological writers. Taking, then, the most favourable supposition for Mr Combe, and supposing that they had been inclined generally to approve of his doctrines, it is quite impossible that they could

at once begin to model their public instructions upon these doctrines ; and on the other hand, however objectionable they might consider them, it is not surprising that they should have hesitated to come forward with any formal answer to, or refutation of, his errors ; seeing that, in order to do either of these with any effect, it would first be necessary for them to study a science, and to learn a language, which they have never been taught, and to both of which most of them are entire strangers.

I may here state, that, about fifteen years ago, I happened to have my attention turned to the subject of Phrenology, and that I have since made it more or less an object of study. Having become convinced of the truth of its general principles, I entered as a member of the Phrenological Society in the year 1822, and thereafter took a considerable share in its proceedings ; and finally, was elected to the office of its President, in the year 1825.

Soon after that time, Mr Combe began to broach those doctrines on human responsibility, and other points, which were afterwards more fully developed in his "Constitution of Man." These I opposed at the time, but without much effect : and Mr Combe having, in 1827, printed a small impression of that Essay for private distribution, I also printed a little tract in answer to it, (which was likewise privately distributed,) but without being able to produce any material

change in his views. At last, finding Mr Combe determined to persevere in these new doctrines, to introduce them regularly for discussion in the Society, and to support them by articles in the *Phrenological Journal*, I resolved to break off all connection with both; and accordingly, I gave up attending the Society's meetings, as did also several other members who entertained the same opinions of Mr Combe's views. I also, from that time, ceased from contributing to the *Phrenological Journal*.

In June, 1828, Mr Combe published his work on the "Constitution of Man," nearly in the shape in which it now appears. He acknowledges that, at its first appearance, the book did not sell, as nearly seven years elapsed before another edition was called for. It was not until, by aid of the "Henderson Bequest," he was enabled to reduce the price, that it came to have any considerable circulation. Since that time, it appears, many thousand copies of it have been sold, chiefly among the operative classes in our manufacturing towns. It also appears that it has been translated into some foreign languages, and that it has been widely circulated in America. I am not surprised at this extensive sale of the essay, as, along with many errors, it contains much that is both instructive and amusing. It contains an account of the interesting discoveries of Gall and Spurzheim, together with other matter well adapted to

the class of readers for whom it seems principally intended. This, with the extraordinary cheapness of the work, may account for its extensive sale.

Although, during the first seven years after its publication, I did not consider an answer called for, seeing that it seemed to have excited little attention; the case was altered after it appeared that the sale of it had increased to many thousands, among a class of readers not the best fitted to detect its fallacies; and that it was circulated chiefly in those places where the population had far outgrown the means of proper Church accommodation; and where, of course, it was offered to the people not along with, but in lieu of, religious instruction. It was then pressed upon me by several friends, that the work ought to be answered, and that I ought to undertake the task, as I understood the subject of Phrenology, as maintained and taught by Mr Combe, and was able to address him in his own language; and that as I had formerly studied his book with the view of answering it, the labour was already half performed.

These reasons may perhaps be held sufficient to account for my engaging in the present undertaking.

Mr Combe's work takes so wide a range, embraces or touches so vast a variety of subjects, and contains so great a multitude of errors, that

in order to answer it completely—to separate the chaff from the wheat—and, admitting what may be true, to expose and refute all that is erroneous,—it would be necessary to write, not a book, but a library. He says in his preface, that it is his wish to avoid controversy. He takes a strange method to avoid it, seeing that he has, in the course of his speculations, not merely declared war against most, if not all, of our secular institutions, but has openly attacked the clergy, and denounced as erroneous almost every article of faith, with regard to the past and present condition of the human race, which is generally held by them on the authority of Scripture.

I shall here mention some of the points on which Mr Combe attacks the doctrines of our divines.

There are, first, the doctrines of the Original Perfection of Man,—the Fall,—and the consequent Depravity of our Nature. Here are three most important points, lying at the foundation of the whole scheme of the Christian faith, which Mr Combe denounces as errors, on grounds the most frivolous, false, and unphilosophical.

We have next an objection to the Paradisaical State of our First Parents before the Fall, founded on a mere fancy which he has adopted, that certain of the faculties of man are adapted to a world in which pain, danger, and death are elements in his condition, and, therefore, he

imagines, would be unsuited to a state from which these were excluded.

Then we have an objection to the theological doctrine that Death was brought upon man as the Punishment of Sin, founded on the assumption that death is inseparable from the nature of an organized being, and that, therefore, it must have been an original institution of the Creator.

We have an objection to the belief, (founded on a passage in Genesis,) that the Pains of Child-birth were part of the punishment inflicted on Woman at the Fall. Mr Combe maintains, that the pains alluded to are not an institution of the Creator at all, but are caused by a disobedience of some unknown Natural Laws.

With regard to the Natural Laws themselves, (which are at present universally disobeyed, for this, among other reasons, that nobody knows what they are,) Mr Combe's system proceeds on a principle directly opposite to that of Christianity. That system aims at improving the moral nature of man in the *first place*, holding that, if this were attained, all other improvement would necessarily follow. Mr Combe, on the contrary, maintains that, in order to improve the moral nature of man, we must first improve his physical condition; and, accordingly, he directs our attention almost exclusively to the petty details of diet, clothing, exercise, &c. "what we shall eat, and what we shall drink, and wherewithal we shall be clothed."

In regard to another most important point, his system is the reverse of that recommended in Scripture. We are there directed "to set our affections on things above, and not on things that are on the earth." Mr Combe, on the contrary, in his Essay, (intended, it will be observed, as a practical manual of conduct, for the use chiefly of the lower classes,) omits all consideration of a future state, and rests all the motives to good conduct on the consequences of that conduct in the present life.

With respect to Revelation, as Mr Combe's system is not founded on it, he had no occasion to speak of it at all. He has done so, however, and has written an entire chapter on the Connection between Science and Scripture. In this, and throughout his book, though he seems to admit the reality of revelation, it is perfectly clear that he entertains no confidence in its power and efficacy as an instrument for the improvement of the human race. Indeed, he seems to consider it as little entitled to attention in any respect, as he represents it as being so obscure, or so corrupted in the text, that no positive reliance can be placed on any thing it contains.*

* I have here omitted a sentence of my original Preface, in which I referred to a passage in Mr Combe's book, where I had supposed him to state, that the precepts of Christianity are "scarcely more suited to human nature and circumstances in this world, than the command to fly would be to the nature of the horse." I am satisfied that, in this instance, I have somewhat misapprehended Mr Combe's meaning. The words do occur, but

Lastly, he states views with regard to a Special Providence, and the efficacy and uses of Prayer, which are totally at variance with the doctrines of every Christian Church.

The above may serve as a specimen,—but it is quite clear that we are yet merely on the threshold,—that Mr Combe has but just *broken ground* before the walls of our Zion, and that he already contemplates still greater triumphs. Indeed, he has not left it to inference, but has openly declared his aim to be nothing less than to plant the standard of Phrenology on the very pinnacle of the Temple, and to make our pulpits resound with the preaching of—“The Natural Laws!” He loudly accuses our divines as blind guides, because they have not already adopted these in their instructions to their flocks, instead of the clear and simple morality, and the sublime and consoling doctrines, of the Gospel.

Let it be observed, that in entering upon my present undertaking, I do not come forward for the purpose of defending Christianity, which I look upon as far removed above any risk of injury from such attacks,—but to vindicate Phrenology from the reproach which has been brought upon it by some of its supporters, and by none more than Mr Combe, of its being hostile to, or

they are used conditionally, and in reference to special circumstances. I still consider the passage objectionable, but not in the way I had at first supposed.

incompatible with, Christianity. Believing, as I do, that Phrenology has a foundation in nature, that its general principles are true, and that it must ultimately lead to highly important results, I am anxious to relieve the minds of those who have conceived a prejudice against it (an extremely natural one under the circumstances) from the idea that it leads to doctrines of a dangerous and anti-Christian tendency ; and I hope to be able to shew, not only that there is no inconsistency between it and any doctrine of Scripture, but that, as far as the two subjects admit of being compared, there exists a perfect harmony and correspondence between them.

In adverting to the objections which have been made to his views, as inconsistent with the doctrines of Scripture, Mr Combe states in the ninth chapter of his work :—" It is gratifying to observe, that these objections have not been urged by any individual of the least eminence in theology, or countenanced by persons of enlarged views of Christian doctrine." In a letter addressed by him to Dr Neill, as one of the patrons of the University of Edinburgh, lately published among the documents in reference to his claims as a candidate for the Logic Chair, he endeavours to bring this specially home to individuals. He there states,—“ The late Reverend Dr Andrew Thomson attended a course of my lectures on Phrenology in 1822 or 1823, and survived the publication of the ‘ Constitution of Man’ (a copy,

of which I presented to him) for nearly three years ; and although he conducted the *Christian Instructor*, and was a zealous, ready, and powerful writer, vividly alive to the purity of the faith which he espoused, yet he never published a word against that book. I sat for several years in his church, and was personally acquainted with him, and yet I never received even any *private remonstrance* from him on the subject."

It is not a little surprising, that Mr Combe should either have forgotten, or never have been acquainted with, the fact which I am now to mention. In the end of the year 1828, on an application being made to Dr Thomson to become a director of the Edinburgh Infant School, then in the course of being established, he declined having any connection with that institution, solely on the ground that Mr Combe was to be a director, and that he did not approve of Mr Combe's principles. It would appear that, in some communications which passed on this subject, between Dr Thomson and Mr Combe's friends, the latter represented this to be *persecution*,—a charge which Dr Thomson indignantly repelled. I have now before me a copy of a letter on the subject, addressed by Dr Thomson to the late Mr William Ritchie, a particular friend of Mr Combe, in which he says :—" I need not repeat the opinion formerly expressed in regard to Mr Combe. I adhere to it without qualification or reserve.

And yet I cannot see it to be persecution of him, that I should refuse to be connected with a voluntary association, of which he is to be a member, when I am convinced that his opinions and his reputation would be injurious to the cause which that association is formed to promote.”* I have not seen any of the previous correspondence, containing the opinion which Dr Thomson had expressed in regard to Mr Combe; but it is quite obvious what must have been its nature. I should add, that the above quoted letter is dated 22d December, 1828, six months after the publication of the “Constitution of Man.”

Mr Combe refers also to another eminent pillar of the Church.—“Farther,” he says, “Dr Chalmers published his Bridgewater Treatise several years after my work had appeared; and although the subjects in his book and mine are closely analogous, he has stated no objections whatever to my views, which is quite inconceivable if he had regarded them as dangerous and unfounded in nature, and been prepared to refute them.” With submission, the circumstances here referred to lead to a conclusion the very opposite of that which is here stated by Mr Combe. It being the case that Dr Chalmers published a book a very few years after the publication of

* It is proper to mention, that the copy letter above quoted was sent to me by a member of Dr Thomson’s family, with a *request* that I would make it public—so as to remove the impression which might be created by the passage now referred to in Mr Combe’s letter to Dr Neill.

this work of Mr Combe's, and on a subject, as he says, very closely analogous, is it conceivable that Dr Chalmers would have entirely omitted all mention of that work if he had *approved* of the doctrines which it contained? Knowing the high character of Dr Chalmers, and how much he must be above any feeling of jealousy in a matter of this kind, I say it is inconceivable that he should not, in such circumstances, have taken some notice of Mr Combe's book, if he had considered it to be deserving of a *favourable* notice.

Lastly, Mr Combe has in this letter referred to the announcement of my intended publication; as to which he says,—“I can hardly anticipate that Mr Scott will consider himself called on to supply the supposed omission of the two learned Doctors in Divinity above named. If, however, I shall be mistaken in this, and if Mr Scott shall make any attempt to shew that my work contains doctrines inconsistent with sound Christianity, it will be sufficient for me to remind you and the public, that Mr Scott is a layman, that he enjoys no reputation for theological learning, and that his opinions, therefore, are not of authority to decide the question.”

What Mr Combe has here stated of me is all literally and strictly true. It is true I am a layman, as Mr Combe himself is, and that I enjoy no reputation for theological learning. I never heard, and do not now understand, that

Mr Combe enjoys any reputation for theological learning, and, therefore, so far as mere authority goes, his opinion will probably not have greater weight than mine. I may also observe, that if Mr Combe, a layman, has written any thing erroneous in reference to Christianity, there can be no objection to his being answered by a layman. Still less can there be any objection to such an answer coming from me, when it is recollected that his attacks against the teachers of our religion are professedly founded on the doctrines of Phrenology, which doctrines circumstances had led me to make a subject of study ; and therefore, I may be supposed better prepared to meet him on this particular ground than those who are comparatively strangers to these doctrines.

I have nothing more to add here, except to express my gratitude to those friends who have favoured me with their advice, encouragement, and assistance, during the progress of my little work. To one of these my acknowledgments are particularly due, without whose assistance I should hardly have been able to finish my undertaking, even in the imperfect manner in which, I am well aware, some parts of it have been executed.

EDINBURGH, *August 5, 1836.*

THE
HARMONY OF PHRENOLOGY
WITH SCRIPTURE.

CHAPTER I.

EXAMINATION OF MR COMBE'S HYPOTHESIS, THAT THE WORLD IS CONSTITUTED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF SLOW AND PROGRESSIVE IMPROVEMENT. — GENERAL VIEW OF THE SUBJECT.

IN the commencement of his work on the Constitution of Man, Mr Combe draws a parallel between the inferior animals and the human race, and the circumstances in which they are respectively placed. He observes, most truly, that animals exhibit a much more simple constitution than man does; that, whether their nature is wild and ferocious, or gentle and inoffensive, they are uniformly and consistently so; and that each tribe is placed in circumstances obviously suited to its character and habits. Man, on the other hand, presents anomalies and inconsistencies without end,—at once destructive and benevolent, selfish and generous—capable of the grossest sensuality, cruelty, and deceit; or of high attainments in wisdom, piety, and virtue. “But now,” says Mr Combe, “shall these conflicting tendencies be reconciled, and how can external circumstances be devised that shall accord with such heterogeneous elements?” These questions have puzzled philosophers in all ages. Mr Combe thinks he is able to solve the riddle.

It is to be regretted, that, in entering upon this most interesting field of speculation, Mr Combe should have thought it necessary, at the very outset, to come into collision with certain doctrines which are generally supposed to lie at the very foundation of Christianity,—I allude to the doctrines of the Fall, and the consequent depravity of the human race.

Mr Combe had no occasion whatever to enter upon topics like these. If it had been his wish to treat his subject in a manner purely philosophical, and to consider the state and prospects of man, as far as he was able, by the lights of natural reason, he might have done so without trenching upon ground which is within the peculiar province of revelation. He might, and, as a philosopher, he was bound to have confined himself to that part of the history of the human race to which we have access from authentic human testimony, or existing monuments; and if, from facts thus established, when compared with the actual state of the race in various parts of the world, he could, by a legitimate induction, succeed in establishing any *general laws* respecting the progress of society in times past, there might then have been rational grounds for drawing conclusions as to the probabilities of this progress in ages to come. In choosing this course, Mr Combe would have avoided all risk of shocking the prejudices, or insulting the faith of any class of professing Christians, or of awakening, what he so much deprecates, the angry feelings of religious controversy.

But Mr Combe has not chosen to take this safe, rational, simple, and truly philosophical course. Instead of a regular induction, drawn from an extensive and well arranged collection of facts, he sets out with an *hypothesis* of the most sweeping description, drawn from analogies the most remote, and premises the most slender

and insufficient. This hypothesis is announced in general terms as follows:—"The constitution of this world does not look like a system of optimism. It appears to be arranged, *in all its departments, on the principle of slow and progressive improvement.*"

In support of this position, Mr Combe first refers to the facts recently discovered by geologists, shewing that this earth has, in very remote periods of time, undergone various revolutions, and has been covered by various races of vegetables and animals, successively produced and successively destroyed, all tending to prepare it for the residence of its present inhabitants, and particularly of man,—the most important of them all. "At last," he says, "man was created, and since that period there has been little alteration in the physical circumstances of the globe."

After some general observations respecting the powers and faculties of man, and their adaptation to the circumstances in which he is placed, he goes on to draw an analogy between the progress of the human race and that of the physical world. "If the physical history of the globe," he observes, "clearly indicates progression in an advancing series of changes, the civil history of man equally proclaims the march, though often vacillating and slow, of moral and intellectual improvement;" and he takes for an example of this improvement the progress from barbarism to civilization in our own country,—and upon this slender shred of a very remote analogy, he thinks he has established a new theory of the Divine arrangements, of universal application, which is to explain the secret purposes of Providence in regard to the human race, "and vindicate the ways of God to man."

He now brings forward his views in a more definite form, and states them in opposition to those generally received. I shall give them in his own words:

“In our own country, two views of the constitution of the world and of human nature have long been prevalent, differing widely from each other, and which, if legitimately followed out, would lead to distinct practical results. The one is, *that the world, including both the physical and moral departments, contains within itself the elements of improvement, which time will evolve, and bring to maturity ; it having been constituted on the principle of a progressive system, like the acorn in reference to the oak.*

“The other *hypothesis* is, that the world was perfect at first, but fell into derangement, continues in disorder, and does not contain within itself the elements of its own rectification.”

It is quite obvious, that in adopting the former of these views, in opposition to the latter, Mr Combe openly maintains opinions, in regard to the past and present condition of the human race, directly at variance with the doctrines of our divines, and of our national church. He nowhere pretends to conceal this; on the contrary, he constantly, throughout his whole work, refers to the doctrine of the corruption of human nature as a *fundamental error*, which has been adopted by divines in consequence of their entire ignorance of a true system of mental philosophy. A great part of his introductory chapter is devoted to shewing the causes of this and various other errors into which he supposes them to have fallen, and pointing out to them a course by which they may promote the intellectual and moral improvement of mankind more effectually than they have hitherto been able to do.

It may here be remarked, in the first place, that the question respecting the corruption of human nature, or, in other words, its degeneracy from its original state, is not a question dependent on any philosophical theory, or system of mental philosophy. It is purely a question

of fact, to be determined by the ordinary means by which we acquire information with regard to other facts. If Mr Combe thinks he is in possession of evidence sufficient to prove that the moral and intellectual faculties of man are at present in a state equal or superior to that in which they existed at his creation, let him produce this evidence, and we shall give it all due consideration. But it must be quite clear, that any evidence upon which we can come to a conclusion on such a subject, can have no connection with the peculiar nature of the faculties themselves with which man is endowed. It is of no consequence, as to the point at issue, whether man possesses sentiments of benevolence, veneration, and conscientiousness, or whether he is endued with propensities of destructiveness and combativeness. The question is, whether these, and all the other faculties, propensities, and sentiments which form part of his nature, are now *in an equally perfect state* as in the day when he came from the hands of his Creator. If Mr Combe can prove that they are so, or that, instead of degenerating, they have actually improved, it will be time enough for him to find fault with the doctrines of divines on the subject of human degeneracy.

To illustrate what I mean when I say, that it is of no consequence, as to this question, *what the faculties are*, I shall suppose the question to be, whether our breed of horses has degenerated from the time when it was first introduced into this island? In this case, it would not in the least tend to a solution of the question, to enter into any detail respecting the anatomy of the horse, or to shew that, at his first introduction, he had exactly four legs as at present; that he had then, as now, two eyes, two ears, two nostrils; that the form of the neck, the hoof, the pastern, and every part, was

similar to what it is now. All this, we would answer, has nothing to do with the question. What we want to know is, not what is his form, and what are his members, but has he, in his entire nature, degenerated or improved? Are his size, strength, or swiftness in the race, diminished or increased? Does he shew more or less sagacity, or is his average age lesser or greater than it was?

As it is obvious that these questions have no connection with the structure, form, and anatomy of the animal, so the question alluded to with regard to the degeneracy or improvement of man, is totally independent of any system we may happen to adopt with regard to the structure of his faculties.

Another remark that occurs on this part of Mr. Combe's speculation, is this, that in his statement of the several systems, he mixes up two questions which are perfectly distinct. The one is, — Has man, as he at present exists, degenerated from his original state; or is he, and has he always been, from the beginning, in a state of slow and gradual improvement? Another, and quite a separate question, is, — supposing it to be shewn that the human race is now in an improving state, — what are the means by which that improvement has been brought about in time past, and what are the best means for promoting this improvement *now*, and for raising man to the highest perfection of which his nature is capable? Are his present faculties, such as they are, sufficient for this purpose? or does he require the aids of revelation, and of spiritual influences, to lead him to the ultimate ends of his being, and to open to him the sources of his highest happiness? These are different questions, and will require to be separately considered; and although, in regard to the last of them, there may be some colour for supposing that something may depend upon our possessing a true

system of mental philosophy, I think it may appear hereafter that Mr Combe places far too high a reliance upon his own views of our mental faculties, and very much undervalues the knowledge which divines, in common with the rest of mankind, have hitherto possessed on the subject.

I may here repeat my regret, that, in coming to the consideration of both these questions, Mr Combe had not confined himself to a statement of his own views, instead of going out of his way to attack those of others. If the first view given here of the constitution of the world had been the true one, and if it could have been established by fair logical deductions from a sufficient number of undoubted facts, Mr Combe needed not to have troubled himself with any other that could be proposed. He might have satisfied himself with maintaining his own doctrine, and trusted to the harmony which must ever subsist between all truths, to reconcile his conclusions with a correct interpretation of Scripture.

The geologists who maintained, from the appearances of the different rocks, and other materials forming the outer crust of the earth, that this world must have existed many thousand years before the period generally assigned to the creation, at first excited great alarm in many religious and well-meaning persons, from the apprehension that their speculations would undermine the authority of the Mosaic writings. This alarm was unfounded, and is now no longer entertained. The geologists attacked no doctrine connected with Christianity. They properly and philosophically confined themselves to the proof of a fact, which is now established by such an overwhelming mass of evidence, that it can no longer be questioned. Had Mr Combe followed their example, and employed himself in a diligent

investigation of the facts bearing upon the point at issue, he probably would have come to different conclusions from those which he has now adopted. At all events, while he confined himself strictly to facts, and to pure philosophical investigation, he need not have feared the hostility of the divines, and it was entirely out of his province to attack any of their doctrines.

When Sir Isaac Newton proposed his theory of universal gravitation as accounting for all the phenomena of the motions of the heavenly bodies, as well as of those on the surface of the globe, he did not encumber himself with attempting to disprove the vortices of Descartes, or the cycles and epicycles of other astronomers. He was quite satisfied with proving his own theory, which he placed upon the basis of a broad induction of well-observed facts, and rigid mathematical demonstration, and he left the admirers and supporters of other systems to maintain their own opinions, or reconcile them to the facts, as they best might.

Mr Combe's procedure differs from this in two respects. He has attacked the opinions of others; and he has *not* established his own on any thing like a satisfactory basis.

I shall, in what follows, go more at large into an examination of his fundamental proposition, that the world has been constituted, with regard to man, on the principle of a *progressive system*; and, after a full examination of the evidence, I trust I shall be able to shew,—

1. That the analogy to be drawn from the geological facts, stated by Mr Combe himself, instead of supporting his general principle, leads to the very opposite conclusion.

2. That throughout the whole range of organic existence, from which any analogies can be drawn applicable to this question, these are uniformly adverse to

Mr Combe's theory, and in favour of the opinions he opposes.

3. That as far as any conclusion can be drawn from history, from the monuments of ancient art, and other remains of antiquity, we are led irresistibly to the belief, that the most ancient nations have been as far, or farther advanced in moral and intellectual attainments, than those which succeeded them.

4. That the course of civilization has, from the first dawn of history until now, proceeded uniformly and exclusively from those countries which were first inhabited, and that no instance can be adduced of any barbarous nation, which, by its own unassisted efforts, ever advanced a single step in the career of moral and intellectual improvement.

5. That the inhabitants of this island have only been raised from barbarism to civilization, by successive conquests and intermixture with other nations, and by other extraordinary stimulating influences operating on the national mind, and coming from without, including, as the most important, the influence of Christianity.

I shall then draw a closer comparison between the two opposite systems, — that of Mr Combe on the one hand, and that of our divines and theologians on the other, and shall endeavour to shew which of them is most consistent with the facts, as far as these can be ascertained by natural reason, and a careful examination of evidence. And, lastly, adverting to the accusations which Mr Combe has brought against our religious instructors, and their mode of teaching, I shall endeavour to shew, both on a larger and a more confined scale, what good has already been accomplished by their means, leaving the reader to draw his own conclusions as to what is likely to be done, by a more extended application of the same means in future.

I.—*Mr Combe's Analogies in support of his Hypothesis.*

My first position then is, that the analogies relied on by Mr Combe to prove his general principle, do, if any thing, prove the reverse.

If we attend to the geological facts he enumerates, to what do they amount? Does it appear from them that the physical world, as originally constituted, “contained *within itself* the elements of improvement, which it required only time to bring to maturity?” The facts are directly in the teeth of such a supposition. I shall take the statement of them in Mr Combe’s own words:

“The globe, in the first state in which the imagination can venture to consider it, says Sir H. Davy, appears to have been a fluid mass, with an immense atmosphere, revolving in space round the sun. By its cooling, a portion of its atmosphere was probably condensed into water, which occupied a part of its surface. In this state no forms of life, such as now belong to our system, could have inhabited it. The crystalline rocks, or, as they are called by geologists, the primary rocks, which contain no vestiges of a former order of things, were the result of the first consolidation on its surface. Upon the farther cooling, the water, which, more or less, had covered it, contracted; depositions took place; shell-fish and coral insects *were created*, and began their labours. Islands appeared in the midst of the ocean, raised from the deep by the productive energies of millions of zoophytes. These islands *became covered* with vegetables fitted to bear a high temperature, such as palms, and various species of plants, similar to those which now exist in the hottest parts of the world. The submarine rocks of these new formations of land *became covered* with aquatic vegetables, on which various

species of shell-fish and common fishes found their nourishment. As the temperature of the globe became lower, species of the oviparous reptiles *appear to have been created* to inhabit it; and the turtle, crocodile, and various gigantic animals of the Saurian (lizard) kind seem to have haunted the bays and waters of the primitive lands. But in this state of things there appears to have been no order of events similar to the present. Immense volcanic explosions seem to have taken place, accompanied by elevations and depressions of the surface of the globe, producing mountains, and causing new and extensive depositions from the primitive ocean. The remains of living beings, plants, fishes, birds, and oviparous reptiles, are found in the strata of rocks, which are the monuments and evidence of these changes. When these revolutions became less frequent, and the globe still more cooled, and inequalities of temperature were established by means of the mountain chains, more perfect animals became its inhabitants, such as the mammoth, megalonix, megatherium, and gigantic hyena, many of which have become extinct. Five successive races of plants, and four successive races of animals, *appear to have been created* and swept away by the physical revolutions of the globe, before the system of things became so permanent as to fit the world for man. In none of these formations, whether called secondary, tertiary, or diluvial, have the fossil remains of man, or any of his works, been discovered. At last, man was created, and since that period there has been little alteration in the physical circumstances of the globe."

These are Mr Combe's statements, and not mine; and assuming them to be correct, what is their amount? Not certainly that the physical world "contained the elements of improvement within itself," and that these were "evolved and brought to maturity" by the sole operation

of "time;" but, on the contrary, *that it required various successive exertions of creative power*, before the jarring elements were reduced into order, and matters were brought into the state in which we now see them.

In short, the history of the physical world, previous to the creation of man, presents us, according to Mr Combe's own account, with little else than a succession of creations and revolutions; in other words, so many distinct acts of Almighty power, by which successive alterations were *induced* upon its original constitution; and how, from a statement like this, Mr Combe can come to the conclusion, that the world "contains within itself the elements of improvement, which time will evolve and bring to maturity," I confess, surpasses my comprehension. To an ordinary understanding it does appear a prodigious *non sequitur*. The argument, as he states it, just comes to this. The world, as at first framed, contained so little of the elements of improvement within itself, that it required four or five successive exertions of creative power to bring it into a state, fitted for the reception of human inhabitants; therefore, (according to Mr Combe's new principles of analogical reasoning,) "the world contains within itself the elements of improvement, which time will evolve and bring to maturity, it having been constituted on the principle of a progressive system, like the acorn in reference to the oak;" or, it may be stated more shortly thus,—The world originally *did not* contain within itself the principles of improvement, therefore *it does* contain within itself the principles of improvement.—Q. E. D.

This is Mr Combe's logic. According to that which I believe to be more current in the world, the conclusion would be the direct contrary. If an analogical argument of this kind is good for any thing, it is good to this extent,—that if in one department of the Creator's

works we find a certain principle or method uniformly acted on, *we may consider it probable*, that the same principle or method will appear in his proceedings in other departinents. For example, if it appears, that in the physical world the Creator has not left matters to proceed according to the blind operation of qualities impressed upon it from the beginning, but that he has at certain epochs *interfered*, and, by successive interpositions of his power, induced certain changes upon his original work, throughout a long series of ages,—if this be true, as Mr Combe's statement indicates, there is reason, from analogy, to conclude that, in the moral world, the interference of the Almighty mind may also be required at certain epochs, in order to produce those changes in the state and character of our race, which are necessary to fulfil his intentions respecting us. I say we may regard this as probable, from analogy. I do not state that it is certain; but only that it would be quite consistent with the usual modes of operation of Deity, as we have seen them exemplified in the physical world, if it were so.

It is extraordinary, that while Mr Combe states the principle of the argument from analogy quite correctly, he should draw a conclusion in perfect opposition to that principle. "The more we discover of creation," he observes, "the more conspicuously does uniformity of design appear to pervade its every department. We perceive here the physical world gradually *improved* and *prepared* for man." We do find it to have been so improved and prepared, but how? Not by the unassisted evolution of its own elements; not by any principle of improvement inherent *within itself*: but by successive exertions of the same Almighty power by which it was originally framed. The physical world, according to Mr Combe's account, has been improved and prepared

for man, in the same way as a field is improved and prepared by a skilful husbandman to receive its destined crop; and if we are to reason from analogy, are we to conclude, that, having once introduced man upon the scene, the author of his being has from that moment abandoned all active superintendence of his welfare? Is the moral world of so much less consequence than the physical, as not to deserve, or are its elements so much simpler and more regular in their action as not to require, such superintendence?

This argument from analogy is in every view the most unfortunate that can be conceived, as it leads, not remotely or doubtfully, but by direct and obvious inference, to conclusions the very reverse of those drawn by Mr Combe; and these conclusions are, as might be expected, supported in the fullest manner by the statements of Scripture, and the undoubted facts of history.*

* As in the physical world Mr Combe has stated that four or five successive creations of plants and animals have taken place, in order to render it fit for the habitation of man, so in the moral world there have been already five great periods or epochs, where God expressly *interfered*, in an extraordinary and miraculous manner, for the purposes of influencing the destinies of the human race.

The first of these occurred at the Fall, when God pronounced the sentence of death upon man, as the punishment of his disobedience; and, at the same time, gave the first promise of a Saviour, who was to restore his fallen nature.

The second occurred at the Flood, when God interfered to destroy the whole inhabitants of the earth, with the exception of the family of Noah and his sons, who were miraculously saved in an ark, and with whom, after the Flood, he made a new covenant.

The third occasion took place at the Call of Abraham, when, the whole race having again fallen into idolatry, God made choice of an individual and family to preserve the knowledge and worship of his name.

The fourth great epoch occurred when the Israelites were brought out of Egypt, and when the Law was delivered to them by Moses, previous to their settlement in the land of Canaan.

The fifth and last occasion of miraculous interference, and to which

II.—*Other Analogies tending to prove the opposite of Mr Combe's doctrine.*

But if, in regard to the physical and moral world, *considering each as a whole*, and looking to the procedure of their Author respecting them throughout a course of ages, there is reason to believe that they have both been constituted in such a manner as to require his occasional interference in the manner described—the principle as to *each distinct act* of creation seems to be the very reverse. From all that can be gathered of the history of the earth and its productions, either from observation of their past and present state, or from the researches of geologists, there appears nothing like progressive creation or evolution of individuals or species in any department of nature. When a new species of plants or animals appears to have been created, it is not derived from an older and more imperfect one, but starts at once into existence, at the Almighty fiat, in all its completeness and perfection. Whatever length of time the species may be continued by ordinary generation, the later offspring of the race acquire no new qualities. Through whatever number of generations, or length of ages, their remains are found accumulated, these remains, in each particular species, are all marked by the same type, the oldest generations being equally

all the rest were preparatory, took place at the advent of our Saviour, and the events consequent thereupon.

I do not insist upon the views now incidentally thrown out, as of any great importance, or as adding any thing to the evidence or credibility of revelation; but since Mr Combe has introduced the argument from analogy, I wish to shew to what issues such an argument may be easily carried; and I am not aware that in doing so I have used it in other than a legitimate way, or have transgressed the bounds of fair analogical reasoning.

perfect as the most recent. There is no such thing as equivocal generation. One species of animals never produces another. The turtles and sauri of the pre-Adamite world, might have multiplied in their fens and shallow waters to the end of time, — they never would have produced the mammoth or the megatherium, the lion or the tiger. None of these would ever have produced a human being. This is well understood by Mr Combe. He distinctly and correctly states, that each new race of plants or animals was *the result of a separate act of creation*; and he states, moreover, in the very outset of his work, the general fact, that every creature, and every physical object, “has received *its own definite constitution*.”*

* In evidence of what I have stated on this point, I may refer to the following passage in Cuvier: “The following objection has already been started against my conclusions, — Why may not the presently existing races of land quadrupeds be mere modifications or varieties of those ancient races, which we now find in the fossil state, which modifications may have been produced by change of climate and other local circumstances, and since raised to the present excessive difference, by the operation of similar causes during a long succession of ages?”

“This objection may appear strong to those who believe in the indefinite possibility of change of forms in organized bodies, and think that, during a succession of ages, and by alterations of habitudes, all the species may change into each other, or one of them give birth to all the rest. Yet, to those persons, the following answer may be given from their own system: if the species have changed by degrees, as they assume, we ought to find traces of this gradual modification. Thus, between the *Palæotherium*, and the species of our own days, *we should be able to discover some intermediate forms, and yet no such discovery has ever been made*. Since the bowels of the earth have not preserved monuments of this strange genealogy, we have a right to conclude, that the ancient and now extinct species were as permanent in their forms and characters, as those which exist at present; or, at least, that the catastrophe which destroyed them did not leave sufficient time for the production of the changes that are alleged to have taken place.”†

After making some observations on the varieties produced in animals by domestication, and by the mixture of breeds effected by the con-

† Cuvier's *Essay on the Theory of the Earth*, translated by Jameson, 4th Ed. p. 114.

This being the case with regard to the successive races of plants and animals, in the ages preceding the creation of man, as far as can be discovered from the researches of geologists, what is our experience respecting those species with which the earth is furnished at present? Do we find that the different genera and species of plants and animals now on the earth contain, each within itself, the elements of improvement? Are the trees of the forest now of loftier growth, and more splendid dimensions, than those which originally covered the mountains of our globe? Does the cedar now rear its umbrageous head in greater magnificence than it did in the days of Ezekiel, who describes it "with fair branches and with a shadowing shroud, and of an high stature, and having its top among the thick boughs? The fir trees were not like his boughs, and the chestnut trees were not like his branches, nor any tree in the garden of God like unto him in beauty." Do we not know, on the contrary, that the glory of Lebanon is fallen, and that in the whole of that mountain range, once covered with the most magnificent forests, a few scattered remnants are all that remain, without the least prospect that its pristine honours will ever be restored? Do we not find the same in all countries originally covered with wood, — that the existing trees are a dwarfish and insignificant race, when compared with those giants of the forest, of which the wrecks and ruins are here and there to be observed, or which have been

trivance, and under the influence of man, and shewing that all these varieties are perfectly insignificant, and never amount to an alteration in the original and proper specific type, Cuvier comes to the conclusion, "that animals have certain fixed and natural characters, which resist the effects of every kind of influence, whether proceeding from natural causes or human interference; and we have not the smallest reason to suspect, that time has any more effect upon them than climate."*

* Theory of the Earth, p. 122.

found preserved in an entire state in the marshes, or buried fathoms deep in soil, the accumulation of ages?

But to come nearer the point at issue: Is there the smallest reason to believe that any existing species of animals has become improved or advanced in the scale of perfection, by virtue of a principle of progression inherent in its own nature, and which time has evolved and brought to maturity? Does the lion now traverse the burning desert with a more lordly step, or shake the wilderness with a more appalling roar, than he did in the days of Moses, who refers to him as the type of every thing that is strong and terrible, or of Solomon, who compares his roaring to "the wrath of a king?" Does the horse exhibit now more magnificent qualities, than those ascribed to him in the Book of Job? And has man, with all his boasted wisdom and skill, "given the horse strength, has *he* clothed his neck with thunder?"

Does the hawk now fly more swiftly, or does the eagle mount up with a stronger wing, or make her nest higher in the rock, than in ages long past? Are the goodly wings of the peacock adorned with more splendid colours, or are the feathers of the ostrich larger and finer, or her flight swifter, than in the days of Job? "What time she lifteth up herself on high, she scorneth the horse and his rider."

I refer to the above passages, merely as occurring in the most ancient writings in the world, to shew that the productions of nature described in them, possessed, upwards of three thousand years ago, the same qualities as they do now, and that no improvement or alteration ever has taken place in these qualities. In the absence of all evidence to the contrary, this might be quite sufficient; but we are not left to mere negative evidence, or the descriptions of ancient writers on this important point. We have the positive evidence of undisputed facts, that

the existing races of animals have undergone no change as far back as it is possible to trace them. For this, we have the express authority of Baron Cuvier, whose judgment, on a point of this kind, will not be disputed.*

We have, therefore, every kind of evidence, positive and negative, for asserting, that neither in the vegetable nor in the animal creation is there any such thing as a natural state of progression ; and that no race or species

* "I have endeavoured," he says, "to collect all the ancient documents respecting the forms of animals, and there are none equal to those furnished by the Egyptians, both in regard to their antiquity and abundance. They have not only left us representations of animals, but even their identical bodies embalmed and preserved in the catacombs.

"I have examined, with the greatest attention, the engraved figures of quadrupeds and birds upon the numerous obelisks brought from Egypt to ancient Rome, and all these figures, one with another, have a perfect resemblance to their intended objects, such as they are still in our days. On examining the copies made by Kirker and Zoega, we find, that without preserving every trait of the original in its utmost purity, they have yet given us figures which are easily recognized. We readily distinguish the ibis, the vulture, the owl, the falcon, the Egyptian goose, the lapwing, the land-rail, the asp, the Egyptian hare with its long ears, even the hippopotamus ; and among the numerous remains engraved in the great work on Egypt, we sometimes observe the rarest animals, the algazel for instance, which was known in Europe only a few years ago.

"My learned colleague, M. Geoffroy Saint Hilaire, convinced of the importance of this research, carefully collected, in the tombs and temples of Upper and Lower Egypt, as many mummies of animals as he could procure. He has brought home the mummies of cats, ibises, birds of prey, dogs, monkeys, crocodiles, and the head of a bull ; and after the most attentive and detailed examination, *not the smallest difference is to be perceived between these animals and those of the same species which we now see*, any more than between the human mummies and the skeletons of men of the present day. Some slight differences are discoverable between ibis and ibis, just as we now find differences in the descriptions of naturalists ; but I have removed all doubts on that subject, in a memoir on the ibis of the ancient Egyptians, in which I have clearly shewn that this bird is precisely the same in all respects, at present, that it was in the days of the Pharaohs. I am aware that in these I only cite the monuments of two or three thousand years back ; but this is the most remote antiquity to which we can resort in such a case."*

* Theory of the Earth, *ut sup.* p. 123.

of either has ever, as a species, improved itself, or shewn any symptom of "possessing within itself the elements of improvement." Nature is constant, as Mr Combe is fond of observing, and her rules admit of no exceptions, and here there is no exception in any class of her productions; from the cedar in Lebanon to the hyssop that springeth out of the wall, or from the leviathan or elephant down to the lowest zoophite or coral insect, none have ever improved themselves, or given birth to improved or superior races. None of these has, as a species, been "constituted on the principle of a progressive system, *as the acorn in reference to the oak.*"

I assume it, then, as a general law, that throughout the whole of organized existence, each species, at its first creation, receives a distinct and definite constitution, which it transmits, without the capacity of improvement, through all succeeding generations. This is not only consistent with all the known facts, but is likewise conformable to what might be expected *a priori*; for how could we suppose that the first of a species, coming directly from the hand of the Almighty workman, who contrived and formed all its different parts, could be less perfect than those which were produced afterwards by its means? The reverse of this appears at first sight much more probable; and accordingly, in certain cases, we find it to be true.

Although each species preserves its original type unaltered, and never can by possibility acquire qualities of a higher nature, yet individuals of the species, or even the whole individuals of a species, from accidental circumstances,—from want of proper food, or from being placed in situations not in harmony with their nature,—may be, and often have been found to degenerate, and fall below the original standard of their race. But there is throughout all animated nature a certain spring

and elasticity of constitution; and as, in the case of individuals, provision has been made for the repair of any injuries arising from wounds or diseases, by the operation of what is called the *vis medicatrix naturæ*, so in the case of a species degenerating from its pristine state, there is still a tendency in the race, when placed again in more favourable circumstances, to recover in some degree the ground it has lost: and, taking advantage of this, man is sometimes able, in the case of those animals whom he has subjected to his sway, by supplying them with improved food, by judicious crossing, by selecting the best individuals to be employed in propagation, and other methods, to raise the breed again in many respects nearly up to the original type. This is the true principle in what is called the improvement of breeds; not that man can, by any means whatever, mend the works of the Creator, or improve or complete what He has left imperfect, for

God never made his work for man to mend;*

but, in races which have degenerated, man is able, by his intellect, to assist Nature in recovering the ground she has lost. In some cases, what is called an improvement is merely such in reference to the uses of the animal to man, and one set of qualities is encouraged at the expense of others. Thus, in the race-horse, the only quality looked to is swiftness, and the breed is propagated with a view to this alone. In cattle which are reared for food, the quality of fattening, or of speedily acquiring the greatest weight of flesh, is that to which the breeder directs his particular attention, disregarding in comparison the qualities of strength and activity, on which depends much of the perfection of the animal. But in all cases whatever, we may hold it as a rule, that, taking

* Dryden.

any species as a whole, no means exist of improving it above a certain point. The original type remains, forming a boundary, beyond which it cannot pass. It may occasionally fall below it, and by proper means be raised up to it again, but it never can be raised higher ; as water conducted in pipes may rise up to, but never above, the level of the original fountain.

Applying these facts to the subject in hand, I ask, Is it at all conformable to the analogy of nature, or to what reason would suggest or anticipate *a priori*, to suppose that man, the greatest, the noblest, the most important work of the Creator's power, should form the only exception to the above rule, and that he should at his first creation have been sent from the hands of his Maker in a rude and imperfect state, when all other productions of the same Almighty power were perfect from the first? Can it be supposed that less care would be bestowed upon the highest, than we see has been exercised upon the lowest of his creatures? Is it at all probable that man, the undoubted monarch of the terrestrial creation, has been sent into his own dominions naked, weak, and miserable, unfurnished with the proper marks and credentials of his authority, and left to struggle through all sorts of difficulties up to the proper sphere of his glory and his power?

If we are to argue from analogy, we are compelled to conclude, that man, like all the animals, was created with all his powers and faculties complete, and that, like them, he received at once a definite constitution, possessing all the perfection of which his nature is capable. This is the general law of creation, and no philosophical reason—indeed, no reason at all—can be assigned why there should be an exception to the rule in this solitary instance.

III.—*Evidence derived from history, and from ancient monuments, respecting the condition of the human race in the earliest ages.*

In looking into history, and comparing the condition of man in past ages with what we find it at present, it is by no means my object to maintain that there has been no improvement in any part of the race. That such improvement has taken place in some nations, and is now proceeding, in regard to our moral and intellectual condition, are points which need not be disputed; but the true questions to be considered are, what is the nature and amount of the improvement observed, and to what causes is this improvement to be ascribed?

In regard to the first of these points, I may observe, that Mr Combe has *no historical authority* for saying that man, when first placed in the world, was in his general nature and faculties less perfect than at present. The traditions and the poetry of all antiquity are against this supposition, and give intimations neither few nor obscure of what has been called a golden age,—a period when the race was better and happier than in the ages which succeeded, and when the earth was without violence and without crime. I refer to these traditions not as proofs of *the fact*, but as proofs, at all events, that a very general *belief of the fact* prevailed at a very early period.

The histories of the most ancient empires in the world are decidedly against the hypothesis. The facts narrated by authentic historians respecting the Assyrian, the Median, and the Babylonian empires, completely negative the supposition that the races which composed them were inferior in powers either of body or mind, to the greatest nations which have since existed. Were there no other facts to evince this, the descriptions of their

works, the immense and splendid cities which they erected, their buildings, which for greatness and magnificence have never since been equalled, far less surpassed,—the fame of which, in distant regions, was such as to procure for them the name of wonders of the world,—prove incontestably that the people which produced them stood high in the scale of physical and intellectual endowment.

Not to mention Nineveh, the capital of the Assyrian kings, the size and wealth of which are stated to have been prodigious, it may be sufficient merely to allude to the more celebrated city of Babylon, which is equally famous in sacred and profane history, and which, whether it be considered in its extent, its magnificence, its wealth, the greatness and power of its kings, its extraordinary revolutions, its final downfall, and its present state of utter desolation, is equally without a parallel.*

* Any detailed description of Babylon would be quite superfluous. Every one has heard of its prodigious extent, comprehending a regular square forty-eight miles in circuit; its walls said to have been two or three hundred feet high, and so broad that several chariots could drive along the top of them, abreast; its hundred gates of solid brass, and the towers surmounting the walls by which these were defended; its massive bridge of huge stones, fastened together by bolts of iron; its palaces adorned with the most splendid sculptures and paintings; its hanging gardens; its tunnel under the Euphrates,* connecting the palaces on opposite sides of the river; its famous tower, supposed to have been the ancient tower of Babel, begun about a century after the Deluge, but afterwards enlarged, strengthened, and adorned, so as to be the most remarkable building in ancient times, and perhaps the highest in the world; the golden image of Belus, or Baal, by which it was surmounted, said to have been forty feet in height, and equal in value to three and a half millions sterling. After every allowance for exaggeration in the description of these particulars, quite enough will remain to satisfy us that the mighty city of Babylon has never been exceeded in greatness and magnificence by any that has since been reared by the power or industry of man; and the accounts of its wealth and luxury shew, that in these respects also its inhabitants were no way behind the greatest of

* This may strike us as one of the most remarkable circumstances regarding ancient Babylon, knowing, as we do, the difficulties which have attended a similar, but far less arduous undertaking, in our own country and time,—difficulties which we have not yet succeeded in surmounting.

Babylon exists no more. Its place is occupied with stagnant marshes, and infested with noisome reptiles. Of its buildings just enough remain to mark where it stood, and to prove the accuracy of ancient historians, by shewing that it was built of bricks fastened with reeds and bitumen. "And they had brick for stone, and slime had they for mortar."

But there are other ancient cities which have been built of more durable materials, the remains of which, still in existence, are sufficient to satisfy the most incredulous of the greatness and power of the people by whom they were reared. I allude to the temples and catacombs

modern nations. Babylon seems to have excelled in rich and ingenious manufactures at a very early period in the history of the world; and its "goodly garments" are mentioned 1450 years before Christ.

The following allusions to the wealth and splendour of Babylon, which are partly literal and partly prophetic, may be taken as filling up the picture of which the above is the outline. The allusions are so circumstantial as to bear the stamp of truth; and if minutely considered, will be found to agree in every particular with what we see realized in the greatest emporium of wealth the modern world can boast:—

"And the merchants of the earth shall weep and mourn for her, for their merchandise no man buyeth any more.

Merchandise of gold and silver;
 And of precious stones and pearls;
 And of fine linen and purple;
 And of silk and scarlet;
 And every odorous wood, and every vessel of ivory;
 And every vessel of most precious wood;
 And of brass, iron, and marble;
 And cinnamon and annomum;
 And perfumes, and myrrh, and incense;
 And wine and oil;
 And fine flour and wheat;
 And cattle and sheep;
 And horses and chariots;
 And *slaves*, — And the *souls of men*;
 And the autumnal fruits of thy soul's desire are gone away from thee;
 And all delicacies and splendours have vanished from thee;
 And never shalt thou find them any more."—Rev. xviii. 11—13.

See *Jebb's Sacred Literature*, p. 457.

of Egypt; and, above all, to the Pyramids—those stupendous monuments, which seem to have been executed by a race of giants, and left standing as if in scorn of the weakness and degeneracy of all succeeding generations.*

* It is in vain to think of describing the tithe of the wonders of Egypt, for it is indeed the land of wonders. Take as an example the ancient Thebes, which Homer characterized as the city with a hundred gates.† The ruins of this city are of such immense extent, as to convince the spectator that fame has not magnified its size; for the diameter of the valley of the Nile not being sufficient to contain it, its monuments rest on the opposite chains of mountains, while its tombs occupy the valleys to the west, far into the desert.

The most ancient remains now existing at Thebes, according to Wilkinson, are unquestionably the great temple of Karnak, the largest and most splendid ruin, perhaps, of which either ancient or modern times can boast, being the work of a number of successive monarchs, each anxious to surpass his predecessor, by increasing the dimensions and proportions of the part he added. Of the hundred columns of the portico alone, the smallest are seven feet and a half in diameter, and the largest twelve. The avenue leading to Luxor, a space nearly half a league in extent, consists of a constant succession of sphynxes, and other chimerical figures to the right and left, together with fragments of walls, columns, and statues. Denon says, that to be enabled to form an idea of so much magnificence, one ought to fancy what is before him to be a dream, as he who views the objects themselves, rubs his eyes to know whether he is awake.

The village of Luxor is built on the site of the ruins of another temple, not so large, but in better preservation. The most colossal parts consist of fourteen columns nearly eleven feet in diameter, and of two statues of granite buried up to the middle of the arms, and having in front of them the two largest and best preserved obelisks known. They are of rose-coloured granite—are still seventy feet above ground, and, including what is covered by the sand, must be at least one hundred in the entire height. Their preservation, Denon says, “is perfect; and the hieroglyphics with which they are covered being cut deep, and in relief at bottom, shew the bold hand of a master, and a beautiful finish. The gravers which could touch such hard materials must have been of an admirable temper; and the machines to draw such enormous blocks from the quarries, to transport them thither, and to set them upright, together with the time required for the labour, surpass all conception.” The stupendous syenite statue of Ramesis II. in the area of the palace temple at Old Quorneh, is perhaps one of the most astonishing remains

† “Thebe portarum centum nobilis fama.”—Pliny. B. 5. c. 9.

The pyramids* have been so often described, that we understand their appearance almost as well as if we had seen them. Nothing so simple was ever so sublime. †

of ancient art in the world. To say that this is the largest statue in Egypt, will convey no idea of the gigantic size or enormous weight of a mass, which, from an approximate calculation, exceeded, when entire, nearly three times the solid contents of the great obelisk of Karnak, and weighed about eight hundred and eighty-seven tons, five and a half hundred weight.

The portico of the temple of Esneh, the ancient Latopolis, is considered one of the most perfect monuments of ancient architecture in existence. It is well preserved, and possesses great richness of sculpture. It is composed of eighteen noble and elegant columns, with broad capitals, and the hieroglyphics with which it is covered within and without, have been executed with great care. The capitals, which are all different, have a very fine effect; and as a proof that the Egyptians did not borrow from other nations, it may be remarked, that all their ornaments have been taken from the productions of their own country, such as the lotus, the palm tree, or the vine.

* Wilkinson observes, that in antiquity the pyramids of Egypt surpass every other monument existing in this or any country; but they do not, of course, from the nature of their construction, at all vie with the magnificence of the ruins of Karnak.

† “With what amazement,” says Dr Clarke, speaking of the great pyramid, “did we survey the vast surface presented to us, when we arrived at this stupendous monument, which seemed to reach the clouds. Here and there appeared some Arab guides upon the immense masses above us, like so many pigmies, waiting to shew the way up to the summit.” “Already some of the party had begun the ascent, and were pausing at the tremendous depth they saw below. The rest of us, more accustomed to the business of climbing heights, with many a halt for respiration, and many an exclamation of wonder, pursued our way to the summit.”

Of the passage to the principal chamber in the interior, Dr Clarke observes, “The workmanship, from its perfection, and its immense proportions, is truly astonishing. All about the spectator, as he proceeds, is full of majesty, and mystery, and wonder. Presently we entered that ‘glorious roome,’ as it is justly called by Greaves, where, as within some consecrated oratory, art may seem to have contended with nature. The floor, the sides, the roof of it, are all made of vast and exquisite tables of Theban marble. So nicely are these masses fitted to each other upon the sides of the chamber, that having no cement between them, it is really impossible to force the blade of a knife within the joints,” &c.

These monuments are vast in the aggregate—vast in the individual parts,—and the weight of the materials, and the power and science which must have been used in their construction, absolutely oppress the imagination.

Supposing we had no historical records at all respecting the greatness of the ancient monarchies, and that we were merely left to infer what we could from the Egyptian remains alone, we certainly could draw no other conclusion, than that these ancient buildings were the work of a great and powerful people, who had not only made the highest attainments in the arts, and in many important branches of science, but had possessed a degree of talent, of taste, and of genius, certainly not surpassed since in any age or country.

It may be alleged, that these monuments only prove the intellectual greatness of the people by whom they were erected, but shew nothing respecting their moral qualities. If, however, intellectual eminence be conceded to them, we are not lightly to presume moral inferiority. And here we are not altogether without some light to shew, that in this respect also the most ancient nations were at least equal to all that succeeded them, down to the promulgation of Christianity. The traditions or histories of all nations bear witness to the comparatively pure morals and simple habits of their ancestors at the rise of each state, and the universal complaint has been, that as wealth and greatness have increased, virtue has disappeared.

“Righteousness,” we are told, “exalteth a nation,” and the truth of the maxim has been exemplified both in ancient and modern times. The Persians, under Cyrus the Great, appear to have been a simple and virtuous people. The education of their youth is said to have consisted chiefly in their being taught to “speak truth, and to ride on horseback;” and if we understand

this in its largest acceptation, it must have included all that is necessary to promote the manly virtues of courage and sincerity, the most important part of what is now considered the education of a gentleman. The Greeks, in the earlier part of their history, were a hardy and vigorous race, patient of fatigue, and capable of sustaining the greatest hardships. Unenervated by sloth, uncorrupted by luxury, their very sports and games consisted in exhibitions of personal strength, emulation, energy, and manly daring; while, to excel in these, they were led to cultivate the virtues of temperance and self-denial to a degree with which modern nations are little conversant. The result of this sort of training appeared in the noble stand which these petty states were able to make against the whole forces of Asia led by Darius and Xerxes; and afterwards, when, by the prudence of Philip, and the fortune of Alexander, they were united under one head, in the astonishing rapidity with which, under the latter, they overran and conquered the great kingdoms of Persia and Egypt, and established an empire, which, though soon rent into four rival monarchies, endured afterwards with little alteration upwards of four centuries.

The beginnings of the Roman state are lost in fable; but at the time it first began to rise to eminence, namely during the second Punic war, we find among them much that, humanly speaking, is virtuous and praiseworthy. The self-devotion of Regulus—the continence of Scipio—the virtue of Cincinnatus—are only specimens of that firmness, temperance, and patriotic feeling, which in those days were far from being rare qualities. The indomitable spirit shewn by the senate after the repeated victories of Hannibal—their noble vote of thanks to their defeated general for “not despairing of the fortunes of the Republic,”—evinces a combination of great and

generous qualities of which there are few examples, and afford unequivocal proofs of the character of a people fit to obtain the empire of the world.

This being the case in the beginnings of these great states, it may naturally be asked, did they improve in morality as they increased in greatness? Does the principle of progression appear in this, or do we find society, in these large masses, to contain within itself the elements of improvement, which time has evolved and brought to maturity? Is it not notorious, that the very reverse is the case,—that virtue and morality are most conspicuous in the earlier history of states, and that from thence the *tendency* has universally been downwards to vice and corruption?

In support of these conclusions, drawn from history, and the remains of ancient monuments, we are enabled, in the case of the Egyptians, to produce a species of evidence to which Mr Combe, at least, can offer no objection.

In the remarks on the cerebral development of nations, contained in Mr Combe's System of Phrenology,* we find the following passage:—"The *ancient Egyptians* appear, from the stupendous monuments of art and science left behind them, to have been a highly intelligent and civilized people; and it is a striking fact, that the skulls of ancient mummies are found almost invariably to belong to the same class as those of modern Europeans. In the (Phrenological) Society's collection there are casts of the skulls of five mummies; and I have seen or obtained accurate descriptions of the skulls of half-a-dozen more; and full size, large development before the ear, and broad coronal surface, characterize them all." It is necessary to mention, that, according

* Second Edition, p. 475.

to the doctrines laid down by all phrenological writers, a considerable size of brain is found to be indicative of a powerful manifestation of the faculties ; and that a large development before the ear, and a large coronal surface, are the marks of a high endowment of intellectual and moral qualities.*

* In farther confirmation of what is stated in the text, I may refer to the account of two skulls in the possession of the Phrenological Society, taken from an ancient temple in Egypt, which there are strong presumptive proofs for supposing to have been those of Ramesis II. and his queen. These skulls were presented to the Society by Captain Felix, R.N. The circumstances in which they were found are thus related : — “ A temple was discovered in December, 1828, which had been erected by Ramses or Ramesis II. Under one of the chambers was a small vault, containing two mummies, a man and a woman, richly and completely gilt. The mummy case crumbled to pieces on being touched. Much gold was found on the mummies, besides three hundred bronze gods of different sizes, &c. In the chamber where the mummies were, the king was dedicator, and no other name appeared. It is always the person to whom the tomb belongs who dedicates it.” Some other conjectures are added, but the whole circumstances seemed to indicate it as probable, that these were really the skulls of Ramesis II. otherwise named Sesostris, (who flourished about the time of the Trojan war, nearly twelve hundred years before Christ,) and one of his wives.

In an account of these skulls given in the Phrenological Journal,† it is stated, that “ the chief value of them is not so much their prodigious antiquity, nor even their increased antiquarian value, arising from the singular glimmer of light which chance has thrown upon their identity, (in which particular, we take it, they are unique among cabinet mummies,) but the confirmation they afford of the phrenological truth, that *a people remarkable for intelligence, taste, enterprise, and all the elements of civilization, — and such a people were the Egyptians, —* must have exhibited a brain well endowed with the organization through which such qualities are invariably manifested.” The article then proceeds to shew that this was actually the case. It had been mentioned in a previous number, that “ the mummies confirm our uniform experience, that the Egyptian head belonged to the Caucasian variety of Blumenbach, to which the European also belongs ;” and it is here added, that the skulls are of large size, indicating, according to the well known phrenological rule, great power and energy of character. The development, which is given at length, is stated to indicate a fair balance of

From the above I think it is evident that Mr Combe is not borne out in assuming that "the civil history of man proclaims the march, though often vacillating and slow, of moral and intellectual improvement." In regard to intellectual attainment, at least, we have seen it proved, that the most ancient nations equalled, or rather surpassed, all that have come after them. The proofs from history, from existing monuments, from phrenological observation on undoubted cranial remains, all unite in leading to this conclusion. We have farther seen, that in every great people, the earlier periods of their history have been most remarkable for a pure state of morals, and that no great improvement in this respect has taken place since the earliest ages. If, then, we find the Egyptians and Babylonians, three thousand years ago, equal, in intellectual and moral qualities, to the principal nations of the world at the present day, what reason have we to suppose that their ancestors, the original stock from which they were derived, had ever been materially below the same standard? Again, if it be true that society is constituted on the principle of gradual progression, "containing within itself the

the animal, intellectual, and moral qualities. In the male head, comparison and causality, (the principal reasoning powers,) also firmness, veneration, and hope, (three of the principal moral powers,) together with cautiousness, and love of approbation, are all stated to be *large*; self-esteem, benevolence, and ideality, also important powers, *rather large*; conscientiousness, or the sense of justice, wonder, gaiety, or wit, and imitation, *full*. This, in any head, would be considered a good development; and if, as is supposed, it belonged to a powerful king, its manifestations would doubtless be productive of great effects. The female head is not less highly endowed, with some striking differences, characteristic of the sex of the party. Both of the heads, in development as well as in size, are above the average even of the European head at this day; and if they afford any thing like fair specimens of the race to which they belonged, they prove, if there be truth in phrenology, that that race must have held a very high rank in the scale of intelligence and civilization among the nations of the world.

elements of improvement, which time is continually evolving and bringing to maturity," then Babylonia and Egypt should have been now the greatest, the most powerful, the most intellectual, and the most moral nations on the face of the earth. Enjoying, as they did, the finest climate, the richest soil, and the most splendid advantages of situation, with immense population, and the possession of what it is now the fashion to call "useful knowledge" (a knowledge of the arts and sciences) in a high degree of perfection, how has it happened that they did not improve these advantages farther? how has it happened that they have so entirely fallen from their ancient greatness? There must be some reason for this, that is not dreamt of in Mr Combe's philosophy.

It will be observed, that in comparing the Egyptians and Babylonians with nations now existing, it is not fair to compare them with ourselves, or with any other nation enjoying the superior lights derived from revealed religion. They ought to be compared with the Chinese, the Japanese, or other nations which are not favoured with a knowledge of revealed truth; for in this way only can it be seen how far the moral and intellectual nature of man may be brought to perfection by the sole aid of those principles of improvement *inherent within itself*. That a great and rapid improvement has now been going on for centuries, and is still proceeding, in those countries which have been brought under the influence of Christianity, is admitted on all sides; but that proves nothing in favour of Mr Combe's argument, unless it can be shewn that Christianity has nothing to do with this improvement.

IV.—*Progress of Civilization over the world.*

BUT let us proceed with our account of the facts. Babylonia is universally understood to have been the first peopled country in the world. From it, as from a centre, the arts and sciences, and civilization, were disseminated among the neighbouring countries, to the east and to the west. The rise of the kingdoms of Persia and India on the one side, and of Egypt and Phœnicia on the other, are instances of this. Greece was civilized by communication with the east. Cadmus introduced letters from Phœnicia. Corn, and a knowledge of agriculture, were brought from Egypt. The curious and ardent spirits of Greece, anxious to see with their own eyes the wonders they had heard of, travelled into these countries, and brought with them a knowledge of their arts, their sciences, their traditions, their philosophy, and their religion.

From Greece, the arts, letters, and philosophy, passed to Rome. The conquerors were civilized by the conquered. The Romans having subdued the nations of western Europe, then possessed by a number of barbarian hordes, carried their arts and literature along with them; and in return for the subjection to which they reduced them, imbued them with a knowledge and a taste for the conveniences of civilized life.

This has been the progress of arts and civilization over the whole world. There has never been an instance known of a nation, which had once degenerated into barbarism, (for I conceive in all cases barbarism to be the result of degeneracy,) that ever raised itself to civilization without the aid of foreign influences. As this is a negative proposition, Mr Combe is aware that it does not require or admit of proof. If he is able to

adduce any instance where a barbarous and savage race have risen, *by their own efforts*, to moral or intellectual excellence, it will be time enough to consider it. We know, that during the period that has elapsed since the discovery of America, not the least improvement has taken place in any of the barbarous tribes scattered over that great continent. The same may be said of the numerous nations inhabiting the interior of Africa. But the rule is universal, and a contrary instance may be searched for in vain.

V.—*Progress of Civilization in Britain, and the causes which have given rise to the improvement of its inhabitants.*

MR COMBE takes the case of the inhabitants of Britain, and mentions that, at the time of the Roman invasion, they lived as savages, and appeared with painted skins; and he seems to conclude, that because they were savages, and we are now civilized, nothing more is necessary to be adduced, in order to establish his principle of gradual improvement. But if we look attentively into history, we shall find that the civilization of the inhabitants of Britain has not proceeded spontaneously from any principles of improvement inherent in themselves, but has arisen entirely from the effects of *successive foreign conquests*, and other influences *coming from without*, the principal and most efficacious of which is undoubtedly Christianity. Judging from the case of other savages, none of whom are ever known to shew the least tendency of themselves towards improvement, the Britons, if left entirely to their own devices, would have been painted savages still.

The Romans first conquered, and then colonized the country, and possessed it for a period of four hundred years. During that time they mixed with the inhabitants, and taught them the arts of peace. Agriculture

was introduced and carried to high perfection, and Britain became a granary for the supply of the Roman armies with corn.

Next came the invasion of the Saxons, who, following the dictates of their native courage, seized upon the rich cultivated plains of England as their lawful prey. They did not conquer merely, they colonized also; and one horde after another of their hardy race came over and possessed the country. They did not drive out, but mixed with the conquered Britons. Both races were improved by their intermarriages, and the best qualities of each were transmitted to their descendants.

But the Saxons were not allowed to possess their conquests in peace. Another set of adventurers came to dispute with them the possession of such a prize. The Saxons having, from long disuse, lost some of their aptitude for war, were obliged to yield for a time to the fierce attack of a race of pirates, who, under the name of sea kings, brought their legions from the shores of Scandinavia. The Danes, though rude and fierce, were not destitute of many high qualities, being true descendants of the Caucasian race; and partly by their mixture with the former inhabitants of the soil, and partly by the excitement caused by their mutual struggles, they added materially to the elements of improvement, and the means already at work, by which the English character was finally raised to the height it has since attained.

Last, came the invasion of the Normans, originally a Scandinavian colony, who, to all the native energy of the race from which they sprung, added some of those refinements inseparable from a residence in a rich and productive country. The superiority of the Norman character over that of the mixed race they came among, appears in nothing more strongly than in the short

period of time in which a mere handful, comparatively speaking, of the former, overran and conquered the whole country, and the entire subjugation to which they finally reduced its inhabitants.

Since that time Britain has been free from foreign conquest, but other elements have been incessantly at work, calling into activity the mental energies of its inhabitants, and combining, in every sort of way, to raise, improve, and civilize the national character.

Part of this may be traced to the incessant endeavours of the people, consisting of the mixed races of Britons, Danes, and Saxons, to throw off the iron yoke imposed on them by their Norman conquerors, and to regain that degree of freedom which they had formerly enjoyed under their Saxon kings; struggles which finally issued in the granting of *Magna Charta*, and the establishment of those privileges of the commons, which have formed the foundation of English liberty.

In the mean time other principles were at work. Christianity, though rudely taught, and imperfectly understood, had, in the midst of all these conquests and revolutions, been silently introduced, and had quietly gained a hold on the feelings and affections of the people. Rude and imperfect as the teaching of Christianity then was, it still contained much that was valuable, and, by its means, a more rational faith and a purer morality became current than that which ever prevailed in heathen times. Its ministers possessed all the learning of the age, and shewed in their lives examples of simplicity and charity. This is an element of improvement of which no heathen nation could ever boast, and, in this respect, our ancestors were more favoured than the greatest empires of antiquity.

Other foreign influences were not wanting to keep up the activity of the faculties, and to forward the

improvement of the race. The gradual encroachment of the Mahometan powers, at last raised a not unreasonable alarm that Christendom might be overwhelmed by the inroads of infidels, and that the Cross might ultimately fall before the armies of the Crescent. The whole Christian world, as if seized by a sudden mania, arose as one man, and Europe poured her countless legions into Asia, for the professed purpose of rescuing from the hands of infidels the possession of the Holy Sepulchre, and of those countries trodden by the footsteps of the Saviour of the world. The avowed purpose was futile, and the success equivocal, and gained by a prodigious sacrifice of blood and treasure; but the demonstration answered an end of far more importance, not contemplated by the immediate actors, though, probably, in part, foreseen by the instigators of the enterprise. The impression made on the followers of Ali was tremendous, and proved to them the utter hopelessness of any attempt to attack the Christian powers within their own territories.

The effect of the Crusades upon the Christians themselves was favourable to national improvement. The universal enthusiasm which they excited, raised into activity many of the nobler attributes of mind, which could not have been called into action during whole ages of less stirring excitement. The reports of those who returned of the exploits of themselves and their companions, their accounts of the countries they had visited, the cities and manners they had beheld, all tended to enlarge the ideas and increase the knowledge even of those who had remained at home, and furnished them with subjects of contemplation, and discoveries more interesting than the low and selfish objects of ordinary life. The result of the whole was, a decided improvement and elevation of the standard of national

manners and national morality, the introduction of a sense of honour, and of a generous attention to the comforts, and a deference to the feelings of the weaker sex, which even yet exercise an influence over most of the nations of Europe.

The effect of these changes on national character appeared in nothing more remarkably than in the alteration which is hereafter visible even in the usages of war. In the wars of conquest carried on by the Edwards and the Henrys in the kingdom of France, amidst all the horrors of such a state of things, there appear here and there gleams of generosity and clemency, tending to soften the distress of the vanquished, and to adorn the laurels of the conquerors with a grace and a humanity unknown in former ages.

But other prospects were soon to open, which directed the attention of Europe to subjects of excitement of a different kind. A new world rose suddenly to view, and the same period saw almost at once a path of access opened in the east and in the west, to regions of which all those objects hitherto considered the rarest and most precious, and forming the chief elements of wealth and splendour, were the native productions. New desires and new objects of ambition arose, and from this period we may date the new turn given to the spirit of enterprise, and the extraordinary energy in the pursuit of wealth, which has since characterized the middle classes in the nations of Europe. From that time their attention ceased to be directed to schemes of mutual conquest, and was turned rather to those vast regions which seemed to offer a boundless field for the gratifications of acquisitiveness. To this cause, and the excitement of the faculties thence arising, are owing much of the progress we have since made in knowledge, in arts and manufactures, and in science. The necessities of navigation have

led us to cultivate astronomy and mathematical science,* and the result of our commercial voyages has been to make us acquainted with the different regions of the globe, their climates and productions, to an extent of which former ages had no conception. We have now seen fulfilled to the letter, the saying of the ancient prophet, "Many shall run to and fro, and knowledge shall be increased."

To all these causes of improvement of our countrymen in mind and knowledge, may be added that which has diffused and disseminated a spirit through the mass of society different from any that prevailed in ancient times, which has already done much, and promises to effect still more, in promoting every moral and intellectual excellence. The Reformation opened a new light to the faculties of man on the subject of religion, and, instead of confining them to the exercise of a blind faith, and an implicit reliance on a bigoted and interested priesthood, taught them to exercise their own intellects in interpreting the word of God, as contained in the Holy Scriptures, and in applying the doctrines therein contained as a rule of faith and conduct. The Reformation was certainly one of the mightiest revolutions, touching matters of the most important kind, that ever occurred in the history of the human race. And its effect was rendered many times more powerful—and, indeed, increased to an extent that can hardly be appreciated—by the discovery which took place about the same time of the art of printing. The breaking up of the monasteries, which immediately, or as a necessary consequence, followed the Reformation, aided by this art, laid open to the world, almost at the same period,

* Greenwich Observatory was established by Charles II. for the express purpose of obtaining accurate observations of the places of the stars for the use of the navy.

the treasures of Greek and Roman literature. The impulse given to the European mind by the united effect of these circumstances was prodigious. The faculties of men seemed to awake as from a slumber of fifteen centuries, and the nations of Europe entered upon a new career of improvement, the results of which were soon visible in inventions in the arts, discoveries in science, and the most splendid displays of literary genius. This progress in art and science has steadily proceeded throughout all the varied fortunes of states, amidst the rise and fall of dynasties, and the revolutions of kingdoms; and, instead of being hitherto checked, seems to be now going on in an accelerated rate, every new acquisition only increasing the desire, and adding to the facilities of farther conquests.

From the above slight sketch, it will be abundantly evident that all these advances in the moral and intellectual condition of our countrymen, have not proceeded, as Mr Combe supposes, from any "principle of improvement inherent in the race, which time alone evolved and brought to maturity," but that they have been begun, continued, and carried on from one step in their progress to another, by a successive application of *foreign influences*, and of *stimuli*, many of them of the most violent kind, arising in one way or another from external causes. Some nations, which at the time of the Roman invasion of Britain were in a state much resembling our painted ancestors, and which from their situation have been removed from foreign communication, remain in the same state to this day. Others, which at that time had attained a certain state of civilization, such as China and India, have stood still, or become retrograde, all the time that we have been making the advances that have been described. Now, as Mr Combe says, nature is constant; and if human nature, as he supposes, was

originally constituted on the principle of gradual improvement, that improvement would, in the course of so many ages, have been visible in every nation, and every country in the world. How, then, upon his principle, has improvement taken place only in one quarter of the globe, and its colonies, while all the rest remains at this day immersed in the grossest darkness?

Mr Combe, in several parts of his work, laments the prevalence of war and conquest, and regards the past history of the nations of Europe, and of our own in particular, as one series of folly and blundering, considering, as he seems to do, that matters would have been greatly improved, had every nation continued to live quietly within its own territories. If, however, we look to the condition of those nations who have remained undisturbed by extensive wars and foreign conquest, we must be convinced that these views are more plausible than sound; and looking to the effect of these circumstances among ourselves, it appears on the whole to be a more reasonable conclusion, that all the wars—all the invasions—all the conquests to which this island has been subjected—all the excitements of foreign expeditions, either for the sake of gain, or of military glory—all the revolutions that have happened to us, either by changes of dynasty, or the contending of adverse factions—all the discussions between rival sects in religion, in philosophy, and in political science—all the alternations between seasons of national prosperity and adversity—all the times of our affliction, and all the times of our wealth,—have just been so many *stimuli* applied to the national mind, and calculated, by the sure operation of cause and effect, to draw forth the energies, and develop the resources of the national character. These circumstances, which Mr Combe laments, and considers so many calamities, seem, on the contrary, to have been undoubtedly among the causes of our improvement.

It may, perhaps, be objected, that all the circumstances above mentioned, which have contributed to the civilization of Britain, with the sole exception of Christianity, are mere *natural causes*, and that their effect may be admitted in perfect consistency with Mr Combe's theory. To a certain extent this may be the case; and it will be observed, I have not stated them merely as militating against Mr Combe's theory, but in order to present to the reader a full and complete statement of *all* the causes which have led to our improvement, which, it must be acknowledged, Mr Combe has not done. When Mr Combe shall so far modify his views, as to admit the beneficial effects of war and conquest, colonization and commerce, as steps in the progressive march of human improvement, he will, no doubt, bring his system nearer the truth. But still we come at last to that greatest and most important element, which Mr Combe's system carefully excludes, but which a mature consideration may satisfy us is of more consequence than all the rest put together. All the *natural* causes of improvement have been in operation, with more or less effect, from the beginning of the world, in every country under heaven; and what is the result? Is it not the case, that, with the exception of those countries in which Christianity prevails, all the rest of the world is sunk in greater or less degrees of ignorance, barbarism, and brutality? Is it not the case, that those countries which have embraced Christianity, are not merely immeasurably superior to the rest, but that they are the only ones where any progress, or any moral or intellectual improvement is at present taking place? When Mr Combe is able either to disprove these facts, or to explain them upon his principles, I shall be willing to give his statements and arguments all due weight; but in the mean time, and until he favours us with this demonstration, I must

be contented to believe, that Christianity is the great and the principal cause of that improvement and that civilization with which it is thus found to be universally conjoined.

I have now examined the theory of Mr Combe in both its parts, and I conceive that I have demonstrated, that in both of them he is wrong. I have shewn, from his own statement of the facts relative to the natural world, that it did not originally "contain within itself the elements of improvement, which time evolved and brought to maturity," but that it was formed by successive steps, and that it required several successive interpositions of creative power to render it a fit habitation for the human race; and, *therefore*, analogy leads us to expect that similar interpositions may be required in the moral world also, in order to lead men to the fulfilment of their ultimate destiny.

The researches of geologists prove that no race of animals were ever derived from other species, or came to perfection by slow and gradual progression, but that every race was at once produced full and perfect; and here, also, analogy would teach us that the same would be the case with man.

The researches of naturalists prove, that so far back as observation is capable of being extended, no alteration whatever has taken place in the condition of any of the animal tribes, and that for three thousand years, or upwards, there is not the slightest appearance of any improvement or progression among them: here, again, analogy would lead us to conclude that the same has been the case with man.

Again, in resorting to the history of the human race, as far as authentic history reaches, we see no proofs of this alleged principle of progression, or that the race

“contained the elements of improvement within itself.” On the contrary, we find that in the remotest ages man had executed works greater and more astonishing than any which have been produced since; from which we conclude, that the people who executed them must have possessed a knowledge, an energy, a perseverance, and capacities of various kinds, superior to those of any modern nation; that the very people who produced these works, instead of being able to carry on the career of improvement, were not able to sustain it, but sunk by a gradual progress downwards to utter decay; that the same has been the case with every one of the great empires that succeeded them, all of which, after a short-lived prosperity, fell successively into vice, corruption, and ruin: so that, to this extent, the progress of the human race has not been upwards but downwards, and instead of advancing has been retrograde.

We have seen, farther, that all the arts and sciences, and all improvement in civilization, have originally emanated from these primitive nations, and have since been communicated from one state to another, in one unbroken series, down to our remote and distant land and generation.

We have seen, that whenever a people became sunk in ignorance and barbarism, they have never again raised themselves by their own exertions to a state of civilization; and that the inhabitants of this island have only been brought into their present condition by a successive mixture with other races, and a series of the most extraordinary stimuli coming to us from without.

These are the undoubted facts, and I submit that they completely disprove the notion that the human race is so constituted as to contain within itself the elements of improvement, which time alone will evolve and bring to maturity.

CHAPTER II.

MR COMBE'S OPPOSITION TO THE DOCTRINE OF DIVINES, RESPECTING THE ORIGINAL PERFECTION, AND SUBSEQUENT DEGENERACY OF THE HUMAN RACE.

I NOW turn to the other supposition, which Mr Combe speaks of as an *hypothesis* hardly worth notice in this enlightened age, namely, "that the world was perfect at first, but fell into derangement, continues in disorder, and does not contain within itself the elements of its own rectification."

Mr Combe states this view as an hypothesis; it is stated in the book of Genesis as a fact.

This book is not a mere historical record, giving an account of events on the credit of human testimony, but is offered to us as written under the immediate inspiration of God, and the proofs of its being so are numerous and conclusive.

As nothing can proceed from the Divine Being but what is true, we can have no hesitation in admitting, that if any doctrine or opinion which may be *supposed* to be contained in the Sacred Writings, or which may have been deduced from any statement therein contained, is found to be contrary to *undoubted facts*, or can be proved on plain and undeniable deductions of reason *to be false*, we must adopt the conclusion, that the doctrine or opinion in question is not really contained in the Scriptures, and that our impression that it did contain such a statement

has arisen from mistake. It is undoubted that all truths must be in harmony with each other, and that philosophical truth can never be at variance with religious truth. But then the question occurs which was asked by Pilate, "*What is truth?*" and as the reasonings of philosophers are not in all cases infallible, it is incumbent upon them, no less than upon divines, in cases where there is an apparent discrepancy, to be most careful in revising their arguments, and the facts upon which these are founded, and to adopt nothing until it is proved *beyond the possibility of mistake*.

In reference to the present subject, there can be no doubt that this ancient document does expressly state, in terms which seem to admit of no dubiety, that the world we now occupy, and all that it contains, and particularly man, its last and most exalted inhabitant, were created at first in a state of high perfection. The creation of man is introduced with peculiar emphasis and solemnity. "And God said, Let us make man after our own image, and in our own likeness; and let him have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth."

The two synonymous expressions, "*after our own image,*" and "*in our own likeness,*" seem to be used on purpose to prevent the possibility of mistake in a point of such importance. This is frequently the case throughout the sacred writings, where the meaning to be expressed is not trusted to a single word or phrase, which might possibly be corrupted or misunderstood; but another is frequently added, to confirm and illustrate it. Both the terms are again repeated, and the form of expression varied, as if to enforce, with peculiar solemnity, the important truth intended to be conveyed.

"So God created man in *his own image*; in the

image of God created he him; male and female created he them."

And again, in the fifth chapter. "In the day that God created man, in the *likeness of God* made he him; male and female created he them; and he blessed them," &c.

It had been specially declared, in regard to every previous act of creation, and with regard to every creature that was made, animate and inanimate, that "*God saw that it was good*;" but after the creation of man, the last and highest production of his power, as if he had now put the crowning work on his vast undertaking, in a manner that imparted a superior lustre to the whole, it is emphatically said, "And God saw every thing that he had made, *and behold it was VERY GOOD.*"

Such are the simple, but solemn and most expressive terms in which the creation of man is related in Genesis, and it would seem impossible for language to convey more clearly and unequivocally information of the fact, that man was originally created with all his powers and capacities, in a state of the very highest perfection.

But this, we have seen, does not satisfy Mr Combe. He has a particular dislike to the doctrine of *the Fall*, and the consequent corruption and depravity of human nature; and to get rid of this, to him, obnoxious doctrine, he directs all his ingenuity. With this view, he has adopted a theory, according to which man (contrary to the analogy of every other being in the world) not only now is, but has been from the beginning, in a state of slow and gradual improvement, "being constituted on the principle of a progressive system, as the acorn in reference to the oak." By this theory, man must have at first started from *zero*, with all his faculties and powers in the very lowest state of development.

This is a necessary consequence from his theory; but

although he rather avoids making the revolting statement in express terms, yet he knows it is a consequence from which he cannot escape, and he almost intimates as much in one or two passages. He says, "When man appeared, he received from his Creator an organized structure and animal instincts, &c. But to the animal nature of man have been added, by a bountiful Creator, moral sentiments and reflecting faculties," &c. After adverting to the higher nature of these, he adds, "But *this peculiarity attends them*, that while his animal faculties act powerfully of themselves, his rational faculties require to be cultivated, exercised, and instructed, before they will yield their full harvest of enjoyment."* According to this, then, when man was first created, he could only manifest the instincts of the animal part of his nature, as these alone were formed to act spontaneously; his higher powers could not then be manifested, as they could not act until they were *cultivated, exercised, and instructed*.

He then goes on to state, that "man thus apparently took his station *among*, yet at the head of the beings that inhabited the earth at his creation." Is this meant to intimate, that, at his first introduction into the world, man was only a superior kind of an oran-outang, or like the Yahoo described by Gulliver, in the voyage to Houyhnhnms, — having, to be sure, the seeds and rudiments of certain moral and intellectual qualities, which time was to evolve and bring to maturity; but being, in the mean time, little superior to the other animals among whom he is said to have taken his place? — *Quer.* Does Mr Combe adopt the opinion of Lord

* This assumption is entirely gratuitous, and unsupported by facts. Where the rational faculties are naturally and originally strong, they act no less spontaneously and powerfully of themselves than those which Mr Combe calls the animal faculties, and require as little assistance from education. There is no distinction, in this respect, between the two sets of faculties.

Monboddo, that men were originally furnished with tails?

According to Mr Combe's view, even the lowest savage existing on the shores of New Holland, must be a highly improved being, greatly superior in his moral and intellectual capacities to the original inhabitants of the globe. The principle of progression, if it be good for any thing, must be good to this extent. If we adopt it at all, it is impossible to escape from the conclusion, that man must have started with his faculties at the lowest possible point. We must carry our calculations backwards, not merely for a few hundred years, but to the beginning of time; and if we do so, there is no possibility of stopping short of this point. Nature is constant, and if the inhabitant of ancient or modern Europe, of Greece, Italy, or Britain, has been constituted as part of a progressive system, so must also the native of New Holland, of Nootka Sound, the Carrib, or the Hottentot.

In this way, to be sure, Mr Combe gets rid of the doctrine of the Fall: for if man commenced his career from the lowest level, he could not by possibility fall lower. We have, therefore, only to consider whether the theory is true: we have to choose between the direct positive statement of Moses, and this hypothesis, for it is no more, of Mr Combe.

Now, setting aside for the present altogether the divine authority of Scripture, and putting both views on the equal footing of a statement that is to be supported by proof, which of the views, I would ask, is most in accordance with the evidence before us,—the simple statement of the Bible, that man was at first created with all his powers and faculties, social, moral, and intellectual, in their highest and most perfect state, (for what less can we understand by the expression, that

he was created in the image and in the likeness of that great Being who is all perfection?) or the supposition that he was, at the first, the same weak, wavering, and imperfect being that he is now; or rather, much more weak, and much more imperfect, but containing within himself the elements of improvement, which it was left to time to evolve and bring to maturity? Which of these is most in accordance with the analogy of nature, the facts of authentic history, and all the evidence we have been able to collect of the past and present condition of the human race? Most assuredly the former. All the productions, either of the vegetable or animal world now existing upon the earth, or which we have any evidence for believing to have existed at any former period; appear to have received, at the first moment of their existence, from the hands of the Creator, the full and complete *definite constitution* assigned to them, in all its perfection; and, as far as we are able to trace, they existed in the remotest ages, in as perfect a condition as they do at present. Not an atom of evidence can be produced, to shew that there has been any progressive improvement in any one of them. We have, therefore, the analogy of *all nature* for concluding that man also, at the period of his creation, received his definite constitution at once, in all its fulness, and in all its perfection.

The earliest accounts we receive of the human race, lead to the inevitable conclusion, that in the first ages of the world man possessed all the powers of body and mind, in at least as great, or more probably in greater, perfection than he does at present; and the most ancient relics of human genius, as well as the most ancient indications of cerebral development, confirm this conclusion in its fullest extent.

If, then, in the present case, we are to be guided by

the ordinary rules of evidence, we can only come to one conclusion, namely, that the statement in Genesis, having all analogy, and all the evidence of fact in its favour, must be held as *proved to be true*; and, *e contra*, that the theory of Mr Combe, having all the presumptions of analogy, and all the evidence of fact against it, must be held as *demonstrated to be false*.

Holding it then as *proved*, that man, like the other works of the Almighty Creator, was made, at the first, with all his powers and capacities perfect, is the second part of the statement true, or is it not, that the world, thus created perfect, “fell into derangement?” And here, I think, we shall not have occasion to go into any long argument, for if we assume *original perfection*, the doctrine of *a fall* from that state of perfection, by whatever means produced, follows as a necessary consequence, all parties being agreed that at present the human race is very far from being in a state of perfection. Mr Combe himself, upon this point, admits all that is any where contended for; for what is the whole aim and object of his book, but to shew that the world, and every thing in it relating to man, his faculties, his moral feelings, and his relations to external objects, is now in disorder, and has always been so? “Man,” he states, “ignorant and uncivilized, is a ferocious, sensual, and superstitious savage.” Have any of the divines spoken of by Mr Combe, who in their total ignorance of the elementary qualities of human nature, and of the relations between us and external objects, “condemned the natural world,” ever made any assertion stronger than this, with regard to the depth of that degeneracy and degradation to which man has been reduced from his primeval state? The disorder both of the mental faculties, and of the relations of men with their Creator, with their brethren of the human race,

and with other objects, is too obvious to admit of dispute. I shall afterwards examine more particularly wherein that disorder consists, (a point on which Mr Combe seems to entertain views that are extremely imperfect and erroneous,) but I may hold the general fact as undoubted. It is admitted by Mr Combe, as well as by divines. The only remaining questions are, How has this admitted disorder been caused, and how is it to be remedied?

I may here take notice of a passage which occurs almost at the outset of Mr Combe's introductory chapter. "The sceptic has advanced arguments against religion, and CRAFTY DECEIVERS have in all ages *founded systems of superstition on the disorder and inconsistency which are too readily admitted to be inseparable attributes of human existence on earth.*"

Who are the *crafty deceivers* here meant? I am unwilling to admit the supposition, that it was intended by Mr Combe to include under this description our Lord and his disciples, whose system is expressly founded on the "disorder and inconsistency" which is throughout all Scripture asserted to be "an inseparable attribute of human existence on earth;" but if this was not his intention, he has not sufficiently guarded himself against misconstruction. He is certainly bound to explain what was his meaning.

Mr Combe will doubtless ask, How do we, who maintain the original high perfection of man, account, upon our principles, for the introduction of evil and disorder into the world? As to the mode of its introduction, we can only refer to Genesis; but as to its *cause*, I answer, we do not attempt to account for it at all. We have no data furnished to our understandings, upon which any philosophical, rational, or even intelligible account can be given of this phenomenon. We have

sufficient data to lead us to the conclusion, and even to what may be considered demonstration of the fact, that man was originally created perfect—we have but too abundant *data* around us, and within us, to prove that he has degenerated from that perfection; but how this degeneracy was caused, what was its origin, or what is to be its issue, are subjects upon which we have not even a glimmering of natural light to direct us, nor an atom of evidence upon which we can repose the smallest confidence. And can we wonder that this is the case, seeing that our faculties merely *make us acquainted with certain facts and their relations, but are not fitted to give us information either of the intimate nature of any one object, or of the real and efficient cause of any one event or phenomenon in the universe.* We know by observation some of the external qualities of objects, but of their real nature and internal structure we know nothing. We do not know our own nature, still less the nature of God; and what other beings or principles may exist in the vast extended universe around us, we may conjecture, but we never can possibly know. We know not the cause nor the manner of the production of a single green leaf: what presumption, then, to suppose that we are capable of comprehending or developing the plan of the universe!

We hold, then, this question respecting the *origin of evil*, as one of those inscrutable mysteries into which the reason of man attempts to penetrate in vain. We consider that it lies on the other side of that boundary which separates the known from the unknown, the knowable from the unknowable; and we are contented to take the account of what is related, or rather obscurely indicated respecting it in the sacred writings, as containing all that is necessary for us to know, and all that it is possible for us to learn on the subject. We are satisfied to take

the facts there stated or indicated, as facts, without presuming to scan them too narrowly with the imperfect lights of human reason, or, more properly speaking, to mix them up with the vain and unprofitable speculations of human folly. This is the correct, and the only philosophical mode of treating a subject like this, where no data exist accessible to us, for enabling us to form a safe and certain judgment. This is following the rule so wisely laid down by Lord Bacon, and “giving unto faith that which unto faith belongeth.”

Adhering to this path, the only one that in such a case can be trodden with safety, the teachers and expounders of our holy religion have carefully examined the sacred volume, and there they find, or think they find it stated, that God at first made man perfect and upright—made him “but a little lower than the angels, and crowned him with glory and honour;” but that man in honour abode not—that he rebelled against God, and disobeyed him in the only point on which he was laid under any restraint—that he was consequently expelled from Paradise—cut off from that intercourse with God which he had originally enjoyed, and sent forth into the world with the command to people and to subdue it, and the doom (in which justice is so admirably tempered with mercy) that from thenceforth he should eat his bread in the sweat of his brow. We read farther, that man, being thus left in a great measure to his own devices, soon fell into all sorts of irregularities and crimes; that the first-born of our first parents was a murderer; and that wickedness multiplied so rapidly, that the earth was filled with violence, and that the thoughts of men’s minds was only evil continually; so that at last God determined to destroy the world by a flood, only interposing to save one family who had preserved in some degree the knowledge and the worship of his name.

We farther learn, that soon after this catastrophe, when men began again to multiply on the earth, they were induced, by causes which we need not here investigate, but some of which will be sufficiently obvious, to disperse themselves into different countries, to the east and to the west, and several great kingdoms soon arose, as we have seen, to the utmost height of prosperity and splendour. From this period the stream of sacred history begins to be mingled with that of the profane, and some account, more or less distinct, has been preserved of almost all the most remarkable tribes who have since inhabited the different regions of the globe.

We may here remark, that although we nowhere find among other nations the same full and distinct narrative of these events as is contained in the writings of the great lawgiver of the Jews, yet the scanty traditions, and meagre fragments of history preserved by other nations, are, as far as they go, quite in accordance with that narrative. We have found traces of the tradition of a deluge in Assyria, in Greece, in India, in China, and even, it is said, in America. The most ancient nations, and those who have preserved any thing like authentic records of their origin, universally concur in attributing that origin to a period within that which Moses has assigned to the great catastrophe, in no case much exceeding four thousand years before the present day. This coincidence, as observed by Baron Cuvier, is far too remarkable to have occurred by chance, between nations so far separated by distance, and so dissimilar in laws, religion, manners, and language; and there is no rational way of accounting for it, except that it is founded in truth.

We may also take the opportunity of remarking, that on this point of the recent introduction of man into the world, at least as an inhabitant of the countries which

he now occupies, history is entirely in harmony with the evidence arising from geological research. On whatever other points geologists may differ, in this they are agreed, that no human remains have been found in even the most recent stratified depositions.*

All those nations which we find established soon after the period of the Flood, (with the exception of one which, for our present purpose, may be left out of view,) had not merely, like our first parents after the Fall, lost communion with God, but soon even lost all knowledge of his name, his person, and character. Although they had before them the attributes of that character visibly manifested to them in the works which he had made, so that, as St Paul says, they "were without excuse," such was the perverseness and depravity of the human heart, that they wilfully shut their eyes to the light which was

* Lyell, the latest authority on this subject, concurs in this respect with Cuvier, and all former geologists. He says, "I need not dwell on the proofs of the low antiquity of our species, for it is not controverted by any experienced geologist: indeed, the real difficulty consists in tracing back the signs of man's existence on the earth, to that comparatively modern period, when species, now his contemporaries, began to predominate. If there be a difference of opinion respecting the occurrence in certain deposits of the remains of man and his works, it is always in reference to strata confessedly of the most modern order; and it is never pretended that our race co-existed with assemblages of animals and plants, of which all, or even a great part of the species are extinct. From the concurrent testimony of history and tradition, we learn that parts of Europe, now the most fertile and most completely subjected to the dominion of man, were, less than three thousand years ago, covered with forests, and the abode of wild beasts. The archives of nature are in perfect accordance with historical records; and when we lay open the most superficial covering of peat, we sometimes find therein the canoes of the savage, together with huge antlers of the wild stag, or horns of the wild bull. In caves now open to the day in various parts of Europe, the bones of large beasts of prey occur in abundance; and they indicate, that at periods comparatively modern in the history of the globe, the ascendancy of man, if he existed at all, had scarcely been felt by the brutes."

thus vouchsafed to them. As, however, the instinctive principles of the nature within them imperatively demanded an object of worship, in place of continuing to adore one God, the creator of heaven and earth, they transferred the worship properly due to him to the persons of kings and conquerors—to inanimate objects, such as the sun and moon—to animals, and even to stocks and stones, the workmanship of their own hands. They personified and deified the passions, and even the lowest vices of human nature. War, drunkenness, and debauchery, and even theft,* had each its tutelary god, and the mode of worship was made to correspond to the supposed attributes of the deity. In such circumstances, the morality of these ancient nations soon became equally depraved as their faith; and we may conceive what was the ordinary standard of conduct among the laity, when we find crimes of every shade and die perpetrated under the name of religion, and under the sanction of their priests. It is remarkable, too, that all this took place, not merely among the ignorant and barbarous tribes, many of whom remained comparatively free from such enormities, but that the abominations I speak of were carried to the greatest height by those nations which attained to the highest point of intelligence and refinement. It was not among the barbarous hordes of Scythia and Bactria, that the wickedness of a demoralizing idolatry was carried to its greatest excess, but among the comparatively civilized and cultivated nations of Babylonia and Egypt, of Greece and Rome.

To this cause, undoubtedly, it is to be attributed that all these nations, after a short-lived period of prosperity, began to decline, and continued to sink, from one

* Mars, Bacchus, Venus, and Mercury.

degree of degeneracy to another, till they fell into utter ruin. Thus, from the first rise of the earliest of these great monarchies, down to the period of the Christian era, so far from mankind shewing any symptoms of progressive improvement, the symptoms, it is melancholy to observe, were almost entirely the other way. The seasons of virtue and prosperity were as transitory and fleeting as they were brilliant; while the decline, in every case, was lingering, gradual, and hopeless, but constantly progressive, like the slow working of a fever after a period of unnatural excitement. No doubt, at the period when Christ appeared, the last of these empires, the Roman, had attained apparently to its utmost extent and splendour, but it was internally rotten to the core; the spirit which had reared it was dead; the elements of its destruction were actively at work, and it already tottered to its fall; and though that fall was protracted, and its ultimate and final extinction delayed for the marvellous period of fourteen hundred years, its doom was not the less certain, and so far as the destinies of mankind were concerned, may even be said to have actually taken place.

Thus all the information derived from human testimony, and from the history of past ages, seems to coincide with the intimations of Scripture, that, during this long period, the human race was gradually deteriorating. It may be objected, that this is inconsistent with what we have observed as to the greatness and civilization of those ancient monarchies whose monuments we have particularized. It may be said, that before these great monarchies could fall into decay, they must first have risen to greatness; and that this implies in each a period, longer or shorter, of some kind of progressive improvement. To this, I answer, first, that there is no proof that the original founders and fathers

of these great states ever were sunk in barbarism. The greatest of them, and those who seem to have possessed the arts and sciences in the highest perfection, are those which appear to have separated the earliest from the original stock,—the immediate descendants of the primeval race, from whom, of course, they must have derived a great part of their knowledge. But, secondly, although the natural stimulus given to the faculties, by the excitement of colonization and conquest, and the acquisition and cultivation of new and fertile territories, must have, for a time, operated powerfully in calling forth the energies of a people, sharpening and improving their intellects, and bringing all their powers into the most favourable modes of action; and though it be true, that in this way improvement did take place, to a *certain extent*, and during a *limited period*, yet the fact undoubtedly is—and the history of these nations proves it to have been so—that this course of improvement was never permanent, but that, as soon as they had attained to their greatest elevation, and when the stimuli of conquest and acquisition was withdrawn, they all of them, without exception, began to decline, and continued to do so down to the period of their final ruin. That this is a true statement of the progress of the four great monarchies, the most refined and civilized part of mankind, is, I think, sufficiently obvious; but with regard to the rest of the human race, the case is so plain as to be beyond the possibility of contradiction. The nations who immediately touched upon the primeval seat of population, carried with them at their first removal, or acquired at intervals, some portion of the arts and knowledge belonging to the original stock; but those who pushed their adventurous excursions farther into the wildernesses around them, the outposts and videttes of society, the *squatters* and *backwoodsmen* of the ancient world, from

the necessities of their situation, the constant warfare in which they were engaged with the beasts of the forest, and the want of communication with the countries they had left, soon lost all traces of civilization, and sunk, in the course of generations, into the savage state. This is not a fanciful picture, but results naturally and necessarily from the circumstances of the race, and is confirmed by all that we know of their past and present condition.

CHAPTER III.

THE REMEDY FOR EXISTING EVILS.

HAVING thus deduced, both from reason and revelation, the doctrine that man was made perfect, and having abundant evidence of his declension from that state, we now come to the only remaining question, What is the remedy for this declension, and how is the race to be raised again to its original perfection?

In reference to this, Mr Combe has stated the practical views to which the two opposite systems already alluded to naturally lead, and stated them quite correctly. "If," he observes, "the former view be sound," namely, that the world is progressive, and contains within itself the elements of improvement, which time will evolve and bring to maturity, "the first object of man, as an intelligent being in quest of happiness, must be to study the elements of external nature and their capabilities, the elementary qualities of his own nature and their applications, and the relationship between them. His second

object will be to discover and carry into effect the conditions, physical, moral, and intellectual, which, in virtue of this constitution, require to be realized before the fullest enjoyment of which he is capable can be obtained."

These are precisely the objects and mode of investigation proposed to themselves by the heathen philosophers in their inquiries respecting the *supreme good*, and these are the proper objects for those who have not been favoured with a revelation.

"According to the second view of creation,"—the original perfection and subsequent fall of man, and his own want of power to regain his original state,—"no good," he says, "can be expected from the evolution of nature's elements, these being all essentially disordered, and human improvement must be derived chiefly from spiritual influences. In short, according to it, science, philosophy, and all arrangements of the physical, moral, and intellectual elements of nature, are subordinate in their effects on human happiness on earth, to religious faith."

Mr Combe has here stated correctly the doctrine of divines on this subject, drawn from the express declarations of Scripture.*

* I have been accused of admitting too easily the account here given by Mr Combe of the doctrine of divines in regard to the comparative value of philosophical and religious knowledge; and it has been alleged that he has given an exaggerated and incorrect statement of that doctrine. I am not aware that he has done so, keeping it in view that it is the *comparative* importance of these two kinds of knowledge that is here spoken of. No one will be so foolish as to suppose, that it is ever maintained by divines, or intended to be intimated in Scripture, that the cultivation of natural science is of no use. All that I understand them to maintain, and all that I conceive to be conveyed in the texts here quoted, is this, that the speculations of philosophy, and all arrangements of the physical, moral, and intellectual elements of man's nature which can be effected by means of science, are *comparatively worthless* as means of promoting the improvement and happiness of the human race, either in reference to the present or a

The relative value of natural science and religious faith is aptly set forth in the following precepts:—

“Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat, or what you shall drink, nor yet for your body, what ye shall put on. Is not the life more than meat, or the body than raiment?”

“Behold the fowls of the air, they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns; yet your heavenly Father feedeth them.”

“Which of you by taking thought can add one cubit to his stature?”

“Therefore take no thought, saying, What shall we eat, or what shall we drink, or wherewithal shall we be clothed; (*for after all these things do the Gentiles seek*;) for your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of these things.”

“But seek ye *first* the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you.”

The effect of *human science*, as tending, in many cases, to render the heart dead to spiritual influences, is indicated in the following passage,—“I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou hast hid *these things* (the doctrines of the Gospel) from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes. Even so, Father, for so it seemeth good in thy sight.”

The comparative futility and emptiness of all human pursuits, which are followed after with so much care and trouble, when contrasted with the value of spiritual influences, is expressively pointed out in the following

future life; in other words, that they are, and ever must be, *subordinate* in their effects upon man's improvement and happiness, to an enlightened religious faith. I wish this to be distinctly kept in view by the reader in perusing what follows, and then no one will be in danger of misapprehending my meaning.

admonition,—“Thou art careful and troubled about many things; but one thing is needful.”

Of a surety Mr Combe would have us to be careful and troubled about *many things*. But to return.

Mr Combe having thus stated the practical results of his system, and that of the heathen philosophers on the one hand, and the doctrine of the Christian divines on the other, and having put the matter upon a fair footing, by stating them as severally dependant on their respective premises, the question may be considered as decided, for we think we have sufficiently proved, in the former part of this section, that the system proposed by Mr Combe, as to the origin and progress of the human race, is utterly false and untenable, and that the doctrines of the divines on the same subject, are not only conformable to Scripture, but are supported by every species of evidence which it is possible to bring to bear on such a subject.

Will Mr Combe, then, abide by the terms he has proposed? His theory of a progressive system being proved to be false, will he abandon his conclusions as to what is the “chief end of man?” And the doctrines of the original perfection, and fall of man being proved, will he embrace the doctrine of divines as to the efficacy of spiritual influences? Or are these things, indeed, hidden from the wise and prudent, and only revealed to babes?

So standing the question, I think I may safely pass over all that Mr Combe has said, as to the neglect, by our divines, of the aids of human speculation, and human philosophy; their “ignorance of the elementary qualities of human nature, and of the influence of organization on the mental powers.” I may safely pass over all that he has said as to “the *first great error*, the theological doctrine of the corruption and disorder of

human nature," the actual and literal truth of which is demonstrated as clearly as any proposition in Euclid. And leaving all these points, I shall return again to the old almanac, and shew, by reference to undoubted facts, what Christianity *has done* during the short, the very short period that its doctrines have been extensively taught in any tolerable purity.

There can be no doubt, that at its first promulgation by the Apostles, the doctrines of the Gospel spread with a rapidity that is without any example, such as is not to be accounted for but by its adaptation to the spiritual wants of the human mind, and the miraculous gifts bestowed upon its first teachers, as evidences of the truth of their mission. Its effects, also, on those who embraced it, were at this period undoubtedly great. Indeed, it can hardly be conceived by us, to whom its doctrines are familiar from our youth, what was likely to be the effect of them when advanced as something new—when the events connected with them had just recently taken place, and when those were proclaimed by men endowed with miraculous powers, who were eye-witnesses of the facts to which they bore their testimony. Long before the conclusion of the first century, we are informed, that notwithstanding of the contempt of the philosophers, and the persecution of the priests and emperors, Christianity had extended its roots far and wide throughout the mighty bounds of the Roman empire. Not only were churches erected in Asia and in Greece, and the doctrine preached elsewhere, through the provinces, from Ethiopia and India to distant Britain, but we are told there were Christians to be found among every class of society in Rome itself; and at the time when persecution was raging against Christians with the utmost fury, there were

Christians on the bench, and in the senate, and even among the officers in the imperial palace.

Its effect upon those who cordially embraced it is said, even on the authority of its enemies, to have been great; but its progress was stopped before it could produce an extensive reformation upon the *masses* of society, partly by the gross corruption of manners and of morals that pervaded every corner of the empire, from Rome itself, that *colluvies gentium*, where every species of wickedness was carried to its extreme, to the distant and semibarbarous provinces—partly to the terrible persecutions to which from time to time Christians were exposed—but partly and chiefly to the corruption of Christianity itself, by its being mixed up, in order to accommodate it to the taste of the people and their rulers, with the superstitions of Paganism, and the vain speculations of what was then called philosophy.

Thus, before Christianity was originally introduced into the Roman empire, the Roman world was thoroughly corrupted; and before it was adopted as the religion of the state, it was in some degree corrupted itself, though not so entirely as it was in after ages under the influence, and by the inventions, of the Roman hierarchy. From this time, therefore, till the period of the Reformation, although there was perhaps no period when the pure doctrines of Christianity were altogether extinguished, and though these were always kept alive in some corner or other of the Church, yet, so far as regarded the world at large, or even that part of it where Christianity nominally prevailed, its light shone with a very faint and imperfect lustre. But the sun was in the heavens, though its full radiance was intercepted by clouds and vapours. Christianity, though corrupted, was Christianity still; and it was impossible that it could be so disguised and altered, but that some

fragment of the true faith, some remnant of a pure morality, should not remain, and make a due impression on its votaries. The leaven was hid in the meal, and though still far from having thoroughly impregnated the mass, yet many of its particles were so impregnated.

So stood matters till the sixteenth century, when the simultaneous occurrence of these two great events—the Reformation, and the invention of printing—opened a new era in the history of mankind. It is from this period, undoubtedly, that we are to date the effectual promulgation of Gospel truth throughout any considerable portion of Europe; and accordingly, we are to judge of its effects solely, or chiefly, by what it has accomplished since that period. Taking the above explanation along with us, as to the comparatively short period of its full operation, I shall proceed to mention what it has done, and what changes have taken place in the manners of society, that may fairly be attributed to its influence.

1. I may mention the almost total extinction of certain crimes, which were very general at least, if not universal, in the heathen world; and the considerable mitigation of others, which, it must be confessed, still prevail in too great a degree. The gross licentiousness and unnatural practices prevalent among the Romans at a time when the empire was in its most palmy state, are sufficiently notorious. It is only necessary to refer to their own writers, Tacitus, Suetonius, Juvenal, Petronius Arbiter, and even the elegant Virgil, to shew that certain crimes were then practised openly, and without shame, which, as St Paul says, are not so much as to be *named* among Christians.

2. It has raised the character and improved the condition of the female sex, 1st, By abolishing polygamy; 2d, By prohibiting divorce, except in the case of conjugal

infidelity. Females were, in heathen times, universally treated as an inferior part of the race, and subjected completely to the will, and even the caprice and tyranny of the male sex. By the universal law of Christian states, the rights of the sexes are now placed as nearly as possible on a footing of equality. The status of females being thus improved, their character has improved along with it. Being now treated with respect, they have been taught to respect themselves, and the consequences have been most beneficial to society. Their opinions are listened to—their approbation coveted—their taste consulted—their comfort sedulously cared for—and their influence in all the arrangements of society little, if at all, inferior to that of the other sex. To this influence is owing much of the good order, decency, and propriety of private life, in which, it will not be denied, the ancients were decidedly inferior to the moderns. And it must not be forgotten, that if Christianity has been the means of raising the condition and improving the character of the female sex, their influence has, on the other hand, been very decidedly favourable to Christianity. The female mind is more generally open to religious impressions than the male—more readily accepts, and more eagerly embraces the aids of spiritual influences; and when we consider the effect this must have on the other sex, and, above all, on the tender minds of the youth of both sexes, who, during the earlier part of their lives, are intrusted almost entirely to the care of their mothers, it is easy to see how powerful an instrument this must be for the amelioration of society.

3. Christianity has been the means of abolishing slavery. It is well known that slavery, and the purchase and sale of captives, existed universally in the ancient world; and although there is no express declaration in Scripture making it unlawful, yet it is obvious that the

whole tendency and spirit of Christian feelings and principles is against the practice. There is no system that so powerfully and effectually teaches the original equality of all mankind, as that which inculcates the infinite value of the human soul, and the obligation upon all to love their brethren (without exception) as themselves. Hence it has arisen, that for many centuries slavery has been abolished in all the European Christian states; and so utterly repugnant is it considered to the genius and spirit of our own constitution, that it has been long since declared by our law authorities, that the moment a slave touches British ground he is free. This of itself might be regarded as a victory of no small value over the selfish prejudices and inveterate customs of antiquity; but another victory—nobler still, because more hardly won—has been achieved by the same principles in our own day. Although British laws did not permit slavery in our own soil, a supposed necessity, countenanced by the example of other nations, continued to sanction it in our colonies. The history of the rise and progress of West India slavery, and of the slave trade, need not here be detailed, as they are known to all; and equally well known were the eager, strenuous, and long-continued attempts to put an end to the cruel and nefarious traffic in “the bodies and the souls of men.” These attempts were at last crowned with success; and no sooner was this point achieved, but an equally strenuous series of efforts began, first to ameliorate the condition of the slave, and finally to abolish slavery altogether. This question took a strong hold of the public mind, in so much, that latterly it became only a question of time, all being agreed on the propriety of abolishing slavery so soon as it could be done without detriment to the slave. The question was at last decided; and whether the proper time has been chosen or not, all are satisfied, that on principle it has

been decided rightly; and Mr Combe himself admits, that no parallel instance can be produced of so noble a sacrifice being made by any nation at the shrine of humanity and justice. But to what, I ask, has been owing the merit of the sacrifice—the glory of the victory? Is it to the peculiar doctrines of any sect of philosophers—the speculations of political economists—or the far-searching views of practical legislators? Does mankind owe the abolition of slavery to Phrenology? Not to any of all these, but to the pure and salutary influence of Christianity alone, are these effects to be ascribed. They are a practical application of the simple and sublime maxim, to “do to others as we would have others do to us.” Every one knows that these questions were first stirred by a small and originally uninfluential body of Christians, considered by many to be visionaries and fanatics, and designated, not in token of respect, but of derision, as “the saints.” But in this case, as in many others, it has been shewn that God has chosen the weak things of the world to confound the strong, and the foolish things of the world to confound the wise. It was neither by superior talent or eloquence, nor the support of eminent station or political power, that the cause of the abolition prospered. The contest was begun, continued, and persevered in, sometimes even against hope, by a steady adherence to Christian principle, which, addressing itself to the higher feelings and sentiments of the public, at last brought the question to a successful termination. In what country, not Christian, has such a victory been achieved, and by such means?

4. Christianity has improved the condition of the people generally, by the institution of the Sabbath. The full value of such an institution can hardly be understood by those who are exempted by their situation from the constant pressure of daily labour. The rich and idle, or

those who are only busied in the pursuit of pleasure, can have no conception of the relief which the Sabbath affords to the poor man, who has been engaged in some laborious occupation during the previous six days. To him, a mere respite from toil is not ease merely, but positive enjoyment. It is like a release from the dull restraint of the school to the schoolboy, like the opening of the prison door to the captive. Mr Combe will not deny that such an institution is suited to the condition and the faculties of man, one law of which is, that the faculties both of mind and body require alternate exercise and rest, and that if too long or too intensely exerted, they lose their tone, and become incapable of duly performing their functions. It may be said, that the same object might be attained, by diminishing the hours of labour in each day; but how could such a regulation be established by law? if established, how could it be enforced? What multiplied rules would be required, and how many exceptions would be necessary to suit every imaginable case! and how easily would such rules be evaded and made of none effect! The institution of the Sabbath, on the other hand, is simple, and its enforcement, as far as necessary, is easy. It is the poor man's privilege, his property. Whatever may occur, that day, at least, is his own, and no taskmaster can, on that day, compel him to take up his burden.

But the good effects of the Sabbath are not limited to the relief of one set of faculties, but extend farther to providing employment for another. It has not been ordained that man should, on that day, be freed from bodily toil, in order that he may spend the time in idleness and dissipation: his higher faculties are called into operation, and an opportunity is afforded him of exercising them, by attending the ordinances of public worship, and listening to the instructions of moral and religious teachers.

5. But the improvement of the condition of the poor, effected by Christianity, does not end here. It has commanded us, — and its commands are, to a great extent, carried into effect, in every country where Christianity is established—to feed the hungry, to clothe the naked, to visit the sick and the prisoner, to hear the cause of the widow and the oppressed. In this country, those injunctions *have* been attended to, and even with some degree of ostentation. Look at the provisions which our laws have made for the support of the poor,—provisions to which no objections have ever been alleged, except that they are too liberal, and that they encourage idleness and improvidence among the lower classes. Look at the magnificent national establishments for the support of those who have fought the battles of their country, and whom age and infirmity have disabled from farther service. Look at our establishments, in every city and district of the kingdom, for the cure of the sick and the diseased, for the succour of the maimed and the wounded among the poor, where the talents and the time of the most eminent professors of the healing art are employed, without fee or reward, in attendance upon those who have no other claims upon them than those of suffering humanity. These things do not strike us, because they are before our eyes every day: we take credit for the feelings which have prompted them, as if they had been the spontaneous suggestions of our own hearts; but we never think of the source from which they have been derived, or rather the cause which has called them into active operation. The fact is, we shall look in vain for such establishments in any but a Christian country. Among the ruins of ancient Rome, we find abundant remains of theatres and amphitheatres, the scenes of the most abominable cruelty—of temples, the abodes of the greatest superstitions—of palaces, of baths, and other appendages of taste and luxury; but we shall search in

vain for the ruins of an hospital, or any building dedicated to the relief of the poor, the suffering, and the destitute.

6. We now come to the case of the prisoner. Prisons have existed in all countries, and all lands have provided for the imprisonment of those whose crimes and irregularities have disturbed the peace and good order of society. It seems, however, to have been generally thought sufficient with regard to such persons, to shut them up, without its being necessary to attend, in any respect, to their comfort; and, accordingly, both in ancient and modern times, dungeons and jails have not been places of confinement merely, but the abodes of squalid wretchedness, of pestilential disease, and of misery in all its forms. Howard was the first in this country to call the public attention to this crying evil, and he has been followed by many others, who have been and who are persevering in their efforts to mitigate the hardships and improve the condition of prisoners. That these have in general been persons naturally of a humane disposition, need not be denied; but for such efforts, daily experience shews, mere benevolent feeling is not sufficient, without the aid of steady Christian principle. Accordingly, it may with safety be predicated, that all who have effectually laboured in this field—the Howards, the Fowell Buxtons, the Frys, and others—have been sincere, pious, and zealous Christians, and so in general have that portion of the public by whom their efforts have been most warmly seconded. Much has been done by their benevolent efforts; and so far have the incidental evils of imprisonment been alleviated, that by some it is now hardly regarded as a punishment; and the difficulty now is, to render the restraint of a prison sufficiently severe, to operate as a check to crime.

7. But it is not in these great national establishments alone that the operation of this improvement is to be seen; but in every direction, wherever good is to be done, or suffering or evil to be allayed, Christian feeling is at hand to prompt and to supply a remedy. Hence our establishments for the reception and cure of the deaf, the blind, and the insane; dispensaries for the supply of medicines and advice to the poor, gratis; societies for visiting the destitute sick, for furnishing clothing to the poor at a cheap and easy rate, for the relief of the aged and indigent, and many others which I need not enumerate. By whom are these establishments and societies maintained, by whom were they originated, and by whose contributions supported? Has it been by the philosophers? No, it has been by humble, quiet, and unpretending Christians.

8. Our establishments for education are all originally to be referred to the same source. It is not matter of doubt, but may be proved by historical documents, that all our establishments of this kind, from the universities down to the parochial schools, owed their origin, either to the efforts of the clergy, or to the gifts and bequests of pious individuals incited by their example, or under the influence of a kindred feeling. The great English seminaries were, in their origin, confessedly monastic, and this is now alleged against them as matter of reproach. The parochial schools of Scotland were established at or soon after the Reformation, by the same men who settled the form and discipline of our Church, and the clergy of the respective presbyteries are still the visitors of these primitive but useful seminaries. By these institutions, secular learning and general information have been diffused over the land, along with moral and religious instruction. Some establishments go farther than this, and in various places large masses of property

have been bequeathed for the pious and charitable purpose of training up the young to usefulness and virtue. The children of poor but respectable parents are received into these institutions, are fed, clothed, and taught for several years, and, after receiving an education better than is attainable by many of a higher class, are apprenticed to trades, and receive a sum of money for the purpose of establishing them in business.

9. With regard to the administration of justice, and the provisions made for dispensing it with an even hand, both to rich and poor, I may refer to one of the earliest Acts of our Scottish Parliaments, which, though enacted in an age comparatively rude, evinces the purest spirit of justice and benevolence, legislative wisdom, and Christian philanthropy. In its expression it is quite perfect, and forms an admirable contrast to the confused, verbose, and cumbersome style of our Acts of Parliament in the present day. After describing the judges before whom causes shall be brought, it proceeds thus:—"To the quhilk judges, all and sindrie, the King shall give strait commandement, alsweil within regalities as out-with, under all paine and charge that may follow, that alsweil to pure as to rich, but fraude or guile, they doe full law and justice. *And gif there be onie pure creature, that for fault of cuning or dispenses, can not or may not follow his causes, the King, for the love of GOD, sall ordain that the judge, before quham the cause suld be determined, purvey and get a leill and a wise advocate to follow sic pure creature's causes.* And gif sic causes be obtained, the wranger sall assyth baith the party skaithed, and the advocate's costs and travale. And gif the judge refuses to do the law evinly as is before said, the party compleinand sall have recourse to the King, quha sall see rigorously punished sic judges, that it sall be exemple till all uthers." Act 2d Parliament of King James I. 1424, c. 24.

The above enactment affords a clear and affecting proof of the influence of Christian principles in an age little removed from barbarism, at a time when it will not be pretended that the feeling it evinces could have been derived from any other source. It has been acted upon ever since, and never more strictly, according to its spirit, than at the present day; and the only inconvenience attending it is, that cases occasionally occur where poor persons, from a litigious or malicious spirit, may be enabled by it to *persecute* those in better circumstances with actions at law, which rest on no solid ground of reason or justice. Even in cases of this description, however, it has been decided, that it is contrary to the spirit of our law to decern for costs against a poor litigant, though he have been never so much in the wrong; it being thought better to submit to this kind of injustice, than to throw obstacles in the way of hearing the cause of the poor, the widow, and the fatherless.

That the means thus employed for promoting the general improvement of the people have not been without effect, may be evident, on considering what was the state of the country and its population a little more than a century since, and what is that condition now.

Fletcher of Salton, writing in the year 1698, ten years after the Revolution, gives the following account of the state of Scotland at that period. "There are at this day, in Scotland, besides a great number of families very meanly provided for by the Church boxes, (who, with living upon bad food, fall into various diseases,) two hundred thousand people begging from door to door. These are not only noways advantageous, but a very grievous burden to so poor a country; and though the number of these be perhaps double to what it was formerly, by reason of the present great distress, yet, in all times, there have been about one hundred thousand

of these vagabonds, who have lived without any regard or submission either to the laws of the land, or even those of God or nature." Then follows a description of crimes too gross to be particularized; and he afterwards proceeds thus:—"No magistrate could ever discover or be informed which way any of these wretches died, or that they were ever baptized. Many murders have been discovered among them, and they are not only a most unspeakable oppression to poor tenants, (who, if they give not bread or some sort of provision to perhaps forty such villains in one day, are sure to be insulted by them,) but they rob many poor people who live in houses distant from any neighbourhood. In years of plenty, many thousands of them meet together in the mountains, where they feast and riot for many days; and at country weddings, markets, burials, and other like public occasions, they are to be seen, both men and women, perpetually drunk, cursing, blaspheming, and fighting together." Such is Fletcher's account, and as at this period the population of Scotland amounted to only one million, so it is plain there must have been about a fifth of the whole living in profligacy or by plunder.

In the year 1717, or nineteen years afterwards, the system of pastoral and parochial instruction having, in the mean time, been in full and active operation, the following statement is given by Daniel Defoe, whose general accuracy is unquestionable. "The people," says he, "are restrained in the ordinary practice of common immoralities, such as swearing, drunkenness, slander, licentiousness, and the like; as to theft, murder, and other capital crimes, they come under the cognizance of the civil magistrate as in other countries; but in those things which the Church has power to punish, the people being constantly and impartially prosecuted, that is,

subjected to the discipline of the Church, they are thereby the more restrained, kept sober and under government, and you pass through twenty towns in Scotland, without seeing any broil, or hearing any oath sworn in the streets." It will be admitted that the same general good order, decency, and sobriety, prevail throughout the country at this day, excepting in those large towns and villages where the population has, by its rapid increase, outgrown the means of religious and moral instruction.

Mr Combe has, in one part of his work, taken some trouble in collecting instances of the persecution of witches in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in different parts of Europe, to which he might have added a vast amount of similar instances in New England within the same period. He has attributed this, and certainly with justice, to the mistaken zeal of pious Christians, and an erroneous interpretation, or rather an injudicious application, of certain texts of Scripture.

This is apparently turned by him into a weapon of attack against Scripture itself, or at least an argument to prove that no reliance can be placed on its declarations, seeing that it is liable to be misinterpreted and misapplied. But it must be owned to be straining the matter beyond all bounds of fair inference, to argue, from an acknowledged abuse of any thing, against its fair, and cautious, and legitimate use; for were such arguments admitted, there is nothing in this world that may not be equally condemned. The persecution of the witches has now, for upwards of a century, been abolished, and admitted to have been the joint product of ignorance and fanaticism. Along with these have vanished all the dreams of magical incantations, evil eyes, ghosts, omens, and every species of diablerie, the offspring of a certain traditionary lore handed down from the days of darkness and heathenism. For all this Christianity is not entirely

answerable, but if at one period the mistaken zeal of some of its votaries afforded encouragement to the *bane*, the enlightened efforts of its disciples in after times have supplied the *antidote*. The torturing and burning of witches was suppressed, not in consequence of its being proved irrational by any philosophical argument, but by its being felt to be contrary to Christian principles. The superstitions of the nursery, and the belief in ghosts and hobgoblins, lingered for some time longer, but are now effectually banished, not by the arguments of philosophy, but the influence of enlightened Christianity, by providing a supply of more useful and salutary instruction for the infant mind, by many little works adapted to the capacities of the young, in which moral and religious truths are presented to them in the most attractive form, and in which every art is used to draw them to the love and practice of virtue. *

* I may here mention, that in estimating the effect which Christianity, and Revelation generally, have produced in the world, we are not entirely to confine ourselves to Christian countries. A large portion of the earth has been for many centuries, and still remains, under the influence of a religion which never would have had an origin, unless the Jewish and Christian revelations had been previously promulgated. It is undoubted that Mahomet borrowed many of the doctrines and precepts of the Koran from the writings of the Old and New Testament; and it is even said, that he was assisted in the labour of composing his work by a Christian monk. Gross and absurd as many parts of that performance are, it must be admitted to contain something superior to the systems of Pagan idolatry which it superseded. The fundamental truth, that there is but one God, and the virtues which it recommends, of justice, and charity to the poor, must have been attended with beneficial effects. If this be admitted,—and it cannot, I think, be denied,—we are justified in claiming any improvement which may have been produced by Mahometanism among the rude tribes which embraced it, as one of the remote consequences of Christianity. Of course we do not lay stress upon this as adding much to the benefits which Christianity has conferred upon the world; but if any one shall state the honesty, or other good qualities of the Turks, as having arisen under a system independent of Christianity, it may be answered, that all which is good in that system was borrowed from Christianity.

Mr Combe winds up his remarks on the teaching of our divines, and its effects, in the following passage :—
“ It appears to me that one reason why vice and misery do not diminish in proportion to preaching, is, that the natural laws (that is, the rules of conduct discoverable by man’s natural reason) are too much overlooked. The theological doctrine of the corruption and disorder of human nature,” (a doctrine which is undeniably true,) “ joined to the want of knowledge of real science, have probably been the causes why the professed servants of God have made so little use of his laws as revealed in creation, in instructing the people to live according to his will.” Now, I do not deny that it may be very proper to instruct the people in the laws of the natural world, as revealed in creation, though it may be doubted whether the pulpit is the proper place whence such knowledge should be taught. But the question I wish to direct attention to at present is, whether it is so perfectly true as Mr Combe assumes, that *vice and misery do not diminish in proportion to preaching*. Many of the facts already stated appear to lead to the conclusion, that in times past vice and misery have diminished in proportion to preaching, and that this is proved to have taken place in this very country on a scale of considerable magnitude. It has undoubtedly been as effectual in its way, in diminishing vice and misery in a moral, as the study and the improvement of medical science have been in a physical point of view.

But I shall bring the matter nearer home, and shall recur to facts which I do not expect will or can be denied, shewing the effects that have been produced, principally, I will say, by zealous and judicious preaching, within our own remembrance, and in this very place where I am now writing. Let those who recollect tell what was the state of manners in this our northern

metropolis, among the higher and middle classes of society, not more than half a century ago. At that time, and for a long period previous, the classes I refer to universally indulged in practices now as universally proscribed. They did not, to be sure, cheat, lie, and steal, but they did their utmost to injure their health and destroy their intellects, by habitual and excessive drinking. Hardly an entertainment took place at which the majority of the male guests did not drink to intoxication. It was thought a disgrace to the landlord if any of them went away sober, and the mark of a mean and cowardly spirit, if any one attempted to shy his glass, or to escape the scene of inebriety. This feeling is graphically described by Sir Walter Scott in his novel of *Waverley*, in his account of the revels at the Baron of Bradwardine's, and is alluded to by Burns in the well known lines,

The first shall rise to gang awa,
A silly coward loon is he ;
The first beside his chair shall fa',
He shall be king amang us three.

This picture is not overcharged ; on the contrary, the half is not told. It was then no disgrace to a gentleman to be seen, or to be carried home, in a state of intoxication. Now, it will be admitted, such things are not merely rare, but we may say absolutely unknown.

But the physical part of the evil was not the worst. The conversation at these nocturnal orgies was even more offensive to moral feeling than the liquor that was swallowed. The topics chosen, and the mode of treating them, were of the grossest description. Not boys, but grave serious men, as they "chirped over their cups," endeavoured to outdo each other in a species of discourse that would not now be tolerated any where. Profanity was, in many cases, added to licentiousness ; and with

many this became so much a habit, that they hardly ever opened their lips without taking their Maker's name in vain in the most blasphemous and absurd imprecations. This nuisance is also abated, and nothing of the kind is heard in any thing like civilized society.

It must not be supposed, however, that our ancestors were so grossly stupid, and so gratuitously wicked, as to love these enormities entirely for their own sake. Many of the men I speak of possessed superior talents and convivial powers of a high order; and amidst their gross licentiousness and profanity, displayed a degree of wild wit, and reckless unrestrained humour, tempered by occasional appeals to better feelings, so as to render the whole not less seductive to the mind, than the wine that sparkled in the cup was tempting to the taste. All this is true; and it may be not less true, that as our entertainments have become more decent, they have, in some degree, also become more dull; but this only enhances the merit of the victory that has undoubtedly been gained over a custom "more honoured in the breach than the observance."

It followed, perhaps necessarily, from this state of manners, that among the professions called learned, particularly the gentlemen of the bar, the Sabbath was almost invariably and systematically devoted to secular employment. So little was it regarded by them as a day of rest, that it was actually chosen, as being less liable to interruption, for those parts of business requiring the closest and most unintermitted attention. Frequently, also, the evening was spent in a renewal of the same festive pleasures which had employed the rest of the week, and certainly with no more restraint on the ebullitions of social glee.

A worse evil than any I have mentioned, prevailed within the above period. Men were then not satisfied

with "walking in the counsel of the ungodly," and "standing in the way of sinners;" but they set themselves, in many instances, in the "chair of the scorner." There were many at that time who prided themselves in openly avowing their unbelief in, and scoffing at, the doctrines of religion and the persons of its professors. This worst of all nuisances is also completely put down. Even the boldest unbeliever does not now venture publicly on a profane jest; and if he has not learnt to respect religion, he at least does not openly insult the feelings of those who profess it.

All these gross, undeniable offences, which within these forty or fifty years were notoriously and habitually indulged in by many among the higher and wealthier classes of society, are now so entirely removed, that some will hardly believe them to have existed; and I conceive it to be equally certain, that their removal has been mainly attributable to the zealous, able, and judicious efforts of our excellent divines. About the commencement of the period we have been considering, although there were many learned and worthy men in the Church, yet there was an apathy and lukewarmness in regard to Christianity among the people, and a want, upon the whole, of zeal and fervency, on the part of the clergy. Since that time a change in these respects has undoubtedly taken place. There has been in some degree a revival of the spirit and knowledge of the true faith. Men have arisen amongst us of energetic minds and splendid talents, who have contributed, as far as their exertions have extended, in removing the veil from men's hearts, and inducing many who "cared for none of these things" to attend to the divine message. The effects of their exertions have appeared not merely in the improvement of manners which has been noticed, but in the more regular attendance on places of worship.

There were formerly few males of the higher classes who frequented the churches, which were either attended by women only, or more generally half empty; now there are few of either sex in the higher classes who habitually absent themselves from places of worship—and among all ranks the regular attendance, good order, and decent demeanour of those who attend, must strike every observer.

But although our preachers were greatly more eloquent and effective than they are, it is impossible their instructions can benefit those who do not hear them. Those who do attend and listen, are benefited, and it will not be pretended that vice and misery prevail greatly among them, or, at least, that they are not diminished by the influence of preaching; but the class in which vice and misery really prevail, is a class that never enters a church,—that has no opportunity of doing so. Our present places of worship are far too few in number for the accommodation of all classes, and these few are closed against the poor by high seat-rents; of course it is the lowest and worst class, those who have most need of instruction, and who are least inclined to seek it,* who, under our present arrangements, are necessarily deprived of its benefits. The clergy, seeing how much our population has outgrown the means of instruction, are now anxious to supply this deficiency, and notwithstanding any opposition that may be made, it is hoped that this great desideratum will soon be obtained. After this is the case, and after the influence of preaching has been brought fully and fairly to bear upon the lowest and most degraded class, if it is then found to fail in diminishing vice and misery, it will be time enough to speak of the inefficiency of preaching. What I maintain, and what

* “Marry, the immortal part hath need of a physician, but that moves not *them*. Though that be sick, it dies not.”

I say is borne out by multiplied facts, is, that it has succeeded as far as it has been tried.

If, then, it be true, that all the mighty empires of the old world fell by the force of inherent corruption, and, after a short period of prosperity, continued to decline until they came to utter ruin, it may be asked, why this has not yet been the case with us? We have seen Britain gradually rising, and, amidst many turmoils and revolutions, constantly advancing in prosperity and improvement for eighteen hundred years, till we have reached a pitch of wealth and refinement equal, perhaps, if not surpassing, those of any ancient state. Wealth, we have seen in their case, produced luxury, and luxury led to vice, and vice to total corruption and ruin. Why is not that our case? How does it happen that now, in the midst of all our overflowing wealth, we are still confessedly improving,—that the higher and middle classes are becoming purer instead of being more corrupt,—that we are engaged in an attempt to reform all abuses, and that the only contest among our parties is, as to which are the best means of perfecting our institutions?

The answer is, that Christianity has been the cause of our preservation. Christianity, taught in a pure and effective form, as it has now been taught among us for two centuries, rendering familiar to the people the sacred and sublime truths of the Gospel, and enforcing by their sanction the simple precepts of morality—calling into activity, and gratifying all the higher and worthier feelings of our nature—and calculated, in course of time, to strengthen and improve these feelings, not in individuals merely, but in the race. Well and truly it has been said of the teachers of this divine doctrine, that they are the salt of the earth.

I have endeavoured to prove, by undeniable facts, what this doctrine and these teachers have already done. Mr Combe speaks of what Phrenology is to do, and I shall be happy to see it realized. In the mean time, I beg to remind him that hitherto Phrenology has done nothing; and to recommend to his notice the maxim, "Let not him who buckleth on his armour boast as he who putteth it off."

CHAPTER IV.

EXAMINATION OF MR COMBE'S VIEWS RESPECTING THE NATURAL LAWS.

I. *General view of the subject.*

THE notion of a *Natural Law* discoverable by man's reason, sufficient for the regulation of all his actions, is as old as the first speculation on the subject of the human faculties. The philosophers of ancient Greece endeavoured to discover this law, by following which man might attain the greatest possible happiness, or what they termed the supreme good. But though many of their speculations directed to this end were plausible and ingenious, and though they formed the loftiest ideas of human virtue, and pretended, by means of it, to be able to attain a happiness equal to that of the gods, they utterly failed in their attempts to form a scheme of practical morality, calculated to effect any improvement on the generality of mankind.

Similar views have been entertained in modern times by various writers. In France, during the latter part of the last century, they became favourite doctrines with a

set of philosophers, whose main object appeared to be, to undermine the influence, and supersede the authority of revelation. These philosophers revived the old speculations on the subject of a natural law, which they maintained to be “universal, invariable, demonstrable, reasonable, just, pacific, and of itself sufficient.” They held, that by means of this law, man would be able, by his own unassisted means, to attain the highest perfection of his nature; and that, if it was only generally understood and obeyed, society would be a scene of unalloyed happiness, and that vice and misery would for ever disappear from the world.

It is obvious that these doctrines were maintained by the writers alluded to, not so much for their own sake, as for the sake of certain consequences which were supposed to follow from them. The great object was to get rid of revelation, and of the law which it proclaims under the highest sanctions,—a law too pure, searching, and uncompromising, to prove agreeable to the wayward and capricious desires of man’s sinful nature. They assumed, that if a law were discoverable by reason, sufficient for the attainment of perfect virtue and perfect happiness, and accompanied by motives sufficiently strong to ensure its being universally obeyed, there could be no necessity for a law being proclaimed by a revelation from Heaven. And as the Creator does nothing in vain, and could not be supposed to have promulgated a law without necessity, it followed that there could be no such thing as a divine revelation, and that every thing pretending to be such must be founded on imposture.

It also occurred, that if the laws by which this world is governed are such, that perfect justice is done in every case, and that perfect happiness is attainable by obedience to them in the present life, no reason could be assigned

for the existence of a future life for amending what may be amiss in the present.

Accordingly, the French philosophers who maintained the doctrine of a natural law, uniformly and consistently rejected all belief in revelation and a future state. These views are fully and elaborately set forth in a work supposed to have been written by Diderot, under the assumed name of Mirabaud, entitled, "The System of Nature, or the Laws of the Moral and Physical World," and are more concisely stated by M. Volney, author of the "Ruins of Empires," in a sequel to that performance, which he first named the "Catechism of a French Citizen," and which was afterwards published in English under the title of "The Law of Nature."

We are warned by high authority to beware of false teachers, of whom it is emphatically said, "By their fruits ye shall know them;" and if in the present instance we apply this sure and infallible test, we can be at no loss to form a correct judgment. These works, which may be called the Confession of Faith, and Shorter Catechism of Infidelity, and others inculcating similar principles, with which France was inundated at the period referred to, were but too successful in poisoning the national mind, and preparing the way for that total dissolution of moral and religious principle which took place in that country at the time of the Revolution, and for the exhibition, unparalleled in the history of the world, of the supreme council of a great nation proclaiming, by a solemn decree, that "there is no God," and that "death is an eternal sleep."

Mr Combe states, that his notions on the subject of the natural laws were derived from a MS. work of Doctor Spurzheim's, with the perusal of which he was honoured in 1824, and which was afterwards published

under the title of "A Sketch of the Natural Laws of Man." I have no doubt this was the case, but there can be as little doubt that Doctor Spurzheim derived his notions from Volney, and the other French writers before alluded to. Doctor Spurzheim's work, like that of Volney, is in the form of a catechism; the general train of thought in both is the same, and in many cases the doctrines stated are identical. There is, however, this difference, that Doctor Spurzheim, while he maintains the same opinions as Volney with regard to a natural law, does not draw the same conclusions against the truth of revelation. In regard to this, his mind appears to have been in a kind of neutral state. He does not expressly admit the Christian revelation to be true, but he refers to its moral precepts "as surpassing all other systems of revealed religion, and as standing the scrutiny of reason."* He seems to consider that the natural laws discoverable by reason, and the precepts of pure Christianity, are in harmony one with another; but it is evidently the tendency of his mind to place more reliance on the former than on the latter, though he seems to entertain the idea that both must concur, in order to produce "that general religious reformation, whose necessity for the well being of man is so evident."

Such is the general scope of Doctor Spurzheim's work; and although, in adopting the doctrine of the French writers with regard to the natural laws, he does, in fact, admit that which forms the foundation of all their infidel reasonings, I have no doubt that he was sincere in believing that he had kept clear of objectionable matter, and that no one, whether Christian or not, could find fault with his mode of treating the subject. It must be quite obvious, however, that if the reasoning of the French writers were correct, and if the consequences

* Page 196.

which they deduce follow legitimately from their premises, it can make no difference that these consequences are not formally stated in so many words, and that if we admit the premises, we cannot consistently reject the conclusion.

The general views maintained by Mr Combe on this subject, are as follows:—"First, That all substances and beings have received a definite natural constitution; *secondly*, That every mode of action which is said to take place according to a natural law, is inherent in the constitution of the substance or being; and *thirdly*, That the mode of action described is universal and invariable wherever and whenever the substances or beings are found in the same condition."

He then goes on to say, that intelligent beings are capable of observing nature, and of modifying their actions. By means of their faculties, the laws impressed by the Creator on physical substances become known to them; and when perceived, *constitute laws to them* by which to regulate their conduct. For example, it is a physical law, that boiling water destroys the muscular and nervous systems of man. This is the result purely of the constitution of the body, and of the relation between it and heat; and man cannot alter or suspend the law. But whenever the relation, and the consequences of disregarding it, are perceived, the mind is prompted to avoid infringement, in order to avoid the torture attached by the Creator to the decomposition of the human body by heat.

Mr Combe then goes on to state more in detail, the nature of those different laws which it is the duty of man to discover and obey. These, as far as they are yet known, he divides into three great classes, namely, 1st, the *physical laws*, embracing all the phenomena of mere matter; 2d, the *organic laws*, comprehending the

phenomena connected with the production, health, growth, decay, and death of vegetables and animals; and lastly, the *moral* and *intellectual* laws, the lower intellectual being common to man with some of the lower animals, the higher intellectual and moral laws being peculiar to man.

Before going farther, I would here observe, that throughout the whole of the statements respecting the natural laws, either by Diderot, Volney, Doctor Spurzheim, or Mr Combe, there are two things included under one name, which are perfectly distinct and separate from each other. In the first place, there are the laws which result from the constitution of natural objects, and which regulate their mutual action on one another, such as the laws of the resistance, momentum, elasticity, &c. of solids, the laws of gravitation, the laws of the pressure of fluids, the laws of vegetation, and so on. Considered in this sense, every object and being in the world has its laws according to which it acts or is acted upon. These are the *laws of nature* referred to by Montesquieu, Blackstone, Erskine, and other writers quoted by Mr Combe in his appendix, and as to which there is no difference of opinion. These, however, are totally distinct from the “Law of Nature,” or “Natural Laws,” spoken of by Mr Combe and those from whom he has borrowed his system; these do not mean the *laws of the constitution of things*, but those rules which the intellect of man is able to deduce *for the regulation of his own conduct*, by means of his *knowledge of those laws* which govern the phenomena of nature. These last are perfectly distinct from the former, and it is a monstrous confusion of ideas to mix them up together.

These two notions, however, the laws of the *constitution of things*, and the laws of *human conduct*, are invariably confounded together by these writers. Thus, Volney, after mentioning certain general facts or laws of

the constitution of natural objects, and stating that these form so many *positive commands* to which we are bound to pay attention, adds, that it has been agreed "to assemble together the *different ideas* and *express them by a single word*, and call them collectively the LAW OF NATURE." And in like manner Mr Combe expressly states, that "a *law of nature* means the *established mode* in which the actions and phenomena of any creature exhibit themselves, *and the obligation* thereby imposed on intelligent beings to attend to it."

In consequence of this mixing up of different, and even opposite ideas under one name, we find an inextricable confusion running through the whole speculations of Mr Combe, Volney, &c. respecting the natural laws, so that we never know when they are speaking of the laws of natural phenomena, and when they are referring to the rules of human conduct. It is also important to notice, that they take advantage of this confusion to introduce another grand fallacy into their statements. This consists in attributing to the *whole* of what they include under the name of *natural laws* those characters of certainty, universality, invariability, &c. which only belong to one of these divisions. Every one will admit that the laws which regulate natural phenomena are "universal, invariable, demonstrable, reasonable, and of themselves sufficient" for all the purposes for which they were established; but it is a very different thing to say that this is the case with regard to any rules which the intellect of man has ever been able, or may ever be able, to deduce from his knowledge of these, for the regulation of his own conduct. This supposes that the intellect of man is perfect, which we know, in his present state, is not the case; that we have discovered all the laws which regulate the phenomena of natural objects, which we know is not the case; and lastly,

that we have discovered all the rules of conduct deducible from that knowledge, which Mr Combe himself admits will not be the case for an immense series of years.

Mr Combe seems to be anxious not to have it supposed that he has derived his views entirely from the French philosophers, and he thinks he is able to bring to his support the high authority of Bishop Butler. This excellent writer, in his work on the Analogy of Religion, in maintaining the probability of a future state of rewards and punishments, uses the argument, that even in the present life, and in the natural world, certain actions are attended or followed by pleasing, and others by painful sensations, analogous to rewards and punishments, so that we are even here in a certain sense under a system of divine government. The passage is this: "Now, from this general observation, obvious to every one, that God has given us to understand he has appointed satisfaction and delight to be the consequence of our acting in one manner, and pain and uneasiness of our acting in another, and of our not acting at all; and that we find the consequences *which we were beforehand informed of* uniformly to follow; we may learn that we are at present actually under his government in the strictest and most proper sense, in such a sense as he rewards and punishes us for our actions. An Author of Nature being supposed, it is not so much a deduction of reason as a lesson of experience, that we are thus under his government, under his government in the same sense as we are under the government of civil magistrates; because, annexing pleasure to some actions, and pain to others, in our power to do or forbear, *and giving notice of this appointment beforehand*, is the proper formal notion of government. Whether the pleasure or pain which thus follows upon

our behaviour be owing to the Author of Nature acting upon us every moment that we feel it, or to his having at once contrived and executed his own part in the plan of the world, makes no alteration as to the matter before us; for if civil magistrates could make the sanctions of their laws take place without interposing at all after they had passed them—without a trial, and the formalities of an execution—if they were able to make their laws execute themselves, or every offender to execute them upon himself—we should be just in the same sense under their government then as we are now, but in a much higher degree, and more perfect manner.” Then follows the passage which Mr Combe has adopted as the motto of his book: “Vain is the ridicule with which one foresees some persons will divert themselves, upon finding lesser pains considered as instances of divine punishment. There is no possibility of answering or evading the *general thing here intended*, without denying all final causes, for final causes being admitted, the pleasures and pains now mentioned must be admitted too as instances of them; and if they are—if God annexes delight to some actions, and uneasiness to others, with an apparent design to induce us to act so and so, then he not only dispenses happiness and misery, but also rewards and punishes actions. If, for example, the pain which we feel upon doing what tends to the destruction of our bodies, suppose upon too near approaches to fire, or upon wounding ourselves, be appointed by the Author of Nature to prevent our doing what thus tends to our destruction, this is altogether as much an instance of his punishing our actions, and consequently of our being under his government, as declaring by a voice from heaven, that if we acted so, he would inflict such pain upon us, and inflicting it whether it be greater or less.”

I have quoted the whole of the above passage, as Mr

Combe seems to lay much stress upon one part of it, though I think it will be evident that it affords no support to his system. In the first place, the "general thing intended" by Butler, is *an analogical argument* drawn from circumstances connected with our present state of existence, and rendering it probable that something similar may take place in a future state. This argument Mr Combe sets aside altogether, as what he has nothing to do with, and confines himself entirely to the situation of man in the present world. In regard to this last, Bishop Butler only refers to the cases (of which he gives an instance in the effect of fire upon our bodies) *where the law is well known to all*, and where it forces itself upon our notice in such a way that none can plead ignorance. He makes it particularly evident, that it is only these cases he refers to, as he states over and over again, that the pleasures or pains annexed to our actions, *which we are beforehand informed of*, are those which make us feel that we are under a government. These were quite sufficient for Bishop Butler's purpose, which was to shew, that as in certain cases we are rewarded and punished for our actions here, there is nothing incredible in supposing that there may be rewards and punishments in a future state. But certainly neither here nor anywhere else does Bishop Butler maintain, either that the arrangements of the present world amount to a perfect system of divine government, or that a perfect and sufficient rule of conduct either has been, or is ever likely to be, deduced by man's intellect, from a study of the laws of nature, and the constitution of things. He has expressly stated the contrary of both these propositions.

First, in reference to the divine government, he has the following passage: "But it is particularly to be observed, that the divine government which we experience ourselves under in the present state, taken alone,

is allowed not to be the perfection of moral government ; and yet this by no means hinders, but that there may be somewhat, be it more or less, truly moral in it. A righteous government may plainly enough appear to be carried on to some degree ; enough to give us the apprehension that it shall be completed, or carried on to that degree of perfection which religion teaches us it shall ; but which cannot appear till much more of the divine administration be seen, than can in the present life.” Again, on the subject of a natural law, and the likelihood of its being discovered so as to serve as a sufficient rule of conduct, I may refer to what follows. “ Some persons, upon pretence of the sufficiency of the light of nature, avowedly reject all revelation, as in its very notion incredible, and what must be fictitious. And, indeed, it is certain, no revelation would have been given, had the light of nature been sufficient in such a sense as to render one not wanting and useless. *But no man, in seriousness and simplicity of mind, can possibly think it so,* who considers the state of religion in the heathen world, before revelation, and its present state in those places which have borrowed no light from it ; particularly the doubtfulness of some of the greatest men concerning things of the utmost importance, as well as the natural inattention and ignorance of mankind in general. It is impossible to say, who would have been able to have reasoned out that whole system, which we call natural religion, in its genuine simplicity, clear of superstition ; but there is certainly no ground to affirm that the generality could. If they could, there is no sort of probability that they would.”

From the above, it appears that the system of Bishop Butler bears nearly the same relation to the speculations of Mr Combe, that a circle does to a straight line : they only touch at a *single point*, but do not and never can

coincide in the smallest divisible part of their extent. Bishop Butler's argument, like the ladder seen in the vision of the patriarch, reaches from earth to heaven. Mr Combe, on the contrary, keeps grovelling on the earth. From that alone his views are derived, and in that they have their termination. Nothing, therefore, can possibly be more opposite than the views of Bishop Butler and those of Mr Combe.

Butler, as we have seen, refers to certain cases as instances of reward and punishment, where the law which is spoken of is *previously known*, and it is obviously in such cases only where the pleasures or pains annexed to actions, can properly be termed rewards or punishments. It is of the essence of reward and punishment, that they follow as the consequence of obedience or disobedience of a law previously made known, and have reference to the state of mind of the party who is to be rewarded or punished. It is the intention or disposition of the mind, and not the mere act of the body, that is ever considered as obedience or disobedience, or thought worthy, in a moral sense, of either reward or punishment. If in any case we happen to act in conformity to a law of which we are ignorant, or which we had no intention to obey, and in consequence experience a certain pleasure, it is absurd to call this a reward: it is an accidental gratification, and nothing more. On the other hand, if we happen to transgress a law not previously made known to us, and in consequence are made to suffer pain which we did not and could not foresee, this is never called a *punishment*, but a *misfortune*. Mr Combe refers to the cases of human laws, where a maxim has been adopted that no one is to be excused on account of ignorance; but this maxim has arisen only from the necessary imperfection of all human institutions, and cannot be compared to

any thing connected with the divine government of the world.

It may here be granted, for the sake of argument, that if all the qualities of objects, and laws of their operation, and all the consequences of our own actions, so far as our welfare is concerned, had been known to us by intuition, or had been announced to us in such a way as not to be misunderstood, this might perhaps have constituted a natural law sufficient for our guidance, and that there might in that case have been no occasion for any other, so far, at least, as the present world is concerned.

But this is not the situation in which we stand. According to Mr Combe's doctrine, we are sent into the world not to obey a law of *which notice has been given to us beforehand*, which Bishop Butler says is the "proper formal notion of government;" but to obey laws of which all mankind have been, from the beginning of the world, and are at this moment, in a great measure ignorant; which the inquiries of six thousand years have not enabled them to discover, and which may not be discovered for thousands of years to come. This is Mr Combe's own statement. He says, (p. 9, col. 1,) "It is impossible, in the present state of knowledge, to elucidate all these laws: *numberless years may elapse before they shall be discovered.*" What sort of a government is this, where we are commanded to obey an unknown law, and which punishes us for not obeying it? It is about as reasonable as the command of the frantic Nebuchadnezzar, who ordered his soothsayers and wise men to be put to death, because they could not tell him his dream, and the interpretation thereof.

Mr Combe has here favoured us with a speculation, the drift of which is to shew, that man is happier in having

his knowledge to seek, than if he had understood every thing by intuition. He instances the case of the bee, and says, that if man had been gifted with intuitive knowledge of every object in nature, he would be in the condition of the bee if his combs had been filled with honey without the need of any exertion on his part; and that he is happier in being enabled to range about the hills and meadows, and to gather honey from every opening flower. It may be observed, that the very supposition that a *creature* should possess intuitive knowledge of every object in nature is a manifest absurdity. Intuitive knowledge of every object in nature would be *omniscience*, and can only belong to the Author of Nature by whom these objects were formed. What we mean by intuitive knowledge as applied to a creature, is a knowledge, either born with him, or acquired with the earliest exertion of his faculties, of those objects which lie within his own sphere, or which are in any way connected with, or conducive to his welfare. Taking the matter in this view, the parallel of the bee does not hold. Man, if gifted with this sort of knowledge, would be exactly in the condition of the bee as it now exists; for the bee has intuitive knowledge of all the flowers and plants capable of yielding honey; and if knowledge is good and desirable of itself—if the pleasure of knowing does not entirely evaporate in the attainment—if it leads to any useful end, and enables us to procure the means of increasing our happiness,—then the possession of such knowledge intuitively must be the most desirable of all things, as it would enable us to avoid every thing that could give us pain, and to obtain every thing that could give us pleasure. The present condition of man, on the other hand, if Mr Combe's account of it be the true one, seems to resemble what the condition of the bee would have been, had it been sent into the fields to gather

honey, without any knowledge of the flowers from which honey was to be gathered, so that it should make innumerable blunders before it discovered what were the plants that afforded what it sought. On the contrary, it appears to me, that nature has not acted to man such a step-dame's part, but has endowed him with such feelings and propensities as in general lead him to that which is calculated to afford him a reasonable degree of happiness, without its being necessary to resort to systems of philosophy, which not one in a thousand has opportunity to study, or capacity to comprehend; or to *natural laws*, which are to be discovered some hundred thousand years hence!

There is altogether something most extraordinary in the view which Mr Combe takes of the situation in which man has been placed in this world. Holding, as he does, that all the evils we suffer arise from ignorance, ~~nothing~~ but the spirit of paradox could give rise to the notion, that the happiness of man has been better provided for by sending him into the world in a state of entire ignorance, than if he had been furnished with intuitive knowledge of every thing on which his happiness depends. Mr Combe maintains, that happiness depends on the activity of the faculties; but is it true that the activity of the faculties is best promoted by ignorance? Is it not, on the contrary, the case, that the most ignorant of mankind are invariably the most indolent, and the least inclined to exert their faculties; while the intelligent are diligent and industrious, and those who know most possess at once the highest motives to be active, and the most extended sphere of activity. The absurdity of the supposition will appear in its true light, when we consider, that the intuitive knowledge supposed necessarily includes an intuitive knowledge of the advantages to be derived from exercising the faculties, and of all that

is necessary for bringing our whole powers, physical and mental, into their most favourable state of action. It would be strange, indeed, if the possession of this knowledge were to incapacitate us from using it, and *if we were to become indolent from having too clear a view of the infinite advantages and pleasures of activity.*

Nothing but suffering will rouse the activity, or subdue the indolence of savages; but the activity so excited does not seem with them to lead to any improvement. If suffering would effect this desirable end, they ought to improve rapidly, for of suffering, by all accounts, they have enough. But from all that we know of savages, we have no reason to think that they ever improve, or that they are in any respect in a progressive state.

We have seen, that, in his introductory chapter, Mr Combe, in order to get rid of the *Fall*, and the doctrine of the corruption of human nature, represents man as originally introduced into the world in a state little superior to the brutes, “a ferocious, sensual, and superstitious savage;” and that he has ever since been in a state of slow and progressive improvement. He now gives us a different view of the subject, and one which seems, if possible, still more fraught with absurdity. “It is interesting to observe,” he says, “that although the first pair of the human race had been created with powerful and well balanced faculties, but of the same nature as at present — if they were not also intuitively inspired with knowledge of the whole creation, and its relations, their first movements as *individuals* would have been *retrograde*: that is, as *individuals*, they would, through pure want of information, have infringed many natural laws, and suffered evil, while, as *parts of the race*, they would have been decidedly *advancing*; for every pang thus suffered would have led them to a new step in knowledge, and prompted them to advance towards

a much higher condition than that which they at first occupied."

Here we have a totally new theory offered of the original condition of our race. According to the first view, which may be called the *Yahoo* theory, there could be no Fall, and no corruption of our nature, as from a state so low it was impossible to descend lower, and that nature could not be *corrupted* which was created in a state of brutal ignorance, and savage ferocity. But by the supposition now made, that man was created at first with all his present powers in a perfect state, Mr Combe, although he rejects the doctrine of the Fall and corruption of our nature, as held by divines, has contrived to furnish us with a new species of Fall of his own. We have now not one system of progression, by which the race is carried on from its original savage condition to the highest state of improvement; but we have a double progression upwards and downwards at the same time, every step upward in knowledge being purchased by another step downward in suffering. We have a race, consisting of two individuals, improving by means of their own degradation, and advancing to wisdom and virtue by the transgression of the whole of their Creator's laws.

Mr Combe's doctrine, then, is, that pain, disease, suffering, and death, are all beneficial arrangements, intended by God for no other purpose, but to teach us the natural laws, or our duty. These evils, according to him, are a part and portion of the means of promoting and ensuring our obedience to the physical, organic, and moral laws ordained for the regulation of the world, and man was placed in this world in a state of entire ignorance of these laws, in order that by pain and suffering he might be brought to discover and obey them. It is a necessary consequence from this doctrine, that he who

has transgressed the most will be the best instructed. He has been taught in the best school, experience. Therefore the most vicious of mankind ought to be the wisest, and those who have committed the greatest crimes ought to become in the end the most virtuous of men.

Man, according to Mr Combe, even as he proceeded from the hands of his Creator, was a fool, whom experience alone could teach ; the greater the experience, the greater the wisdom, and wisdom must be taught by folly, and virtue by vice. We have heard of ignorance being the mother of devotion ; it now appears that it is also the mother of knowledge. According to this view, *evil is necessary by the very constitution of our nature*, and this, *not as a punishment inflicted by Infinite Justice, on account of the wilful transgression of a known law*, but as the result of a state which made transgression necessary, and suffering inevitable. Man being placed by his Creator, *from the very first*, in a state of entire ignorance of his will, and with capacities fitted only by slow and difficult steps, and after the endurance of many a pang to discover it, it was impossible for him not to err, and suffering and sin is thus made to form, not an accidental, but an essential part of that constitution of things under which he was placed. God is thus made directly the author of evil, and is represented as having, by the arrangements of creation, laid man under the necessity of transgressing his will, denying him all means of knowing that will, except that of the suffering following upon such transgression, and thus compelling him to do evil, that good may come. Is it possible to reconcile such a view of things with the character of an all powerful, all wise, all just, and all benevolent Creator ?

In regard to these natural laws, it is certainly not too much to call upon those who allege their existence to

prove their own case ; and not merely to prove that the laws exist, but that it is possible for man to discover them so as to attain a perfect rule of conduct. But it has not been, and we are safe in saying it cannot be, proved that man in his present state is able to discover the whole laws, either of his own constitution, or of the constitution of external objects. That he ever shall discover them by the unaided exertion of his own faculties, is a mere assumption, ventured without proof, contrary to all experience, and destitute of all probability. And when we consider what is included in the words, “all the natural laws,” the whole nature, constitution, qualities, and modes of operation of every object and every being, including man himself—of every thing within us and without us—of every thing in the heaven above, and on the earth beneath, and in the waters under the earth—of every thing, in short, in the creation of God, and the relations existing among all of them—that it, in fact, amounts to nothing short of *omniscience*,—does not the assumption strike us as one of prodigious arrogance and absurdity ?

That this is by no means an exaggeration or overstatement of the case, will be evident on referring to Mr Combe’s own exposition of the number and complexity of those laws, which he says it is our duty to study and obey. “Every natural object,” he says, “has received a definite constitution, in virtue of which it acts in a particular way. *There must, therefore, be as many natural laws, as there are distinct modes of action of substances and beings viewed by themselves.* But substances and beings stand in certain relations to each other, and modify each other’s action in an established and definite manner, according to that relationship ; altitude, for instance, modifies the effect of heat upon water. There must, therefore, *be as many laws of*

nature as there are relations between different substances and beings."

If any one, on reading the above, is not at once satisfied that the knowledge here supposed is unattainable by man in his present state, I despair of his ever being convinced of this by reasoning. I may, however, state a few considerations.

The laws of nature appear to our limited faculties to be infinite. Even the objects, or rather the classes, genera, and species of objects in the creation are infinite with respect to us, at least we have never yet arrived at a complete enumeration of them, and each of these possesses a definite constitution varying in every species, the laws of which are also infinitely various. The portion of these that has been hitherto explored, is small indeed in comparison of their whole extent, and yet that little is known imperfectly, and known comparatively to few. Of many of the laws of our own nature we are yet profoundly ignorant. Phrenology has disclosed to us some new truths, and has enabled us to distinguish some of the mental faculties, and to give them names, but that is all that can be said. Of the true nature and functions of many of these faculties — of the real extent and mode of their operation — of what they really are competent to do, and what they cannot do, — we are nearly as ignorant as ever. The *relations* between us and the various objects of creation, and the relations of these among one another, are also infinitely various; and, considering the infinitude of objects comprehended in these relations, must surpass the utmost stretch of our imaginations to conceive. If the simple powers which exist in nature are in themselves too vast for our comprehension, what shall we say to the *combinations* of these, which, according to the rule of calculation in such cases, must

necessarily amount to an infinity of infinities, the product of one infinite number multiplied by another !

The very kind of our knowledge is defective, as well as its degree. It has already been observed, that we are only able to perceive certain definite relations of things, not the things themselves. We only see the succession of events, not the causes by which these successions are produced. It is a maxim in metaphysics, that we know nothing of efficient causes, beyond the mere phenomenon of constant and invariable sequence. If, then, we neither know the intimate nature of any one object, nor the efficient cause of any one event, where can we find adequate terms to express our amazement at that extreme folly which can induce any one to suppose that we are able to develope the entire phenomena of the universe ?

From the nature of the human faculties, such a knowledge must have been unattainable by man even in his original state of perfection, possessing, as we must suppose, no other faculties than those which he has at present. But we know, and have proved, that man has grievously degenerated from his original perfection. His religious faculties have degenerated, so that he can no longer discern or appreciate as he ought the character and perfections of the Creator. His moral faculties are perverted and depraved, so that he can no longer feel or act as he ought towards his fellow-men. His perceptive powers are darkened, and his reflective and reasoning powers are rendered sluggish and inactive, so that he can no longer discern objects in their true colours, or appreciate justly their true character and value ; and in most cases he prefers the delusive colouring of his own imagination to the pure and unmingled light of heavenly truth.

I have endeavoured to argue against the supposition of our being able to discover, and to obey, *all the natural*

laws, by shewing its impossibility. But I am not obliged to take this ground. They who allege that it is possible, are bound to prove their own case. They will find that all their attempts to do this are vain. All experience is against the supposition. No man has ever attained a perfect knowledge of all the laws that ought to regulate his conduct—nor has any one individual of the race ever been able to act up even to the imperfect measure of the knowledge he possessed. The wisest men are always the first to acknowledge their own ignorance; the best men are the most prone to lament the multitude of their imperfections and errors. Although one man should attain to, we shall not say perfection, but a very near approach to it, and be able to discover all, or nearly all, the natural laws, and attain to that pitch of constancy and virtue as to conform his conduct to them in every respect, what would this signify to the world, unless all the rest of mankind could attain the same degrees of knowledge and virtue?

What use, then, can it serve to hold out expectations of our attaining, by human means, a knowledge so vast and multifarious—a knowledge of all the Creator's works, and all the relations subsisting among them? Such a knowledge can belong only to the Creator himself; and the idea of it looks almost like a renewal of the first temptation,—a promise that we shall be *as gods, knowing good and evil*.

The true state of the case is this: We find ourselves here in a world where certain arrangements have been made for our use and convenience by the bountiful and all-wise Creator. It is for our interest to study these arrangements, and to accommodate our conduct to them, *as far as we know them*; and in doing so, we obey—not those laws of nature, physical and organic—but the laws of prudence and good sense, arising from a due use

of our moral and intellectual faculties. Had Mr Combe satisfied himself with this plain unambitious doctrine, he would have commanded universal assent. Had he attempted less, he would have effected more.

Mr Combe knows the extreme ignorance and prejudice which prevail in the world. The mode of enlightening ignorance is by giving short lessons, and communicating instruction by little at a time. "They who do teach young babes, do it by gentle means and easy tasks." Instead of this, he has thrust upon us at once a system, of which it is evident that he himself neither knows the length nor the breadth, and which in truth it transcends the human faculties to comprehend. Instead of laying upon us a burden suited to our strength, he has pointed out to us a huge mountain, and ordered us to remove it and cast it into the sea. Indeed, it may be fairly stated, without any figure, as a literal truth, that if Mr Combe had proposed to the inhabitants of this country to level the Grampians, and to throw the materials into the German Ocean, this would have been a feasible, moderate, and easy task, and one likely to be accomplished, in comparison with that which he would have us to undertake. It would have been a *measureable* task, and the time and means required for its accomplishment could be exactly calculated; but the task he has proposed is one which far transcends the powers of all human calculation.

No one will venture to deny, that some of the arrangements of the Creator are so obvious as to be understood by all, and that, *when they are fully understood and explained*, it becomes our interest and duty to conform to them, and we only obey the laws of prudence in doing so; and many of them are so imperative, that we must do so if we would live in the world. There is no harm whatever in representing these necessities of our nature

under the name of laws—natural laws, if you will—which it is our interest and our duty to obey. Some of these are pointed out by Dr Spurzheim and Mr Combe, and instances may be given of the following:—

The law of cleanliness, which is not only conducive to decency and propriety of personal appearance, but eminently conducive to the preservation of health.

The law of temperance in the use of food.

The law of sobriety, or moderation in the use of stimulating liquors.

The laws of exercise, as necessary for preserving both the bodily and mental organs in a proper state.

These, and a variety of other rules for preserving the health, are exceedingly useful, and it is highly important that they should be duly explained and enforced.

But even as to these, Mr Combe begins at the wrong end, if he supposes that any one will ever be induced to obey these laws, unless he is first taught to obey a law of a higher nature. Who are they that attend most carefully to the laws I have mentioned—the very lowest of any that can be looked upon as rules of conduct, and which merely have reference to the body? Who are in general the most cleanly, temperate, sober, industrious, and regular in all their actions and occupations? Is it they who cheat, lie, steal, murder, and bear false witness? Is it they who live, though not altogether in unbelief, in the habitual disregard of a God, contempt of His word, and neglect of His ordinances, who take His name in vain, who profane His Sabbaths, and despise His commandments?

Most assuredly not. They who are most thoroughly imbued with a knowledge of moral and religious truth, are also in general those who are most attentive to preserve themselves from physical contamination. Those who are most impressed with the importance of the

weightier matters of the law,—justice, mercy, and truth,—are also most attentive to the smaller observances of sobriety, order, and regularity, in all their habits of life.

The tree is known by its fruits, and no man can gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles. It is in vain to attempt to improve the plant by pruning its diseased branches, and removing gangrenous excrescences from its extremities, if it is all the time rotten at the root, and in the trunk from which the branches arise. These are the dispositions of the heart, those faculties the proper state and direction of which constitute us religious and moral beings. Unless we reform these, we do nothing; we only expel one evil to give place to another.

Nothing is able to effect this reformation short of spiritual influences. If these are properly applied for, and properly cherished, every thing else will follow in due course. If the mind is purified from deceitful vanities and sinful desires, it will seek to manifest its inward purity by an outward behaviour conforming to it. No man who is really impressed with a full sense of his duty to God, will be filthy, indolent, luxurious, gluttonous, a wine-bibber, and a despiser of outward decency.

This is the order of proceeding in which any real good is to be effected; and this order is clearly pointed out in the passage formerly quoted. “Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat, nor for the body, what ye shall put on. Is not the life more than meat, and the body than raiment? Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and *all these things shall be added unto you.*”

Although this affords a different, and I think a more accurate view of the situation of men in this world, and of the true means of improving his character and condition, than that taken by Mr Combe, the result, as far

as the practical application of our faculties is concerned, will be nearly the same. All that has been said affords no objection whatever, but the contrary, to our pursuing the study of natural science as far as we can. We have every inducement to do so, without adopting any fantastic views of attainments in knowledge and improvements in the condition of our race, of which, in our present state, we can form no distinct conception. Instead of the infinitude of petty laws and minor regulations, which, according to Mr Combe, we are called upon to discover and obey, there is, according to this view, one law only applicable to this subject, namely, that delivered to us by our great teacher, "Occupy till I come." The Creator has bestowed on us faculties, and most assuredly he did not intend that they should lie idle; on the contrary, he has expressly condemned those who do not put them to use, and who hide their talent in a napkin: all which clearly points it out to be our interest and our duty, as well as one of our highest pleasures, to exert our faculties in the discovery of truth, and to employ the knowledge we may thus acquire in the promotion of useful ends.

Man will doubtless fulfil his destiny, and attain whatever heights of science lie within the reach of his faculties; but this consummation will not be hastened by commencing his career with extravagant expectations. In the road to science, as well as in other pursuits, modesty and humility are the true guides to eminence, and proud and high imaginations are the sure forerunners of a fall; or, as the same remark has been beautifully expressed by Lord Bacon, "It is no less true in this kingdom of knowledge, than in God's kingdom of heaven, that no one shall enter in, except he become first as a little child."

II.—*On the Principles stated by Mr Combe as affording a Key to the Divine Government.*

It has been stated, that Mr Combe divides the natural laws into three great classes,—*physical, organic, and moral*. I have stated, that there are properly only two kinds of laws,—the laws of the constitution of things, and the laws of human conduct. The physical and organic laws belong to the former of these divisions, the moral law to the latter.

Properly speaking, we cannot be said to obey or disobey the physical and organic laws. They are matter of observation and knowledge—when we know them, we may adapt our conduct to them; they are matters of order and arrangement—when aware of them, we may meet them by counter arrangements.

The moral law is different. It is not matter of observation and reasoning, but of feeling and consciousness. It speaks to us as with a voice from Heaven, prompting us to do this, and warning us to refrain from that.

When we *act in conformity* to the physical and organic laws, (the laws of things without us,) we do so from considerations of *prudence*, from knowing the convenient or inconvenient consequences which follow from their operations. But our moral feelings tell us that certain actions are right and others wrong, independent of all consequences. To the first we conform merely; it is the latter only we can be said to obey.

These are not mere verbal distinctions; they will be found to have important applications, when we come to consider the great principle which Mr Combe has announced, and which he considers to afford a full

explanation of the divine government, namely, that the above mentioned laws are independent of each other.

The importance which Mr Combe attaches to this principle, will appear by the solemn manner in which he announces it. He says, p. 6. col. 1, “ I have brought into view, and endeavoured to substantiate and apply a doctrine, which, as far as I have been able to discover, is the *key to the true theory of the divine government of the world*, but which has not hitherto been duly appreciated,—namely, THE INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE AND OPERATION OF THE NATURAL LAWS OF CREATION.”

It is not very easy to see how this principle is to explain the whole system of the divine government, even granting it to be true to the utmost extent.

It is quite true, that in a certain sense the different sets of laws alluded to are independent of each other. Nobody imagines that there is any direct connection between the laws of gravitation or hydrostatics, and those of benevolence or justice. But this goes very little way in explaining the system of the divine government. There are other points of which Mr Combe takes no notice, but which are indispensable towards a true view of the matter. He has said nothing, here at least, of the *superior authority* and *obligation* of the moral law. This requires to be obeyed *without evasion*, and nothing can excuse or justify its infringement. With regard to the laws of physical existence, prudence no doubt requires that we should *attend* to them in order to avoid unpleasant consequences; but that is all. There is nothing to prevent our *evading* or *avoiding* their operation, or *counteracting* one of them by another, provided we can find the means to do so. In fact, the principal use of our studying these laws is to enable us to evade them, and to render their operation of none effect, whenever it is likely to hurt us. We study them

as a smuggler or contraband dealer studies the excise laws, to discover, not how we shall obey them, but how we shall avoid the penalties annexed to their infringement. This is quite inadmissible with regard to the moral law, and therefore the two sets of laws stand on a perfectly different footing. But what is more ; cases occur when it is not only permissible, but when it may be our duty to despise these mere prudential considerations, and directly to disobey, as Mr Combe would call it, the physical law, taking our chance of the penalty, or even with the certainty of incurring it in all its extent.

But there is another circumstance which distinguishes these two sets of laws, and which shews that, so far as we are concerned, they are not so entirely independent. It is important to observe, that obedience to the *moral law*, taking this in its largest sense, as including the proper use of all our faculties, almost necessarily leads to the consequence of our properly attending to all the laws, which affect us, relative to the course of external nature ; and even in the most disastrous circumstances, places us in the most favourable position for what Mr Combe would call *obeying* these laws. I shall take notice of both these points in their order.

It would be in vain to attempt to give instances of all the modes in which the intellect of man avails itself of the arrangements of nature to produce the effects he desires. One principle, which is almost universal, and upon which depend a vast number of useful results, may be called the principle of *antagonism*,—namely, employing one law of nature to counteract another. In agriculture, we oppose the strength of men and horses to overcome the cohesion and resistance of the soil. In navigation, we oppose the force of the wind to the resistance of the water. In building, the materials are kept in their places by their opposing weight and strain, of which the

arch may be given as an example. In cooking, we employ the heat of boiling water, or the radiating power of a common fire, to reduce the cohesion, or separate the ingredients of the substances used as food. In chemistry, we apply to the substance we work upon, other agents, the particles of which have a more powerful attraction for its particles than these have for one another, and thus produce innumerable changes.

In all these cases it is absurd to talk of our obeying laws of nature. On the contrary, we make them obey us. The great object of our proceedings is to counteract one law by means of another. Instead of obeying these laws, we command them, and the real use of our studying them is that we may be enabled to wield them as instruments for effecting our purposes. In short, we just come to the emphatic and expressive maxim of Bacon, that in every thing regarding natural science, "knowledge is power."

I shall now mention some cases where these laws may be properly despised or disregarded. When Mutius Scaevola was brought before King Porsenna, in order to afford him a proof of the indomitable firmness of the Roman character, he thrust his hand into a pan of burning charcoal, and held it there until it was half consumed, informing him at the same time that a large number of equally determined spirits had sworn to put him (Porsenna) to death, and that they never would desist from their purpose so long as he remained in the Roman territory. This action is said to have convinced the barbarian of the hopelessness of his enterprise, and induced him to make peace with a nation whom he could never expect to subdue. In this case, Scaevola *disobeyed no law*. He despised the pain which he knew was to be the consequence of his bold and intrepid action. He voluntarily submitted to that pain: and his

disabled hand, throughout his future life, instead of being a memorial of his punishment, became a trophy of his fame.

Hundreds of instances might be mentioned to shew the superiority of the moral law over those prudential rules of conduct which, in ordinary circumstances, are generally observed in deference to the laws of external nature. In cases of unavoidable calamity, by fire, by flood, or by pestilence, we are often imperatively called upon to assist unfortunate sufferers, though with very great danger to ourselves; and even when we fail in such attempts, or fall victims to our own efforts to succour the distressed, the feeling with which our exertions are regarded, is certainly any thing but that of disapprobation. We have obeyed the superior law,—a law from which nothing could excuse us, except a manifest proved impossibility.

But the superiority of the *moral law* shines most conspicuously in cases where attempts have succeeded in the face of difficulties which, antecedently to success, must have defied all calculation. Many instances may be given of heroic courage succeeding in attempts which appeared at the time altogether hopeless. It would be tiresome to repeat a list of cases. I shall refer to one—the well known story of the mother in a Swiss village, whose child was carried off by an eagle to its eyry among some neighbouring rocks. The accident being discovered, some of the most active and enterprising of the young men started to scale the precipice, and endeavour to rescue the unconscious victim; but one after another was compelled to desist, from a conviction that the ascent was impossible. Not so the mother, who, impelled by that mysterious law of love which bound her to her child, was blind to all danger, and could see no impossibility; she thought of nothing but her child, and that she must

save it; and, clinging to the roots of bushes, and projecting points of rock almost invisible, she made her way over precipices which the most adventurous chamois hunter had never trod, gained the nest of the rapacious birds before they commenced their repast, scared them away with her cries, rescued her child, and returned with it safe and unharmed to the terrified and astonished group collected in the valley below.

Mr Combe states, as an example of the *independence* of the laws, the following case:—“The most pious and venerated missionaries, sailing to civilize and Christianize the heathen, may, if they embark in an unsound ship, be drowned by *disobeying* a physical law, without their destruction being arrested by their morality. On the other hand, if the greatest monsters of iniquity were embarked in a staunch and strong ship, and managed it well, they might, and, on the general principles of the government of the world, would escape drowning, in circumstances similar to those which would send the missionaries to the bottom.” All that is perfectly undeniable, but it does not exhaust the case. If good and pious men embark in an unsound ship, knowing it to be unsound, they disobey the laws of *common prudence*, and may expect to suffer the penalty: nay, on their own principles, they are guilty of gross presumption, and of tempting Providence, so that they are doubly culpable. But place the two sets of characters in the same circumstances. Supposing both to set sail in vessels believed to be sea-worthy, but which become leaky, or strike upon a sunken rock, or meet with any other misfortune, Mr Combe himself will admit, that, in such a case, the crew in whom all the powers of intellect, and all the sentiments and propensities are in a sound state, and directed to their proper objects, in strict accordance with the moral law, would be better fitted to take the precautions

necessary to ensure safety, than men who were in the habitual practice of abusing their faculties and indulging in every vice. The one, viewing with calm resignation the prospect of imminent death, would possess their faculties clear and undisturbed; hence they would be able to take all necessary precautions, without hurry or confusion; while the other, tortured with fear and remorse for past misdeeds, would be unable to combine their efforts with any useful effect: and hence, to use Mr Combe's own words, "the former, on the general principles of the government of the world, might escape drowning, in circumstances which would send the wicked and licentious crew to the bottom."

The case of the ship *Griper*, related by Mr Combe, in which the crew were saved from imminent danger, in consequence of "the admirable moral and intellectual condition of their minds," is a direct illustration of this principle; and similar instances will be found in the accounts given of the shipwreck of the *Alceste*, in the Straits of Gasper, in 1816; in that of the burning of the *Kent*, in the Bay of Biscay, in 1829, and various others; while a melancholy instance of a contrary result, arising from the want of proper moral and religious feeling, is shewn in the case of the shipwreck of the *Medusa*, a French frigate, on the coast of Africa, in the same year in which the *Alceste* was wrecked, namely, 1816.

The efficacy of a sound condition and moral state of the faculties, appears in all cases where great exertions are to be made, and when men are placed in circumstances which call forth all their latent energies. Instances of this occur both in offensive and defensive war, (a state which more than almost any thing else rouses the faculties of man, and enables him to exhibit qualities which would otherwise lie dormant,) when the courage inspired by moral considerations has generally

proved superior to mere numerical force. Scarcely any superiority of numbers, even when aided by the highest military skill, has ever proved sufficient to crush a people determined to preserve their religion and their liberties, of which examples may be found in the wars carried on by the arms of Spain against the inhabitants of the Low Countries in the sixteenth century, and the struggles of the Swiss cantons against the house of Austria in the fourteenth.

It is cases like these that redeem history from the reproach of being a mere record of crimes, as they shew what human nature is capable of, in doing and in suffering, when animated by conscientious zeal and moral principle. We feel a deep interest in the fate of those who are unjustly attacked, we deplore their losses, we rejoice in their success ; but whatever may be their varied fortune, we generally find, that, in the end, the plans of the oppressor are baffled, and the cause of justice and humanity triumphs.

In barbarous times, before men were brought fully under subjection to equitable laws and impartial judges, and when disputes were settled by wager of battle, even in this rude mode of determining differences, however absurd it may appear to us, the party who maintained the cause of truth and justice possessed an advantage over his adversary, which in many, perhaps in most cases, had the effect to incline the victory in his favour. The sense of right nerved his arm with double vigour, and inspired him with the confidence of fighting under the protection of Heaven ; while the sense of wrong weighed upon the spirit of his adversary, unsteadied his aim, and weakened the force of his blows. Thus we are told, many, of previously approved courage, have, in such combats, felt themselves unable to exert their usual prowess, and, conscience-stricken, yielded to their

adversaries, and confessed their misdeeds. The poet represents such a character exclaiming, —

Hah ! I am feeble !

Some undone widow sits upon mine arm,
And takes away the use on 't ; and my sword,
Glued to the scabbard with wrong'd orphans' tears,
Will not be drawn.

MASSINGER.

The cowardice of criminals is proverbial. “ The thief believes each bush an officer.” Those who commit any great crime, seem to act as if deprived of their reason. Nothing, in general, can exceed the stupidity of murderers. With every motive for concealment, they generally act in such a manner as to betray their guilt ; and, in the absence of all other evidence, convict themselves by their own folly. Remorse for guilt, joined to the fear of detection, seem to produce a kind of stupefaction, and a confusion of the intellect, which lead to the above results.

These considerations might be sufficient to prove the superiority of the moral law, — to shew that its binding power differs, not merely in degree, but in kind, from that of those rules which we are led to adopt in compliance with the arrangements of external nature ; and that, in some cases, it is even able, within certain limits, to correct and modify their effects. But there is another circumstance which places this matter in a still clearer light : A *Revelation* has been granted to fix and explain the *moral law*, while nothing of the kind has been thought necessary with regard to those inferior prudential rules which bear reference to the laws of physical and organic objects.

III. — *Considerations shewing that a Revealed Law was necessary.*

THAT a moral revelation was necessary cannot be seriously disputed. I have already stated Bishop Butler's opinion as to this; but I wish to shew, that the principles admitted by Dr Spurzheim and Mr Combe lead to the same conclusion. The rules of conduct deducible from the moral feelings, though felt to be strongly binding, are confessedly imperfect. No man possesses *all* the moral and intellectual faculties (from which, and by which alone, these laws can be deduced) in a state of the highest perfection. In the generality of mankind these are more or less defective, and some of them even altogether inoperative. This is not merely the statement of divines, but is acknowledged by Dr Spurzheim and Mr Combe, in various passages of their writings. Mr Combe states, (p. 15, col. 2,) that, "in *most* individuals, one or several of the moral or intellectual organs [faculties] are so deficient in size [power,] in proportion to the organs of the propensities, that their individual perceptions of duty would be far under the highest standard." The doctrine of the Fall, or the universal degeneracy of the human race, is one which Mr Combe has denied, but I submit that it is demonstrated to be true by this very fact. How this should be overlooked by him, is to me perfectly unaccountable; for were there no other evidence on the subject, and were Scripture even silent concerning it, I would have considered this of itself as being almost sufficient to have established the doctrine. The existence of the faculties of veneration, hope, conscientiousness, benevolence, and those other moral feelings which have been denied to the brutes,—supposing it to be, as Mr Combe believes it to be, proved, that such faculties have been conferred upon man,—affords unquestionable

proof that he was created in a state of exalted perfection: the acknowledged deficiency of these sentiments in the generality of mankind, and their evident imperfection even in the best of men, sufficiently prove that he has degenerated, or, in other words, *fallen* from that state.

Dr Spurzheim divides conscience into *absolute* and *individual*: by the former he means what the rule *ought to be*, as dictated by all the moral and intellectual faculties in the most perfect state;* and by the latter, what is dictated by the particular feelings as they exist in each individual; and as these are in no individual case absolutely perfect, it follows, that no man can trust entirely to the dictates of his own conscience,† and hence that there is a necessity for a positive law, fixed by legislation, divine or civil, to be the standard and rule of our actions.

Dr Spurzheim, in his work on the Philosophy of the Mind, asks the question,—“What individual can determine moral evil and moral good; that is, dictate the moral laws?” To which he gives the following remarkable answer,—“I think it is with moral as with all other principles: a blind man cannot establish the principles of colouring, nor one born deaf those of music. The great painter gives the rules of his art, and the great genius for music indicates the laws of harmony. In the same way, he who possesses the faculties proper to man in the highest perfection, and in whose actions they predominate—*he who can challenge the world to convict him*

* “How may conscience be divided? Answer. Into absolute and individual. The first, is conscience, as it ought to be for all men; the second, as its name implies, is the conscience of individuals.”—Spurzheim’s *Natural Laws*, p. 88.

† “Can we trust to the individual consciences of mankind? Answer. No, it is impossible. Many feel very slightly the necessity of being just, and never think of examining actions with relation to rectitude.”—*Ibid.* p. 89.

*of sin,**—has a right to determine moral principles, and to fix rules of moral conduct. Those, therefore, who would make exceptions, and say, ‘Follow my words and not my deeds,’ have no title to give rules of action to the community, or to superintend their practice. How noble was the saying of Christ on this point,—‘*If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not.*’”

I cannot tell what has been in the mind of Dr Spurzheim when he wrote the above passage, — whether he believed that any mere man does, or ever did possess the requisite perfection; or whether he thought a divine revelation necessary. Whatever was his meaning as to this, certainly his statement conforms so far with the Christian system, according to which a being *has* appeared on earth, possessing all the requisites he mentions for enabling him to determine moral principles, and to fix rules of moral conduct; and who has accordingly left us rules and principles which are absolutely perfect, and admit neither of alteration nor improvement.

Mr Combe takes a different view of the subject. He holds, that “the dictates of the moral and intellectual powers, which constitute rules of conduct, are the collective dicta of the highest minds, illuminated with the greatest knowledge.” Where are we to look for these dicta, or how are we to discover and determine which are the highest minds, illuminated with the greatest knowledge? Are they to be self-constituted, or chosen by others? If the latter, by whom is the choice to be made, and how? What is to be the qualification for the vote in electing these representatives of the human race? Are we to have a ten pound franchise? or household or universal suffrage? Alas! looking to the species of wisdom we find in the assemblies so elected, we much fear there will be neither certainty nor unanimity in the decisions of such

* So in the original.

representatives. Those who are the fittest to act and decide, will be last to become candidates for the honour. The oracle, when asked by Cræsus where a really wise and happy man was to be found, referred him to Aglaus; but no one at the court of Cræsus knew, or had ever heard, of such a sage; and, after a long search, he was discovered in an obscure situation, and in a low rank of life, poor but contented, digging in his garden.

Supposing this assembly met, how are they to proceed in settling disputed points? A. has large benevolence, and B. great conscientiousness; and of course they differ as wide as the poles asunder on various questions of criminal legislation, and many other points. How are these questions to be decided? By the vote of a majority? or how? Hundreds of such questions occur, to which no answer can be given, which can be considered authoritative and decisive. The truth is, that the whole is a mere dream. How are we to expect a consistent or harmonious system, embracing the entire range of moral science, proceeding from a collection of various minds, however excellent in their way, yet necessarily, from their organization, taking different views of many points, some of which may be of the first importance, when *here*, on the very threshold, we find a difference so striking between two minds, both of high moral and intellectual qualities, as to the very *means by which a rule is to be attained*? Dr Spurzheim and Mr Combe, both professing the same principles, differ at the first step. One says a rule can only be given by an absolutely perfect being; the other says it is to be obtained by the collective wisdom of all the highest minds. Who shall decide when such doctors disagree?

Nothing can be more certain than the fact, that no perfect system of morals ever has been produced by man's unassisted faculties. The systems of the ancient philo-

sophers are acknowledged to be imperfect. Those which have been produced in modern times are not such as to supply their deficiencies. Volney and Diderot will hardly be said to have succeeded better than Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno. Mr Combe considers that they have failed, because they did not possess a knowledge of the true philosophy of mind. Is the system of Dr Spurzheim, who he imagines to have attained that knowledge, a perfect one, or has he (Mr C.) alone attained perfection?

I may refer to any one who has read the works of both these philosophers, to say, whether either of them have made the least approach to a clear and intelligible, not to say a perfect system. They refer us to sentiments of benevolence, of justice, of veneration, of firmness, and various others which God has implanted in man, and which man alone possesses; and they expatiate most eloquently on the excellence of these sentiments, and speak *in general terms* of a law which they tell us is in harmony with all of them, and with the whole nature of man; but *they are unable to produce a single distinct principle wherein this law consists, without reverting to the language of that very Scripture whose authority they disclaim, and which their system is intended to supersede.* Dr Spurzheim, and also Mr Combe, refer repeatedly to the principle of "doing to others as we would that they should do to us." Where did they find that principle? Have they deduced it fairly from the facts furnished by phrenology, or established it on any other grounds purely philosophical? No such thing. They have *stolen* it, with many others, from Revelation, without the aid of which they would never have been able to work it out. When they do descend to particulars, and endeavour to establish principles of their own, they involve themselves in endless contradictions

and absurdities. The rules they propose contain nothing definite or certain, nothing upon which we can place the smallest reliance. They talk about *justice* without telling us what it means, and *duty* and *obligation*, without explaining what these point at. They talk of the *supremacy* of certain sentiments, while they leave out of view the highest objects to which these sentiments may be directed. They are at variance upon some of the plainest cases, and with reference to the simplest and most important concerns of life. Even the institution of marriage, which forms the very root from which all the other relations of society are derived, is not placed by them on any firm foundation, and all that they say respecting it is of the most loose and unsatisfactory description. The same may be said of the relations between *parent* and *child*, *master* and *servant*, and all the other important relations of life. They give absolutely no rules, they furnish us with no principles which are to guide our conduct in regard to such relations. They do not seem to be aware of this deficiency themselves, for the relations I here speak of are so firmly established in society, as now constituted, that they seem to have taken them for granted, without ever looking for a foundation for them in their new system. But when we come to cases of a more complicated kind, —to questions regarding property, and other rights, civil or political,—we see they are completely bewildered, and that they are embarked in a sea without a shore, and that they are without a chart, without a compass, and without a rudder.

What, then, becomes of the boast, that the natural laws are *universal*, *invariable*, and *unbending*? Perhaps this might be the case if we could ascertain what they are; but we have the acknowledgment of the supporters of the system themselves, that this is not the case, and

that we have the laws still to seek. With regard to the physical and organic laws, and the relative laws of human conduct to be derived from these, it is *admitted*, that we are so much in the dark, that they may not be discovered for an innumerable series of years. And as to the moral law, our condition is even worse, as our teachers are not even agreed by what means its dictates are to be discovered. We are, then, shut up to the conviction, that a revelation was necessary. The moral law, originally written in distinct and legible characters upon man's heart and conscience, having become defaced by the corruption of his nature, a *republication* of it by a revelation was necessary. And such a revelation and republication have been granted, not once only, but on two memorable occasions: first, at the original delivery of the law to the Israelites by Moses, amidst the thunders of Sinai; and secondly, by this having received the fullest confirmation and sanction from the Son of God himself, by whom it has been explained and illustrated in a more perfect manner, and its authority extended over the whole human race. This *moral law*, thus doubly revealed and republished, with every sanction of supreme authority, does, in fact, possess all the characters which have been arrogated to belong to the "natural laws,"—namely, it is UNIVERSAL, INVARIABLE, HARMONIOUS in itself, *conformable* to the most perfect *moral feeling*, and to the most perfect *reason*, and in the strictest sense DIVINE.

IV.—*Perfection and Invariableness of the Revealed Law.*

It has been the fashion, among writers who do not admit the doctrinal part of Christianity, to speak highly in praise of the pure and simple, yet sublime morality, of the New Testament. Dr Spurzheim, in several

passages, bears testimony to its excellence; and he states, that pure Christianity (meaning thereby Christian morality) surpasses all other revealed religions in every kind of perfection, and that it stands the scrutiny of reason.* It is, however, generally held by him, that the morality of the New Testament is infinitely superior to that of the Old.† If this were true, it would argue an imperfection in the original revelation, and prove, that the revealed law is neither universal nor invariable. Dr Spurzheim asks, “Do the religious and moral precepts of the New Testament surpass those of the Old in perfection and excellence?” And he answers, “Whoever will compare the qualities attributed to the Supreme Being, regard the spirit of the laws contained, and observe the means proposed for teaching these, in each, must inevitably recognize the infinite superiority of the doctrines of Christianity.” Now, whether we are to judge by one or another, or all of these criteria, it may be proved, in the clearest manner, that this is a mistake. What are the *qualities* attributed to God in the Old Testament? Is he not described as the “Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering and abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity, and transgression, and sin.”‡ In another place he is described as “visiting the iniquities of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate him; but shewing mercy unto thousands of them that love him, and keep his commandments.”§ “The Lord is merciful and gracious, slow to anger, and plenteous in mercy. Like as a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear him.”|| And again, “The Lord is gracious and full of compassion; slow to anger and of great mercy. The

* Nat. Laws, p. 196.

† Ibid. p. 213.

‡ Exodus, xxxiv. 6, 7.

§ Exodus, xx. 5.

|| Psalm ciii. 8—13.

Lord is good to all, and his tender mercies are over all his works.”* Are there any qualities attributed to God in the New Testament different from the above? Can there be any superior, or any that can more thoroughly impress us with love and reverence for his name?

Again, if we regard the *spirit of the laws* contained in the Old Testament, we shall find not merely that they are no way inferior to the precepts in the New, but that they are identically the same. For what do we find declared to be the two great commandments, on which our Saviour has told us “hang all the law and the prophets?” They are the following,—“Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind; and thy neighbour as thyself.” And what else do the precepts of the New Testament inculcate, but love to God, and love to man? The great and comprehensive precept of our Lord, “to do to others as we would have them to do to us,” is just a different mode of expressing the Old Testament commandment to “love our neighbour as ourselves.” The two precepts are identical; but the way in which the rule is put by our Saviour is more easily understood, and more readily applied, so as to have an influence on the heart and the practice of believers. Many practical rules of conduct may be quoted from the Old Testament, corresponding exactly with the precepts of the New, such as the well known one in Micah, “He hath shewn thee, O man, what is good; and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?”†

The real superiority in the New Testament does not lie in the laws themselves, but in the more full explanation and application of those laws, which had already

* Psalm cxlv. 7, 8.

† Micah, vi. 8.

been distinctly promulgated by Moses and the Prophets, and in the more clear revelation of those sanctions by which obedience to them is inculcated and enforced. Thus, in reference to the law "to love our neighbour as ourself," the Jews understood this only to refer to their dealings with those of their own nation. But Christ at once undeceived them in this respect. When asked by the lawyer, "But who is my neighbour?" he replied by relating the parable of the good Samaritan, an individual of a nation with whom the Jews had no dealings, whom they utterly despised and hated, — thus unequivocally intimating, that all men, of every country, are in this sense, and in reference to this command, our neighbours, and that the precept is of universal application. And again, in reference to the special commandments of the second table of the law, he shews, that it is not merely the outward act that is commanded or forbidden, but that the commandments are intended to reach to the thoughts and intentions of the heart. This is in fact neither any addition to, or extension of, the original law, as contained in the Old Testament: for unless a thick veil had been on their hearts, the Jews might have seen, that all this was included in the precept, to love our neighbour as ourselves. And the very same thing is contained in the tenth commandment, which is expressly directed against all irregular and inordinate desires of the heart and the affections.

One great point in which the precepts and the morality of the Old Testament are supposed to differ from those in the New, is the greater stress which is generally imagined to be laid in the latter on the virtues of meekness, patience, and forgiveness of injuries. But even here there is really no difference in the sentiments inculcated, but only — what might be expected — their being more fully explained and emphatically enforced

in the teaching of our Saviour, than in the words of the old prophets.

The sentence, "Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth," is quoted verbatim from the 37th Psalm. "The meek *shall inherit the earth*, and shall delight themselves in the abundance of peace."

So far in regard to those general moral laws which, though delivered in the first instance to the Israelites, were intended for and suited to the circumstances of all mankind. These are, in the strictest sense, universal, invariable, and unbending. As to those particular enactments specially directed and intended for the chosen people, though they contain many peculiarities suited to their situation, and the purposes which, in God's providence, they were destined to serve in the economy of the world, it can be shewn, that the general *spirit* of the laws is the same; and that they are composed on the same principles as those which have dictated the precepts of the New Testament. In the Roman law, which may be considered as the most perfect code that ever was framed by any heathen nation, a broad distinction is drawn between those rules of conduct which are demanded by *justice*, and those which are dictated by *benevolence*. Though conformity to both is considered right and proper, it is the first only that the law interferes to enforce by positive regulations; the latter is left to individual feeling and public opinion. The first are termed the *jus expletrix*; the other, the *jus attributrix*: the rights in the one case being full and complete, and definable by strict rules; those in the other, not being considered so definable. In the Jewish law, on the contrary, there are positive regulations by which acts of benevolence *towards man and beast*, are in many cases rendered imperative, and this is believed to be the case in the laws of no other ancient nation. The following instances may be quoted:—

“ If thou meet thine enemy’s ox or his ass going astray, thou shalt surely bring it back to him again.

“ If thou see the ass of him that hateth thee lying under his burden, and wouldest forbear to help him ; thou shalt surely help with him.”

“ Also thou shalt not oppress a stranger ; for ye know the heart of a stranger, seeing ye were strangers in the land of Egypt.”*

In the following laws, regard is not only had to the dictates of benevolence ; but to the laws of nature, by which every thing, animate and inanimate, is made to require occasional *rest* ; even the land, by unceasing crops, becoming unproductive.

“ Six years thou shalt sow thy land, and shalt gather in the fruits thereof : But the seventh year thou shalt let it *rest and lie still ; that the poor of thy people may eat : and what they leave, the beasts of the field shall eat*. In like manner thou shalt deal with thy vineyard, and with thy oliveyard.

“ Six days thou shalt do thy work, and on the seventh day thou shalt rest ; *that thine ox and thine ass may rest, and the son of thy handmaid and the stranger may be refreshed*.”†

“ Thou shalt not pervert the judgment of the stranger, nor of the fatherless ; *nor take the widow’s raiment to pledge*.”‡

“ When thou cuttest down thine harvest in thy field, and hast forgot a sheaf in the field, thou shalt not go again to fetch it ; *it shall be for the stranger, for the fatherless, and for the widow : that the Lord thy God may bless thee in all the work of thine hands*.

“ When thou beatest thine olive tree, thou shalt not go over the boughs again : it shall be for the stranger, for the fatherless, and for the widow.

* Exod. xxiii. 4, 5, 9.

† Exod. xxii. 10—12.

‡ Deut. xxiv. 17.

“When thou gatherest the grapes of thy vineyard, thou shalt not glean it afterward : it shall be for the stranger, for the fatherless, and for the widow.”*

These are dictates of benevolence, such as have never occurred to other lawgivers to establish as laws, but plainly suggested by the most profound wisdom.† And, as addressed to the Israelites, the following reason for them is stated, giving them, in their case, an additional sanction ; and, as in many other instances, rendering their laws a perpetual memorial of the remarkable events of their history. “Thou shalt remember that thou wert a bondman in the land of Egypt ; and the Lord thy God redeemed thee hence : therefore, I command thee to do this thing.”

From the above, it will, I think, be evident, that both the general moral law, and the peculiar national institutions delivered to the Israelites, are precisely the same in substance and in spirit as the precepts of the New Testament ; and that the only superiority in the latter, consists in the more full explanation and clearer enforcement of their mild and beneficent principles. I am aware of only one exception, in which a special rule, relaxed in the case of the ancient Jews, is more rigidly and strictly enforced upon the followers of Christ. In reference to the law of marriage, the former were permitted in certain cases to put away their wives, by giving them a writing of divorcement. But this is said to have been permitted solely on account of the “hardness of their hearts.” The Jews, at the time this law was promulgated, were a rude and semi-barbarous people. They had been for upwards of a century in a state of servitude to the Egyptians, and during the latter part of that

* Deut. xxiv. 19—21.

† This has been overlooked by Dr Chalmers in his argument against the Poor Laws. See *Natural Theology*, vol. ii. pp. 113—119.

period, the servitude had been of a very hard and galling description, — a state which was incompatible with much refinement of manners or sentiment. If among such a people marriage had been altogether indissoluble, it might have given rise to much domestic cruelty; and rude uncivilized men might not have hesitated to rid themselves of wives they hated, by putting them to death. On this account, not because in itself right or proper, but to avoid a worse evil, *permission* of divorce was given under certain conditions. But in the case of Christians, this permission is recalled; and it is positively declared, that divorce shall not be allowed for any reason, except that of conjugal infidelity.

On this subject Dr Spurzheim, and it is believed also Mr Combe, hold opinions at variance with the Christian code. Dr Spurzheim, in his Catechism, has the following question:—"Is divorce permitted by natural morality?" Answer, "Yes. The couples which have no family, or which can provide for the children they may have, in as far as justice requires, do well to separate rather than to live in perpetual warfare;" and he adds reasons for this opinion, which I need not quote. Mr Combe says nothing on this subject in his present work; but in his lectures on Moral Philosophy, delivered in the course of last winter, he has, I understand, advocated the right of divorce. He says, in his book,* that "as far as he can perceive, the dictates of the natural laws and those of revelation coincide in all matters relating to practical duties in temporal affairs." Now, here is a most important matter, relating to the first practical concern of human life, in which Dr Spurzheim and Mr Combe, our great authorities in regard to the natural laws, have stated a rule directly

* Page 10, col. 2.

contrary to that delivered to us in the most express terms by Christ himself.*

But in comparing the law revealed in the Scriptures with the natural laws as now explained and promulgated

* The manner in which this is done is the most express and unequivocal that can be conceived, and cannot be softened or explained away by any ingenuity. The rule is distinctly stated in St Matthew's Gospel in the Sermon on the Mount,—“It hath been said, Whosoever shall put away his wife, let him give her a writing of divorcement: But I say unto you, That whosoever shall put away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, causeth her to commit adultery: and whosoever shall marry her that is divorced committeth adultery.”† Some additional particulars with regard to this are mentioned by St Mark, as having been stated by Christ on another occasion. “And the Pharisees came to him, and asked him, Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife? tempting him. And he answered and said unto them, What did Moses command you? And they said, Moses *suffered* to write a bill of divorcement, and to put her away. And Jesus answered and said unto them, For the hardness of your heart he wrote you this precept: But from the beginning of the creation God made them male and female. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and cleave to his wife; and they twain shall be one flesh: so then they are no more twain, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder. And in the house his disciples asked him again of the same matter: And he saith unto them, Whosoever shall put away his wife, and marry another, committeth adultery against her: And if a woman shall put away her husband and be married to another, she committeth adultery.”‡ The law as revealed, then, is quite clear: At the first, even at the creation, the institution of marriage was formed, and declared to be indissoluble. Moses, in the case of the Jews, and on account of the hardness of their hearts, permitted divorce to prevent greater evils; but Christ *restored the original law*, and to that his followers are bound to pay obedience. That this law, as now understood and adhered to in Christian countries, is founded on the most impregnable grounds of reason and justice, and is the rule best suited to promote the welfare of man and the ends of civil society, is, I conceive, demonstrable; but it has pleased Dr Spurzheim and Mr Combe to think otherwise, and to conceive themselves wiser than the great founder of our faith. The question would require to be discussed at greater length than is possible in this little work: I merely state the point here to shew, that Mr Combe is wrong in supposing that his views on every point coincide with the dictates of revelation.

† Matthew, v. 31, 32.

‡ Mark, x. 2—12.

by Mr Combe, it is necessary to state, that the latter are not only vague and imperfect so far as they go, and infinitely inferior in distinctness and precision to those simple and sublime rules of conduct delivered to us by the inspired writers ; but that they are defective in so far as they omit one whole branch of our duties, and that the most important of all. The very highest rules, if rules they can be called, which are stated by Dr Spurzheim or Mr Combe as the guides of our conduct, regard merely our intercourse with our fellow-men, or the improvement of our own faculties. They are altogether silent with regard to another, and a higher branch of duty,—that, namely, which has reference to our connection and intercourse with our Divine Creator, and which regards another and a future state of existence. This is the more inexcusable, inasmuch as, according to the system of mental philosophy which they have adopted, and which they conceive to be so much superior to any thing that has hitherto been proposed, a particular class of faculties has been given, expressly, as it would appear, to connect us with the invisible world. These are, the faculties of *veneration*, *hope*, and *wonder*, which are placed by themselves among the highest of the faculties peculiar to man, and whose objects and purpose must therefore be of the highest dignity and importance ; and yet, according to them, no functions are assigned to these faculties of the smallest practical utility.

If there be, as I hold undoubtedly there is, a faculty of *veneration*, its highest, and indeed its only proper object, must be the Supreme Being, who alone possesses all the qualities to exercise and to gratify such a feeling in the fullest extent.

If there be a faculty of *hope*, giving us the desire of future and distant good to ourselves and others, then its highest and only proper gratification must have reference

to a future state of existence. It is impossible that such a feeling—so strong and irrepressible, so sweet in the enjoyment it conveys, and so insatiable in the desires and aspirations it gives rise to,—could have been conferred, if all these aspirations were to be confined to the present short and unsatisfactory state, and its gratification finally crushed by the prospect of an event, which is close at hand with every one of us—the inevitable fate which awaits us all—the natural death of the body.

If a faculty of *wonder* has been conferred, to direct our attention to matters which we cannot thoroughly understand—to things which we see but in part, and know but in part, and which we can here only contemplate as through a glass, darkly, and which inspires the most intense desire and curiosity to know those things more thoroughly,—this, I conceive, affords a proof, that in some way or another, and if not now, in some other state of existence, these desires will be more fully gratified—when that which is now dark will be more plainly revealed, and that which is now mysterious will be more fully explained—and when new causes of wonder will arise in endless and inexhaustible succession.

These are the natural hopes, feelings, and desires, to which these faculties give rise; but for them the system of Mr Combe has provided no gratification, no exercise, *no intelligible use*. He has assigned, and according to his principles, by which he confines himself strictly to the present visible world, and the province of our bodily senses, he can assign no laws for their exercise, as he points out no objects upon which they can be adequately exercised.

But what is wanting in Mr Combe's system, is supplied by revelation. The proper and legitimate objects of these faculties, and the laws by which they are to be exercised, have both been revealed, and in that revelation

are placed in the first rank. As the moral laws are superior to the physical and organic, so those laws which relate to our connection with the things which are unseen and eternal, are superior to the moral. Their obligation is in the strictest sense *supreme*. Obedience to them is to be sought in the first place, because it includes, or necessarily leads to all other obedience.

The first great law having relation to the Divine Being, is that which has already been quoted,—"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart." This includes the whole; but in condescension to human weakness and ignorance, it has been enforced by three great practical commands,—forbidding the acknowledgment of other gods—the worship of idols—and the irreverent or unnecessary use of the name of the Supreme Being. The purpose of these commands is obvious, as guarding against the three great offences into which mankind are liable to fall in relation to this subject,—polytheism, idolatry, and blasphemy. A fourth injunction is added, which has a double reference to things divine and human,—the setting aside one day in seven, as a day of rest from secular employments, and to be devoted principally to the worship of God, the study of his law, and the contemplation of the wonders of his works. These four laws, if steadily observed, will not fail to cherish and keep alive in our hearts that reverence towards God, admiration of his wisdom, wonder at his greatness and power, and gratitude for all his mercies, that go to form the complex feeling which we express by the words worship and adoration. This feeling is imperfect, unless *all our faculties* are more or less engaged in it, all the feelings which can be brought into harmony with respectful love and reverence, all our hopes and fears, all our feelings of attachment, of confidence, of firm and abiding faith,—all these must be

called into activity in order to the right performance of an act of adoration, and are necessary to a compliance with the command to love the Lord our God with all our heart.

This, we are told, is the *first* and *great commandment* of the law. We do not rise to a compliance with this by first obeying other laws ; but if we are able to attain this, it of itself will lead to all other obedience. If we love God, we must desire to please him, and to avoid whatever is contrary to his will, and, consequently, the love of God leads necessarily to all righteousness. He himself has said, “ If ye love me, keep my commandments, and this is my commandment that ye love one another ;” and if we love one another, we will, of course, do no wrong one to another, but rather good, bearing one another’s burdens. If we love him, and feel a constant sense of reverence towards him, we will endeavour to maintain personal purity, that we may be able to render him acceptable service. Personal purity, and zeal and activity in well-doing, lead to a clearness of the understanding, and a sound condition of all the faculties, and this to attention to all minor points by which these may be best cultivated and preserved.

If, therefore, we would improve the condition of man, the true mode of proceeding is to begin by improving, exercising, and strengthening his religious sentiments, and directing them to their proper objects. From this, as from a pure and hallowed fountain, will naturally flow every other kind of improvement. The diligent and persevering use of those means which have been pointed out as enabling us to obtain the aid of spiritual influences, has been experienced to be effectual in promoting this improvement in the case of individuals, and that to a degree amounting to a complete change of character ; and if this has been the case in individual instances, no

reason can be stated why the same effects may not follow in regard to the race in general, if the same means were diligently applied, and steadily and consistently persevered in through a series of ages; and hence, no bounds can be set to the improvement of the world, which may be finally expected from the universal diffusion of Christianity.

CHAPTER V.

ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE HUMAN FACULTIES, CONSIDERED IN RELATION
TO THEIR RESPECTIVE OBJECTS.

MAN is composed of an organized body and a reasonable soul, and is endowed with capacities and powers, animal, rational, moral, and religious.

Mr Combe has considered his constitution in all these different respects except the last. He considers man merely in his relations with external objects in the present life. He looks exclusively to what is within the province of the bodily senses. He confines his views, as to space, to the surface of the earth which we at present inhabit; and, as to time, so far as regards the individual, to the miserable span of seventy or eighty years, which, so far as mere sense is concerned, appears to comprehend the term of our existence.

There would be less objection to this mode of considering the subject, if he were merely silent in regard to those mighty themes which are suggested by the ideas of an unseen and a future world; but this, I am sorry to say, is not the case. He alludes to them, no doubt, and most properly states that they belong to the province of

revelation ; but he does not leave the matter there. He not only makes no attempt to shew a correspondence between what revelation teaches on these important subjects, and the conclusions of natural science, but he takes every opportunity, as far as his ability extends, of turning the latter, openly or covertly, into a weapon of attack against the credibility of the former. We have already seen how far he has attempted this in regard to the scriptural doctrines of the original perfection, the fall and the consequent degeneracy, of man, and we have seen that he has signally failed in this attempt. We shall afterwards have occasion to consider other instances of the same kind, in the conclusions he has drawn with regard to the paradisaical state, and his views respecting death, and the future prospects of the human race. These need not be farther anticipated here.

Even though he had merely been silent on these subjects, and had confined his attention strictly, as he professes to do, to the present life, and to what lies within the province of the senses, I would have considered such a view of man, and his relations to other objects, to be eminently defective, inasmuch as it omits by far the most important of these objects and relations. The omission is inexcusable. Mr Combe cannot allege that speculation on these subjects, in a general way, is unphilosophical ; for the most eminent philosophers of ancient times, Socrates, Plato, and others, who were ignorant of a revelation, shewed that, by the light of natural reason alone, man could arrive at conclusions, very nearly, if not altogether, amounting to demonstration, on the subject of a future state, as well as on the existence of a God. And it will be afterwards shewn, that the natural arguments for both are greatly strengthened by the discoveries of Phrenology. Taking into view,

then, both these peculiarities in Mr Combe's system,—the arguments for a future state *omitted*, which plainly lay in his way, and to which he has himself referred in other publications, and the arguments openly stated, or covertly insinuated, *against* it, which lay entirely out of his way,—we can only surmise his determination to be, to exclude it as something that is absurd and incredible, or which, if believed at all, is to be believed without evidence; and which, therefore, must be unworthy of the consideration of a rational being.

I shall pass over what he says respecting man as a physical and organized being, as there is nothing in regard to these upon which we materially differ. He has pointed out some correspondences between our bodily frame and external objects, evincing a wise and benevolent adaptation of the one to the other, as many other authors have done before him. This is a most interesting subject, and is still far from being exhausted, many minute correspondences existing which have not yet been adverted to; but enough has been done in this field of inquiry to establish beyond all dispute or cavil the infinite wisdom, power, and goodness of the Creator. This, as Lord Bacon says, is an excellent argument, and has been exceedingly well handled by diverse, and I do not see that there is any thing in Mr Combe's views which has added much either to our knowledge or conviction on the subject.

Leaving, therefore, those points on which there is no difference of opinion, I proceed at once to the consideration of the mental faculties of man. And here, as I stated in the preface, I adopt substantially the same system as Mr Combe, namely, that which has been gradually evolved and deduced from the observations and discoveries of Gall and Spurzheim. Like him, I assume this doctrine to be founded in truth, and “con-

sider it to afford the clearest, the most complete, and the best supported system of human nature which has hitherto been taught." I have, therefore, taken it for the basis of my views, but it will be seen that the conclusions I draw from it are very different from his. The public will now have an opportunity of judging which of these are the most sound and philosophical.

As I am here arguing with a believer in Phrenology, I need not enter into a statement of the evidence on which it is founded. I have here Mr Combe on my side. He considers the evidence sufficient, and so do I. He has, in his various writings, stated the evidences originally adduced by the founders of the science, and added many original observations of his own, confirming and illustrating their views. He has strenuously, and I think successfully, answered the common objections to the doctrine, as leading to materialism, atheism, and fatalism. It is, therefore, unnecessary here to enter into these objections, and various others, which have been refuted over and over again, and which the opponents of the system seem to have at last abandoned.

As to those who are unacquainted with the science, who have not examined its evidences, and have not as yet adopted its doctrines, I may propose the scheme of the faculties which it exhibits as one which corresponds with what we find in nature. Let it be adopted, if they will, as a theory, which, as far as it goes, explains a great number of the mental phenomena; and it does not appear that they can reasonably object to it, until they are able to produce a better, or one which shall explain the phenomena more perfectly. To those who wish to study the subject, to examine the evidence, and judge for themselves, I must refer to the original works of the discoverers, Gall and Spurzheim, and to those of Mr Combe himself, so far as they treat of the evidences; but

above all, I must recommend the careful and diligent observation of nature after the method pointed out by these writers, there being no possibility of arriving at any fixed or sound belief on the subject, without such careful and continued observation.

I shall now proceed to the enumeration of the faculties, as revealed to us by phrenological observation. Mr Combe has, in his work, gone over the whole of them two or three times; first stating them as divided into *propensities*, *sentiments*, and *intellectual faculties*; next, giving a view of these as compared with each other, and in order to prove the supremacy of the moral sentiments and intellect; and, lastly, stating them as compared with external objects. It is needless at present to follow him through all his details. I shall therefore adopt, as the basis of my remarks, his first enumeration, giving his statement of the faculties, their uses and abuses, in his own words, and afterwards adding any thing which I may think material to be noticed, which he has either omitted, or stated more positively than the observed facts appear to me to warrant.

“ORDER I.—FEELINGS.

“GENUS I.—PROPENSITIES, *common to man with the lower animals.*

“THE LOVE OF LIFE.

“APPETITE FOR FOOD.—*Uses*, nutrition.—*Abuses*, Gluttony and drunkenness.”

Note. This last appears to me to be a mistake. I would say that the abuses of this faculty are gluttony and *epicurism*. Drunkenness, or the abuse or excess of stimulating and intoxicating substances, such as spirits, opium, tobacco, and the like, pro-

ceeds from a different cause. It arises from the love of excitement, and depends, not upon one, but upon the *whole* organs of the brain, which are all, without exception, subject to the exciting effects produced by these substances.

“1. AMATIVENESS, produces sexual love.”

“2. PHILOPROGENITIVENESS.—*Uses* : affection for young and tender beings.—*Abuses* : pampering and spoiling children.”

Note. The peculiar objects of this feeling seem to be the young of our own species in general, but particularly our own offspring. It is generally stronger in the female than in the male, which is evidently a wise provision, as the principal care of young children necessarily devolves upon the female. Its abuse in pampering and spoiling children, arises solely from ignorance; for when properly enlightened by intellect, there can be no doubt that this faculty would lead us to consult the permanent welfare of the child, in preference to the indulgence of his present wishes and immediate feelings.

“3. CONCENTRATIVENESS.—*Uses* : It gives the desire of permanence in place, and renders permanent emotions and ideas in the mind.—*Abuses* : aversion to move abroad; morbid dwelling on internal emotions and ideas, to the neglect of external impressions.”

Note. This faculty was originally termed *inhabitiveness*, because its organ is found to be large in men and animals who are attached to particular spots, and averse to change of place. This is the sole function attributed to the faculty by Gall and Spurzheim. Mr Combe is of opinion that its proper function is the power of concentrating various faculties upon one subject, or in the performance of one act, and that the aversion to motion is only a consequence of

this concentration of thought. Phrenologists are not yet agreed upon the point, and much careful observation would be required to set it properly at rest.

“4. ADHESIVENESS. *Uses*: attachment, friendship, and society result from it. *Abuses*: clanship for improper objects, attachment to worthless individuals. It is generally strong in women.”

Note. This faculty gives a tendency to form strong attachments to individuals of our own species; but if this gratification is denied, it may shew itself in attachment to some of the inferior animals. In general, it inclines us to love those who love us; but this reciprocity of affection is not always necessary. It may also give rise to a love of our native country or district, and, along with the last mentioned faculty, to the feeling and the love of *home*. Joined to the sexual propensity, it leads, even among the most ignorant savages, to a kind of marriage, or, at least, a permanent union between individuals of opposite sex. Hence it appears that this institution has a foundation in the nature of man, and is suited to the human faculties. Other faculties, however, particularly *conscientiousness*, *firmness*, and *veneration*, united to positive, legal, and divine sanctions, are necessary to give the institution that peculiarly sacred and binding character which it has in all civilized countries.

“5. COMBATIVENESS.—*Uses*: courage to meet danger, and overcome difficulties; tendency to oppose and attack whatever requires opposition, and to resist unjust encroachments.—*Abuses*: love of contention, and tendency to provoke assault.” Mr Combe adds,—“This faculty obviously adapts man to a world in which danger and difficulty abound.”

Note. The tendency of this last observation will be seen afterwards. That it is true in man's present state need not be disputed; but Mr Combe draws conclusions from it which do not legitimately follow, with regard to the unfitness of such a faculty for a paradisaical state. This point will be considered in the sequel.

“6. DESTRUCTIVENESS.—*Uses*: desire to destroy noxious objects, and to kill for food. It is very discernible in carnivorous animals.—*Abuses*: cruelty, murder, desire to torment, tendency to passion, harshness and severity in speech and writing.”

Note. This faculty is by no means limited to the desire of destroying living beings. It gives the desire of destroying generally, and of breaking or rending any object, animate or inanimate, and is not only capable of many legitimate uses, as in quarrying, mining, clearing forests, cutting roads, &c. but its employment is indispensable to the production of the simplest article which man is able to construct; it not being possible for human ingenuity to form any structure or fabric but by breaking, dividing, or otherwise destroying those substances which are employed as its materials. Among the abuses of this propensity may be mentioned, that innate love of mischief which is possessed in a strong degree by some individuals, and which is shewn sometimes in the wanton defacement of statues, and other ornamental works.

Mr Combe here adds a remark of a similar tendency to that which he makes in regard to Combativeness. “This feeling places man in harmony with death and destruction, which are woven into the system of sublunary creation.” To this I make the same answer as in the last case. Though it be

true, as man is now situated, it does not follow that it may have been so always, there being abundant legitimate exercise for a destroying faculty without the destruction of life.

In his System of Phrenology, Mr Combe mentions, that “Destructiveness has been regarded by some phrenologists as communicating a more general species of energy to the mind. In endeavouring to trace analogically the manner in which it produces this last effect, it has been supposed to give an impatient craving for excitement: a desire to vent the mind, as it were, on something; a feeling which would be delighted with smashing and turmoil, or with any great irregular commotion, rather than with the listlessness of repose.” He afterwards observes, — “The *real* effect of Destructiveness seems to be, to communicate ability to act with energy in certain situations in which, with that organ small, the individual would be completely paralyzed. In this way it may add *vigour*, even to the manifestations of benevolence,” &c. This is just one of the instances in which it is seen that we really are not yet arrived at a clear and accurate knowledge of the real extent and scope of many of the faculties. We see their general tendency; but of their exact limits and functions we have in many cases no very definite idea. Mr Combe here mentions, that *some* phrenologists are of this opinion with regard to Destructiveness; and I may state, that I am one of the number. I think it probable that both *combativeness* and *destructiveness* are general powers, communicating different kinds of energy to the mind, and giving rise to a delight in the exhibition of power, physical or mental. I have elsewhere likened them to the steam required for the

working of the mental machinery, of which *combateness* may be considered as acting on the *low* pressure, and *destructiveness* on the *high* pressure principle. I merely state this as a supposition which is still to be tried and proved; and much consideration and careful observation may be required to enable us to ascertain its truth or falsehood.

“ 7. SECRETIVENESS. — *Uses* : Tendency to restrain within the mind the various emotions and ideas that involuntarily present themselves, until the judgment has approved of giving them utterance. It is simply the tendency to conceal, and is an ingredient in prudence. — *Abuses* : Cunning, deceit, duplicity, and lying.”

“ 8. ACQUISITIVENESS. — *Uses* : Desire to possess, and tendency to accumulate articles of utility, to provide against want. — *Abuses* : Inordinate desire of property, selfishness, avarice, theft.”

Note. This faculty has no reference either to providing against want, or appropriating what belongs to others. It seems to give rise to the feeling of *property*, and to the desire of *acquiring*, without reference to the means by which the acquisition is to be made, or the purposes to which it is to be applied; and hence, it requires to be regulated by the *sense of justice* and other higher feelings, and by intellect.

“ 9. CONSTRUCTIVENESS. — *Uses* : Desire to build and construct works of art. — *Abuses* : Construction of engines to injure or destroy, and fabrication of objects to deceive mankind.”

Note. This faculty not only gives the *desire*, but the *talent* for constructing. Its organ lies between those of the propensities and lower intellectual faculties, and its function partakes of the nature of

both. In regard to the construction of engines to destroy, and objects to deceive, these are not abuses of *constructiveness*, but of other faculties which employ its powers for improper purposes. There may be an abuse of this faculty in the excessive indulgence of the tendency to construct for the mere pleasure which it affords, without a regard to utility, and spending time and money in executing laborious works, without end or object.

“ GENUS II. SENTIMENTS.

“ 1. *Sentiments common to Man with the Lower Animals.*”

Note. It may be remarked, that it is only *certain species* of the lower animals which possess any of the sentiments now to be mentioned. They should therefore be called, sentiments common to man, and *some of* the lower animals.

“ 10. SELF-ESTEEM.—*Uses*: Self-respect, self-interest, love of independence, sense of personal dignity.—*Abuses*: Pride, disdain, overweening conceit, excessive selfishness, love of dominion.

“ 11. LOVE OF APPROBATION.—*Uses*: Desire of the esteem of others, love of praise, desire of fame or glory.—*Abuses*: Vanity, ambition, thirst for praise independently of praise-worthiness.

“ 12. CAUTIOUSNESS.—*Uses*: It gives origin to the sentiment of fear, the desire to shun danger, and circumspection; and it is an ingredient in prudence.—*Abuses*: Excessive timidity, poltroonery, unfounded apprehensions, despondency, melancholy.”

Note. It may be added, that the gratification of this

faculty is the *sense of security* ; and that it gives rise to a high degree of pleasure, when we find ourselves completely surrounded by a defence which keeps all danger at a distance.

“13. BENEVOLENCE.—*Uses* : Desire of the happiness of others, universal charity, mildness of disposition, and a lively sympathy with the enjoyment of all animated beings.—*Abuses* : Profusion, injurious indulgence of the appetites and fancies of others, prodigality, facility of temper.”

Note. We may add to the *uses* of this feeling, compassion for the distressed, impelling us to use every exertion for the relief of suffering and sorrow ; hospitality and kindness to strangers.

It may be mentioned here shortly, that though the faculties or feelings hitherto mentioned, are said to be *common to man and some of the lower animals*, they are in man so modified by his higher sentiments and superior intellect, that they almost appear different feelings. This is particularly observable in the sentiments just noticed, which have a totally different scope and range in man, from what they have in the animals. The *love of approbation* of the dog, for instance, has its highest aim and reward in the encouraging looks and gestures of his master. In man, it aims at universal and never-dying fame. *Benevolence*, in animals, amounts to no more than passive meekness and good nature. In man, it excites a lively grief for the distresses of others, and the most energetic efforts for the relief of suffering. In all the feelings, even the lowest, it is not to be forgotten that, in man, they are HUMAN feelings, necessary and good in their legitimate sphere, and only leading to

evii when they are abused by excess, or exercised in opposition to higher principles.

“ II. *Sentiments proper to Man.*

“ 14. VENERATION. — *Uses* : Tendency to venerate or respect whatever is great and good ; gives origin to religious adoration. — *Abuses* : Senseless respect for unworthy objects consecrated by time or situation, love of antiquated customs, abject subserviency to persons in authority, superstitious awe.”

Note. Mr Combe elsewhere mentions, that the highest object of this faculty is the Divine Being, and he assumes the existence of God as capable of demonstration. I would add here, that this faculty has obviously been conferred upon man, to qualify him for some degree of intercourse with his Maker. It is not satisfied with that limited greatness and perfection which is to be found even in the highest characters among men, which are never altogether without alloy, but leads us irresistibly, on the wings of contemplation, to a Being all-powerful, all-wise, and all-good. When the sentiment is powerful, it is not satisfied with a mere intellectual perception of these qualities, but seeks to pour forth its aspirations in prayer and praise. This is its proper and legitimate exercise, and affords at once its highest duty, and its highest gratification.

To the abuses of the faculty mentioned by Mr Combe, I would add, that it leads to undue deference to the opinions and reasonings of men who are fallible like ourselves—the worship of false gods, polytheism, paganism, idolatry.

“ 15. FIRMNESS. — *Uses* : Determination, perseve-

rance, steadiness of purpose. — *Abuses* : Stubbornness, infatuation, tenacity in evil.”

Note. This is one of the most important faculties we possess. It is indispensable to the attainment of every kind of excellence, physical, moral, and intellectual. Without perseverance or firmness of purpose, we cannot attain proficiency in any pursuit, either in the mechanic arts, or those connected with taste and imagination. The juggler who tosses up six balls in the air, and makes them perform circles round his head, and the violin player who entrances his audience with the concord of sweet sounds, only attain excellence in their respective walks, by the most intense perseverance directed for half a lifetime to an exclusive object. The same may be said of the scholar, the orator, or the actor. In short, the rule is universal.

In morals, an individual possessing the best sentiments of benevolence, conscientiousness, &c. will not act a uniformly consistent and truly moral part, unless with the aid of *firmness*, which enables him to withstand feelings of a different kind, that would withdraw him from his duty, and to do what is right in defiance of temptation. *Firmness*, when united to correct moral feeling in other respects, forms the mind to *habits* of virtue, and is then called *moral principle*, which is nothing else than the firm adherence to whatever we are once completely satisfied is right and proper. Without this, let the other feelings be what they may, they will ever be the sport of accident; and the conduct being guided by the impulse of the moment, will be constantly liable to error. In every point of view, therefore, *firmness* may be said to deserve the pre-eminence which distinguishes the position of its

organ in the head, as it is the crown and the consummation of all moral virtue. To one deficient in this quality, it may with truth be said, “Unstable as water, thou shalt not excel.”

“16. CONSCIENTIOUSNESS.— *Uses*: It gives origin to the sentiment of *justice*, or respect for the rights of others, openness to conviction, the love of truth. *Abuses*: Scrupulous adherence to noxious principles when ignorantly embraced, excessive refinement in views of duty and obligation, excess in remorse or self-condemnation.”

Note. It is necessary to keep in mind, that this sentiment is different from *conscience*, which means the general power of moral judgment, resulting from the whole faculties in combination. The proper function of this faculty is the sense of *justice*. It seems to desire justice in the abstract, both to others and to ourselves. It leads us to do justice to others certainly; but it also leads us to expect just treatment in return. When we are treated with injustice, it gives rise to a feeling of resentment, not from selfishness, not on our own account, but on account of the breach of the rules of just dealing; although sometimes we may be quicker to see injustice done to ourselves, than where it only affects others. In the different relations of life it gives rise to the feeling of duty, and to the reciprocal feeling of right: to the feeling of gratitude for favours, and resentment for injuries; to the feeling of equity in deciding questions as to property; to the desire of rewarding good and punishing bad actions. When united with *firmness*, it forms the character of the man, “*justus et tenax prepositi*,” and the sentiment may then be described in the words of the definition given of justice in the

Roman law, "*Constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi.*"

"17. HOPE.—*Uses*: Tendency to expect future good: It cherishes faith.—*Abuses*: Credulity with respect to the attainment of what is desired, absurd expectations of felicity not founded on reason."

Note. Hope is the grand sweetener of human life. It adheres to us in all circumstances, even the most disastrous. In poverty and distress; amidst privation, suffering, and sorrow, hope still paints the future in bright and cheering colours. Nor is the feeling confined to the events of the present life,

"Hope travels through, nor quits us when we die."

It undoubtedly "points to an hereafter;" and we cannot believe that a feeling so strong—so decided—so unbounded in its aspirations, would have been conferred upon man, had he not been intended for a greater scene after his present limited existence is closed. It "cherishes faith" in the promises contained in the Scriptures, as the prospects which these open to us are exactly suited to gratify its longings. These views of the nature and uses of *hope* lead to important practical consequences, which do not enter into Mr Combe's system, but which are essential to a true and accurate view of the nature of man, of his future prospects, and of the *whole* circumstances in which he is placed.

18. "WONDER.—*Uses*: The desire of novelty; admiration of the new, the unexpected, the grand, the wonderful, and extraordinary.—*Abuses*: Love of the marvellous and occult; senseless astonishment; belief in false miracles, in prodigies, magic, ghosts, and other supernatural absurdities. *Note.*—Veneration, hope,

and wonder combined, give the tendency to religion ; their abuses produce superstition.”

Note. The object of the faculty of wonder, seems to be the mysterious,—those things which our faculties do not enable us perfectly to comprehend. One of its principal uses seems to be to stimulate curiosity, and to excite us to use our faculties for the discovery of truth ; and although, with regard to any single point, the feeling ceases as soon as that curiosity is perfectly gratified, there never are wanting fresh objects to awaken it anew. Those who know most, are only the more sensible how much remains behind, which their researches have not yet enabled them to reach, and this, it is probable, must be true of the highest created intelligence.

If this be the case in the physical, it is still more so in the moral world. We know something of the various faculties of our minds, but we know nothing of the mind itself, its nature and essence, or of the connection between it and the body ; or of the nature of that great and mysterious Being who formed us, the world, and all that it contains, animate and inanimate. These must ever remain to man, though raised to the highest perfection of his nature, objects of mystery and wonder ; nay, the more he knows, the mystery will only appear the greater, and the wonder be raised the higher. Instead of being the offspring and the accompaniment of ignorance, *wonder* is felt most intensely by those who know the most. The ignorant survey the starry heavens without any feeling of wonder. To the astronomer, who is aware of the nature and extent of the objects which are there presented, these afford a subject of endless wonder.

“ 19. IDEALITY.—*Uses*: Love of the beautiful and splendid, desire of excellence, poetic feeling. *Abuses*: Extravagant and absurd enthusiasm; preference of the showy and glaring to the solid and useful; a tendency to dwell in the regions of fancy, and to neglect the duties of life.”

It does not seem necessary, in connection with the subject of this work, to add any thing to the above description of ideality.

“ 20. Wit.—Gives the feeling of the ludicrous, and disposes to mirth.”

Note. It may be doubted if this is properly to be considered as a sentiment. I am of opinion, that it is an intellectual faculty, the function of which is the perception of contrast and incongruity; and that the feeling of the ludicrous does not arise from it alone, but from a combination of it with other faculties. Spurzheim at first considered it as belonging to the intellect, and the situation of the organ in the head favours that opinion. There can be no doubt, that the faculty which disposes us to view things in a ridiculous light, is of use in some kinds of reasoning. Nothing is considered as more purely a matter of intellect than mathematics; and we know that in this study, cases frequently occur where a truth can only be proved by a *reductio ad absurdum*.

The abuses of this faculty are many. It gives rise, when improperly used, to scoffing at things sacred and venerable, and ridiculing all that is good and praiseworthy.*

“ 21. IMITATION.—Copies the manners, gestures, and actions of others, and appearances in nature generally.”

Note. This should have been stated as a faculty common

* See an Essay on “ Wit, and the Feeling of the Ludicrous.”—*Phrenological Journal*, vol. iv. p. 195.

to man with some of the lower animals. It is possessed by all the monkey tribes, and by several kinds of birds, as parrots, starlings, the mocking bird, and various others. It is also a talent, and may be considered as in some respects an intellectual faculty.

Mr Combe does not state the uses and abuses of this faculty. It is of the greatest use in education. The young are, for the most part, creatures of imitation, and are naturally led by this tendency to copy the manners, behaviour, tones, and actions of those around them, and they thus acquire many habits which it would be extremely difficult for them to learn in any other way. "Example," according to the proverb, "is better (or more effectual) than precept;" a truth which is generally admitted, though we seldom consider how far the principle extends, or how much we really learn by pure imitation. It is by imitating, or mimicking the speech of others, that we first learn to speak. Writing is learnt in the same way; so are music, dancing, drawing, and almost every other accomplishment. After we have got over the first steps of our progress, much may, no doubt, be done by nature, genius, and inborn talent; but in the first steps themselves, we are invariably assisted by imitation.

In those who possess a higher endowment of the faculty than is common, it may be exercised for amusement, or merely to shew the perfection to which it may be carried. In this way, it is useful to actors, professed mimics, ventriloquists, and others who exhibit their talents in public. In private life, however, mimicry, unless when kept under control by great prudence, is extremely apt to offend those

who are the objects of it, and is greatly liable to abuse, especially when joined with a taste for the ludicrous.

“ORDER II.—INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES.

“GENUS I.—EXTERNAL SENSES.

“FEELING, or TOUCH; TASTE; SMELL; HEARING; SIGHT.—*Uses*: To bring man into communication with external objects, and to enable him to enjoy them.—*Abuses*: Excessive indulgence in the pleasures arising from the senses, to the extent of impairing bodily health, and debilitating or deteriorating the mind.”

“GENUS II.—OBSERVING AND KNOWING FACULTIES, WHICH PERCEIVE THE EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS.”

“22. INDIVIDUALITY.—Takes cognizance of existence and simple facts.”

Note. I have stated my views as to this faculty at some length, in a paper published in the *Phrenological Journal*.* It seems to combine the information afforded by the senses and the lower observing powers now to be noticed, and to form from thence distinct conceptions of individual objects. It corresponds nearly with what Dr Thomas Brown terms the power of *comprehension*. All individual objects are made up of parts, and of an aggregate of compound qualities. When we *comprehend* these, and view them as united in one object, we have a proper idea of an *individual*.

“23. FORM.—Renders man observant of form.”

Note. This faculty observes the relations of form,—

* Vol. v. p. 226.

form itself being nothing but a relation. It gives the power of recollecting faces and persons, written characters, and forms in general. It is probable that it perceives and gives rise to the love of symmetry, or regularity in forms.

“24. SIZE.—Gives the idea of space, and enables us to appreciate size and distance.”

Note. I would again say here, that this faculty observes the *relations of space*,—space as extended all around us. It gives a feeling of externality, or what Dr T. Brown calls *outness*. It gives the perception of perspective.

“25. WEIGHT.—Communicates the perception of momentum, weight, and resistance; and *aids* equilibrium.”

Note. It observes the *relations of resistance*, and mechanic forces generally; weight and momentum being only particular examples of such forces. It compares and judges of their relative strength. It does more than *aid* equilibrium, being the only source from which we derive the feeling. *Equilibrium* is the balancing of *equal weights or forces*, and is, therefore, just one mode of exercising the faculty which perceives weight or force. It is employed and gratified in walking, riding, dancing, and all other bodily exercises.

“26. COLOURING.—Gives perception of colours and their harmonies.”

Note. Gall calls this the *sense of the relations of colours*, which he supposes to be distinct from the simple power of seeing or perceiving colours. He supposes it to be a talent peculiar to man. It inspires the love of colours, and is the foundation of the art of colouring in a painter.

GENUS III.—KNOWING FACULTIES, WHICH PERCEIVE
THE RELATIONS OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS.

“27. LOCALITY.—Gives the idea of relative position.”

Note. If Dr Gall’s observations on this faculty are correct, it comprehends a great deal more than this. He seems to consider it as the faculty of travelling, the power or ability to FIND OUR WAY to any place or object we have a desire to reach. It gives the power of directing our course, either when there are no landmarks, or in paths the most intricate and perplexed. It enables us to recollect the points of the compass, and to regulate our motions accordingly (*s’orienter.*) It is not merely a faculty, but a feeling, inspiring the love of travelling, which in some persons amounts to a passion. It is possessed in a high degree by certain animals.

“28. NUMBER.—Gives the talent for calculation.”

Note. This is a power peculiar to man. None of the lower animals appear to possess it in any degree. It is of immense use in the affairs of life, and in many scientific pursuits. It is the foundation of an important part of mathematical science.

“29. ORDER.—Communicates the love of physical arrangement.”

Note. It appears to give the love of arrangement in space, and of regularity in time. Persons in whom the faculty is strong, love to have every thing done in its proper time, and kept in its proper place. Their actions seem as if regulated by clock-work. There seems no reason to think that any of the lower animals possess a general faculty of this kind, though some of them have particular instincts akin to it.

“30. **EVENTUALITY.**—Takes cognizance of occurrences or events.”

Note. This may be called the historical or narrative faculty. It is nearly connected with individuality. This last observes objects as they exist in space; eventuality takes notice of changes or events as they follow one another in the order of time.

“31. **TIME.**—Gives rise to the perception of duration.”

Note. Perhaps it would be more correct to say, that it is the faculty *which gives rise to the feeling of duration*, and enables us to divide it into larger and smaller portions. It may be observed, that duration is nothing of itself, but permanence or continuance of existence; and that all our *measures* of duration are derived from *motion*, continued and uniform motion, as the motion of a pendulum or clock—the motion of the earth round its axis—the apparent motions of the heavenly bodies. It may, therefore, be questioned whether this is not the faculty for observing motion, which, when exercised *with memory*, may give rise to the feeling of duration. This feeling certainly exists, and however it arises, of course it includes a perception of musical time, or rhythm, which is nothing more than a sense of the relations of very small portions of duration.

“32. **TUNE.**—The sense of melody and harmony arise from it.” *

Note. This faculty is the sense of the relations of musical tones. Combined with **TIME**, it gives the talent for music.

“33. **LANGUAGE.**—Gives facility in acquiring a know-

* This is a faculty *sui generis*, and should have been placed in a division by itself. It certainly has nothing to do with “observing the relations of external objects.”

ledge of arbitrary signs to express thoughts : readiness in the use of them, and the power of inventing and recollecting them.” *

Note. Dr Gall supposed that there are two faculties connected with language, one giving the power of forming and recollecting articulate sounds or words, being equivalent to what metaphysicians have called *verbal memory* ; the other, the power of associating these, or any other arbitrary signs, with the ideas they are intended to represent, and of combining them with facility so as to express our meaning. These two qualities are not always found together ; and therefore it is probable that Gall’s opinion is correct, and that they are really separate faculties. The former of them, the power of forming articulate sounds, is possessed by several of the feathered tribes, as parrots, mocking birds, &c. Some idiots are known to possess it in great perfection, who are quite incapable of understanding the words they repeat. The latter, or the power of associating arbitrary signs with ideas, is certainly possessed in some degree by dogs, and other sagacious animals, who are often seen to understand what is said to them by their masters and keepers. Man alone possesses both these qualities, and therefore he alone enjoys the gift of articulate or spoken language. The uses and abuses of the faculty are too well known to require description.

GENUS IV.—REFLECTING FACULTIES, WHICH COMPARE, JUDGE, AND DISCRIMINATE.

“ 34. COMPARISON.—Gives the power of discovering analogies, resemblances, and differences.”

* The same may be said of this faculty as of *Tune*.

Note. Although this faculty may give the power of perceiving differences, or of perceiving where there is a *want* of resemblance, its original and proper function is to discover resemblances and analogies. It perceives differences just as the faculty of tune perceives discords, or a want of harmony. Resemblance is its proper object, and that which affords it its gratification. Persons in whom this faculty is predominant, delight in analogies and resemblances, and make constant use of them in illustrating their ideas. If they are authors, their works are filled with similes, metaphors, and comparisons of resemblance. Parables, apologues, fables, and allegories, are their favourite methods of conveying instruction, all of which are dependent on the power of perceiving analogies and similitudes. The language expressive of mental qualities is in its origin entirely metaphorical, and consequently dependent on the same power. This subject is of great extent, and would require more consideration than has hitherto been bestowed upon it. *

“35. CAUSALITY.—Traces the dependences of phenomena, and the relation of cause and effect.”

Note. This faculty seems to observe the relations of fitness, adaptation, and proportion, from which we *infer* the connection between cause and effect.

As I have stated that I consider WIT to be an intellectual faculty, and not merely a feeling of the ludicrous, I would place it in this division. The feeling of the ludicrous undoubtedly arises from a certain mode of comparing ideas; and as *comparison* is understood to compare with a view to discovering resemblances and analogies, and *causality* compares

* See an Essay on the Faculty of Comparison, by the author of this work, *Phrenological Journal*, vol. iv. p. 319.

with the view of tracing close and intimate connection, fitness, and proportion, so *wit* seems to compare with the view of discovering contrasts and incongruities,—relations the very opposite to those which are observed by *comparison* and *causality*. I have explained my ideas on this subject elsewhere, and cannot here enter into details which have no connection with the object of the present work.

I have now gone over Mr Combe's entire list of the faculties, adding what I think he has omitted in his account of their functions, and mentioning shortly any points on which I differ from him, and the grounds upon which I do so. I shall now present the reader with another general view of the subject, and with some observations respecting the connection of the different faculties, which appear to me to possess considerable interest.

In the first place, I beg to state, that although, for the sake of convenience, I have hitherto followed Mr Combe's classification of the faculties, as divided into propensities, sentiments, and intellectual faculties, and these subdivided into other species, I consider this classification to be very imperfect, and calculated in many respects to mislead those who are not very thoroughly conversant with the science. Indeed, it appears to me that it is impossible to give a perfectly accurate view of the faculties in a tabular form.

Observation shews that each faculty is connected with a particular portion of the brain, which must be considered as the organ through which it manifests itself during life. These organs do not lie in such an order as to enable us to take them up *seriatim*, and divide them into orders, classes, and sections. They lie rather in groupes and clusters, their situation in the head

corresponding in a remarkable manner with their relative uses. These groupes are in many cases not separated by distinct boundaries, but, like the colours of the rainbow, the tints of the sky, the species and genera of plants and animals, are connected with, and run into one another by imperceptible gradations, so that we can hardly tell where one class ends, and another begins. Thus, although, speaking generally, we find that the organs of the intellectual faculties occupy the forehead; those of the lower, or what may be called the animal propensities, the inferior and posterior parts of the brain; while those connected with the moral and controlling powers are found in the top or crown of the head; yet several cases occur, where we have great difficulty in determining, or rather, where we cannot positively determine, whether a faculty belongs to one class or another. I have already mentioned some cases, such as *constructiveness* and *imitation*, where this doubt occurs; and there are others which will present themselves on a farther view.

I may here refer to a little work which I published anonymously fourteen years ago,* in which I pointed out in detail this grouping or clustering of the organs, and the apparent propriety that seemed to have dictated the mode of their distribution. It may not be improper here to point this out very shortly.

At the base and hinder part of the head, we find in the cerebellum, the organ of *Amativeness* or physical love. Above it, we find an organ specially directed to the love and the care of our offspring. Immediately adjoining to this, and on each side of it, are the organs appropriated to *Adhesiveness*, the propensity of attachment in general, leading, when united to the sexual

* Observations on Phrenology, as affording a systematic view of human nature. Edin. 1822. Pp. 57.

feeling, to the institution of marriage. Above, there is the organ which, whatever may be its precise sphere of activity, certainly comprehends among its functions the feeling of attachment to home; next to which, and higher in the head, we find *Self-esteem*, leading to that regard to ourselves which is necessary for securing individual preservation and comfort. "We here see the love of home surrounded by the love of self, and of those objects which are nearest ourselves, as wife and children, forming altogether a group which may be denominated the domestic affections, the very names of which must give rise to feelings that are dear to every heart. We observe, too, that this group of affections is surrounded and embraced, as it were, by the combative and destructive powers and *Cautiousness*, indicating that these powers are best employed in preserving and defending the objects of our kind affections."*

The first command given to man after his creation, was to "increase, and multiply, and replenish the earth;" and the next was to "subdue it." We have mentioned the propensities which tend to accomplish the first of these objects. We now come to such as have reference to the second.

We may first mention *Combativeness*, which gives the disposition to oppose aggression, to struggle against and overcome difficulties; and *Destructiveness*, which enables us, without remorse, to destroy, to break, to rend, and reduce to fragments inanimate objects, and to kill living animals, when such destruction is necessary for the procuring of food, or materials for other purposes. Whatever may have been the use of such faculties at the period immediately succeeding the creation, before the flesh of animals was required for food, there can be no doubt that now these faculties are legitimately employed

* Observations on Phrenology, p. 16.

in hunting, killing, or otherwise destroying, noxious animals, or those which are required for our daily nourishment. "For pursuing his game with success, it is necessary that the hunter use secrecy and caution, the one to enable him to surprise his prey, the other to avoid danger. Accordingly, next the destructive organ, and also adjoining the combative, lies *Secretiveness*, leading to slyness, cunning, and stratagem. Above that, and still bordering on combativeness, is the organ of *Cautiousness*, the use of which is most obvious, both as tending to control the combative and destructive propensities, and to prevent us, in the eager indulgence of them, to run headlong into danger and to death."*

These, which may be called the savage propensities of our nature, are common to us with the beasts of prey, who hunt, surprise, and destroy their game nearly in the same manner as man. Low as they may be ranked in the scale of our faculties, they are not merely necessary to the existence, but, in a certain extent, to the greatness and power of the human race. Without them man could neither have acquired nor preserved that superiority which was bestowed on him at his creation, when dominion was given him over all the other creatures.

To exalt the profession of arms, and to supply those feelings so dazzling to the imagination of youth, of the "pomp and circumstance of war," we have *Love of approbation* and *Ideality*; the one lying above *Cautiousness*, and the other before it. These propensities, joined to *Self-esteem* and *Firmness*, supply the qualities of the hero of antiquity; of an Achilles "impiger, iracundus, inexorabilis, acer;" but to form a true hero, one who fights, "pro aris et focus," in defence of his country, its independence, its liberties, its laws, and its religion, there are required, in addition to these, all the moral sentiments in their highest exercise.

* Observations on Phrenology, p. 17.

Advancing towards the front, we find, next the destructive faculty, *Acquisitiveness*, giving the sense and the desire of property; and before it, in contact with the organs of the intellect, *Constructiveness*, or the desire and the faculty of using the productions of the earth in forming new combinations, either for use or ornament, in framing habitations more convenient than the dens and caves of the earth, and garments more comfortable than the skins of beasts.

These two faculties lead to various results. They incite to exertion—they promote industry. They raise man from the hunter state to that of the shepherd; from that to the agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial. *Number* and *Order* lie next, for this obvious reason, that without the one we would not know the amount of our possessions; without the other, the greatest accumulation of wealth would be nearly useless, and little better than splendid lumber. Lastly, to impart to riches elegance as well as comfort, and to give us ideas of magnificence and splendour, there is placed immediately above these two organs *Ideality*, which includes the love of what is great or beautiful. It is this faculty which raises the precious metals to something more than glittering dross, gives to the sparkling gem its brightest lustre, and confers an importance on personal decoration, which even heightens the effect of female beauty, and the awe and majesty which belong to kings.

We have now examined three groups or systems of faculties, respectively connected with the *Amative and Adhesive*,—the *Combative and Destructive*,—and the *Acquisitive and Constructive* propensities. The first of these may be called the social, and the second the warlike, and the third the industrial group. We have seen how these are successively manifested in the history of the species; we may add, they seem to be developed in

a like order in the history of the individual, — youth, as we have been told, being devoted to love — middle age to ambition — old age to avarice.* Shakespeare has the same idea, nearly, in his *Seven Ages*, where, immediately after the schoolboy, we have the lover “sighing like furnace,” — then the soldier, —

Jealous in honour, sudden and quick in quarrel,
Seeking the bubble reputation
Even in the cannon's mouth, —

And afterwards the

Slipper'd pantaloon, with youthful hose *well saved*.

Proceeding now to the front, we find, around and above the orbits of the eyes, a set of faculties which furnish perceptions and conceptions of sensible qualities, namely, *Form, Size, Weight, and Colour*. These, with *Order* and *Number*, are peculiarly adapted for the mechanical and useful arts. They lie almost in a line tending from the junction between the forehead and nose on both sides towards the temples, and terminate in *Constructiveness*, as if indicating their proper end and purpose. Higher faculties are no doubt necessary for bringing the arts to perfection, but dexterity of execution in the operative department of art depends entirely on these inferior powers.

Returning again to the front, we have another set of faculties, between the mechanical faculties below, and the higher intellectual powers above, the organs appropriated to the purposes of the fine arts. And first, in the centre, we find the organ of *Form*, which, aided by *Size* and *Constructiveness*, and under the guidance of superior faculties, leads to the arts of statuary and architecture.

Near these, lies the organ of *Colouring*, which, with

* Vision of human life in the *Tatler*.

the other faculties above mentioned, produces the art of painting.

Beyond these lie the organs of *Time* and *Tune*, forming the foundation of all the delights of music.

Last, and highest in the scale, lies *Ideality*, the love of all that is great, beautiful, and perfect,—the origin of divine poesy.

The organs that have been mentioned are not only essential to the arts, but afford the basis of several of the most useful sciences.

The *forms* and *colours* of the stems, leaves, calyx, corolla, stamens, pistils, and other parts of the plant, their relative *sizes*, their *number*, and the *order* or physical arrangement in which they occur,—these afford the means of botanical classification, and are the foundation of the science of botany.

In chemistry, every different substance is compounded, or combines with others, in certain proportions of *weight* and *volume*, the proportions being ascertained by *number*.

The objects of mechanical science, including mechanics proper, hydrostatics, hydraulics, astronomy, are all included under *form*, and *size*, and *weight*, and *time* or *motion*, and the relations or proportions of these are all capable of being measured or calculated by *number*.

In the higher mathematics, signs are substituted for numbers, and the intermediate steps of the process of calculation being gone through by their means, the results may be reduced to numbers again, when this is required for practical purposes.

Above the organs appropriated to the arts, and to chemical and mechanical science, lie those of the knowing faculties. These are *Individuality*, which takes cognizance of objects, and *Eventuality*, which has regard to occurrences and events. Objects are distinguished

by their respective *forms, sizes, weight, colour*, for the observation of each of which there is a separate faculty. Individuality takes up the separate items of information afforded by these, and combines the whole into the perception of an individual object. Events are distinguished as they occur in *time* and *place*, in *order* or in *number*, and these particulars, or items of information, are taken up by *Eventuality*, and combined into the conception of an event. In both, the matter conceived or apprehended of, is a complex one, including a variety of particulars; and when these are all fully understood, we are said to *comprehend* them. At one time, these two faculties, or rather these organs, were termed the higher and lower *Individuality*,—a name which may still be retained, even though we admit the functions to be as here stated,—the one taking cognizance of individual *objects*, the other of individual *events*; the one regarding things as they exist in space, and the other as they exist in time. The position of the two organs favours this supposition, the first resting upon and between the organs of *Locality*, and the latter being in contact, on each side, with the organ of *Time*.

The situation of the organs of these two faculties, giving the memory of facts and events, corresponds most remarkably with what metaphysicians have observed of those *principles of association*, by which past objects and events are brought to our recollection. The principal of those associating links which aid the memory, and assist in recalling ideas to the mind, are *contiguity of time* and *place*, *resemblance* and *contrast*, and the relation of *cause* and *effect*. Accordingly, we find these organs of *Individuality* and *Eventuality* absolutely surrounded on all sides, by those of *Locality* and *Time*; *Comparison*, which observes resemblance; *Wit*, which observes contrasts; and *Causality*, which takes cognizance of causes and effects.

This coincidence has long struck me as very remarkable, if not, indeed, the most remarkable that occurs in regard to the position of the organs.

The organs of the three reflecting faculties, as they have been called, lie at the top of the forehead, in the precise order that is most fit, — *Comparison*, which discovers relations of resemblance, as being the most important, being placed in the midst. Upon this faculty depends the formation of abstract ideas, and the originating of all terms expressive of mental qualities.* On each side of this lies *Causality*, which discovers the relations of proportion and fitness, from which we infer cause and effect. Beyond this lie the organs of *Wit*, the faculty which perceives and delights in strong contrasts and violent incongruities; and beyond these, and behind them, on each side, the organs of *Ideality*, a faculty which takes cognizance of relations the most refined and subtle of all, giving rise to that most mysterious and undefinable of all qualities, BEAUTY.

Above, and touching upon *Comparison*, and on each side of the organ of *Benevolence*, lie the organs of *Imitation*, which we have mentioned to partake both of the nature of a feeling and an intellectual faculty. Its position seems well adapted to its function, the faculty which leads to imitating or *forming resemblances* being fitly placed beside that which gives *ideas of resemblance*. Next this, and adjoining to the organ of *Causality*, lies that of *Wonder*, the position of which seems no less proper. *Causality* leads to knowledge of those things most removed from our senses; knowledge which does not come to us directly, but by a process of reasoning, but which may, nevertheless, be perfect in its kind. But the object of *Wonder* is not perfect knowledge, but

* See *Essay on Comparison* before mentioned, also Dr Thomas Brown's *Lecture on the Feeling of Resemblance*.

imperfect, or, as Lord Bacon calls it, "*broken knowledge*," where sense, and even reason fail us,—at once inviting and checking our curiosity, and leaving us standing as it were on the brink of a flood, of which the most perspicacious ken cannot discern the farther side.

We are thus arrived at the utmost bounds of reason, beyond which intellect cannot penetrate, and where we feel sensible of all the weakness and ignorance of our nature. But in contemplating what lies beyond, two feelings seem especially called into action,—*Hope* and *Fear*. And so it is, that the organs of these feelings lie in a line behind and adjoining that of *Wonder*, the first holding, as it deserves, the more eminent place. Immediately behind *Wonder*, lies the organ of *Hope*, leading us to paint the future and unknown with the gayest and most flattering colours, in which it is aided by *Ideality*, lying immediately below it. But as if to keep these feelings in check, and to prevent us indulging too much in dreams of bliss which may never be realized, there lies behind the organ of *Caution*, whose office it is to warn against possible evil, to suggest doubts and difficulties, to repress presumption, and even, when apparent danger presses closely, to inspire the most lively feelings of fear and terror.

We thus have seen, on carefully considering the grouping of the faculties, that there is no hard defined boundary between intellectual faculties and feelings, but that the former are shaded into the latter by nice and almost imperceptible gradations.

We now come to the coronal surface, where we find a group of faculties or feelings the highest of all, forming the proper distinctive character of man, and placing it at an infinite height above that of the highest of the brutes.

First, in the front, and in the medial line, as indicating

its superior nature, lies the organ of *Benevolence*, leading us, as we have seen, to desire the happiness of others. It is placed immediately above, and in contact with, the organs of the intellect, as intimating that the intellectual powers ought ever to be used for promoting the good of our fellow-creatures.

Adjoining to *Benevolence*, or the social principle, leading to the love of and a regard to the welfare of all mankind, and including a merciful disposition to the brute creation, we find, next behind it in the medial line, the organ of *Veneration*, inspiring deference to our superiors, subjection to our parents, loyalty to our sovereign and those in authority, and religious awe and piety towards the Supreme Being. This principle forms the groundwork of all our most sacred institutions, of all government, and of all religion. This feeling, if strong, as it is in all the highest characters, might perhaps prove too overwhelming, and lead to an undue prostration of the faculties, were it not supported behind by *Firmness* and *Self-esteem*, and on each side by *Hope*, the first two producing confidence in ourselves, the latter trust in our good fortune, and in the Divine goodness and mercy.

Farther back, immediately behind the organ of *Hope*, we find *Conscientiousness*, giving rise to the feelings of justice and equity, lying between *Firmness* and *Cautiousness*, which are exactly the feelings most necessary to regulate its movements. *Caution* is, of all others, most important to be attended to in deciding as to what is just; but after the decision is formed on proper grounds, the most inflexible firmness is necessary to carry that decision into execution.

Conscientiousness is well placed in another respect, lying as it does half way between the love of self, and the objects connected with self, — *Veneration*, which

produces respect to our superiors, and a supreme love and regard to the Creator,—and *Benevolence*, which leads to the love of our neighbour. When united and combined with these different feelings, it converts what was before simple *inclination* into binding *duty* : and thus it points to three different classes of duties,—the duties we owe to *ourselves and our families*, the duties we owe to *God* and to civil magistrates, and the duties we owe to our *fellow-men* and fellow-subjects. These it is the province of the moralist and the divine to point out, and to enforce with their proper sanctions.

The organ of *Self-esteem*, though placed behind these, as inferior in dignity, must still be considered of high importance, and is indispensable to the perfection of the human character. When properly directed by intellect and conscientiousness, it may undoubtedly be considered a moral feeling, and many cases occur where it materially aids in preserving us from mean and improper actions. It would, however, be apt to become excessive and pernicious, were it not accompanied on each side by the *Love of approbation*, which renders us amenable to the opinion of others ; and had it not adjoining it the organs of the domestic and kindly affections, embracing those whose good opinion we would most wish to preserve ; all tending to modify and soften down any overweening conceit of ourselves, and preserve it within the bounds of propriety.

Then, to give the character consistency and power, and to prevent our actions and purposes from being the sport of every passing emotion, there lies at the top of the head the organ of *Firmness*, giving, as we have seen, constancy to persevere in our undertakings, resolution to face danger and difficulty, patience to endure suffering ; which gives the power to resolve, supplies the determined will to do what is right, and converts what would

otherwise be mere feeling into steadfast *moral principle*. This is the faculty which binds together and gives solidity and consistency to the whole character, of which the other sentiments and faculties compose the separate parts. It is, therefore, one of the most important of the faculties, being, in fact, the keystone of the arch which keeps all the rest in their places.

I have hitherto taken no notice, in this arrangement, of the faculties of words and of *Language*. The organs appropriated to these faculties lie at the base of the brain in front, behind and above the orbits of the eyes, forming the inferior roof of that vault, the upper part of which is occupied by the organs of the intellectual faculties. As all conventional signs consist of some modification of sound or form, and as language consequently depends in the first instance on the faculties which perceive these qualities, its organ is naturally placed in contact with those of *Form* and *Tune*. But there is another reason for its being placed where it is, namely, that from this position it communicates with the organs of the observing, knowing, comparing, reasoning, and imaginative faculties, indicating distinctly the union of all the intellectual powers requisite to the perfection of that rarest and most splendid of human endowments, the gift of eloquence.

These are all the faculties generally recognized by phrenologists, and of which the organs have been discovered to lie in the exterior convolutions of the brain; but there seems to be something more necessary to afford a complete view of the mental system. Man possesses, besides these, *Consciousness*, by which he is enabled to perceive and reflect upon the feelings and operations, or states of mind produced by the activity of these organs, and by which also he is *conscious* that he remains the same individual from day to day and from year to year, notwithstanding all the changes that take place both in

his bodily organs and his mental capacities. Mr Combe alludes to this in his *System of Phrenology*,* and states that it is "extremely difficult to determine whether the consciousness of personal identity is connected with a particular organ, or is the result of the general action of the whole." It is impossible to discuss the point here fully, but the following is generally understood by Phrenologists to be the true explanation of the matter : That the living and *conscious* principle which we call *Self*, or let us say at once the *Soul*, is a simple and indivisible being, of which the brain is the organ during life ; that what we call *faculties* are merely different *states* of this simple being ; that the separate organs of the brain afford the means by which these states of mind are induced and manifested ; that consciousness is not to be considered an attribute of each faculty, but only an attribute of the *mind* itself, of which the faculties are the different states. This view of the matter entirely relieves Phrenology from the imputation of its leading to Materialism, to which it is no more liable than any other system admitting the brain to be the organ of the mind. It is also a strong confirmation of this view, and of the soul being a simple and uncompounded substance, that *Consciousness* is always the same, and always single. Whatever faculties are active, we have the feeling that they belong to the mind, but are not the mind ; that the living principle, *Self*, would remain the same, though one or more of our faculties were dormant or lost, or though we were to acquire new ones, just as we remain the same individual though we become blind or deaf, or though we acquire the gift of sight by the operation of couching for cataract. With this explanation, the system of faculties seems to account satisfactorily for all the mental phenomena.

* *System of Phrenology*, by George Combe. Second edition, p. 402.

To return to our consideration of the position of the organs, I think it appears that, taking the system as we have it, the situation of every faculty is exactly that which is most proper and commodious, and that none of them could be changed or reversed without deranging what appears a very beautiful scheme. We have seen that they lie in regular order, advancing gradually from the lower to the higher, and thence to the highest of all. Each organ seems to lie adjacent to those of the other faculties with which it is most nearly allied; and in some instances the different groups are so connected with one another, and radiate through each other in such a way, as to make the whole hang together like the different parts of one elegant design. This harmonious junction and dovetailing of the different organs is exceedingly curious; and it is obvious that the coincidences are far too numerous and exact to have occurred by chance. As soon might we expect that a number of separate pieces of wood, brought casually together, should form a beautiful cabinet, as that the names of thirty-four or thirty-five faculties put down at random should compose a complete and well-combined system of the mental powers, as this appears to be. But it is well known that Gall and Spurzheim did not invent this system at once, but formed it piecemeal, by a gradual and patient examination of facts. The organs of the different faculties were discovered one after another, and in some of their earlier works many blanks appear in the scheme of the faculties, which then wore a bald and disjointed appearance, till these were filled up by subsequent discoveries.

It is indeed extremely unlikely that such a scheme should be devised by conjecture and hypothesis. It is so different from any that has been previously given to the world, that it is almost impossible it should have

occurred to the mind of man, in any other way than that in which it did occur to its authors. The inference I would draw from the whole is, that this is not a human invention, but the evolution of a scheme composed and designed by the same mighty mind which devised the structure of the universe.

Had Doctors Gall and Spurzheim sat down to devise a system from their own imagination, it is morally impossible they could have contrived one which harmonizes so completely with itself, and with the actual state of the human faculties, and the uses to which these are subservient. This is a problem which has puzzled the most eminent philosophers, so as almost to entitle us to conclude that its solution was beyond the reach of human ingenuity. Independently, therefore, of more direct evidence, the presumption is exceedingly strong, that they did not invent, but *discovered it* by observation.

Supposing that we knew nothing of human nature but what we are able to gather from systems of philosophy, what notion could we form of man from perusing all the works that have ever been written on the metaphysics of the schools? Is it not obvious that they afford a very indistinct or inadequate account of what man really is, and of what are his powers, dispositions, and functions. On the contrary, the system we have been now considering, to use the expression of an acute writer,* seems to present us with "a portrait from the life."

If we take our account of man from this system, would it not be evident, that a being possessed of the powers and faculties here attributed to him must be a wonderful being; that if the intellectual faculties are active and predominant, he must be a great and powerful being; that if to these be added a large share of the destructive propensities, he must be a terrible being; and if the

* The late Mr Abernethy of London.

kind, the social, the benevolent, the moral and religious qualities are added to the intellectual, and the destructive powers used only for the purposes of good, he must be all but divine; “in action how like an angel, in apprehension how like a God,—the beauty of the world, the paragon of animals!” But is it not equally evident, that if the balance of the powers is not duly preserved, if the lower propensities are too powerful, and act without due regulation, or even if any of the higher sentiments exceed the bounds of propriety and moderation, so as to interfere with the due exercise of the rest, his actions will be betrayed into obliquity and error, and the whole character will be degraded? And such is the state of man.

CHAPTER VI.

ON MR COMBE'S PRINCIPLE OF THE SUPREMACY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS
AND INTELLECT, AND ON CONSCIENCE.

HAVING stated shortly the scheme of the human faculties, which, generally speaking, both Mr Combe and I assume as the basis of our views, I shall now advert to some points upon which we differ, and where I think he errs in the practical application of his own system.

The first grand principle which he adopts, is what he calls the supremacy of the moral sentiments and intellect over the lower propensities.

Mr Combe opens his remarks on this subject, with another quotation from Butler, which I shall give entire.

“Mankind has various instincts and principles of

action, as brute creatures have; some leading most directly and immediately to the good of the community, and some most directly to private good.

“Man has several which brutes have not; particularly *reflection*, or *conscience*, an approbation of some principles or actions, and a disapprobation of others.”

It is remarkable how very exactly these views tally with the system revealed by Phrenology.

“Brutes obey their instincts or principles of action, according to certain rules; suppose, the constitution of their body, and the objects around them.

“The generality of mankind also obey their instincts and principles, all of them, those propensions we call good, as well as the bad, according to the same rules, namely the constitution of their body, and the external circumstances which they are in.

“Brutes, in acting according to the rules before mentioned, their bodily constitution and circumstances, act suitably to their whole nature.

“Mankind also, in acting thus, would act suitably to their whole nature, if no more were to be said of man's nature than what has been said; if that, as it is a true, were also a complete, adequate account of our nature.

“But that is not a complete account of man's nature. Somewhat farther must be brought in to give us an adequate notion of it, namely, that one of these principles of action, *conscience*, or *reflection*, compared with the rest, as they all stand together in the nature of man, plainly bears upon it marks of authority over all the rest, and claims the absolute direction of them all, to allow or forbid their gratification, being in itself a principle manifestly superior to a mere propension. And the conclusion is, that to allow no more to this superior principle or part of our nature than to other parts, to let it govern and guide only occasionally in common

with the rest, as its turn happens to come, from the temper and circumstances one happens to be in, this is not to act conformably to the constitution of man: neither can any human creature be said to act conformably to his constitution of nature, *unless he allows to that superior principle the absolute authority which is due to it.*"

To the doctrine here delivered I cordially and entirely subscribe.

Mr Combe has discarded the term *conscience*—a term universally used, and perfectly understood by all mankind, as applied to those internal feelings which dictate to us what is right and wrong in conduct—and has adopted in its place a formula involving a theory of his own. "Right conduct," he says, "is that which is approved of by the whole moral and intellectual faculties, fully enlightened, and acting in harmonious combination. This," he adds, "is what I call the *supremacy of the moral sentiments and intellect.*"

Now in order to understand this, it is necessary to know what is here meant by the term "moral and intellectual faculties." Taking the expression in its popular acceptation, it is universally admitted, that *the moral and intellectual faculties* are those by which the conduct is to be regulated; and, therefore, to tell us that right conduct is that which is approved of by these faculties, gives us no information whatever. We knew all that before phrenology was discovered. But these expressions are used by Mr Combe in a limited and technical sense—not applied to the whole moral capacities of our nature, but to certain distinct feelings or propensities, of which the precise functions have been specified by phrenological writers, and which they have chosen to denominate, specially and exclusively, *the moral sentiments*. But although thus limited to a special class of

the feelings, his language with respect to them is far from precise. He sometimes speaks of the *moral sentiments and intellect* generally; at other times he states them to be the *faculties peculiar to man*. Here we begin to see the defects of the arrangement and classification of the faculties which he has adopted, as mentioned in the last chapter. The sentiments peculiar to man are there stated by him to be *veneration, firmness, conscientiousness, hope, wonder, ideality, wit, and imitation*. *Benevolence* is there excluded, as that is stated to be a sentiment common to man and the inferior animals.

When, however, he comes more closely to the subject, he finds that this enumeration will not answer his purpose. If there be a principle of *benevolence* in man, which doubtless there is, it is impossible to exclude it from the list of the moral powers. Mr Combe gets over the difficulty in this way: "Benevolence," he says in a note, "is stated in the works on phrenology as common to man with the lower animals; but in these creatures it appears to produce rather passive meekness and good nature than actual desire for each other's happiness. In the human race, this last is its proper function; and, viewed in this light, I treat of it as exclusively a human faculty." To this I answer, that if the feelings of *benevolence* in man and in the lower animals are feelings the same in kind, and having the same tendency, (which I presume they must be from their being called by the same name by all phrenologists,) they must be essentially the same feelings, and the only difference between them must be either a difference in degree, which we can perfectly understand, or the difference occasioned by the superior intellect of man, giving the sentiment a larger scope, or field of action. There can, I think, be no other differences; and if so, Mr Combe is not entitled to state this as peculiarly a human sentiment, unless he

is also disposed to treat in the same way *cautiousness*, *love of approbation*, and other feelings, which, when illuminated by man's intellect, receive a totally different direction, and are extended to a totally different class of objects, than those which occupy the feelings which receive these names in the animal tribes.

But the list is not only defective—it is redundant, and includes faculties which Mr Combe does not admit to have a moral tendency. In his enumeration of the “moral sentiments” at p. 18, he begins with *benevolence*, and then adds *veneration*, *hope*, *ideality*, *wonder*, and *conscientiousness*, (omitting *wit*, *imitation*, and *firmness*;) and he adds in a note, “The classification of the moral sentiments in the phrenological system is not perfect. It includes *wit*, *imitation*, *firmness*, and *wonder*, which are not necessarily or essentially moral. By the *moral sentiments*, when used as a general expression, I mean *benevolence*, *veneration*, and *conscientiousness*, aided by *hope* and *ideality*.”

Mr Combe *talks* about philosophy, and about philosophical principles; but surely, if we are to treat the subject philosophically, we are entitled to ask upon what philosophical principle he proceeds, when he fixes upon those five faculties as exclusively *the moral sentiments*; and also upon what principle he regards three of them as the chief, and the other two as auxiliary. It appears to me that he proceeds on no principle at all, and that both the selection and the distinction are purely arbitrary.

It might have brought us nearer to a better arrangement, if it had been recollected that *imitation* is a faculty possessed by several of the lower animals; and still farther, if it be held, as I strongly suspect to be the case, that “*wit*” is not a sentiment, but an intellectual faculty, as it was considered by Gall. But why omit

firmness, which, if it do not of itself originate any moral feeling, is indispensably necessary to the proper working of the faculties which do originate such feelings, and without which there can be no such thing as consistent moral conduct?

As to the intellectual powers, he has given no statement of those which partake in the supremacy he contends for. But I am not disposed to be critical as to this, it being impossible that any of the intellectual faculties can possess any supremacy over another. All are supreme in their own way when rightly used, and none can claim any pre-eminence in matters which do not lie within their own province. If there be any difference among them in this respect, it is this, that the observing and knowing faculties, which are generally called the *lower* intellectual faculties, and most of which are common to man and the brutes, are less apt to be in error than the reasoning and reflecting powers, which belong exclusively to man. Whatever conclusions we may come to through the means of *comparison* and *causality*, by any reasonings from analogy, or from the supposed connection of cause and effect, if we find these contradicted by *facts* which are palpable to the senses, the reasoning must go for nothing. I am willing, however, to take Mr Combe's statement here as it is, and give him the benefit of *all* the intellectual faculties.

But waving all objections to vague and inconsistent language, and taking Mr Combe's statement in any way, it must appear to be rather rash to attribute *supremacy* to any set of faculties, let them be what they may, when we find it expressly admitted, that *all* the human faculties are liable to be abused, to be defective, to be wrong directed, and that one class of them is not exempt from error more than another. It seems absurd to attribute supremacy to that which is thus fallible:

and Mr Combe is so sensible of this, that he finds it necessary, in order to maintain the supremacy he contends for, to introduce three new principles.

“In maintaining this supremacy,” he observes, “I do not consider any of the moral sentiments and intellectual faculties singly, or even all of them collectively, as sufficient to direct conduct by their mere instinctive suggestions. To fit them to discharge this important duty, they must act in *harmonious combination*, and be *illuminated by knowledge of science*, and of *moral and religious duty*.”

It must be quite obvious, that, by these qualifications, Mr Combe's great principle is reduced to nothing. We could understand the doctrine if it were stated, and if we were satisfied that we could trust to the spontaneous suggestions of these sentiments, one or all of them, either by themselves, or when enlightened by the intellect, but this, we have seen, Mr Combe does not maintain. He finds that his *elephant*, the peculiarly human sentiments, (even when assisted by all the intellectual powers,) before it can be fitted to support the whole moral world, must itself have something to stand upon; and therefore he introduces no fewer than *three tortoises* to support it:

1. Harmonious combination.
2. Knowledge of science.
3. Knowledge of moral and religious duty.

We give him up the first at once, as it is quite evident that, in any view, powers that are not in harmony among themselves, can never be fitted to govern others, or to afford a rule of conduct to the whole.

The second of his postulates, the *knowledge of science*, means, we presume, a knowledge of the *natural laws*; that is, an intimate knowledge of our own nature, and of every thing else in the world. We have already stated

what occurs as to this. It is certainly desirable for us to possess this knowledge, just as it may be desirable that we should be able to fly, to live a thousand years, or any thing else that is at present unattainable. But if we are to remain ignorant of morality until we attain this knowledge, we are afraid a considerable time must still elapse before the world is destined to emerge from its present state of moral darkness.

The third and last condition is, that the moral and intellectual faculties shall be illuminated by a *knowledge of moral and religious duty*. Is it not obvious that this is giving up all that he had previously stated? A knowledge of moral and religious duty is exactly what we are in search of; and if we are able to attain it, where is the use of all the cumbrous machinery of moral sentiments, or sentiments peculiar to man, or any sentiments you please, illuminated by intellect, and a knowledge of all the natural laws, and acting in harmonious combination? This is really darkening counsel by vain words.

But to proceed with Mr Combe's view of the matter. Where is this knowledge of moral and religious duty to be obtained? Not certainly from the moral sentiments and intellect, for these, he has already said, are insufficient to direct our conduct without this very knowledge. Where, then, are we to go, for man has no higher faculties than these?

Mr Combe informs us, that the sources of this knowledge are "*observation and reflection, experience, and instruction by books, teachers, and all other means by which the Creator has provided for the improvement of the human mind.*" This is all very good, and not particularly new; but how are we to *observe* and *reflect* except by means of the intellectual faculties? How are we to draw profit from *experience*, except by the same means? As to instruction by *books*, he should explain what books

he means? Is it books written by men? Are not these the productions of the human sentiments and intellect? Who are the teachers he refers to, and whence do they derive the doctrines they teach? What faculties do they possess which we have not, and what higher claims have they than ourselves to pronounce definitively as to what is right in conduct?

Mr Combe refers to *other means* which the Creator has provided for the improvement of the human mind. To what means does he allude? All merely *human means* are included among the particulars already noticed. We feel ourselves, therefore, upon the principles stated by Mr Combe himself, shut up to the conclusion, that these means must be something *more than human*. We come just to the point to which the matter has been so often brought before,—we are compelled to resort to *Revelation*.

Unless Mr Combe is prepared to deny the authority of Revelation altogether, he must admit that it is one of those means by which the Creator has provided for the improvement of the human mind. And if he admits this, and, after all the circuitous route he has taken, his doctrine leads, in its ultimate result, to the conclusion, that the intellect and sentiments of man are insufficient of themselves to direct what is right in conduct, and that to fit them for this important purpose, they require to be illuminated by reflection and experience, and by that knowledge of moral and religious duty, which is to be obtained from the *revealed will of God*, we are henceforth agreed, and no objection, so far as I know, can be stated to his principle. According to this view, the moral sentiments and intellect are extremely useful in enabling us to obtain a view of our moral and religious duty, and in retaining us in the path of duty when so discovered; but what becomes of their supremacy?

Mr Combe has gradually modified this doctrine of the supremacy. In a paper on this subject, published in the *Phrenological Journal*,* he stated it in a more uncompromising way. What he then insisted upon was, "*the natural supremacy of the moral sentiments.*" There was nothing stated there about the necessity of their being enlightened by a knowledge of moral and religious duty. We have seen how he has modified the doctrine since. The same kind of modification appears in the arguments he has used to prove this supremacy. "*The great distinction,*" he observes in the *Journal*, "between the animal faculties and the powers proper to man is, that the former are all selfish in their desires, while the latter disinterestedly long for the happiness of others." This statement was opposed upon grounds which he found himself unable to resist, and accordingly he has now modified it as follows:—" *The great distinction between the animal faculties and the powers proper to man is, that the former do not prompt us to seek the welfare of mankind at large: their object is chiefly the preservation of the individual himself, his family, or his tribe; while the latter have the general happiness of the human race, and our duties to God, as their ends.*"

This last statement is still not quite correct. It would require, at any rate, to be limited strictly to those powers, which Mr Combe has latterly described as the proper *moral sentiments*; but even to some of these the distinction attempted to be drawn does not apply. It does not appear how *wonder*, *hope*, and *ideality* prompt us to seek the welfare of mankind at large. Even *veneration* does not by itself refer directly to the welfare of the *human* race. The only two faculties which seem directly to have this for their object, are *benevolence* and the sense of *justice*; but Mr Combe very properly does not con-

* Vol. iii. p. 327.

sider these as the only moral faculties. But even taking the matter as he states it, I have yet to learn that a feeling is not a moral one because it is limited in its object to *private good*. Are the ties which connect us with our wives, our families, our friends, or our country, less strong and obligatory, or our duties towards them less sacred and binding, than those which have relation to strangers — to all mankind? Are they not acknowledged to be more so? Are they not at least *moral duties*? and can we shake ourselves free from them upon any pretence of preferring the welfare of the whole race to that of a few individuals? Is not the neglect of these duties one of the most grievous crimes we can possibly commit? and is it not declared that he who provides not for those of his own house, is worse than an infidel?

Another principle which he formerly maintained was this—that the “animal faculties [meaning the faculties common to man and the lower animals] in themselves are *insatiable*, and, from the constitution of the world, never can be satisfied; holding satisfaction to be the appeasing of their highest and last impulse of unregulated desire;” while, on the other hand, “the higher sentiments have a boundless scope for gratification; their least indulgence is delightful, and their highest activity is bliss. They *cause no repentance*, leave no void, but render life a scene at once of peaceful tranquillity and sustained felicity.” To this it was objected, that it was not a fair comparison of the two sets of faculties, but a comparison of the abuses of the one, with the fair, proper, and legitimate exercise of the other; that all the faculties, from the lowest to the highest, were liable to be abused, and that the improper or excessive activity, even of the highest sentiments, led to evil, and consequently, to repentance; that taking the propensities as they are, apart from their abuses, they are not insatiable; that, on

the contrary, they are more easily satisfied than the higher sentiments; that they are soon gratified to their utmost capacity of enjoyment, and when so gratified, their cravings cease; while the sentiments peculiar to man seem to have no limits to their aspirations, but bear upon them the marks of being created for infinity.

Mr Combe seems to have been satisfied that his first statement was incorrect, and accordingly he has now modified it as follows:—"All the faculties when in excess are insatiable, and from the constitution of the world, never can be satisfied. They, indeed, may be soon satisfied on any particular occasion: Food will soon fill the stomach, &c.; but after repose they will all renew their solicitations. They must all, therefore, be regulated, particularly the propensities and lower sentiments." It seems to me that this statement is just as inaccurate as the former: but, supposing it admitted, what becomes of the great distinction formerly attempted to be drawn between the lower powers and those peculiar to man?

There is no *such* distinction as to the possibility of satisfying the faculties. They may all, high and low, be gratified on a particular occasion, but no gratification they can receive at any one time will satisfy them for ever. They all renew their solicitations. It would rather appear that the longings of the higher sentiments are the more difficult to satisfy of the two. Nothing in the present life can ever fully gratify their aspirations, and they can look for entire satisfaction only to another state of existence. This, and the higher value of their objects, are the true causes of their superior dignity.

With all this shifting of his ground, Mr Combe has completely failed in his attempt to establish a *philosophical principle*, which may serve as the foundation of a new system of morals. There are no discoveries to be made in morals,—every thing relating to the subject that

is either speculatively true or practically useful has been known for ages. All that is really of consequence to be known, is included in the short statement of Butler, that “man has various instincts and principles as brute creatures have, some leading directly to the good of the community, and some most directly to private good ; and that he has several which brutes have not, particularly *reflection* or *conscience*, an approbation of some principles and actions, and disapprobation of others.” Phrenology enables us to enumerate the instincts and principles here referred to a little more accurately than we could heretofore, to give them distinct names, and to state their uses and relative dignity. But with all this, it has not really furnished us with a single new propensity, sentiment, or principle of action, which was not before known to exist, by those practically acquainted with human nature. In saying this, I am saying nothing derogatory to the study of Phrenology : on the contrary, I consider it as its best recommendation, and its highest praise, that its dictates coincide perfectly with those of *practical good sense* ; and the benefit which I expect to arise from it is this, that when it is more carefully studied and better understood, it may make the rules of good sense more generally received and more uniformly acted on. To effect any good in this way, however, much caution will be required ; and care must be taken that we are not led away by plausible theory from the well known paths of practical morality.

It might have been better, if, instead of going about to establish new principles of morals, we contented ourselves with shewing wherein Phrenology coincides with principles already known. It is no small matter to have it proved, that among the sentiments peculiar to man of which it gives us an account, there are three which all will acknowledge to be of pre-eminent use and dignity,—

conscientiousness, or the sense of *justice*, *benevolence*, and *veneration*; and we are gratified to observe the coincidence of their dictates with the excellent summary of human duty given us by the inspired writer:—"He hath shewed thee, O man, what is good; and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to *do justly*, and to *love mercy*, and to *walk humbly with thy God*."

Supremacy cannot be arrogated to any thing human. There is nothing truly supreme, but the will of the Creator. The faculties which he has implanted in us to direct us to what is good, are only valuable as means of giving us a knowledge of that will. But we are to blame, if, knowing the imperfection of these faculties, even in the best of men, we rest satisfied with their dictates alone, and do not resort to every means within our reach for obtaining a knowledge of his will. But as he has thought proper to lay before us a distinct revelation of that will, can we be excused, if, *on any pretence whatever*, we refuse to examine that revelation, and do not endeavour, by every means in our power, to ascertain its precise import?

With regard to the human faculties, and their relative degrees of use and dignity, the real state of the case seems to be as follows: man possesses all the faculties which are separately possessed by any of the lower animals, and others peculiar to himself. He possesses those faculties which are common to all the animal tribes, even the lowest, without which they could not exist, could not be animals at all,—such as the feelings of hunger and thirst, and the desire to propagate his species. These, if inferior in dignity to the faculties peculiar to man, are superior in necessity. The race may exist without the one, it cannot without the other.

We need not again enumerate the faculties. Their very names shew that they are of different degrees of dignity and value; that they rise from lower to higher

and higher grades, but that each of them is in its own place good, and tends to a useful end. Those which have in view the preservation of the individual, his offspring, and other near connections, are more necessary to the race than those which look to the general good of the whole. The latter, unless confined to objects which are near us, and the attainment of which is clearly within our means, are exceedingly apt to evaporate in words, and in a vague and indolent *sentimentalism*, which, instead of doing good, does harm, by leading us away from the humble paths of unpretending usefulness. Universal philanthropy, or that which assumes the name, unless under the conduct of consummate prudence and consummate ability, seldom or never produces any result at all adequate to the magnificence of its pretensions, and never even then, without a concurrence of circumstances as rare as it is fortunate. In short, the desire of doing good, unless limited to proper objects, like other kinds of ambition, is apt to end in disappointment, or, as the poet says of glory,—

— is like the circle in the water,
That never ceases to enlarge itself,
Till, by broad spreading, it disperse to nought.

We are not entitled to pick and choose among the faculties, to deify and idolize one class of them, and to degrade and vilify another. The more we examine the arrangements of Providence, and the motives and consequences of our actions, the more reason we find to believe, that the interests of the individual and of the race are identically the same, and are to be advanced by the same course of conduct. Honesty has long been admitted to be, even in a selfish view, the best policy, and a just and liberal treatment of our fellow-men, in the end, the best means of promoting our own interest. The conferring of benefits on others conduces, more than

any thing else, to increase our own happiness. According to this view, a thoroughly enlightened self-esteem, leading to the desire of our own greatest good, and a thoroughly enlightened benevolence, leading to a desire for the highest welfare of our fellow-men, should direct us precisely to the same course of conduct,—that course which we have reason to believe, and which indeed we know, to be most conformable to the will of God. If the foregoing view be correct, the whole powers of the mind, the selfish, the social and benevolent, and the religious, if all were sufficiently enlightened and properly directed, would be entirely in harmony with each other, and produce one harmonious result. This, could it be attained, would be the perfection of human nature: this, and nothing short of this, would be perfect morality.

The view here taken of the human faculties, which represents them rising one above another by an almost imperceptible gradation, and all in harmony with each other, affords a more pleasing, and, at the same time, I am satisfied, a truer picture of our nature in its most perfect state, than that which would divide them into two classes, separated by a wide and strongly marked interval. Thus, and thus only, does the constitution of man appear in a light worthy of its original perfection, and worthy of its high ultimate destiny—not like a piece of new cloth put into an old garment, where the parts are not fitly joined, but like the “robe which was without a seam, woven from the top throughout.” It is all of a piece, every part corresponding to another, with nothing superfluous, and nothing wanting. Man is not like a satyr, the face and upper extremities only human, but the lower parts those of a brute. He is all human, bearing in every part the impress of the same divine original.

Do we then say that all the faculties are equal? We

say the very reverse;—that they rise in dignity and authority, from lower to higher, from higher to the highest. How do we know this? We know it by the same means as Mr Combe knows it. We require no philosophical teacher, no cunningly devised system, to inform us of it. We feel it—we are *conscious* of it. The faculties, if possessed in a sound and efficient state, give us intimations of no doubtful kind of the different degrees of authority to which they are entitled.

The intellect has a twofold office to perform in the formation of our moral judgments: 1st, in enlightening the feelings, and presenting the objects by which they are interested in the proper point of view; and, 2d, in acting with *consciousness*, turning their operation inwards upon the state of those feelings themselves, weighing and comparing their several intimations, and pronouncing upon the whole a decision, “approving of some principles and actions, and disapproving of others.” This is what Bishop Butler calls *reflection* or *conscience*.

We are not entitled to confine *conscience* to the dictates of one particular class of feelings. All the feelings of which we are *conscious*, having a moral tendency, or bearing in any way whatever on the due regulation of our conduct, must be considered as sharing in its decisions. Mr Combe says, the higher sentiments themselves are blind guides, and in order to direct our conduct, require to be enlightened by intellect. But the intellect is also capable of enlightening the lower feelings which are common to us and the inferior animals; and when they are so enlightened, and are employed in their own legitimate province, their tendency is as decidedly moral as that of the higher sentiments. Self-esteem leads us to seek that which is for our own advantage. When unenlightened by intellect, it may prompt us to indulge in present

pleasures of which we do not see the evil consequences. But if intellect once clearly points out that our greatest and permanent good is only to be attained by a life of temperance and sobriety, truth and honesty, a regard for the welfare of others, and a humble reliance on the goodness of God,—self-esteem will, when so enlightened, become a powerful aid to virtue, and furnish the strongest motive to strict moral conduct.

Philoprogenitiveness is one of the lower propensities, and is possessed by many animals. Its objects are limited. It does not certainly aim at the happiness of all mankind, though, in its effects, it has immense influence on the welfare of the whole race. It *only* leads men to the love of their own offspring, and of young and tender beings in general. It attaches us to them by the strongest ties, and impels us to attend to their wants, and minister, as far as in our power, to their happiness. When unenlightened, it may lead to absurd indulgence and improper treatment of children, just as unenlightened benevolence may lead men to acts which are hurtful instead of being beneficial to society, or, as Mr Combe himself states, “to injurious indulgence of the appetites and fancies of others.” But allow here the same advantage as is insisted on in the case of the higher sentiments. Let the feeling be properly enlightened by the intellect with a view of what conduces to the permanent good of its object, and it will undoubtedly lead us to seek that permanent good, and to refuse hurtful indulgences, and thus its tendency will be as strictly moral as that of the weaker, but more diffusive, desire to benefit the whole race.

Benevolence is a feeling said to be common to man and the inferior animals. Being in them unenlightened by intellect, it is confined to a passive meekness of disposition. In man it is more active; but it is the light

afforded by intellect which renders it so different a feeling in him, and gives it so much a larger scope and field of action. Other sentiments, common to man and the animals, which in them are confined and selfish in their objects, are in man extended in a similar manner. For instance, *cautiousness*. This is a most important, and, when enlightened by intellect, is undoubtedly a moral power, restraining us from action until we are assured that we can act with safety. Observe how it leads the physician to probe every system of disease, to examine every slight indication, to put every question which may elicit the truth, to doubt, to weigh probabilities, to leave nothing unexamined which may enable him to effect a cure, or to avoid the risks that may attend a rash and precipitate decision. In like manner, when the judge is engaged in trying a difficult or doubtful point, on his *caution*, as much as on his sense of justice, depends the probable soundness of his judgment, and the safety of the rights submitted to his determination. So it is with the general, on whose care and caution depend the safety, the welfare, the lives of his whole army — it may be the rights, the independence, the liberties of his country. To all who are in any way placed in situations of trust, *cautiousness* is not useful merely, it is indispensable.

There are not merely some, but many — nay, a very large proportion of mankind — who, in certain circumstances, are not to be restrained from crime by any other means than the *fear of punishment*. This is the case in general with the ignorant and uneducated part of mankind, and, indeed, almost with the whole of our race before the intellect has sufficiently expanded, or has been sufficiently enlightened by education. When the fear of punishment operates so as to prevent offences, who shall deny it to be moral feeling? It may be, and

certainly is, a low motive compared with some others, but it is not the less a *moral* motive, as indeed is every one that operates upon the will so as to regulate the conduct.

But it is in regard to a future state that *cautiousness* vindicates most distinctly its right to be considered as a moral element in our constitution. When intellect points out the probability, and revelation assures us of the fact, that there *is* a state of existence beyond the grave, where blessings are in store for those who conform to the divine will; but that the wicked, those who set that will at defiance, and who persevere to the end in a state of impenitence, will suffer a punishment corresponding to their evil deserts,—will not this, if firmly believed, be a powerful preservative from wickedness? It is needless to say that this is a low and selfish motive. Granting it to be so, it is not the less a moral instrument to compel us into the path of duty. But it is not more selfish than *hope*, or any other feeling, benevolence only excepted. It is not merely for ourselves that we are alarmed, but for our friends, our countrymen, for all mankind. We are incited by it to greater and greater exertions, to spread a knowledge of true religion and a pure morality among the heathen, and among the ignorant and vicious at home. It just *doubles the motive*, both for ourselves and for others, when we find that one course of conduct leads to happiness, and another to misery, in an everlasting state, and that there is no halting between the two; that we, and every other human being, must either be in the one predicament or in the other. Is it possible to conceive an accumulation of motives stronger than this? and can we allow to the one any superior cogency, any supremacy, that is denied to the other.

The true principle, then, which dictates, or ought to

dictate, what is right in conduct, is not the predominance of any one set of faculties over another, but the just balance among them all, each of them being allowed exactly that influence *which is its due*. Each of them is supreme within its own department, when acting in harmony with the rest, and "when enlightened by intellect and a knowledge of moral and religious duty." When all of them are properly illuminated and directed, there can be no opposition between them. To obtain this just balance and harmony among the faculties, so as to give to each its due share of satisfaction, and its due share of influence, is the extremely difficult problem which moralists are required to solve.

To enable each individual to attain to this just balance and harmony in his faculties, the only internal guide, though sometimes an insufficient one, is *conscience*. This is no particular faculty or feeling, such as *benevolence*, *veneration*, the sense of *justice*, or the like. It is the GENERAL POWER OF MORAL JUDGMENT which the mind possesses in consequence of its whole constitution, resulting from its general consciousness of separate and individual feelings, and the power of the intellect in reflecting upon these, and determining their relative degrees of weight and authority. This, I think, corresponds with the view taken by Bishop Butler, in the passage formerly quoted. A similar view of the matter is adopted by Dr Chalmers, in his work on Natural Theology. "The supremacy of conscience," he observes, "does not seem to have been sufficiently adverted to by Dr Thomas Brown. He treats the moral feeling rather as an *individual emotion*, which takes its part in the enumeration along with others in his list, than as the great master emotion that is not appeased but by its ascendancy over them all. Now, instead of a single combatant in the play of many others, and which

will only obtain the victory if physically of greater power and force, it should be viewed as separate and signalized from the rest by its own felt and inherent claim of superiority over them. Each emotion hath its own characteristic object wherewith it is satisfied. But the specific object of this emotion, is the regulation of *all* the active powers of the soul ; and without this, it is not satisfied.”* After illustrating this by the discovery which may be made of the original purpose and object of a watch, by inspecting the different parts of its mechanism, he adds the following :—“ And a similar discovery may be made by examination of the various parts and principles which make up the moral system of man — for we see various parts and principles there. We see *ambition*, (self-esteem,) having power for its object, and without the attainment of which it is not satisfied ; and *avarice*, (acquisitiveness,) having wealth for its object, without the attainment of which it is not satisfied ; and *benevolence*, having for its object the good of others, without the attainment of which it is not satisfied ; and the *love of reputation*, (love of approbation) having for its object their applause, without which it is not satisfied ; and lastly, to proceed no farther in the enumeration, *conscience*, which surveys and superintends the whole man, whose distinct and appropriate object it is to have the entire control, both of his inward desires and outward doings, and without the attainment of this, it is thwarted from its proper aim, and remains unsatisfied. Each appetite, or affection of our nature, has its own distinct object ; but this last is the object of conscience, which may be termed the moral affection. [It should rather be termed the *power of moral judgment*.] The place which it occupies, or rather which it is felt that it should occupy, and which naturally belongs to it, is that of a

* Chalmers's Works, vol. i. p. 312.

governor, and taking to itself the direction over all the other powers and passions of humanity. If this superiority be denied to it, there is a felt violence done to the whole economy of man."

Considering that Dr Chalmers is not a phrenologist, it is astonishing how near he comes, in the above passages, to that very language which a phrenologist would have used in reference to the subject under consideration. His view of the matter, and that of Butler, correspond precisely with that which I have endeavoured to give; and the whole may be taken as an instance of what I formerly stated, that the principles of phrenology, when right unfolded, will ultimately be found to coincide perfectly with those to which men of superior intellect have already been led by intuitive feeling and practical good sense. The difference between the view taken by Dr Chalmers and Bishop Butler, with regard to the general supremacy of conscience, and Mr Combe's view which attributes supremacy to certain special feelings, is sufficiently apparent, and need not be here farther insisted on.

I wish now to examine a little more particularly, the practical working of that power of *reflection* or *conscience*, such as it is possessed by the generality of mankind. It is admitted not to be in all cases, by itself, a perfect rule, or an efficient guide to right conduct; but as it is the only internal guide we have, it is desirable to know in what manner it gives its intimations, how far these are to be trusted, and how far they are generally operative.

It is proper to take into view the different states of this power, as it manifests itself before and after the act which is to be judged of. In the former case, it may be called *premonitive* conscience; in the latter, *approving* or *condemning* conscience.

And here, in place of going into a long analysis, which

might be tiresome to some readers, and little instructive to others, I shall present a distinct case by way of illustration ; and instead of proposing one of my own, I shall take one from the writings of an author who is generally allowed to have known something of human nature, and whose pictures of the internal workings of the mind have generally been regarded as correct.

In the tragedy of Macbeth, the poet introduces the usurper reasoning with himself previous to the murder of Duncan, and stating the motives which premonitive conscience suggests to dissuade him from the meditated crime.

If it were DONE, when 'tis done, then 'twere well
It were done quickly : If the assassination
Could trammel up the consequence, and catch
With his success, surcease : That but this blow
Might be the be all, and the end all here—
But HERE, upon this bank and shoal of time,—
We'd jump the life to come.

It appears by this that Macbeth is not influenced by the fears of a future judgment ; at least, that he is determined not to let this stand in the way of his purpose. He proceeds—

But in these cases,
We still have judgment *here* ; that do but teach
Bloody instructions, which, being taught, return
To plague th' inventor. This even-handed justice
Commends th' ingredients of our poison'd chalice
To our own lips.

He was aware that great crimes seldom escape punishment even in this world ; and that others might hereafter be incited by his example to treat himself as he now intended to treat his present victim. These are mere selfish and prudential considerations, but he now approaches what has the appearance of conscientious feeling.

He's here in double trust :

First, as I am his kinsman and his friend,
Strong both against the deed ; then as his host,
Who should against his murderer shut the door,
Not bear the knife myself.

He warms as he goes on, and represents the amiable qualities of his victim in terms that appear sincere ; but still what he seems most to regard is not the pleading of natural compassion and moral principle in himself, but the universal condemnation of the world which will pursue the perpetrator of so great a crime.

Besides this, Duncan

Hath borne his faculties so meek, hath been
So clear in his great office, that his virtues
Will plead like angels, trumpet-tongued, against
The deep damnation of his taking off.
And pity, like a naked new born babe,
Striding the blast, or heaven's cherubim, horsed
Upon the sightless coursers of the air,
Will blow the horrid deed in every eye,
That tears shall drown the wind.

He has by this time brought his whole feelings into a proper tone—he gives but a glance at the worthless cause for which he would plunge into so irremediable guilt.

I have no spur

To prick the sides of my intent, but only
Vaulting ambition, &c.

The result of the whole is, that his bloody purpose is for the present abandoned.

The above exhibits, as I conceive, a correct picture of *premonitive conscience*, suggesting, in its own quiet way, all the motives which, in such a mind as Macbeth's, might occur to dissuade him from so horrid a deed as murder ; and we find that, except in one or two allusions, the real guilt of the deed is hardly so much as thought of. It is not the crime, but the consequences of the

crime to himself, that he chiefly fears—the probability of its being somehow punished even in this world—the universal horror it will excite in the minds of others,—these are what determine him, for the time, to give up his murderous intent. Not that he does not feel the guilt too, in all its aggravation, but that this would not have been sufficient to decide him without the other considerations that have been mentioned.

After the crime is perpetrated, we have a scene of a different kind. The high wrought state of excitement into which his ambitious views, and the persuasions of the lady, had raised him when he “screwed his courage to the sticking place,” and determined to commit the act, has now given way, and *reflection*, or *conscience*, now opens his eyes to the full horror of his situation.

Macb. I have done the deed.—Didst thou not hear a noise?

It was but the owl and the cricket, but to the disturbed mind of Macbeth every thing is a cause of alarm. His eye glances on the bloody evidences of his guilt, and he exclaims,—

This is a sorry sight.

Lady M. A foolish thought to say a sorry sight.

Macb. There's one did laugh in's sleep, and one cried *murder*! They did wake each other. I stood and heard them; But they did say their prayers, and address'd them Again to sleep.

Lady M. There are two lodged together.

Macb. One cried, God bless us! and; Amen, the other; As they had seen me with these hangman's hands. Listening their fear, I could not say, Amen, When they did say, God bless us.

Lady M. Consider it not so deeply.

Macb. But *wherefore* could not I pronounce, amen? I had most need of blessing, and amen Stuck in my throat.

Lady M. These deeds must not be thought After these ways, else they will make us mad.

There is nothing more hitherto than the natural

operation of the good feelings he possessed, awakened to activity, after the strong excitement under which he committed the crime had subsided. What follows is bolder. He had previously seen an air-drawn dagger—the mere product of his excited fancy. He is now represented as *hearing a voice*, which is equally the result of high wrought feelings, and expressive of the deep horror with which his crime seems now invested.

Methought I heard a voice cry, *Sleep no more!*
 Macbeth does murder sleep, the innocent sleep ;
 Sleep, that knits up the ravell'd sleeve of care,
 The death of each day's life, sore labour's bath,
 Balm of hurt minds, great nature's second course,
 Chief nourisher in life's feast.—

The lady, who has no such compunctious feelings, is astonished at this emotion, and asks, impatiently,—

What do you mean ?

In his answer, it appears that this internal monitor had made so deep an impression upon him, that the “voice” appeared to address not himself merely, but the whole household :

Still it cried, *Sleep no more ! to all the house :*
 Glamis hath murder'd sleep, and therefore Cawdor
 Shall sleep no more, Macbeth shall sleep no more !

His emotion has now totally deprived him of the power of thinking and acting ; but she retains both :

Lady M. Go, get some water,
 And wash this filthy witness from your hands.
 Why did you bring these daggers from the place ?
 They must lie there. Go, carry them, and smear
 The sleepy grooms with blood.

Macb. I'll go no more :
 I am afraid to *think* what I have done ;
Look on't again I dare not.

When she takes the daggers, and leaves him by himself, a knocking at the gate raises him from his stupor :

Whence is that knocking ?
 How is't with me, when every noise appals me ?
 What hands are here ? Ha ! they pluck out my eyes !
 Will all great Neptune's ocean wash this blood
 Clean from my hand ? No : this my hand will rather
 The multitudinous seas incarnardine,
 Making the green, one red.

She returns, and again urges him to retire, to which he pays no attention.

To know my deed, 'twere best not know myself.
 Wake Duncan with thy knocking !—Ay, would thou couldst !

The following remarks upon this subject are contained in a paper on the character of Macbeth, in the first number of the *Phrenological Journal* : * — “ Lady Macbeth had no struggles before the crime : she has no immediate remorse after it. But Macbeth, who is represented with so much more feeling of a good tendency than she possesses, with some *benevolence*, some *conscientiousness*, large *love of approbation*, and considerable *cautiousness*, has no sooner committed the act to which he was goaded on by his own and his wife's ambition, than he is seized with the utmost horror at what he has done. Conscience, in such minds as his, is said to be a treacherous monitor, inasmuch as, before the commission of the crime, it warns us only in the gentlest whispers, but afterwards raises its accusing voice like thunder. This is easily and beautifully explained by the phrenological doctrine, that the organs of the different faculties are not always in an equally active state, but come into activity *seriatim*, either from internal causes, or as they may be affected by external circumstances. The doctrine is, that, previously to the commission of crime, the propensities leading to that crime are in a highly active

* Pages 106, 107.

state ; but no sooner are these gratified, than a reaction takes place. The propensities, wearied with long exertion, become dormant, and the moral powers coming into activity, shew us the enormity we have been guilty of in all its horror. It is not merely *conscientiousness* that, being roused, is offended by the commission of the crime. *Veneration*, when it exists, is offended by our seeing that we have transgressed the laws, and done outrage to the commands of our Maker. *Love of Approbation* is offended, in that we *feel* that we have incurred the reprobation, the scorn, and the hatred of all the wise and the good. *Cautiousness* is alarmed at the evil consequences which may attend our guilt in this world, and the punishment which awaits it in the next. This, joined to *Secretiveness*, alarms us with the fear of detection, and we start at every sound, and mistake every bush for a minister of vengeance. In the case of murder, which outrages a greater number of the higher sentiments than almost any other crime, *benevolence* is highly offended, and, through that, all the social affections. All these feelings, being roused in the mind of the murderer after the passions that led to the murder have subsided, are sufficient to convert his mind into a nest of scorpions. The whole mixed state of feeling constitutes what is called *remorse*, and which probably, when those feelings are possessed in any considerable degree, continues to haunt the culprit through life, and to render him his own tormentor, even when he is not overtaken by public justice."

This, then, is CONSCIENCE, and this the way in which, in many cases, it asserts its supremacy. The case above stated is one where a crime has been committed under the influence of selfish and inferior feelings, and contrary to the dictates of the higher sentiments. But cases may be figured, and have no doubt occurred, where the very

highest sentiments have led to crime. This is particularly apt to occur in matters of the most important kind, as in relation to points of religious faith. It cannot be doubted that many persecutors of heretics have been incited to acts of the most atrocious cruelty, from the most firm and conscientious belief, that they were acting for the benefit of the souls of mankind, and even of those whom they most bitterly persecuted. Can it be doubted that this was the case with Saul the persecutor, when he went down to Damascus, "breathing out threatenings and slaughter against the disciples of the Lord." His sincerity in this has never been questioned; he firmly believed he was doing God service. But after his miraculous conversion, we can easily conceive the anguish of mind which this sincere and conscientious man must have endured, when he discovered that Jesus of Nazareth, whom he persecuted, was in truth the Son of the living God — the Eternal King of Glory — the Saviour of the world. He possessed the sentiments of *veneration, hope, wonder, benevolence, justice, and firmness*, in great endowment, and in high activity, before as well as after his conversion; and it was *in consequence* of their activity that he was a persecutor; but this would afford him little consolation after it was declared to him how grievously they had been misdirected, and how deeply and fatally he had been in error. We may imagine his thoughts during the three days that elapsed before the visit of Ananias, while he remained blind, solitary, and fasting; all his self-righteousness cast down, and humbled in the dust. His previous ignorance would not then appear to excuse him, for he would feel that he ought to have *inquired* into the evidence before he persecuted the followers of Christianity, and that, in fact, his understanding had been darkened by an *evil heart of unbelief*. Accordingly his remorse, or con-

demning conscience, was so strong, that notwithstanding all his subsequent labours and sufferings in the cause of the Gospel, he declares himself to Timothy to have been “the chief of sinners.”

Here is an instance of a condemning conscience, where there has been no premonitive warning given to save from the committed act. His whole faculties, sentiments, intellect, and propensities, were acting in a state of perfect harmony, when he persecuted the Church of Christ. His conscience fully approved of his threatenings and slaughter of the disciples. The difference, therefore, between the abuses of the higher sentiments and those of the lower feelings seems to be this, — that in the former case, in many instances, there is no premonitive warning. Conscience not only does not disapprove, but approves, and hence the crimes arising from this source are perfectly frightful. The author of the *Natural History of Enthusiasm* asserts, that the blood shed by the Church of Rome, in direct persecution, in the loss of life in pilgrimages, and in the Crusades, and other religious wars, far exceeds that of all the other wars that ever have been waged on the face of the earth, or loss by calamities of earthquakes or volcanoes, &c.

In the case of St Paul, his conscience was awakened, and a complete new turn given to all his feelings and ideas, by his being miraculously convinced of the fact, that what he had so strenuously opposed as a false religion, actually was the true one. But there are cases where no such conversion takes place. Infidel writers have in all ages opposed, vilified, ridiculed, and abused the professors and the doctrines of Christianity, and no reasonable doubt can exist that many of them have done so from a sincere belief that the whole was a system of delusion, that the Bible was a cunningly devised fable,

and its contents no more worthy of credit than the Koran of Mahomet, or the Vedas or Shasters of the Bramins. Such a writer as Voltaire, for instance, or our own David Hume, might go to the grave in the belief, that all his attacks on Christianity were calculated to benefit mankind, and to relieve them from the evils of priestcraft and superstition. But supposing such a one, after a long life spent in disseminating infidel opinions, to be on his deathbed convinced, like Rochester, by the arguments of some learned and able divine, that all the doctrines which it had been the business of his life to vilify and oppose were strictly and literally true, it may be easy to imagine—though hardly to the full extent—the flash of horror that would in an instant come over his mind, on its first becoming opened to this conviction. When he thought of the multitudes who had been, through his means, unsettled in their faith—convinced by his sophistry—swayed by his opinions—awed by his sarcasms—turned from the truth by his sneers and ridicule: when he considered the increasing—the wide spreading mischief which had arisen, was still arising, and might continue to arise, from this sort of propagandism of unbelief, long after he was laid in his grave, and felt that he had no opportunity to undo even the thousandth part of the evil he had caused—that his career was run—the record closed—and nothing remaining but that the judge should pronounce a sentence, to be arrested only by an abject trembling appeal for undeserved mercy. It is needless to complete the picture.

From the above it appears, that conscience is so far to be trusted, that when it gives its premonitive warning, however feebly, we may be sure that we are wrong, but that even when that warning is altogether wanting, we cannot be always sure that we are right. In case of the abuses of the higher sentiments, we have found, that in

many cases there is no warning : hence these abuses are the most fatal, and are least likely to be removed or remedied. Repentance or conversion in such cases is rare ; and hence the care that is incumbent upon us to take, before we finally make up our minds to enter upon a course involving such fearful responsibility.

In all cases it is believed the premonitive warning is less strongly and decidedly pronounced than the accusing voice after the act ; and the experience of this is just one of the constraining reasons why the previous admonition, when given, ought to be more promptly and implicitly obeyed.

Each individual is the sole custodier of his own conscience. No one can decide for another of what feelings he is conscious, or what is the extent of his knowledge of moral and religious duty. If the sentiments are deficient, the intellect narrow, the education defective, and the knowledge of duty imperfect, we cannot expect from the individual the same correct judgment of right and wrong, or the same correct conduct in society, as we look for in men whose minds are cast in a happier mould, whose sentiments are sound and active, their intellects clear, and who have been trained in the knowledge and practice of good and virtuous principles. But this we may rely on, that the best are conscious of many deficiencies ; that all, whatever may be the standard of their moral judgments, come short of that standard which they themselves bear impressed upon their minds. Not only is it so, but those who stand the highest in moral and intellectual attainments, are just, on this very account, the most feelingly conscious of their own imperfections, and are the first to acknowledge how far they have fallen below that standard of perfect right, which they see a little more clearly than others. Thus it is that the conscience of every man, and particularly

of the best men, acknowledges the truth of what is so forcibly stated in the Bible, that he is a sinner in the sight of God, and that, if brought before the tribunal of a perfectly righteous Judge, he has no hope of acquittal, except through the merits and intercession of Him who is *mighty to save*.

CHAPTER VII.

ON THE SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE OF HUMAN DEPRAVITY.

IN the first chapter, I examined particularly Mr Combe's assumption, that the world, and especially the moral and intellectual condition of man, is in a state of slow and progressive improvement; and his argument derived from thence against the doctrine of man's original perfection, his fall from that state, and the consequent depravity of his nature. I think it was sufficiently proved, in the course of that investigation, that Mr Combe's views, in regard to these points, are quite destitute of any solid foundation.

I could not in that preliminary chapter enter upon the phrenological view of the question, as it was necessary, before doing so, to state what the phrenological doctrines are, and what are the different powers of intellect, and the different propensities and principles of action, which in that science are stated to be comprehended in the complicated system of the human faculties. Having now in some degree explained what phrenology has revealed to us in regard to these, I shall proceed very shortly to state, 1st, What I understand to be the real scriptural doctrine of the depravity of human nature; and, 2d, What light, if any, is thrown upon

this subject by phrenology, and how the views which it affords agree with the scriptural doctrine; and in the course of this statement, I hope to be able to remove any shadow of ground which might appear to favour Mr Combe's objections.

In the first place, in maintaining the entire depravity of human nature as it at present exists,—that is, its universal degeneracy from its original and destined perfection,—divines do by no means intend to teach that there are no tendencies towards good in the human constitution. It may be, that in maintaining strenuously a doctrine of such importance, and one which lies at the foundation of our faith, some divines may have used language too strong, or with too little qualification; but that is not to affect our estimate of the doctrine, so far as it is substantially true. Dr Chalmers has distinctly adverted to this, in his theological lectures, in a passage of which the following (extracted from notes taken in his class-room) will be found, I believe to contain the substance:—

“The depravity of human nature is the initial article in Christianity. Christianity is, in truth, the religion of sinners.* The world is in a state of enmity to God, in a state of ruin and decay. *Consciousness* tells us of the state; *conscience* of its guilt; but not perfectly, without the aids of the Word and the Spirit. There are too sweeping denunciations made on this subject by some theologians. They have put the conscience into a state of discrepancy with the fact. We must temper the representations of a fierce and flaming orthodoxy, and not needlessly exasperate the antipathies of men. While we maintain the entire depravity of human nature, yet still we must admit that there is virtue in

* “I am not come to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance.”—Matthew, ix. 13.

the world. We must admit the real virtues of antiquity, in the continence of Scipio, the devotion of Regulus, the morality of Socrates, Plato, &c.* Some have resolved these heathen virtues into a love of applause; but there is a native sense of integrity in many. Domestic duties are in many instances performed from principle, and disquietude is felt if they are not attended to. We cannot deny that some men are actuated by motives of benevolence, philanthropy, &c. But the more this is admitted, so much the more evident is it that man has fallen from his original righteousness. When man is charged with guilt, this is rested on his *ungodliness*. If this count is made out, it is enough. Examine the best moral constitution of any man on earth, we may find benevolence, integrity, &c. but *no loyalty to God.*"

This, then, is the doctrine, that the depravity of man consists, in the first place, in his having *forsaken God*, and that from this has flowed, as a necessary consequence, all his other depravity. No doubt there are degrees in depravity, and some have fallen to greater depths of degradation than others; but this is true universally, that all mankind, without exception, are in a state immeasurably below the original perfection of their nature. "The moral question," says Dr Chalmers, "between God and man, is one thing, and between man and man is another thing. One man may manifest kindness, and another malice, but both are *alienated from God*. The relative distances and elevations of the earth sink into insignificance when compared with the immensity of the distance of the earth from the sun; so it is in the moral condition of man. One man is more moral than another, but the differences are incon-

* "These, not having the law, are a law unto themselves."—Romans, ii. 14.

siderable, when compared with the immense interval that separates all from a state of *perfect allegiance to God.*"

Holding this, then, to be the doctrine, I shall endeavour to illustrate it in different ways. First, in regard to our original state : man was created in the image of God, and while he remained in paradise, enjoyed an intercourse with him far nearer and more perfect than we at present possess. Hence, he had a more accurate knowledge of the will of God, and more constraining motives for its performance. He was formed for intercourse with and an entire dependence upon God, and while he remained in that state, he was perfect. He walked in the sight of God ; and having inclinations agreeable to his will, he could not act otherwise than according to it. In this state there could be no imperfection, and no sin.

The phrenological view of such a state would be this : — Having all his faculties and sentiments in perfection, these would always lead him "to seek to God" as their highest object. *Veneration* would impress him constantly with ideas of the greatness of God and his own dependence upon him, and lead him in all things to inquire after his will, and to obey it. *Wonder* would be constantly excited by new discoveries of the character of God, and the greatness and variety of his works. *Ideality* would receive constant delight from the unfading perfection of the one, and the splendour and beauty of the other. *Benevolence* and *conscientiousness* would instinctively lead him to that conduct towards his fellow-men, which would conduce most to their happiness, being that which God designed when he implanted such sentiments in his mind ; the one making those actions a pleasure, which the other would point out to be a duty. An enlightened *self-esteem* would lead to the same conduct,

as the best means of promoting his own happiness. Acting constantly under a sense of the presence of God, he would constantly endeavour so to act as to obtain his *approbation*; while *cautiousness* would lead him to avoid whatever might offend, and *hope* would point smiling to the delightful future, which nothing could disturb while he continued in obedience. The social qualities of *adhesiveness*, and the love of *offspring*, would of course lead, in private, and with relation to a more confined class of duties, to the same perfect and unblamable conduct, as the other sentiments we have mentioned in relation to their more extended sphere. Thus, all the faculties which could operate in any way as motives upon the conduct, would in this situation lead directly and necessarily to one result, — a *perfect submission to the divine will*.

But in this state man did not continue. He had his choice of remaining in a state of dependence upon God, or of leaving him and trusting to his own resources. He was induced, by what means we need not here inquire, to prefer the latter. He was seduced from his allegiance. He disobeyed a positive command, and in so doing, was guilty of an overt act of rebellion. He was, in consequence, banished from that intercourse with God which he had hitherto enjoyed, and sent into the world to reap the fruits of the choice he had made.

The change produced by this may be compared to that which the earth would sustain if separated from its connection with the sun, — if it were driven or attracted by any extraneous force from its present orbit. The earth and all its productions remaining the same, they would soon degenerate when deprived of the warmth and light of the solar rays.

In like manner, man, after the Fall, remained the same creature as he was before, but his situation was altered. He retained the same faculties, but the highest of these

were deprived of their highest, their appropriate objects. His *veneration* and *wonder* might still lead him to contemplate the perfections of God through the medium of his works, but they no longer enjoyed the perfect gratification resulting from his immediate presence. He no longer acted under a constant sense of that presence, and consequently God was now “not in all his thoughts.” But more than this, he no longer looked up to God with unmingled, undisturbed feelings of *veneration*, *love*, and *hope*. *Fear* mingled in his thoughts of Him whom he had offended, and what we fear, we soon learn to hate, or at least endeavour to banish from our minds. Hence, to do His will—to obtain His approbation—was no longer his supreme wish—his earnest and constant endeavour. In the same way, his feelings towards his fellow-creatures were likewise disturbed and perverted. These were no longer feelings of perfect love. It is natural to suppose, that as both the man and the woman had participated in the guilt of the Fall, they would soon be led to mutual recrimination.* This would naturally lead to angry and unpleasant thoughts of each other, and occasionally to mutual offences. In every view, therefore, both of duty to God and duty to man, the human faculties, by the change which had taken place, were turned away from their proper objects, and their proper modes of exercise. From the moment of his first departure from God, man had no longer the same clear knowledge of His will, nor the same constraining motives to obey it. His faculties, deprived of those objects, for the contemplation and enjoyment of which they were primarily intended, attached themselves to those which were improper, and acting with irregular and misdirected energy, necessarily

* Something of this kind appears in the excuse offered by Adam for his disobedience, Gen. iii, 12.

led to evil; and thus he unavoidably fell from one degree of depravity to another.

But the evils of the Fall did not end here. The spiritual and moral degradation which it produced brought necessarily in its train the physical. The influence which retained the mental powers in their just balance being removed, the disorder would constantly tend to increase. The laws of propagation (admitted, nay, insisted on by Mr Combe as part of his system,) communicating to the children the disordered state of faculties which the parents themselves suffered under, necessarily continued, and, except under very favourable circumstances, increased and deepened the features of the original degradation. The moral and religious feelings, not receiving their proper gratifications, would languish and decay; while the lower propensities, kept in constant exercise, and constantly in view of their appropriate objects, would rise into an unnatural and fearful predominance. Each generation, as it succeeded, would thus become not only more alienated from God, but physically more imperfect, and mentally more unfavourably constituted than the last; until, finally, as we are told, "the earth was filled with violence, and the thoughts of man's heart was only evil continually."

There is evidently nothing in this that is not perfectly consistent with all that Phrenology teaches, and indeed nothing but this will afford an explanation of our present condition. We see that the present state of the human faculties is much more imperfect than the high nature of some of them would lead us to expect. It is acknowledged by all the phrenological writers, that the higher sentiments are generally weaker than the lower propensities; and that, in a great majority of our race, some one or more of the former are eminently defective. From this, it appears undeniable, that the faculties have been thrown

off their proper poise and balance. But this is not all. The faculties are not only ill balanced, they are all individually imperfect. None of them act spontaneously as they ought, nor perform their functions at once with ease and satisfaction. Some are dormant and sluggish, some are over-active. Some require to be stimulated, some to be restrained. The phrenological doctrine of their *alternate activity*, of their becoming active *seriatim*, and requiring alternate periods of exertion and rest, is of itself a proof of degeneracy, and a necessary cause of irregular manifestation. In order to perfection, they ought to be constantly in a state ready for use; never exerted when not required, and never wanting in power when the occasion for action occurs. Is this the case with the human faculties now, in any individual, or is there any probability that it ever will be so?

The necessity which is universally acknowledged, of the cultivation of the mental powers by means of education and moral training, and the utter sterility of mind which appears when this education is neglected, is a proof of degeneracy. The same appears in the necessity of applying, to a great part of our race, the active restraints of law; the impossibility of preventing crimes by all the modes of inculcating moral and religious duty, or even, when these fail, by all the terrors of punishment; the necessity of a constantly renewed appeal to the higher sentiments, through the institutions of religion, by exhortation, by preaching, by an application of all the moral motives that can operate upon the feelings of men. And, perhaps, even the strongest proof of all is the astounding fact, that even the revelation of a Saviour, and a free offer of pardon to sinners, has yet only partially succeeded in reclaiming the race, and that a large, by far the larger portion still obstinately reject and loathe

a method of unmerited salvation, the only one suited to their present condition, and the only one capable of bringing them back to that God whom they have forsaken.

The present and past depravity of man is a fact universally admitted ; but another question remains, — Is our nature capable of rectification by the development of its own elements ? This is the real point to be determined, for all the rest is too obvious to admit of dispute. Divines deny that man is capable of rectifying the disorders of the world by his own exertions. Mr Combe maintains that he is, and that a knowledge of phrenology, and the natural laws, will enable him to do so. As all that is to be done in this way is still to be spoken of in the future sense, it is impossible for Mr Combe to prove how far this assumption is correct, and to what extent the condition of man may be improved by the means alluded to. We can only speak from probabilities, and from experience of the past ; and these are all against the assumption, that any great or decisive improvement is likely to be effected in this way on the generality of mankind. With every disposition to think highly of the doctrines of Phrenology, believing them to be substantially true, and that they will ultimately come to be considered as of high importance, I cannot see any rational grounds for believing, that, taken by themselves, these doctrines will be more successful than those of other philosophical systems, in remedying the numerous disorders that have crept into the world. Some of these systems have been *founded on truths* equally undeniable as those of Phrenology : and, on comparing them carefully together, many of the principles they inculcate are identically the same as those now maintained by the phrenologists ; but they have failed, and Phrenology will fail also. Granting, what I can by no means admit, that the natural laws, as

expounded by Mr Combe, are calculated to lead to clearer views of duty than other systems; this is but a small part of what is wanted. The great questions are, What are their sanctions? and supposing them to be known, What is the probability of their being obeyed? The great desideratum is, to supply *sufficient motives* to act up to the views of duty we possess.

The answer to the first question must be, that the natural laws, properly speaking, have no *sanctions*. They carry with them, to besure, certain consequences,—that is to say, if we act in a certain way, we shall reap a certain quantity of enjoyment, and if we act otherwise, we shall be visited with a certain portion of suffering; but as these are to occur in the present life, and as (the laws being known) their amount would be clearly foreseen and determined, the whole would, of course, become matter of calculation, and it would be left to every one's choice to obey them or not, every one being at perfect liberty to disobey any particular law, provided he made up his mind to endure the penalty.

This being the case, supposing the whole “natural laws” to be at this moment engraved on tables of brass, and made known to every individual of the human race—supposing all the difficulties of discovering them to be got over, and that they were ascertained and demonstrated as clearly as the rules of geometry in Euclid,—is any one so ignorant of human nature, as to believe that they would on that account be universally obeyed, or that the knowledge of them would be in all cases made use of, to promote the good of the species?

Mr Combe has himself anticipated this question, and answered it in the negative. He admits, in one passage,*—what, indeed, he could not reasonably deny—that a

* Constitution of Man, people's edition, p. 10, col. 2.

mere knowledge of the natural laws is *not sufficient* to ensure observance of them. But is not this at once admitting, in substance, that his system is radically and incurably defective? He says, that “practical training, and the aid of *every motive* that can interest the feelings, are necessary to lead individuals to obey the natural laws.” What motives does he here allude to, that are not included in, or do not necessarily arise from, a knowledge of the laws themselves,—a knowledge of our own constitution, and of the relations subsisting between it and external objects? If such constraining motives do exist, is it not evident, that in these, and not in a mere knowledge of the natural laws, lies the true and only hope of raising man from his present state of ruin and degradation? He goes on to say — “Religion, in particular, may furnish motives highly conducive to this obedience.” Then why, it may be asked, does he exclude from his system all considerations of a religious nature? Why does he exclude those considerations which even natural religion is calculated to furnish, and which have been admitted even by heathens,—the belief in a future state, and the sanctions of future rewards and punishments? These, it seems, do not fall within the object of his book; * but why do they not? Is it not evident, that by omitting them, he has voluntarily, and of set purpose, founded his system on a defective basis, and excluded that which is alone capable of supplying the defect?

The real question, after all, is a question of motives. We are not so destitute of the knowledge of what is right, as of inclination to act up to the knowledge we possess. For one who acts wrong from ignorance, there are hundreds who do so from the perversity or weakness

* Constitution of Man, p. 7, col. 1.

of their nature. This complaint is as old as the time of Horace :—

Video meliora proboque.

Deteriora sequor. *

It is echoed by St Paul,—

“ The good that I would, I do not ; but the evil which I would not, that I do.

“ For I delight in the law of God after the inward man ; but I see another law in my members warring against the law in my mind, and bringing me into captivity unto the law of sin,” &c. †

But one fact is worth a thousand arguments and general statements ; and, accordingly, Mr Combe lays great stress on individual cases. In particular, he refers to the case of a benevolent individual, who, in his anxiety to carry into practical effect the views of Mr Owen, injured his constitution so far by severe labour, as to bring on spitting of blood. He states that, “ being now unable for such severe exertion, he gave up his whole time to directing and instructing the people, — and for two or three weeks spoke the whole day, *the effusion of blood from his lungs still continuing.*” ‡ The consequences were such as might have been expected. This mode of treatment brought on a confirmed pulmonary disease, of which he died in the course of a few months.

It will at once be admitted that the conduct of this person was in the highest degree irrational. The excuse of ignorance can hardly be received ; at least it is believed, that examples of such extreme ignorance are rare. But granting that, in this instance, the error was caused by ignorance, what will be said of the case I am now going to state ?

* I see the right, and I approve it too ;

Condemn the wrong, and yet the wrong pursue.

† Rom. vii. 19, 22, 23.

‡ Constitution of Man, p. 38, col. 2.

What will the reader say, when I mention that Dr Spurzheim, the coadjutor of Gall—the joint labourer with that great man in the field of phrenological discovery—the author of the Catechism of the Natural Laws, from whom, Mr Combe acknowledges, he derived his first ideas on the subject, brought on the illness which resulted in his death, by what Mr Combe himself would describe as a flagrant act of disobedience of these very laws? The following account of this event is given in a letter addressed to Mr Combe, by Mr Nahum Capen, of Boston, dated November 15, 1832, inserted in the *Phrenological Journal*, vol. viii. p. 127.

“It is with the deepest feelings of grief, that I state, that Dr Spurzheim is no more.

“He died in this city, on the 10th instant, at 11 o'clock, P. M. after an illness of about three weeks. On the 17th September he commenced a course of lectures on Phrenology in this city, and soon after, another course at Harvard University, Cambridge. These lectures occupied six evenings in the week. He delivered, besides, a course of five lectures before the Medical Faculty, on the anatomy of the brain, in the day time.

“The subject having met with the most favourable reception, he laboured, with great earnestness and pains, to elucidate its principles. He, being personally admired by our citizens, his time and presence were in constant demand. Added to these continued engagements, our peculiarly changeable climate had an unfavourable influence on his constitution. Sudden changes exposed him to cold; and an incautious transition from a warm lecture-room to the evening air, was attended with debilitating effects. This variety of causes, brought on at first slight indisposition, which, if it had been attended to, might have been easily checked. Regard-

ing his illness of less consequence than the delivery of his lectures, he exerted himself for several days, when prudence required an entire cessation from labour. THIS WAS THE FATAL STEP: cold produced fever, and this *imprudence* seemed to *settle* the fever in the system.

“He was confined to his room about fifteen days, which time his disease gradually assumed a more alarming aspect until death. He was averse to all active treatment from the beginning, and resorted to simple drinks,” &c.

A similar account of the same event is given in a letter of the 16th November, received by Mr Combe from Dr Robert M'Kibben of New York. “His illness continued for some time after having been chilled, and he persisted in lecturing, until the last lecture or two he was quite *obscure* and confused, and evidently labouring under great weakness. No persuasion of his friends, however, could prevail on him to desist, until the Wednesday fortnight before his decease, when the fever had increased so much as to confine him to his bed. He would use no remedies, though urged to do so by the medical gentlemen who most anxiously attended him: Lavements were the only things he would use, and he objected that the British and American practice was too active, unfortunately forgetting the climate he was in. The symptoms were very obscure in the accession, but they gradually assumed the form of synochus, with great nervous depression, and he gradually got worse, until the fatal catastrophe occurred.”

Now, here we have a man, as Mr Combe will admit, of the highest intellectual and moral eminence,—a *physician*,—acquainted thoroughly, if any human being can be said to be so, with the laws of his own constitution, and its relations with external objects; and yet

we find him, in the important point of his own health, acting directly in the teeth of these laws, in obstinate defiance of all warning, and bringing upon himself, as the immediate consequence, disease, ending in death. I state all this as the undoubted fact, without the most remote intention of casting the slightest shade of disrespect on the memory of Dr Spurzheim; to whom, on the contrary, I would do all honour. But the point I aim at is this,—if such a man is found to have so erred, who can ever be free from error? And what utter insanity is it to expect, not that a large portion of mankind, but that *all mankind*, will, at some period, be so enlightened, as to be safe from falling into such errors.

How long will it be, under Mr Combe's system, before mankind in general shall become equally enlightened on the subject of the natural laws, as Dr Spurzheim? But we see that, even granting this were the case, our situation would be little if at all mended; for we here find Dr Spurzheim himself, whom it is not too much to call the author of this very system, erring as deeply and as fatally as the worthy and benevolent, but ignorant Owenite.

If the natural laws were at this moment universally known, it is possible that a certain portion of the best constituted of mankind—those whose faculties and dispositions are most happily balanced and best commingled—would conform to them from inclination; another, and perhaps a larger portion, might obey them from a sense of duty; a third portion might obey them from the selfish motives proposed by Mr Combe (the highest motive which he, in any case, holds out for such obedience being, that we may expect ultimately to reap from them the greatest harvest of enjoyment;) and a fourth portion might obey, to avoid the pains and evils which they would see to be the consequence of infringing

them. But all these classes together would amount, it is to be feared, to but a small numerical portion of mankind. Mr Combe is aware, that in the great majority of the race, the lower propensities are greatly superior in strength and activity to the higher and peculiarly human faculties ; and this being the case, is it not probable, that the knowledge of "*nature and her laws*" would be turned by such persons into the means of gratifying their strongest inclinations ?

The laws and their consequences being all thoroughly known, the generality of mankind would act as they do now ; and seeing clearly the right path, would follow, as at present, the wrong. The depravity of human nature would be too strong for the laws. Some would disobey them from the mere spirit of contradiction, or to please a wayward inclination ; some to gratify a predominant propensity or craving passion ; some would partake of the enticing cup of present pleasure, though *certain death*, at a limited distance, stared them in the face, as immense numbers do at this day.

I may here refer to the following passage from Bishop Butler, (quoted by Mr Combe for a different purpose,) as directly confirming the above view ; and it is impossible for Mr Combe, on his principles, to produce an answer to it. " In the present state, all which we enjoy, and a great part of what we suffer, is put in our own power. For pleasure and pain are the consequences of our actions, and we are endowed, by the Author of our nature, with capacities of foreseeing these consequences." " I know not that we have any one kind or degree of enjoyment, but by the means of our own actions. And by prudence and care we may, for the most part, pass our days in tolerable ease and quiet ; or, on the contrary, we may, by rashness, ungoverned passion, wilfulness, or even by negligence, make ourselves as miserable as ever

we please. *And many do please to make themselves extremely miserable ; i. e. they do what they know beforehand will render them so. They follow those ways, the fruit of which they know, by instruction, example, experience, will be DISGRACE, and POVERTY, and UNTIMELY DEATH. THIS, EVERY ONE OBSERVES TO BE THE GENERAL COURSE OF THINGS,*" &c.

In the above passage, Bishop Butler has stated, in a few words, all that is of any practical utility in Mr Combe's system ; and he has shewn, in addition, that, as human nature is constituted, it is impossible to restrain men from vice by any such considerations. But there is a farther view which is well deserving of our notice.

Knowledge is desirable, certainly, when joined to, and properly directed by good principles ; but knowledge, merely by itself, is a two-edged weapon. There is a knowledge of evil, as well as a knowledge of good ; and the "natural laws," if thoroughly known, would disclose the one as well as the other. Though knowledge is power, most assuredly it is not virtue.* Some would study these laws for no other purpose than that of discovering new and untried methods of disobeying them, and snatch, as they do now, short moments of frantic excitement, at the expense of early death, or lasting disease and misery. It is not necessary that the pains to be avoided are removed to the other side of the grave ; many will undoubtedly brave them with all their terrors, even in the present life. It will with some be, as now, a point of honour to do so, and many may think it a proof of a mean and cowardly spirit, to be deterred from an enjoyment which they covet, by the prospect of evils

* See the Tables and Calculations of M. Guerry, proving, that in those parts of France where education has made the greatest progress, the proportion of crime is the greatest, and that in those districts where there is least education, crimes are the most rare.

which a man of ordinary constancy *may* be able to bear, and from which, at the worst, when he finds them to become intolerable, he may escape at any time, by an act for which, however criminal, Mr Combe's system provides no punishment,—*Suicide*.

Many undoubtedly there are, and these even not the most degraded and vicious of mankind, whom nothing will prevent from gratifying their most craving propensities, and tasting present enjoyment, let the consequences be what they may. In the heyday of youth, when the blood boils in the veins, no consideration of evils to be endured in the present life will deter them from tasting the cup of pleasure — or, when once they taste, from drinking even to the dregs. With them, the great craving is for excitement.

They scorn in apathy to float or dream
Down listless Satisfaction's torpid stream ;
But dare, alone, in vent'rous bark to glide
Down turbulent Delight's tempestuous tide.*

And they will do so, although at the bottom they see a gulf which they believe is to swallow them up for ever.

To many such, there will appear even a *bravery* in despising laws which have no other sanction than a little corporeal suffering in the present life ; and companions will encourage one another to disobedience, by the same motives which Lady Macbeth urges upon her lord to induce him to the murder of Duncan. “Art thou afeard,” such a one may say,—

Art thou afeard

To be the same in thine own act and deed
As thou art in desire ? Wouldst thou have that
Which thou esteem'st the *prime solace* of life,
And live a coward in thine own esteem,
Letting *I dare not* wait upon *I would*,
Like the poor cat i' the adage ?

The young, the thoughtless, and those endowed with strong passions, will never learn wisdom so as to be of any practical use, except from the stern teacher, experience. Of them it must always be true, what the poet has applied to a gay and unfortunate monarch :

Fair laughs the man, and soft the zephyr blows,
While, proudly riding o'er the azure realm,
In gallant trim, the gilded vessel goes—
Youth on the prow, and pleasure at the helm,
Regardless of the sweeping whirlwind's sway
That, hush'd in grim repose, expects his evening prey.*

Were the *natural laws* and all their consequences universally known, they would be studied to procure new and ever varied modes of present enjoyment—to procure the means of gratifying the lower, even the very lowest, propensities; and the consequence would be, that vice, immorality, and debauchery of all kinds, would be carried to a height, of which, at present, we can have no adequate conception. The world would be ransacked for condiments more piquant to the taste than Curry or Cayenne—for intoxicating substances more powerful than Alcohol or Opium—for wines more delicious and exhilarating than Champagne or Burgundy. The present generation would find themselves mere children in the arts of procuring, heightening, prolonging, and sustaining to the utmost extent every form and mode of sensual enjoyment.

We would see new varieties of HELLS, suited to our increased knowledge, and consequently extended sphere of enjoyment, in which every resource of human ingenuity would be exhausted for the destruction of time, talents, fame, fortune, health, and life itself. We would have establishments for the rich, more luxurious and more seducing than the gayest of our modern clubs; and

* Gray's *Bard*.

beverages more palatable, cheaper, and more exciting, than the poison which is at present dealt so liberally from our gin palaces, for the poor. We would not, like Thalaba, require to go to Tunis, nor to search under the sea, for the Dom-Daniel. We would have Dom-Daniels of our own in every street, crowded by whole hecatombs of more willing victims than ever prostrated themselves before the car of Juggernaut.

But if there were, as there undoubtedly would be, some, who would willingly go all this length, and brave all consequences in the mad pursuit of transitory pleasure, there are others, who, possessing more *Cautiousness*,—certainly not more virtue,—would trim their vessels in the voyage of life more warily, and endeavour to compromise the matter between the love of enjoyment and the dictates of prudence. These would study the *natural laws*, to discover how far they might be able to go in vice, and yet return unharmed—to ascertain what amount of sensual pleasure they might be able to enjoy, without the entire destruction of life and health, and the future comfort of their worldly existence. The question would be, not what they might be able to enjoy consistently with innocence and duty, but what they might be able to enjoy with safety.

Were man endowed with universal knowledge of the capacities of his own constitution, and the powers of external nature, and freed, as Mr Combe seems to desire, from all the checks arising from fear of death and the prospect of an existence to come, while his faculties and dispositions remain as they now are, every one would of course rush forward to reap as much enjoyment as he could in the present life; and what kind of enjoyments these would in general be, we may easily suppose, when we have it on the authority of Mr Combe himself, that, with the generality of mankind,

the higher feelings and intellectual faculties are weak and defective, and the lower propensities greatly predominant. To one so constituted, it would be in vain to point out the pleasures arising from the cultivation of the intellect, or those high and generous feelings which form the chief distinction of our race. He would tell you, that *his* happiness is not placed in these, but in the gratification of his appetites, and in sensual and epicurean enjoyment—in the destruction of innocent animals in the chase—or in the still more exciting pursuits of war and bloodshed. You can have no answer to this. It is needless to point out the delights of peace and virtue to one who cares nothing about them—or to depict the future pain and misery he is bringing on himself, to one who sets all such considerations at defiance. Speak of death—Mr Combe has argued away, as far as he is able, all the effect which this circumstance is fitted to produce, and he carefully excludes every motive arising from the prospect of a future state. He represents, indeed, the evil which a man who follows such a course will bring upon his children, and upon the human race in general; but he might as well address the winds. What does the selfish man care for his posterity, or for the welfare of his race? If he will not be deterred from a life of vicious pleasure by a prospect of the evils it will bring upon himself, will he be stopped in his career by the consideration that his guilt is to be expiated in the person of another?

Supposing, then, that Christianity, as at present taught, were abolished, and the “Natural Laws” erected in its room, the concerns of life, confined to the present world, would become, as I have said, mere matter of calculation. But men, according to their predominant feelings, would calculate differently. While a few would undoubtedly prefer the enjoyments of sentiment and

intellect to those of sense and passion, some would, as now, prefer a short life of high excitement, and endeavour to crowd into as narrow a compass as they could, all the delights of which *their* nature was susceptible ; while others, like true epicures, would wish to prolong the feast, and while, like Solomon, they “ withheld not their heart from any joy,” would partake of these so cautiously, as not to bring the course of their delights to a too abrupt conclusion. This last may be thought the more rational and more prudent plan, and would certainly be more consistent with the *natural laws* ; but it is just as far removed as the other from that which is alone worthy of regard,—moral and virtuous conduct. What, then, becomes of the fine drawn speculations of Mr Combe, as to the regeneration of the world by means of the *natural laws* ?

Christianity presents not only the clearest views of duty, but also the most powerful motives to obedience ; and if those, enforced by every consideration that can influence the mind of man, have not been hitherto sufficient to restrain the evils arising from perverse inclination and unbridled passion, will any fact revealed by Phrenology have this effect ? If men have not been prevented from crime by the constraining motives of the fear of God, and the love of a Saviour—the prospect of divine wrath on the one hand, and eternal felicity on the other—will their headlong passions be quelled, and their wayward propensities kept in check, by the doctrine of the *supremacy of the moral sentiments and intellect* ? Is there any thing in this doctrine more attractive than the speculations of Plato or Socrates, on the *Beauty of Virtue* and the happiness of living *according to nature* ? Will the irreligious man be convinced and rendered pious, by being informed that there are in the brain organs of *Veneration, Hope, and Wonder* ? Will the thief be

arrested in his designs, by appealing to an organ of *Conscientiousness*, and the statement that this principle is superior to *Acquisitiveness* and *Secretiveness*, for that these organs lie at the base of the brain, while that of the former lies on the coronal surface? There seems to be here so slender a ground to serve as the foundation of so vast an edifice—so immense a distance between the admitted premises and the desired conclusion,—that I am at a loss to conceive how any sane individual can seriously believe for a moment, that upon such a foundation as this he can be able to rear a system for the recovery of a lost world.

But though it were certain, that, by the means proposed, man were capable in some respects of improving his condition, one thing is clear, that if we are right in our account of human depravity, no effort of man can avail to remedy that evil, because it must ever remain impossible for him to remove its cause. That cause, as has been explained, is the *alienation of man from God*, banishment from his favour and presence, the dissolving of that intercourse and connection with God, in which he was originally placed, in which state only his faculties were furnished with their highest objects, and where only he could use them in unison with the divine will. Created for a state of dependence upon a Being of infinite perfection, nothing can remove the evils caused by his revolt, but restoring him to the same state. It is needless to ask if the means proposed by Mr Combe will effect this. All his pretended remedies are mere palliatives, utterly powerless to effect any important relief while this grand evil remains unredressed. As well might it be attempted, in the case formerly supposed, of the earth being removed from the cheering influence of the sun, to supply the want of that influence by artificial means, as to remove the evils of man's lot, and the defects of his

present state, by such wretched expedients. As, in the one case, nothing could effect a satisfactory change, but to restore the globe to its place; so, in the other, nothing can remedy the condition of man, but bringing him back to that God whose favour alone is life. Almighty power alone is capable of effecting this revolution, and Almighty power has been exerted to effect it. A free offer of restoration is held out to those who will accept it, but so deep seated is the evil, as to take away from many even the *desire* of being restored.

It is needless to carry this speculation farther. Those who are willing to understand the doctrine we maintain, will see that it is consistent with phrenological as with all other known truth. Those who are determined not to understand, are proof against any reasoning. It is needless to continue the discussion for their sakes: "They are joined to their idols: let them alone."

CHAPTER VIII.

OBJECTION TO THE PARADISAICAL STATE OF OUR FIRST PARENTS CONSIDERED.

MR COMBE, like the divines, seems to consider the doctrine of the corruption of human nature as the test by which his system is to stand or fall. Hence he directs against it every argument his ingenuity can devise. In connection with this doctrine it is generally held, that man was placed, at his creation, in a paradise, from which pain and death were excluded, and that those evils were afterwards brought upon him in consequence of his fall. Mr Combe objects to this, that man is endowed with certain faculties, which fit him for a

scene of danger, pain, and death, and which would be unsuited to a state into which these were not allowed to enter.

In his general account of the faculties, Mr Combe states, with regard to *Combateness*, that "it obviously adapts man to a world in which danger and difficulty abound;" and that *Destructiveness* "places man in harmony with death and destruction, which are woven into the system of the sublunary creation." If Mr Combe had been imbued with the true philosophic spirit to which he lays claim, he would have been satisfied with stating this to be the case *in relation to the present system of things*; and had he done so, his statement would have been liable to no objection, for so far it is unquestionably true.

But Mr Combe is not satisfied with this. He has overstepped the proper boundaries of legitimate inquiry, and most unphilosophically attempted to rear up an argument against a doctrine with which he had nothing to do. After mentioning what is quite true, that *Cautiousness* is "admirably adapted to the nature of the external world," he adds,—"It is clear that the gift of an organ of *Cautiousness* implied that man was to be placed in the field of danger. It is adapted to a world like the present, *but would be at variance with a scene into which no evil could intrude.*"

The tendency of this last remark is sufficiently obvious; but to remove all doubt, Mr Combe adds the following paragraph, in which he openly attacks the opinions on this subject held by divines,—opinions which, whether they are true or false, lie beyond the province of fair philosophical inquiry.

Referring to the propensities which have just been mentioned, he says,—"Theologians who enforce the corruption of human nature *would do well to consider*

whether man, as originally constituted, possessed the organs of these propensities or not. If he did possess them, *it will be incumbent on them to shew the objects of them in a world where there was no sorrow, sin, death, or danger.* If these organs were bestowed *after* the Fall, the question *will remain to be solved*, whether man, with new organs added to his brain, and new propensities to his mind, continued the same being as when these did not form parts of his constitution. Or, finally, they may consider whether the existence of these organs, and of an external world adapted to them, does not prove that man, as he now exists, is actually the same being as when he was created, and that his corruption consists in the *tendency to abuse his faculties*, and not in any *inherent viciousness* attributable to his nature itself."

This passage proves Mr Combe either to be entirely ignorant or entirely neglectful of the proper objects of philosophical inquiry, and of the boundary which separates its legitimate sphere from those subjects into which reason is unable to penetrate. He has overstepped this boundary. He has departed completely from the course which he had marked out for himself in his preface. He there says,—“I confine my observations exclusively to man AS HE EXISTS *in the present world*, and I beg that, on perusing the subsequent pages, this explanation may be constantly kept in view.” I humbly apprehend that Mr Combe has here forgotten his own limitation, and extended his inquiry to subjects not relating to man as he exists in the present world, but relating to man as he existed in a different state, as to which natural reason furnishes no information.

Theologians are not called upon to consider whether man, as originally constituted, possessed the *organs* of the propensities alluded to or not. Their duty, as

theologians, is to give a correct interpretation of Scripture, and not to presume to be wise above what is written. Scripture furnishes no information whatever respecting the organs of the brain, either as they existed at the creation, or as they exist now. As an object of natural science we may properly inquire into their present state, but all information fails as to their condition in a previous order of things. The bare proposing of such a question indicates a mind not thoroughly imbued with that true philosophical spirit, so beautifully alluded to by Dr Thomas Brown, in his introductory lecture,—“a spirit which is quick to pursue whatever is within the reach of human intellect, but which is not less quick to discern the bounds that limit every human inquiry, and which, therefore, in seeking much, seeks only that which man may learn.”

Again, supposing man to have possessed such faculties at his creation, it is just as little incumbent upon theologians to shew what were the objects of them in a paradisaical state, a world where there was no sorrow, sin, death, or danger. We may conjecture what might have been their use in such a world, but we never can possibly know. Mr Combe has pointed out certain uses which they serve in the world *as it now exists*, and that was enough for his avowed purpose, and all that as a philosopher he was entitled to do. Had he been inclined to treat the subject philosophically, he would have said, *that he was not called upon to shew their uses in such a state ; but that doubtless, in whatever state man may have been placed before the commencement of the present system of things, from the known wisdom and goodness of the Creator, we may be sure that he would be furnished with proper objects for the employment and gratification of all his faculties.*

The next question is not excelled in absurdity, by any

that ever was propounded by the schoolmen: If these “organs were bestowed *after the Fall*, whether man, with new organs added to his brain, and new propensities to his mind, continued the same being?” &c.—Upon this I would only remark, that Mr Combe, in proposing such a question, seems to have forgotten what he had written in a former part of his work; for at page 7th he says, “If a theologian were to maintain that these organs, or several of them, were bestowed on man in consequence of sin, or from any other cause, philosophers would remain silent to such proposition.” He seems to be aware, that such a statement as this, *coming from his opponents*, would be utterly unphilosophical and preposterous: and yet, with marvellous inconsistency, he makes no scruple of gravely submitting to them this very proposition, as requiring their serious consideration, and as giving rise to a question which it is *incumbent on them to solve*! This is utterly undeserving of answer. “*Indignandum de isto, non disputandum est.*”*

The last question is, “Whether the existence of these organs, and of an external world adapted to them, does not prove that man, as he now exists, is not actually the same being as when he was created, and that his corruption consists in his tendency to abuse his faculties, and not in any inherent viciousness attributable to his nature itself?” Passing over the ineffable nonsense about new organs being added to the brain, and admitting man to be essentially the same being, (that is, of the same species,) as he was at his creation, it may be asked, What does it signify whether his corruption consists in a natural tendency to abuse his faculties, or in any inherent viciousness attributable to these faculties? What is the difference between an inherent viciousness, and an inherent tendency to abuse? There is, and there

* Seneca.

can be none whatever. Viciousness, is a tendency to abuse; and a tendency to abuse, is just viciousness. If Mr Combe admits a natural tendency in man to abuse his faculties, he admits quite enough to establish the doctrine of human depravity.

But to return to the questions put respecting the existence of such propensities as *Combateness* and *Destructiveness*, — although the questions themselves are utterly unphilosophical, and though they neither deserve nor admit of an answer, so far as regards the *facts*, it is easy to answer the *objection* which they are intended to raise against the paradisaical state of man at his creation. To the question, whether man was originally endowed with propensities of *Combateness* and *Destructiveness*, we answer, that we have no means of knowing; but supposing he was, this affords no objection to the supposition that he was originally placed in a world from which sorrow, sin, death, and danger were excluded; for even in such a world, there might have been abundant exercise for such propensities. Mr Combe himself states, (p. 26,) that in his philosophical millennium, after man shall have been able to discover and obey all the *natural laws*, and when, consequently, on his own principles, pain and evil must be banished from the world, *Combateness* and *Destructiveness* “would receive *full gratification* in muscular exercises,” or “in any employment requiring the exertion of muscular strength.”

I have already alluded to what Mr Combe has mentioned in his “System,” (though he has not chosen to repeat it in his “Constitution of Man,”) that these two propensities are general powers, not limited to the outward acts of fighting and killing, but communicating to the mind, each in its own way, a certain species of energy, which may be turned to account even in carrying

into effect the purposes of benevolence. This is the true view of the matter ; and what is there in the fact of the existence of such faculties as these, inconsistent with the supposition of a paradisaical state? The fact is, that such faculties are not useful merely, they are absolutely necessary to the perfection of such a being as man in any state whatever. Without them he must have been a poor, weak, nerveless, and inefficient creature, unfit for maintaining the prominent place in creation he was destined to hold, and utterly incapable of exercising that dominion which was given to him over the creatures.

Combativeness is now perfectly understood to be a quality which gives the love of strenuous exertion of any kind, physical or mental. *Destructiveness*, or the feeling which goes under that name, communicates to the mind an energy superior to this, a vehemence and fiery impetuosity which bears down all before it, and which is necessary on various occasions to give effect to the brightest exhibitions of moral excellence, and the most splendid exertions of genius. Who that has heard the finest bursts of eloquence from some of our first rate orators, whether at the bar, in the senate, or in the pulpit, but must be satisfied of the immense effect which the powers we have mentioned have in exhibiting to advantage all the highest qualities of mind? Who, for instance, that has heard our own orator, Dr Chalmers, in some of his most transcendent displays of genius, but must be satisfied that the truths which he inculcates with regard to the condition of man, or the magnificent views which he opens up of the greatness and goodness of the Deity, owe more than half their power and effect to the overwhelming vehemence with which they are poured forth, and brought home to the consciences and the understandings of his hearers?

In fact, the qualities we have mentioned have not only

both a fair and legitimate sphere of activity of their own, but seem to be necessary to the effective and vigorous manifestation of all the other powers, bodily or mental. Holding this to be the case, can it be supposed that man, with all his faculties of body and mind in a state of absolute perfection, would, when placed in a world where no evil was allowed to enter, be deprived of powers so indispensable, and condemned to a state of bodily or mental inaction? Would not one great source of his happiness consist in the vigorous exertion of all his powers, accompanied with a perfect satisfaction such as at present we are hardly able to imagine? What we are now enabled to accomplish with toil and difficulty, he would then be able to perform with ease and pleasure. And what is there to prevent us from supposing, that in this perfect state of the faculties, the most powerful and energetic activity of these, and of all the other powers, bodily and mental, might be so controlled and modified as to be exercised on all occasions, and under all circumstances, consistently with the most perfect innocence, and that the highest exertions of power and genius might then be made harmless as the gambols of childhood? He must, at least, have a low idea of the perfection of human nature, of the goodness of God, and of the infinite resources of divine wisdom, who cannot imagine to himself all this, and a thousand times more, as possible in a world which God himself saw to be good, and into which sorrow and sin, pain and death, were not permitted to enter.

It is of no consequence whether what is here suggested in answer to Mr Combe's objection to the paradisaical state, be true or not, in point of fact. The matter lies beyond the reach of our faculties, and nothing respecting it can be reduced to the test of evidence. But what we have now suggested *may* be true, and that is quite suffi-

cient as an answer to the objection. For aught we know, and for aught Mr Combe knows, the above may have been the state of man in Paradise. Other answers might be given which would equally remove the difficulty, but it is useless to multiply conjectures about a fact, the real state of which cannot possibly be known.

In regard to *Cautiousness*—there is no doubt that it is a faculty well adapted to our condition in the present life, where so much danger and evil abound; but there is just as little doubt that it might have been equally well adapted, though in a different way, to another state of things. The perfect satisfaction of this faculty consists in the feeling of safety; and where could this feeling be enjoyed in so much perfection, as in a state from which all pain, and danger, and evil were excluded? While man continued in a state of dependence upon God, and while it was his privilege and his delight to do His will in all things, an appropriate exercise would be afforded to this sentiment, by leading him to avoid every thing that could offend his gracious Benefactor. This is a feeling which no degree of perfection in his powers, no circumstances of happiness in his condition, could ever render unnecessary to a finite and created being, standing in the presence of his great Creator and Master. The difference between his condition then and his condition now may have been this, that, in his original and perfect state, all his faculties were sufficient to answer the purposes for which they were conferred; whereas now, in our imperfect and fallen state, we feel that they are not always sufficient for these purposes. Then, the possession of *Cautiousness* would enable man, with ease, to avoid every cause of annoyance; while now, we feel that, in spite of all the caution we are able to bestow, troubles come upon us, as the sparks fly upwards, many of which we are not

able to avoid. Now, in our best estate, we feel *Cautiousness* disagreeably affected by perpetual alarms; then, it would receive entire gratification in the constant feeling of perfect security—the faculties of man, by its aid, being sufficient to provide for that security, under all possible circumstances.

But had there been no other object for *Cautiousness* in Paradise, an abundant explanation of the necessity of such a faculty would be afforded by the command not to eat of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, under the pain of death. Surely this command was specially addressed to *Cautiousness*. Unfortunately, in this particular case, the faculty was not sufficient to avert the danger. Into that point we need not enter. Enough has been said to answer the objection.

CHAPTER IX.

ON DEATH.

1. *Objection to the Doctrine that Death was brought upon Man as the Punishment of sin, considered.*

MR COMBE'S objections to the Paraisaical state are contained in a few short sentences; but on the subject of death he has favoured us with a long dissertation. His object is to shew, that death is inseparable from the condition of man, as an organized being—that it is a benevolent and merciful institution, as it provides him with many enjoyments which he could not have otherwise possessed—and that, upon the whole, on natural grounds, having reference to this world alone, it is not to be regarded as an evil.

His views on the first of these points are thus stated :—
“ I am aware that, theologically, death is regarded as the punishment of sin, and that the attempt to reconcile our minds to it is objected to, as at once futile and dangerous. But I beg leave to observe, that philosophers have established, by irrefragable evidence, that before man was created, death prevailed among the lower animals, not only by natural decay and the operation of physical forces, but by the express institution of carnivorous creatures destined to prey on living beings ; that man himself is carnivorous, and obviously framed by the Creator for a scene of death ; that his organic constitution, in its inherent qualities, implies death as its final termination ; and that if these facts be admitted to be undeniable on the one hand, and we are prohibited on the other from attempting to discover, from the records of creation itself, the wise adaptation of the human feelings and intellect to such a state of things, neither the cause of revelation nor that of reason can be thereby benefited. The foregoing facts cannot be disputed or concealed ; and the only effect of excluding the investigation on which I propose to enter, would be to close the path of reason, and to leave the constitution of the external world and of the human mind apparently in a state of contradiction to each other. Let us rather trust to the inherent consistency of all truths, and rely on all sound conclusions of reason being in accordance with every correct interpretation of Scripture.”*

“ The true view of death, therefore, is, that it is an essential part of the system of organization ; that birth, growth, and arrival at maturity, as completely imply decay and death in old age, as morning and noon imply evening and night — as spring and summer imply harvest—or as the source of a river implies its termination.

* Constitution of Man, p. 53, col. 1.

Besides, organized beings are constituted by the Creator to be the food of other organized beings, so that some must die that others may live. Man, for instance, cannot live on stones, or earth, or water, which are not organized, but must feed on vegetable and animal substances, so that death is as much and as essentially an inherent attribute of organization as life itself.”*

“To prevent, however, all chances of being misapprehended, I repeat, that I do not at all allude to the state of the soul or mind after death, but merely to the dissolution of organized bodies.”†

Before proceeding to notice these statements, it is proper to observe, that Mr Combe takes a very imperfect view of the theological doctrine alluded to, if he regards death as comprehending merely the dissolution of the body. This, according to theologians, is but a part, and the least important part, of death, considered as the punishment of sin. They consider death in a threefold view, — as *spiritual*, *temporal*, and *eternal*. Without going into any discussion on the point, I shall merely refer to the definition given of *Death* in Cruden’s Concordance. “DEATH signifies, (1.) *The separation of the soul from the body.* Gen. xxv. 11. *This is temporal death.* (2.) *A separation of soul and body from God’s favour in this life, which is the state of all unregenerate and unrenewed persons, who are without the light of knowledge and the quickening power of grace.* Luke, i. 79. *This is spiritual death.* (3.) *The perpetual separation of the whole man from God’s heavenly presence and glory, to be tormented for ever with the Devil and his angels.* Rev. ii. 11. *This is the second death, or eternal death. To all these kinds of death, Adam made himself and his posterity liable, by trans-*

* Constitution of Man, p. 56, col. 2.

† Ibid.

gressing the commandment of God in eating the forbidden fruit. Gen. ii. 17."

It would be entirely out of place here to insist farther upon a doctrine so peculiarly and strictly theological, and I only mention it at all to prevent its being supposed, that, in regarding death as the punishment of sin, theologians only refer to temporal death. Mr Combe confines his attention exclusively to the latter, which he merely considers as the dissolution of the body, and which theologians regard as the separation of the soul from the body; and as that is certainly held by them to be *part* of the punishment of sin, I shall proceed to consider the question as regarding it alone.

In the passages above quoted, Mr Combe commits the same offence against the proper rules of philosophical discussion, as I had occasion to complain of in the last chapter. He carefully and properly guards himself against being understood to allude to the state of the soul or mind after death, which he repeatedly states to belong to the province of revelation. He ought to have gone farther, and declared, that he refers to the subject merely in relation to man *as he exists in the present world*, and that *he does not carry his conclusions* to a state which existed before the present system of things, as to which we have no facts to guide us from natural science, and no information except what is furnished by Scripture. The "*records of creation*" furnish no materials from which we can draw any inference as to the state of man in the period which intervened between his first introduction into the world, and his fall from innocence. This is equally within the province of revelation, and equally beyond the sphere of philosophical inquiry, as the state of the soul after death.

The whole transactions stated in the first three chapters of Genesis are evidently so different from any of

which we have experience at present, as to take them out of the category of those general laws which now govern the current of nature's operations. They all partake of the character of miracles so far, that they all imply a special interference of divine power. The creation of the world itself, a fact which is admitted by all, is equally miraculous, whether we consider it to have been accomplished at once, or by successive steps through a period of countless ages, or imagine the present world to have been erected on the ruins of one which preceded it. The creation of man was a new miracle, clearly distinguished from the formation of the lower animals, and his nature in some respects essentially different from theirs. Every thing which followed is miraculous : the planting of a garden in Eden for the habitation of man ; the tree of life which grew in the midst of the garden, and the tree of knowledge beside it ; the intercourse which took place between God and man, which, though then it might appear natural, is to us miraculous ; the creation of woman ; the command not to eat of the forbidden fruit ; the temptation ; the fall ; the curse, or sentence pronounced upon the tempter, the woman, the earth, and the man ; and finally, the expulsion from Paradise, are all miraculous, or rather, they relate to a state of things when every thing, as compared with the present, was miraculous. Of these events, we have no information whatever but what we derive from Scripture.

It was not until after his expulsion from Paradise, that the state of man was fixed in the condition in which he now appears. It was not till then that the general laws which form the course of nature, were *as to him* finally arranged—nay, some of those laws were not entirely adjusted on their present footing till after the Deluge. It must, therefore, be unphilosophical and irrational to

attempt to draw any conclusion from his condition now, in evidence of what it was then.

That the lower animals have always been liable to death, both in the present world and in that which existed before the creation of man, may be at once admitted; and that man is now equally so, is a fact about which there can be no dispute. But it is going quite beyond the province of philosophy to contend, that, because this is the case with man as he now exists, therefore, it must always have been so, and that it must have been so in a state totally different from the present—a state which revelation tells us to have been altogether surrounded by circumstances purely miraculous.

If there is any difference in this respect between the state of the soul after death, and the state of human nature previous to the Fall, it is this,—that natural reason is less able to afford us any light respecting the latter, than it is respecting the former. Independent of Scripture, reason affords us some grounds for drawing conclusions in favour of a future state; and man, in all ages, has possessed notions, more or less distinct, of a state of existence of the soul, or thinking principle within us, after its separation from our present body. Socrates and Plato, and other heathen philosophers, have come very near to the same views upon this subject, which are more clearly unfolded by revelation; but with regard to the state before the Fall, as well as the Fall itself, and every thing connected with it, reason affords us no information whatever. There are, to be sure, certain obscure intimations, contained in some ancient poems, of an age when men are said to have been universally virtuous and happy: but these are more likely to have been derived from tradition, than to have been deduced from any grounds of reason, and are, at any rate, too much mixed up with mythological fictions to be deserving of attention

here. We have, therefore, nothing with regard to this state, but the positive declarations of Scripture; and we must take these as they are given us.

According to the Scripture accounts, there are three circumstances which take man, in his primitive condition, quite out of the rules which are applicable to him in his present state. 1st, He was created in the image of God, who, we are informed, "breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and he became a *living soul*." This is not stated to have been done at the creation of any of the animal tribes. 2d, He enjoyed personal intercourse with God, which it is hardly possible to suppose would have been allowed to a mere mortal creature. 3d, He had access to a species of food altogether unknown to us,—the fruit of the tree of life. Of what is included in any one of these circumstances, we are utterly ignorant, and all speculation concerning them is irrational and vain. But unless we are prepared to reject revelation, and to treat the whole as a forgery and a fable, they must be held as removing man so far above his present condition, as to render every argument drawn from his present state, just as inapplicable with regard to his condition at that period, as it can be with regard to his *future* condition after the resurrection.

It is expressly stated in Genesis, that in consequence of man's transgression, a sentence was pronounced upon him, in which death was included as one of its articles, which would have been absurd had he been already liable to death as part of his original constitution. It is stated by St Paul, that "by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin;" and this is not a solitary text, for many other passages occur, intimating clearly that death, with regard to man, is the consequence of sin, and part of its punishment.

This is the Scripture doctrine; and it stands upon ground which cannot be impugned by any philosophical argument, for it *lies beyond the proper sphere of philosophical investigation*, as much as any thing else that lies beyond the limits of the world *as now constituted*. All Mr Combe's arguments respecting this subject must be confined to the present state of things. We shall consider a few of them.

"Death, then," he says, "appears to be a result of the constitution of all organized beings; for the *very definition* of the genus is, that the individuals grow, attain maturity, and die." This proves nothing; it just takes for granted the point to be proved. The following looks something like an argument, though it is a bad one: "The human imagination cannot conceive how the former part of this series of movements could exist without the latter, as long as space is necessary to corporeal existence. If all the vegetable and animal productions of nature, from creation downwards, had grown, attained maturity, and there remained, the world would not have been capable of containing the thousandth part of them, so that, on this earth, decaying and dying appear indispensably necessary to admit of reproduction and growth."

This objection is pre-eminently absurd, considering that we are speaking of a state of things of which we know positively nothing, and respecting the proceedings and arrangements of a Being who has only to *will* an effect, in order to produce it. What might have been the state of man had he continued without sin—had the first pair and all their posterity continued to enjoy personal intercourse with their heavenly Father, and to do his will in all things, as the angels do in heaven,—we cannot possibly know; but this we are sure of, that their situation would have been then, as it is now, wisely adapted to their constitution, whatever that might have

been. If it had pleased the Almighty Creator that man should have lived for ever not subject to disease or decay, he had the power to accomplish this without committing the enormous blunder of leaving the race without sufficient room to contain them. It is not merely unphilosophical, it is ridiculous, and even blasphemous, to suppose that the resources of Divine power and wisdom are not equal to the solution of a problem like this. These resources are infinitely beyond those of the human understanding, and nothing but the grossest folly can lead any one to imagine that there is any difficulty here. There are many methods obvious even to us, by which the difficulty could be avoided; and it is of no consequence whatever whether this should be done, by arresting the farther increase of the race, after the world had become sufficiently stocked with inhabitants, or by transferring a part of them to other mansions, without tasting of death, as we are informed was actually done with some holy men of old, as Enoch, "who walked with God, and was not, for God took him;" or, as Elijah, the greatest of the prophets, who was carried to heaven in a chariot of fire.

The same observations apply to the following remarks. They are all exclusively applicable to the present system of things,—that system which commenced at the Fall, and in which the world has continued ever since the expulsion of man from Paradise; but they are utterly irrelevant and inapplicable either to the original state of man before the Fall, or his future state beyond the grave.

"1st. It is obvious that amateness and philoprogenitiveness are provided with direct objects of gratification, as one concomitant of the institution of death. If the same individuals had lived here for ever, there would have been no field for the enjoyment that flows from the

domestic union and the rearing of offspring. The very existence of these propensities shews, that the production and rearing of young, form part of the design of creation ; and the successive production of young appears necessarily to imply the removal of the old.

“ 2d. Had things been otherwise arranged, all the other faculties would have been limited in their gratifications. Conceive for a moment, how much exercise is afforded to our intellectual and moral powers in acquiring knowledge, communicating it to the young, and providing for their enjoyments—also, what a delightful exercise of the higher sentiments is implied in the intercourse between the aged and the young ; all which pleasures would have been unknown, had there been no young in existence, which there could not have been without a succession of generations.

“ 3d. *Constituted as man is*, the succession of individuals withdraws beings whose physical and mental constitutions have run their course and become impaired in sensibility, and substitutes in their place fresh and vigorous minds and bodies, far better adapted for the enjoyment of creation.

“ 4th. If I am right in the position that the organic laws transmit to offspring, in an increasing ratio, the qualities most active in their parents, the law of succession provides for a far higher degree of improvement than could have been reached, supposing the permanency of a single generation possessing the present human constitution.”

These remarks (with the exception of the last, which involves a theory of extreme difficulty) are excellent, as applicable to our present condition ; and to that extent it may be at once admitted, that the present arrangement is good—but it is quite unphilosophical to argue that no other arrangement could have been made suited

to man in another state. As well might it be argued, that the happiness of heaven hereafter cannot be perfect, because there, we are informed, there is neither to be marrying nor giving in marriage, and, consequently, there cannot be the same field as there is here for domestic enjoyment, and no employment in the rearing of offspring, communicating knowledge to the young, &c. It is absurd to argue in this way. From the known wisdom and goodness of the Creator, we may be quite sure that, in the original state of man, while he continued perfect and sinless, he must have possessed, as he will possess in heaven, every thing necessary to gratify his faculties. Now, that we are made subject to death, and that some enjoyments have been consequently taken away from us, others have been mercifully provided, which, in some respects, console us under these irremediable evils; but it does not follow from this, either that death was originally a necessary and indispensable condition of our existence, or that it is not an evil after all.

There is one *natural law* of which Mr Combe has taken no notice, namely, the law of *Compensation*. It is one of the characteristics of God's dealing with his creatures, that when he deprives a race or an individual of any enjoyment or of any privilege, he bestows a double portion of some other gift to compensate for the want. The lower animals are deprived of the enjoyments of intellectual and moral intercourse; but they are not sensible of the deficiency, and those they possess, limited as they are, are rendered sufficient for their happiness. Sheep and cattle are exceedingly stupid, and seem to possess very few ideas; but to make up for this, they are so constituted as to be almost continually either feeding or ruminating, so that with them, all the time they are awake, there is almost no end to the pleasure

of feeding. Carnivorous animals eat more rapidly, and despatch their meals more quickly, but have abundant employment for their faculties in seeking their prey. The law of compensation also takes place in man. Men who are deprived of sight, are gifted with extraordinary sensibility of hearing and touch; and so in every thing else. In the paradisaical state, man's greatest privilege and highest enjoyment must have consisted in an intercourse with God—an intercourse sufficient to occupy and to gratify all his faculties to the utmost. When that intercourse was withdrawn, other objects were mercifully accorded to him; and while banished from the divine presence, lying as we now do under the universal sentence of death, provision is wisely made for a succession of beings, who are born, grow up, continue a few years, and die, each in its little hour receiving and contributing something towards mutual enjoyment. All this is abundantly wise and merciful, and no other arrangement would have agreed so well with the condition of man as a fallen creature; but it is utterly unphilosophical to conclude that it is necessary, or that Omnipotence itself could not have devised another suited to man in a different and more perfect state of being.

Mr Combe conceives, that, if man would only obey all the *natural laws*, death, during the earlier periods of his existence, would be abolished, and the only instance of it remaining would be death from old age.

He observes, that, "In every country, individuals are to be found, who have escaped from sickness during the whole course of a protracted life. Now," he adds, "as a *natural law* never admits of an exception, this excellent health could not occur in any individuals, unless it were fairly within the capabilities of the race."

Let us consider this argument of Mr Combe's, and see to what conclusions it may lead.

There have been instances, in many countries, of men growing to the height of eight, nine, or even ten feet. Now, if a natural law never admits of an exception, this exalted stature would never occur in any individual, unless it were fairly within the capabilities of the race: therefore, there is nothing to prevent the human species from becoming a race of giants.

Instances have been known of twins being born attached to one another by a natural ligature, like the Siamese youths lately exhibited in this country. Now, as a natural law never admits of exceptions, this would not occur even in one solitary case, unless it were fairly within the capabilities of the race. Thus we may have a whole nation of Siamese twins.

What idea Mr Combe may attach to a *natural law*, in cases like the above, I know not; but certainly these and similar cases are generally looked upon as exceptions to the ordinary course of nature's operations. He is the first, I believe, who has denied such exceptions to exist, and he has also the merit of being the first who has adopted the exception as the rule, and attempted to convert the rule into the exception.

No doubt it may be true, that in every country, among the many millions of inhabitants it contains, there may be insulated cases of favoured individuals who have escaped from serious sickness during a protracted life. But is it not true, that such instances are extremely rare, about equally rare as the cases of giants and other preternatural productions? By far the greater number, indeed the great mass of mankind, find themselves at times liable to bodily pain and sickness. That is the general rule; the other is the exception, or, it may be called, an extreme case. Some are less liable to disease than others, and of those who are so, there may be some so little affected by it, that we may say, they have never

suffered from it at all. There are extreme cases, but all cases cannot be extreme.

But Mr Combe says, there is no occasion for this being the rule; men suffer sickness because they disobey the *natural laws*, or because their fathers or their progenitors have disobeyed them before they were born. Well, let us take it in that way. Most men—nay, we may say, all men—disobey the *natural laws*. Their fathers have disobeyed them, universally, before they were born, and, therefore, the race is afflicted with pain, disease, and sickness, leading to early death. For the disobedience in time past, that is beyond remedy. But who shall say, that looking to the present condition of the race, and the known weakness and waywardness of our nature, they will be universally, or even generally, obeyed in time to come.

From the consideration we have already given this subject, we think we are entitled to conclude, that human reason is utterly incompetent to devise means for producing so great a reformation—that physical and moral evil are far too widely spread and too deeply rooted to admit of being removed by any means or motives which philosophy is capable of presenting to us—that the *natural laws*, even though universally known, will never be perfectly *obeyed* in the sense intended by Mr Combe, and that, consequently, pain, disease, and death, at the earlier, as well as the later periods of our existence here, must remain part of the lot of humanity, as long as the race remains in the present world.

But what is, perhaps, the most objectionable part of Mr Combe's speculation, is the attempt to take away all the *moral effect* of the contemplation of death, and to place man, in regard to this institution, on a level with the beasts that perish, by endeavouring to reconcile us

to that institution on grounds equally applicable to them as to us, having reference solely to the present life, and turning away our thoughts altogether from the only point relating to it that is really of importance,—the prospect of a life to come.

“Let us inquire,” says he, “how the moral sentiments are affected by death in old age as a natural institution.

“*Benevolence*, glowing with a disinterested desire for the diffusion and increase of enjoyment, utters no complaint against death in old age, as a transference of existence from a being impaired in its capacity for usefulness and pleasure, to one fresh and vigorous in all its powers, and fitted to carry forward to a higher point of improvement every beneficial measure previously begun. *Conscientiousness*, if thoroughly enlightened, perceives no infringement of justice in the calling on a guest, satiated with enjoyment, to retire from the banquet, so as to permit a stranger with a keener and more youthful appetite to partake. And *Veneration*, when instructed by intellect that this is the intention of the Creator, and made acquainted with its objects, bows in humble acquiescence to the law. Now, if these powers have acquired in any individual that complete supremacy which they are clearly entitled to hold, he will be placed by them as much above the terror of death, as a natural institution, as the lower animals are by being ignorant of its existence.”

If any argument were wanting to prove the utter insufficiency and hollowness of Mr Combe's principle of the supremacy of these feelings, which he chooses to call exclusively the *moral sentiments*, this passage would be sufficient of itself to prove that insufficiency. Who could ever be fortified against the terrors of death by considerations like these? He tells us what *Benevolence*

says, and what *Conscientiousness* says, and what *Veneration* says, just as if these were separate individuals, each having a vote in the congress of the faculties. And if man had no other faculties than these, the decision would be unanimous, and, according to Mr Combe's view, quite satisfactory. It may be quite true that *Benevolence*, which merely looks to the welfare of others,—*Conscientiousness*, which respects their rights,—and *Veneration*, which looks up to the Creator,—may feel no disturbance at the prospect of death. But that is not the question. *These are not the faculties which are affected by the prospect of death.* The faculties which really are so affected are, first, the *Love of life*, which Mr Combe admits to be an original principle or feeling for which there is an organ in the brain; second, the *Love of self*, which by no theory of morals, not even the Christian, is ever required to be less strong than the love of our neighbour,—for we are only commanded to love our neighbour *as ourselves*; *Hope*, which the prospect of death is calculated entirely to crush and destroy, and which nothing can reconcile to it but the promise of a life to come; and lastly, *Cautiousness*, which ever regards death, as soon as we understand what it means, with the greatest solicitude and alarm. It, therefore, signifies nothing to tell us what *Benevolence* says, and what *Conscientiousness* says, and what *Veneration* says; but *what does the man say* who possesses the one set of faculties as well as the other? The latter set of faculties, so long as they possess any sensibility, are strongly impressed with horror at the idea of death; and it signifies nothing to tell us that another set of faculties, which, in general, act with much inferior force, *do not* feel this horror. *The man feels it*, and that is enough. It may safely be pronounced, that, apart from the prospect of a future state, every human being, whose

mind is in a sane, active, and well ordered condition, feels a natural horror at the idea of death, and regards it as the greatest of earthly calamities. Philosophers may speculate on the subject in their closets, and persuade themselves that they are reconciled to the idea of death; but their feelings change when the King of Terrors actually makes his approach, and delivers his awful summons. Mr Combe mentions this to have been the case with Lord Byron in the near prospect of death, though, in general, he felt no great desire to live; and, it may be affirmed, the feeling is universal. In all circumstances, except under the pressure of complicated calamities or incurable disease, or in cases of overwrought religious feeling, when the faculties are in a disordered and morbidly excited state, or when existence itself seems to have become a burden, there is no real instance of a desire for, or even an indifference about, death. As Dr Johnson observes, we know it will do us no good to whine, and we submit; but we submit because our fate is unavoidable, and for no other reason.

All attempts to argue away the fear of death on natural grounds are universally felt to be utterly hollow and worthless, and can have no other effect than to turn away our eyes from the only true preservative from that fear, and, as far as in us lies, to detract from the value of "the blessed hope of everlasting life," which is held out to us by the Gospel.

2.— *On the omission of a Future State.*

Throughout the whole of his speculation on death, Mr Combe has industriously, and of set purpose, excluded all consideration of a Future State. There might have been less harm in this, had his work been a purely

philosophical one, intended merely as an ingenious exercise of the understanding, and addressed exclusively to philosophers. On the contrary, however, he states in his preface, that his purpose is *practical*; that his great object is “to exhibit several of the most important *natural laws*, and their relations and consequences, with a view to the improvement of *education*, and *the regulation of individual and national conduct*.” Accordingly, the work has been widely disseminated among the labouring classes, and others of the less educated portion of society. The object of the *Henderson Bequest*, is expressly to promote its circulation among these classes. It is put into the hands of the young and the half-instructed, as a manual of information on all points relative to their condition in this world; and not merely for the regulation of private conduct, but for guiding their opinions on every point of national and political, as well as individual interest. In these circumstances, it is impossible to admit the excuse which Mr Combe offers for the omission of this most important and vital element in the constitution and condition of man. He says, at p. 7, that the objection stated to that omission, is founded on a misapprehension of the object of the book. “It is my purpose to shew, that the rewards and punishments of human actions are infinitely more complete, certain, and efficacious in this life than is generally believed; but by no means to interfere with the sanctions to virtue afforded by the prospect of future retribution.” To this, the answer is obvious, that such a mode of considering the subject may be very fit for a philosophical thesis, but is radically defective and unsound when applied to a practical treatise of morals, intended expressly for the instruction of the people.

In order to consider, to any proper or useful effect, the subject of death, it must be, first of all, necessary to

ascertain what death truly is. Now, this depends entirely on the question whether there is a future state or not. If there is no future state, then death is the extinction of life, and the end of our existence. If, on the contrary, there is a state of existence beyond the grave, then death is merely the transition from one mode of existence to another ; it is the termination of one life, and the commencement of another. Surely a matter so inconceivably important as this, ought not to be left in uncertainty in a practical and popular work, a manual of instruction for the regulation of conduct, which is to be industriously disseminated among the lower and less educated classes of society.

Even though it be conceded to Mr Combe, that he was not called upon, in such a work as this, to go beyond the sphere of natural reason, he is without excuse, in as far as there are many arguments for a future state deducible by reason, which came fairly and naturally under his notice, and which he was bound, in discussing such a subject as this for the edification of the people generally, to place before them in their true light. And he is the more especially inexcusable in this, as the system of human nature which he adopts as the basis of his entire work, has furnished grounds in support of this conclusion, clearly confirming those which were relied upon by the philosophers of other days. Mr Combe is quite aware of these arguments, and has expressly alluded to them in his *System of Phrenology*.

In speaking of the organ and faculty of *Hope*, in that *System*,* he has the following passage : “ In religion, this faculty favours the exercise of faith ; and by producing the natural tendency to look forward to futurity with expectation, disposes to belief in a life to come.

* Combe's *System of Phrenology*, second edition, p. 207. Third edition, p. 307.

“ The metaphysicians admit this faculty, so that Phrenology only reveals its organ, and the effects of its endowment in different degrees. I have already stated an argument in favour of the being of a God, founded on the existence of a faculty of *Veneration*, conferring the tendency to worship, of which God is the proper and ultimate object. May not the probability of a future state be supported by a similar deduction from the possession of a faculty of *Hope*? It appears to me, that this is the faculty from which originates the notion of futurity, and which carries the mind forward in endless progression into periods of never-ending time. May it not be inferred, that this instinctive tendency to leave the present scene, and all its enjoyments, to spring forward into the regions of a far distant futurity, and to expatiate, even in imagination, in the fields of an eternity to come, denotes that man is formed for a more glorious destiny than to perish for ever in the grave? Addison beautifully enforces this argument in the *Spectator*, and in the soliloquy of Cato; and Phrenology gives weight to his reasoning, by shewing that this ardent hope, this ‘longing after immortality,’ is not a factitious sentiment, or a mere exuberance of an idle and wandering imagination, but that it is the result of a primitive faculty of the mind, which owes at once its existence and its functions to the Creator.” There is more to the same purpose, but this is quite sufficient, and shews that Mr Combe is quite aware of the argument; and how, after having obtained so clear a view of a doctrine, in his opinion so beautiful and consolatory, deduced from a principle recognized by Phrenology, he should have omitted all notice of it in a work expressly founded on the basis of that doctrine, appears utterly unaccountable. Admitting that it did not strictly fall within the original plan of his work, it would, at any rate, have

formed a graceful and appropriate *pendant* to that work. It could have detracted nothing from the force of his previous reasonings, and might have obviated some of the objections which occur to his treatise in its present shape.

But though the passage I have quoted from his System shews that Mr Combe had there so far admitted the phrenological argument for a future state, he has not stated it quite correctly, nor followed it to its full extent, or to all its applications. He considers that the faculty of *Hope* “ originates the notion of *futurity*,” and “ carries the mind forward in endless progression to periods of never-ending time.” This appears to be a mistake. As phrenologists recognize a special faculty and organ for giving us a feeling of *duration* or *time*, it seems a necessary consequence that this feeling must extend to the *future* as well as the past, and therefore that the notion of *futurity* must originate with that faculty ; and the moment we admit this notion at all, we are necessarily carried forward in endless progression to eternity itself, as there is nothing which by possibility can set any limit to our notions of duration. It would appear that *Hope* does not originate, but merely *modifies* our feelings and anticipations of that futurity of which we previously had a distinct notion. Farther, it must be recollected that *Hope* is not the only faculty which looks forward to the future. *Cautiousness*, which, in its more active states, gives rise to the feeling of *Fear*, is no less interested in the subject of futurity ; and in looking to the future, which must always in the present life be to us an object of much uncertainty, *Hope* and *Fear* alternately hold the sway, and keep our minds nearly equally balanced between them.

I would therefore say, that the probability of a future state is supported not by one, but by various feelings and faculties of the mind. In the first place, *reason* or

causality points out, that as in the present life the vicious and immoral are frequently prosperous, while the good and the virtuous suffer various calamities, it is therefore probable, from the known justice of the divine character, that after the present life we shall pass into another state of being, where those irregularities shall be redressed, and where vice will be punished, and virtue rewarded, with perfect justice and impartiality. But still, though this may be probable, death, the passage to this new and unknown state, appears as something dark and mysterious, and *Wonder* has room to expatiate over a field where much uncertainty prevails. *Hope*, in the meantime, as Mr Combe justly represents, “beckons us to spring forward into the regions of futurity, and denotes that man was formed for a more glorious destiny than to perish for ever in the grave.” But here our aspiring hopes are checked by *Cautiousness*, which, awakened by the still small voice of *conscience*, whispers to the sinner that this glorious destiny may not be prepared for him; and that instead of death opening to us a region of never ending delight, it may only usher us into a place of punishment for offences reiterated, aggravated, and numberless.

Dark and dismal as death may appear, when considered merely as the termination of the present life, it becomes, from these obscure and conflicting views, when considered in the farther light of its being the commencement of another state of existence, an object of tenfold doubt and anxiety.

The view taken by Mr Combe of deducing the probability of a future state from a feeling of *Hope* alone, is clearly not the true view in which it is to be considered. Naturally, *Fear* unquestionably predominates. Every one is conscious of offences against his Maker's laws, which he feels to be deserving of punishment, while no one can assume to himself such a stock of merit as to

afford any just claim to, much less assurance of reward. To man, therefore, unenlightened by a revelation of the divine will, and of God's gracious purposes of pardon and acceptance to penitent sinners, the prospect of death, as viewed through the medium of his natural feelings, is almost universally an object of unmitigated terror.

Revelation removes, in a great measure, these natural terrors, by representing God as willing to forgive iniquity, and to receive into his favour all who shall come unto him in the way he has expressly appointed. Into this subject I have no occasion to enter. It belongs to the department of theology, and its explanation must be left to divines. It is sufficient here to indicate, that from this source alone can any rational or satisfactory antidote be obtained against those terrors with which death is universally regarded by the natural feelings of mankind.

This mode of considering the subject does not suit the views of Mr Combe. His object seems to be, to reject every view of our condition that does not flatter the pride, and gratify the selfish longings of our nature. He does not fairly consider *all* the principles of our constitution, even according to the system which he has adopted. He picks and chooses among the faculties,—he has his pets and his favourites among them,—and magnanimously rejects all of them that have the misfortune to displease him. He worships *Hope*, as presenting him only with pleasing and flattering anticipations. He altogether renounces *Cautiousness*, as a most uncivil and impertinent faculty, whose never-ending doubts and prognostications of evil are positively disagreeable. *Wonder* is entirely at a discount, and seems only fit to be banished to the nursery. *Veneration* meets with no great favour. *Conscientiousness* is spoken of with respect, but deprived of more than half its authority, being dethroned from the seat of justice, and positively interdicted from its ancient and universally admitted office of

punishing the guilty : while *Benevolence* is deified and raised to a supremacy which no one has hitherto ventured to ascribe to it. This is no caricature ; it is the strict and literal truth, and any one who will take the trouble to go carefully through the whole of Mr Combe's lucubrations, will find it to be so. Now, what kind of dealing with a subject is this ? We have here several original principles and feelings implanted in the mind, all of the highest importance, the existence of which Mr Combe expressly acknowledges, — *Veneration, Wonder, Hope, Fear, Justice*, and *Benevolence*, — all bearing, more or less, upon the subject of a future life, and all, for any thing we are able to pronounce, of equal weight and authority. But Mr Combe seems to think he is entitled to dispense with that authority whenever he pleases.

The united voice of all these faculties undoubtedly points to the high probability, if not absolute certainty, of a future state, but gives us no assurance of what that state will be. While *Hope*, encouraging us with views of the goodness of God, holds out the prospect of an eternity of felicity and glory, *Cautiousness*, or *Fear*, regarding only his greatness, his power, and his justice, represents the possibility, and something more than the possibility, of punishment for offences. Now, if the feelings which God has implanted in our minds point to these different conclusions as equally probable, or rather that the latter is the most probable of the two, where is the use of shutting our eyes to what, if true, must be our inevitable fate ? This seems, however, to be the natural result of Mr Combe's doctrines.

We have seen that, when Mr Combe does think proper to look into this subject, he only takes advice of those counsellors who will flatter him, and give him the sort of advice he desires. But in the present work, he takes care to exclude all unpleasant suggestions, by

positively refusing to look into the subject at all, or to cast a single glance across the gulf which separates us from the other world.

When we fairly and impartially listen to the suggestions of all the sentiments and powers which have reference to a future state, it is interesting to observe, how nearly they come to that view of the matter which is afforded to us by revelation. We there see, that the future life which it reveals to us is not exclusively addressed to our hopes, but that it is not less directly calculated to alarm our fears; that, while we are called upon to trust in the goodness and mercy of our Divine Author, we are not less imperatively expected to think of his inflexible justice, and of those high attributes of righteousness and purity which cannot tolerate the sight of iniquity; and we cannot bring ourselves to believe, that, with all our manifold offences, we can possibly find access to his favour, from any merit of our own. In short, the picture presented by the natural suggestions of the mental feelings, as far as it goes, appears to bear the same relation to that afforded by revelation, as the shadow does to the substance, or as the reflection in a mirror does to the objects which are placed before it.*

* The following passage, which has often been quoted, from Dr Adam Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, coincides remarkably with the view given in the text of the natural feelings of man in regard to futurity. The passage was pointed out to me after I had written the preceding.

“If we consult our natural sentiments, we are apt to fear, lest, before the holiness of God, vice should appear to be more worthy of punishment, than the weakness and imperfection of human nature can ever seem to be of reward. Man, when about to appear before a being of infinite perfection, can feel but little confidence in his own merit, or in the imperfect propriety of his own conduct. In the presence of his fellow-creatures, he may often justly elevate himself, and may often have reason to think highly of his own character and conduct, compared to the still greater imperfection of theirs. But the case is quite different when about to appear before his *infinite Creator*. To such a being, he can scarce

The effect of excluding these views, as is here done by Mr Combe, can only be, to lull the mind into a deceitful calm,—to whisper to it “Peace, peace, when there is no peace,” and consequently to prevent us, as far as possible, from having recourse to the only true refuge,—the hope that is set before us in the gospel.

Mr Combe seems to think that his System, having reference only to the present life, by pointing out the consequences of evil actions in this world, will be equally effectual in presenting motives to a moral course of life, as the prospect of retribution in a life to come. He says, at page 7, “It appears to me, that every action

imagine, that his littleness and weakness should ever seem to be the proper object either of esteem or reward. But he can easily conceive, how the numberless violations of duty of which he has been guilty, should render him the object of *aversion* and *punishment*: neither can he see any reason why the divine *indignation* should not be let loose without any restraint upon so vile an insect, as he is sensible that he himself must appear to be. If he would still hope for happiness, he is conscious that he cannot demand it from the *justice*, but that he must entreat it from the *mercy* of God. Repentance, sorrow, humiliation, contrition at the thought of his past conduct, are, upon this account, the sentiments which become him, and seem to be the only means which he has left, for appeasing that wrath which, he knows, he has justly provoked. He even distrusts the efficacy of all these, and naturally fears lest the wisdom of God should not, like the weakness of man, be prevailed upon to spare the crime, by the most importunate lamentations of the criminal. *Some other intercession, some other sacrifice, some other atonement*, he imagines, must be made for him, beyond what he himself is capable of making, before the purity of the divine justice can be reconciled to his manifest offences.

“The doctrines of revelation coincide, in every respect, with these *original anticipations of nature*; and as they teach us how little we can depend upon the imperfection of our own virtue, so they shew us, at the same time, that *the most powerful intercession has been made, and the most dreadful atonement has been paid, for our manifest transgressions and iniquities.*”—Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 204, 206.

This passage, expressing as it must be understood to do, the unbiassed opinion of Dr Smith on the important subject to which it refers, is contained in the first edition of his work, but was, for what reason is not known, omitted in subsequent editions. But *litera scripta manet*.

which is morally wrong in reference to a future life, is equally wrong and inexpedient with relation to this world, and that it is essential to virtue to prove this to be the case." To me, on the other hand, it appears, that in many situations there are various actions which are morally wrong of themselves, and against which the prospect of a future retribution, if firmly believed, would offer an effectual check, which are not adequately punished by any consequences which follow from them in this world, and which, in certain situations, cannot even be said, with a view to this life alone, to be *inexpedient*. One of these offences, to which I have already alluded, is *Suicide*. If this is not looked upon as a crime, which is to be punished in a future state, most assuredly there is no punishment provided for it, or any consideration that can operate as a check against the commission of it, in this world. Mr Combe, upon his principles, has no argument which he could oppose to an intending suicide. Supposing a man reduced to the greatest misery and want, with no hope of extrication, and, on the contrary, having nothing before him but the prospect of a lingering life of wretchedness and infamy, what, upon Mr Combe's system, could be suggested to turn him from his purpose? It is needless to attempt to deter him by representing the extinction of life. He is tired of life, he is utterly wretched, and he considers that death would only be a relief from suffering. Death, considered as the extinction of being, or annihilation, is the object of his deliberate choice. What can be said on Mr Combe's principles in answer to this? Punishment in this world is out of the question, for by the very crime itself the criminal withdraws himself from all possibility of punishment here; and by the rule which Mr Combe has prescribed to himself of refusing to look beyond this life, he is prevented from supposing a punish-

ment hereafter; so that, upon the whole, it does not appear that any other conclusion can be come to but this, that under his system suicide is not to be regarded as a crime; and consequently, that whenever any one tires of life, and chooses to desert his post, he is fully entitled to do so. For this, which in other systems is considered the greatest, because the most irremediable of crimes, the "Natural Laws" afford no remedy.

CHAPTER X.

ON THE PAINS OF PARTURITION.

THE pains of child-birth are proverbially considered about the greatest to which the human frame is subjected, and certainly no other species of suffering is so universal. No doubt the suffering is in some cases more severe than in others; but in all ages, and in all countries, it has prevailed more or less, so as to be universally considered as unquestionably an institution of the Creator. It may be asked, Could this have been an original institution, and could such severe suffering have been made the lot of the female while the race continued in its original and perfect state?

In the book of Genesis, in the account which is given of the sentence pronounced on the first pair in consequence of their transgression, a very remarkable passage occurs, which appears to account in a certain way for the peculiarity alluded to. Before the sentence was pronounced on man, including the race in general, this peculiar burden was laid upon the woman: "I will greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy conception: in sorrow thou shalt bring forth children." The propriety of this being made the punishment of the woman is manifest, because this is the only punishment to which

she could be exclusively subjected. All other bodily pains are common to both sexes; but those attendant on conception and parturition are necessarily confined to the female.

It was to the woman the highest privilege and honour that she should give birth to beings like herself. The sentence now pronounced seems to have been intended to prevent her from glorying in this distinction — to keep her humble, even at the moment when she was fulfilling the most important function of her existence — and even at this ecstatic moment, to remind her of her fall from purity and happiness. Two other circumstances deserve notice as to this peculiar curse: first, the universality of its infliction. It is not dependent in any degree on outward circumstances. No rank, no wealth, no power, can procure any exemption. It attaches to the queen upon the throne equally as to the servant that grinds at the mill. Though proverbially the severest of pains, such is the strength of that principle which inspires the female with the desire of having children, that it never deters the most delicate woman from placing herself in the way of having them. This is a provision evidently necessary for the continuance of the race; but there is another point in which benevolence towards the sufferer is equally conspicuous, — that, severe as the suffering is, so great is the delight of having offspring, that after the pangs of delivery are over, the mother feels all her pain overpaid with the most lively feelings of delight. “A woman when she is in travail, hath sorrow because her hour is come; but as soon as she is delivered of the child, she remembereth no more the anguish, for joy that a man is born into the world.” Nothing, surely, could be more beautifully appropriate, and no infliction so severe could be so eminently tempered with mercy.

The above are views which are very generally received with regard to this subject, and appear to be supported on reasonable grounds ; but they are totally disregarded by Mr Combe. He finds, that the suffering referred to is a fact directly in the teeth of his theory about the *natural laws*, and therefore he must get rid of it, at all events. The scriptural part of the matter is easily evaded, but as to the main circumstance, he has nothing for it but boldly *denying the fact*, and asserting that the sufferings are neither universal nor necessary. He accordingly observes, — “ The sufferings of women in child-bed have been cited as evidence, that the Creator has not intended the human being, under any circumstances, to execute all its functions entirely free from pain. But besides the obvious answer, that the objection applies only to one sex, and is, therefore, not to be too readily presumed to have its origin in nature, *there is good reason to deny the assertion*, and to ascribe the suffering in question to *departures from the natural laws* in either the structure or habits of the individuals who experience them.”

These *good grounds* which Mr Combe alludes to, to prove that the pains of parturition are not a provision of nature, consist in certain cases among women of the lower ranks, who have been delivered, or have delivered themselves, of illegitimate children, with so little pain, as to return almost immediately to their work, or make exertions, which to persons in better circumstances might appear very unusual at least, if not incredible. He also refers to the easy labours of Negresses, and women of other savage tribes, who are reported by some travellers to suffer comparatively little in child-birth. To this it may be answered, — *first*, that these cases are precisely similar to those which occur in regard to every thing else, where persons under strong excitement, or in circum-

stances of urgent necessity, have made exertions which they never could have done under ordinary circumstances. Soldiers on a storming party, amidst the thundering of cannon, the explosion of mines, and surrounded by death in all its shapes, have been known, in the heat and eagerness of the assault, to mount walls where there could hardly be said to be a breach, and to overcome difficulties of all kinds, which at a period of less fearful excitement, they would have been quite incapable of surmounting. Instances of this occurred in the late Peninsular War, at the sieges of Badajos and Ciudad Rodrigo, when individuals who had been taken next day to the parts of the walls which they had scaled, would not believe that they had done so, and felt and declared themselves utterly incapable of doing the same again. Now, a woman, in any rank of life, who, to avoid disgrace, conceals her pregnancy, must, from the dread of discovery and the necessities of her situation, be in a state of excitement and desperation, not less, perhaps even greater than a soldier upon a forlorn hope, and will consequently be able to make similar exertions. But what a woman in such circumstances in a civilized country is likely to feel, may probably be felt universally by pregnant females among the savage tribes, who are known to be treated with such cruelty by their husbands, that they often long for death, and are said sometimes to murder their female infants, merely that they may not be subjected to the incessant cruelties which they know is to be their lot if they are allowed to survive. Such cases, therefore, are not within the general rule; they are instances of that kind which every where prevail in nature, where great calamities and hardships are met by a wise and merciful provision of *strength to bear* what necessity imposes, and where one law of nature is thus found to neutralize and control another.

At the best, the cases referred to never can be understood as offering any objection to the general law. In this, as in every kind of suffering, it may happen that in some instances it is less severe than in others. It does not follow, although the suffering may be borne, and may not much affect the strength of the individual, that therefore there has been no suffering. We are not entitled to say, in any instance, that there has been none; and even those in which there is least, cannot be regarded as exceptions to the rule, but only as extreme cases,—cases where the suffering has been the smallest possible. It is in vain to argue upon such grounds against the existence of an institution known to prevail in all ages, in all climates, and in all countries, in a greater or less degree, over the whole world. We have a perfect reliance on the uniformity of nature's operations, and on the invariable connection between effects and causes; and, therefore, we believe that women, who are placed under exactly the same circumstances as those referred to by Mr Combe, will be able to bear their sufferings equally well. But if decent females in civilized countries are not to be relieved of the pains alluded to, until they are placed in the same circumstances as women in the lower ranks, who conceal pregnancy to avoid disgrace, or the females of savage tribes, who are treated by their lords and masters worse than slaves, — if these are the conditions which the *natural laws* require to mitigate or to remove the pains of child-birth, it will be long before they receive any benefit from this magnificent discovery. The cure is obviously worse than the disease.

CHAPTER XI.

ON THE RELATION BETWEEN SCIENCE AND SCRIPTURE.

MR COMBE has, in his work on the Constitution of Man, laid down two different views bearing upon the subject of the relation between philosophy and theology, which are precisely the reverse of each other.

In his introductory chapter, he first accuses theologians of having fallen into gross errors in doctrine, in consequence of their having formed their systems in an age "when there was no sound philosophy, and almost no knowledge of physical science," and when, consequently, "they were unavoidably ignorant of the elementary qualities of human nature, and of the influence of organization on the mental powers, the great link which connects the moral and physical world. They were unacquainted," he observes, "with the relation subsisting between the mind and external nature, and could not, by possibility, divine to what extent individuals and society were capable of being improved by natural means. In the history of man, they had read chiefly of misery and crime, and had, in their own age, beheld much of both. They were, therefore, naturally led to form a low estimate of human nature, and to expect little good from the development of its inherent capabilities."* After some farther observations in the same strain, and expatiating on the importance of philosophy towards obtaining accurate views in regard to religion, he states, that at present, "to all practical ends connected with theology, the philosophy of nature might as well not exist. Divines," he remarks, "have frequently applied scientific

* Constitution of Man, p. 4, col. 2.

discoveries in proving the existence and developing the character of the Deity, but they have failed in applying either the discoveries themselves, or the knowledge of the divine character obtained by means of them, to the constitution of any system of mental philosophy capable of combining harmoniously with religion, and promoting the improvement of the human race.”* And he concludes the chapter thus,—“They (the divines) have complained of war waged openly or secretly by philosophy against religion; but they have not duly considered, whether religion itself warrants them in treating philosophy and all its dictates with neglect, in their instruction of the people. True philosophy is a revelation of the divine will manifested in creation; it harmonizes with all truth, *and cannot with impunity* be neglected.”†

In the second chapter he states, in regard to his favourite *natural laws*, “Before religion can yield its full practical fruits in this world, it must be wedded to a philosophy founded on these laws,” — (laws, it will be observed, that are as yet very imperfectly known, and which may not be all discovered for thousands of years to come;) “it must borrow light and strength from them, and in return communicate its powerful sanction in enforcing obedience to their dictates.”‡

Mr Combe has here brought many grave and serious accusations against our divines for their neglect of human philosophy, and stated very plainly his conviction of the impossibility of their forming a system of religion that shall be of any practical utility without its aid. He here seems to hold that they cannot too soon embrace the doctrines of Phrenology as the true science of mind, — trace out its full correspondence and harmony with Scripture, and with the doctrines of our holy

* Constitution of Man, p. 5, col. 1.

† Ib. p. 7, col. 2.

‡ Ib. p. 10, col. 2, at bottom.

religion, and bring the whole to bear with accumulated power upon the understandings and the consciences of their hearers. He is in such haste in regard to this, that although Phrenology is a doctrine — not of yesterday, that is too remote — though it is only a science of the present hour — only at this moment emerging above the mental horizon, and still encumbered by the mists and fogs of misapprehension and error, — he would have them take it even now, in its present crude and undigested shape, and mix it up with the oracles of heavenly truth, the message intrusted to them by the unerring dictates of divine inspiration. He accuses them loudly of neglect of duty, in not having done so already ; and in the concluding part of his work, he declares that “ the first divine of comprehensive intellect and powerful moral feeling, who shall take courage, and introduce the *natural laws* into his discourses, and teach the people the works and institutions of the Creator, will reap a great reward in usefulness and pleasure. If this course shall, as heretofore, be neglected, the people, who are daily adding to their knowledge of philosophy and practical science, will in a few years *look down with disrespect* on their clerical guides, and probably force them, by ‘*pressure from without,*’ to remodel the entire system of pulpit instruction.” *

This is *one* view of the subject, and certainly a strong one, expressed in language not remarkable for its mildness and courtesy ; and it would not be very wonderful if, in some other part of his voluminous writings, Mr Combe had somewhat modified his opinions upon this particular point, and expressed them somewhat differently. It is, however, a little extraordinary, that in this very work itself, and in the very same introductory chapter in which he brings his sweeping accusation

* Constitution of Man, p. 97, col. 1.

against divines for their neglect of human philosophy, he expresses, in terms equally decided, an opinion the *very opposite* of that to which I have above referred. He is arguing, that as God is the author of nature as well as of Scripture, it is impossible that any truth correctly deduced from an examination of the one, can be at variance with a correct interpretation of the other. "On the ground," he observes, "that organs and faculties have been given by the Creator, they (the philosophers) are entitled to maintain that a philosophy of morals, correctly deduced from their constitution, must accord with all correct interpretations of Scripture, otherwise religion can have no substantial foundation. If two sound interpretations of the divine will, as recorded in creation and in Scripture, can by possibility contradict each other, we can have no confidence in the moral Governor of the world. As, then, all real philosophy and all true religion must harmonize, *there will be a manifest advantage in cultivating each by itself, till its full dimensions, limits, and applications shall be brought clearly to light. We may then advantageously compare them, and use the one as a means of elucidating or correcting our views of the other.*"*

It is needless to make any commentary on the above passages, except to observe that the views are precisely the opposite of each other; and as they occur in the same work, and almost in the same page of that work, we are clearly entitled to call upon Mr Combe to declare explicitly to which of the two he chooses to adhere. Whatever may have been the case when he wrote the Constitution of Man, and although he might have been, at that time, equally balanced between opposite opinions, it would rather appear that he has since found it advisable to lean to the sentiment expressed in the last quoted

* Constitution of Man, p. 7, col. 1.

passage. In a letter addressed by him to Dr Neill, as one of the patrons of the University, on the occasion of his being candidate for the Professorship of Logic, he gives the following exposition of his views on the subject: —

“ I regard religion as a sacred subject, *which ought not lightly to be brought into collision with philosophy.*”

“ It appears to me more advantageous to investigate nature *by herself first*, and to proceed to compare her phenomena with Scripture, *only after being certain that we have rightly observed and interpreted them.*”

“ By this method we shall preserve our minds calm and unbiassed for the investigation of truth ; we shall test nature by herself, which is the proper standard by which to try her ; and we shall avoid bringing discredit on Revelation by involving it in unseemly conflicts with natural phenomena.”

We have no right, perhaps, to insist that Mr Combe should, in his philosophical speculations, agree in every point with the doctrines of our divines ; we have no right to insist that where he conscientiously differs from them, he should state that difference in language uniformly complaisant and courteous ; but we have a right to insist that he should be *consistent*, that he should not lay down one rule in one page of his work, and a perfectly opposite one in another, and that he should not lay down rules as binding upon his theological opponents which he himself breaks through without scruple in every chapter — wherever, in short, it happens to suit his purpose. If he insists, as he seems to do, that divines and theologians shall refrain from attacking or criticising his views, or comparing them with those which they have deduced from their interpretations of Scripture, “ till their full dimensions, limits, and applications shall be brought clearly to light,” then, most

assuredly, he has no right whatever to attack the opinions and doctrines of theologians, or to compare them with the views derived from *his* investigation of nature, till he can say that these views have reached their full dimensions, and that we may be perfectly certain that the natural phenomena have been throughout rightly observed and interpreted.

If, therefore, Mr Combe shall finally adhere to the view of the subject last quoted, and stated in his letter to Dr Neill, it may be expected, that, for the sake of consistency, he will expunge from the next edition of his work, the whole tirade of abuse which he has so unsparingly lavished on the clergy, on account of their refraining from mixing up the doctrines of our most holy faith with the speculations of human philosophy — speculations, as yet, confessedly crude and imperfect, and which, certainly, are at this moment very far from having “attained their full dimensions,” or from having “their whole limits and applications brought clearly to light.”

Apart entirely from the inconsistency above noticed, from which Mr Combe may clear himself as he best may, there is something quite preposterous in the whole of the accusations he brings against the clergy. He says, “they have frequently applied scientific discoveries in proving the existence and developing the character of the Deity.” And so far, doubtless, they have done well; but he adds, “they have failed in applying either the discoveries themselves, or the knowledge of the divine character obtained by means of them, to the construction of any system of philosophy capable of combining harmoniously with religion, and promoting the improvement of the human race.”*

* Constitution of Man, p. 5, col. 1.

It may be here remarked, that it is not the business or the duty of divines to form "Systems of Philosophy." It is the business of philosophers to do so, and if they perform this task correctly, there is no fear whatever that they will succeed in establishing any doctrine inconsistent with a sound interpretation of Scripture. The truth is, that the field of philosophical investigation, and the field of theological investigation, lie entirely separate; and if those who labour in them respectively, keep each within their own bounds, and do not invade the proper province of the other, there can be no danger of their ever coming into unseemly collision. The nearest approach that they can ever make to each other, — the utmost that can be expected in regard to their throwing light upon each other,—will be this, that when we shall be able to attain views of both that shall be perfect and complete in all their parts, it will be seen that there is not (as we are now satisfied there cannot be) any inconsistency between them; but, on the contrary, that there is (as we are now satisfied there must be) a perfect and a beautiful harmony between them,—the one of them reflecting an image of the other, as in a smooth mirror.

In the meantime, and until the philosophers shall have completed their investigations, and are able to exhibit their doctrines "in their full dimensions, limits, and applications,"—and after we are perfectly certain that they have succeeded "in rightly observing and interpreting nature,"—Mr Combe is quite right in saying, that the two studies should be kept separate. And this is exactly that which divines have done, and are doing, and that for which Mr Combe has most inconsistently lavished upon them all kinds of vituperation, threatening them with the contempt of "the people," and the "pressure from without," forcing them "to remodel the entire system of pulpit instruction."*

* Constitution of Man, p. 97, col. 1.

By persevering in the course which they have hitherto followed, divines will best comply with the injunctions of their great Master, who sent forth his disciples, not certainly to teach the *natural laws*, or any system of human philosophy, but with the command to preach the Gospel to all nations. They will thus best imitate the example of these apostles themselves, one of the most zealous and energetic of whom, (and the only one, it may be observed, who was endowed with any portion of human learning,) declared with regard to himself and his brethren,—“The Jews require a sign, and the Greeks *seek after wisdom*: But we preach Christ crucified; unto the Jews a stumbling-block, and unto the Greeks foolishness; but unto them which are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ, the power of God, and the wisdom of God.”*

This apostle, in the same epistle to the Corinthians, when addressing those very Greeks, who, as he had previously mentioned, “sought after wisdom,” and looked upon the doctrine of the Cross as “foolishness,” emphatically declares, “I determined not to know any thing among you save Jesus Christ, and him crucified.”† This entirely accords with one of the views stated by Mr Combe; to the other view stated by him, it is entirely opposed: but whether he shall adhere to the one view or the other, our divines may well be excused if they consider Saint Paul a safer guide than Mr Combe, and the gospels and epistles of the New Testament more clearly within the object of their mission than the “Natural Laws” or the “Constitution of Man.”

Mr Combe was, at one time, a great admirer of Lord Bacon, and considered it as the highest honour to be ranked among the number of his followers. Of late,

* 1 Cor. i. 22—24.

† Ibid. ii. 2.

however, his admiration of this prince of philosophical writers seems to be manifestly abated; and in his *magnum opus*, the "Constitution of Man," it is remarkable, that the name of Bacon is not once mentioned from the beginning to the end of the book. This is the more surprising, as Lord Bacon has delivered his sentiments very fully on the connection between Science and Scripture, to which Mr Combe has devoted an entire chapter. Mr Combe, at one time, quoted Lord Bacon's opinion on this very point, and laid no little stress on his authority; and his subsequent silence on this topic may be sufficiently accounted for, by his finding that the authority of Bacon is entirely against him.

Lord Bacon states it as one great cause of errors in religion, "the taking an aim at divine matters by human, which cannot but breed mixture of imaginations." Now, this is exactly what Mr Combe has attempted to do; endeavouring, by arguments drawn from human science, to ascertain the character and attributes of the Deity,—what is his will concerning us his creatures, and what are the feelings and principles that guide his dealings towards us. In another place, Lord Bacon observes, "The prejudice hath been infinite, that both divine and human knowledge have received by the *intermingling* and *tempering* of the one with the other; as that which hath filled the one full of heresies, and the other full of speculative factions and vanities."* Mr Combe has also attempted to do this, and he pours out the vials of his wrath against the divines, because they refuse to do the same thing, and "intermingle and temper" the doctrines of our holy religion with arguments drawn from human philosophy. Against this, Lord Bacon records his opinion in the strongest manner, in various parts of his works.

* Bacon's Works, Montagu's edition, vol. i. p. 259.

In his *Meditationes Sacræ*, in treating of heresies, he quotes the following text, to which he afterwards refers on numerous occasions :—“ *Ye do err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God.*”

“This canon,” he observes, “is the mother of all canons against heresy. The causes of error are two,—the ignorance of the *will of God*, and the ignorance, or not sufficient consideration, of *his power*. The *will of God* is more revealed in the Scriptures, and therefore the precept is, ‘Search the Scriptures.’ The *power of God* is more revealed by the creatures, and therefore the precept is, ‘Behold and consider the creatures.’”* This is a favourite idea with Lord Bacon, and is repeated by him many times in different places.

But the distinction between divine and human knowledge, and the impossibility of our reaching the one of them by means of the other, is more fully set forth in the following passage, in the *Discourse on the Interpretation of Nature* :—“Wherefore, seeing that knowledge is of the number of those things which are to be accepted of with caution and distinction—being now to open a fountain, such as it is not easy to discern where the issues and streams thereof will take and fall—I thought it good and necessary, in the first place, to make a strong and sound head and bank to rule and guide the course of the waters, by setting down this position, or firmament, namely, that ALL KNOWLEDGE IS TO BE LIMITED BY RELIGION, and to be referred to use and action.

“*For if any man shall think, by view and inquiry into these sensible and material things, to attain to any light for revealing of the nature or will of God, HE SHALL DANGEROUSLY ABUSE HIMSELF.* It is true, that the contemplation of the creatures of God hath for end, as

* Bacon's Works, *ut supra*, vol. i. p. 217, 218.

to the nature of the creatures themselves, knowledge; but, as to the nature of God, *no knowledge, but wonder*, which is nothing else but contemplation broken off, and losing itself. Nay, farther, as it was aptly said by one of Plato's school, 'The sense of man resembles the sun, which openeth and revealeth the terrestrial globe, but obscureth and concealeth the celestial; so doth the sense discover natural things, but darken and shut up the divine. *Therefore attend his will as himself openeth it, and GIVE UNTO FAITH THAT WHICH UNTO FAITH BELONGETH.*'*

The same views are repeated in the treatise, *On the Advancement of Learning*. "And, as for the third point, (that we do not presume, by the contemplation of nature, to attain to the mysteries of God,) it deserveth to be a little stood upon, and not to be lightly passed over. For if any man shall think, by view and inquiry into these sensible and material things, to attain that light wherein he may reveal unto himself the nature or will of God, *then indeed he is spoiled by vain philosophy*. For the contemplation of God's creatures and works produceth (having regard to the works and creatures themselves) knowledge, but, having regard to God, no perfect knowledge, but wonder, which is broken knowledge. And, therefore, it was most aptly said by one of Plato's school, 'that the sense of man carrieth a resemblance with the sun, which, as we see, openeth and revealeth all the terrestrial globe, but then it obscureth and concealeth the stars and celestial globe; so doth the sense discover natural things, but darkeneth and shutteth up divine.' And hence it is true that it hath proceeded, *that diverse great learned men have been heretical, whilst*

* Bacon's Works, *ut supra*, vol. i. p. 257, 258.

*they have sought to fly up to the Deity by the waxen wings of the senses.”**

There are various other passages in Lord Bacon's works to the like purpose and effect. In regard to natural theology, he states, — “The bounds of this knowledge are, that it sufficeth to convince atheism, but not to inform religion. Wherefore, by the contemplation of nature, to induce and enforce the acknowledgment of God, and to demonstrate his power, providence, and goodness, is an excellent argument, and has been excellently handled by divers.

“But, on the other side, out of the contemplation of nature, or ground of human knowledge, to induce any verity or persuasion concerning *points of faith*, is, in my judgment, not safe. *Da fidei quæ fidei sunt.*”†

The same distinction is again drawn in treating of theology proper. “Wherefore we conclude, that sacred theology, (which, in our idiom, we call divinity,) is grounded only upon the word and oracle of God, and not upon the light of nature; for it is written, ‘*Cæli enarrant gloriam Dei* ;’ but it is not written, *Cæli enarrant voluntatem Dei* ; but of that it is said, ‘To the law and to the testimony; if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them.’ (Isaiah, viii. 20.)”‡

I have quoted these repeated statements of the same or similar ideas, because the repetition proves, that what Lord Bacon thus lays down was no unweighed or passing thought, but his fixed and permanent belief concerning the most important of all subjects. Now, what is it that he so repeatedly states? That the Scriptures are the only sure foundation for any speculation respecting the will and purposes of God, as the works of creation are the only sure foundation for any speculation respecting

* Bacon's Works, *ut supra*, vol i. p. 257, 258. † Ibid. ii. 128, 129.

‡ Ibid. i. 299.

his power; that it is unwise, and unsafe, and unphilosophical, to mix and confound these two kinds of knowledge—to argue respecting the will of God from any view and inquiry into the works of creation, or to attempt to explain the works of his power by any statements contained in, or arguments drawn from, the Scriptures. Mr Combe has not only himself offended against the first of these rules, but he is angry at our divines for not having offended against it also.

The whole scope of his essay is directed to shew what the *intentions* and *purposes* of the Creator are—in other words, what is his *will*—in the arrangements he has made with regard to the material world, and the relations he has established between us and the objects among which we are placed. He has gone farther, and carried his thoughts to the higher aim of shewing what are and what are not the *feelings* with which the Deity regards the faults and errors of his creatures.

I do not inquire here, whether, in the conclusions he has come to respecting the purposes, intentions, and will of God, Mr Combe is right or wrong; all I mean to say at present is, that in these speculations he has undoubtedly overstepped that great “position and firmament” which, as if with a prophetic view of such speculations as this, Lord Bacon has laid down “as a strong and sound head and bank, to rule and guide the course of the waters.” Neither do I inquire at this point whether the doctrines which divines have deduced from their interpretations of Scripture, which are objected to by Mr Combe, and which he so unceremoniously denounces as errors, be altogether correct in all their parts. Of that I have spoken elsewhere; but what I say here is, that, in resorting to Scripture for information respecting man’s original state by nature—the will of God respecting him—the moral law—and the nature and

extent of man's responsibility,—the divines have applied to that source which Lord Bacon has so repeatedly, so anxiously, and so earnestly stated to be the only source from which any sound information on these subjects can be derived. They have, as his lordship has expressed it, “attended the will of God as himself hath opened it, and given unto faith that which unto faith belongeth.”

It accords entirely with this view, and with the so often repeated rules of Lord Bacon on this subject, that God, who does nothing in vain, has condescended to make a revelation to man, shewing what was his original state at his creation—how he has fallen from that state—what God himself has done for our restoration—and what he requires on our part, to enable us to avail ourselves of so great goodness. Had we been capable of discovering this by our unassisted reason, it would not have been thus revealed. Phrenology has not been so revealed, nor any of the sciences, because we were capable of discovering them for ourselves. But this most important of all knowledge—the knowledge of the relation in which we stand to our Maker, and of our responsibility to him—has been specially revealed, because it was not otherwise discoverable. To this revelation, then, we must resort, if we would know any thing of these relations, and that responsibility; and it is the only philosophical mode of proceeding to do so.

If we proceed according to the Baconian rules, and if theologians on the one hand, and philosophers on the other, limit themselves to those points of inquiry which properly fall within their respective spheres, there is no possibility that human science can ever come into collision with the revealed Word of God. According to the simple but comprehensive words of our *Shorter Catechism*, the Scriptures were vouchsafed to teach us “What man is to believe concerning God, and what duty God

requires of man." On these points the authority of Scripture is, and ever must remain, paramount; and no deductions of human science, let these be carried never so far, can ever prove any thing contrary to, or inconsistent with, what Scripture has clearly revealed upon these points; nor is it even to be expected that, in such matters, it can ever yield any material assistance towards the interpretation of Scripture.

If it be asked, Where then is the legitimate province of ethics, or the philosophy of morals? I must again refer to Lord Bacon. Of this he speaks as follows:—"And if it be said, that the care of men's minds belongeth to sacred divinity, it is most true; but yet moral philosophy may be preferred unto her as a wise servant and humble handmaid. For as the psalm saith, that the eyes of the handmaid look perpetually towards the mistress, and yet, no doubt, many things are left to the discretion of the handmaid to discern of the mistress's will; so ought moral philosophy to give a constant attention to the doctrines of divinity, and yet so as it may yield of herself, within due limits, many sound and profitable directions."*

Such are the rules laid down by Lord Bacon, with regard to the respective boundaries and limits of revealed truth and philosophical investigation,—rules which no philosopher has ever ventured to controvert, and which no one has ever transgressed with impunity. Let us see what they amount to. What is the meaning of "knowledge being limited by religion," except this,—that we are not to speculate from grounds of human knowledge, upon points which are clearly and indubitably revealed to us as true, and which we are to receive as matters of faith? What is the meaning of "giving unto faith that which unto faith belongeth," but just the

same thing,—that whenever any thing is clearly revealed to us as true, in point of faith, all speculation as to its truth must thenceforth be at an end? Of this nature we may safely reckon the facts revealed in the Scriptures, respecting the original perfection, the fall of man, and the consequent depravity of the whole human race, and the utter inability of man to regain his lost perfection, or to restore himself to the favour of God by any exertion of his own. What is so revealed on these points must be held as true, and there an end. This is giving unto faith, that which unto faith belongeth.

But what does Mr Combe understand by giving unto faith what unto faith belongeth? From this essay, we must conclude, that he understands it to mean—giving to it precisely nothing at all. The doctrines, or rather *the facts*, which I have just now mentioned, are written throughout the Scriptures as with a sunbeam; but Mr Combe denounces them, in the most positive terms, to be fatal errors, which have infected and spoiled the entire system of Christian theology; and he calls upon our divines to renounce these doctrines which they see recorded in every page of the Bible, and from henceforth to teach the people Phrenology and the *natural laws*! Is this giving to faith, that which unto faith belongeth?

A very acute writer of the last century, Dr Jonathan Swift, in a work which is not often quoted in a philosophical discourse, (his *Directions to Servants*,) gives the following very significant advice to all domestics whatsoever:—“If your master or lady happen once in their lives to accuse you wrongfully, *you are a happy servant*; for you have nothing more to do, than for every fault you commit while you are in their service, to put them in mind of that false accusation, and protest yourself

equally innocent in the present. Mr Combe, in common with all that class of philosophers who have a talent for making discoveries which do not exactly tally with the doctrines and opinions of our religious teachers, is in this happy predicament; for, as is well known to the philosophical world, the Pope and the Cardinals, between two and three centuries ago, condemned Galileo to the prisons of the Inquisition, for presuming to demonstrate, on the principles of human science, the diurnal motion of the earth round its axis, which they chose to affirm to be contrary to reason and to Scripture. Every person is now satisfied that, in this particular case, Galileo was stating nothing but what was true, and that the Pope and the Cardinals were entirely in the wrong. This is, in its way, a most excellent story, and assuredly it has not been lost upon Mr Combe, for we find him quoting it upon all occasions. We have it stated in the introduction to his *System of Phrenology*; we have it again in the *Constitution of Man*;^{*} it is referred to almost in every number of the *Phrenological Journal*; and, in his Letter to Dr Neill, mentioned in the Preface, he comes down upon us once more with this never ending story of Galileo and the Cardinals. The use he makes of it, too, seems to be strictly in conformity to the advice of the Dean of St Patrick's; for whenever it is objected to any of his dogmas, or opinions, that they are not conformable to the doctrines of Scripture, or any thing else, he immediately quotes the case of Galileo, and maintains, that as the Cardinals were wrong in accusing him of unscriptural doctrine, so we must now be equally wrong in the objections brought from Scripture against him, Mr Combe. It never occurs to him as being possible that there can be any error on *his* side. The Pope and the Cardinals were wrong in their attack upon Galileo,

* Page 89.

and, therefore, in all cases, divines must be in the wrong, in objecting to doctrines of any kind whatever, which may hereafter be announced by any one choosing to call himself a philosopher.

There is, however, this essential difference between the doctrine taught by Galileo, and those subjects to which Mr Combe has now directed so much of his attention,—that the former did not lie properly within the province of Scripture, whereas the latter does. The Scriptures were not given to teach men astronomy and geology, or any branch of natural science. Objections brought against them, therefore, drawn from particular interpretations of Scripture, were quite out of place. The cardinals objected to the Galilean doctrine about the rotation of the earth, and in doing so, they erred, “not knowing the power of God.” Modern divines were equally wrong in objecting to the doctrines of geology, for the Bible never was intended to teach geology. It was intended to give man an account of his origin, chief end, and final destination; and so far as the first of these points is concerned, geology is precisely in accordance with Scripture,—at least it contains nothing inconsistent with it. Mr Combe would be equally invulnerable, were divines, on the ground of any opinions drawn from Scripture, to object to the fundamental doctrines of Phrenology, to deny the correspondence between cerebral development and mental manifestation, or its uses as now successfully applied to the cure of mental, or as it rather may be called, cerebral disease. On these points Mr Combe would stand as on a rock, and might defy every attempt to put him down by the assumed authority of Scripture, for this good reason, that Scripture says nothing on the subject more than on any other part of physical or medical science. The case of Galileo is here precisely

in point; and Mr Combe would be perfectly justified in quoting it. It comes to be a very different thing, however, when Mr Combe assumes the offensive, and attacks theologians on their own peculiar ground, as when he denounces as errors, the doctrines of the Fall and the depravity of human nature. These are doctrines which it was the purpose and intention of the Scriptures to teach, doctrines which lie at the very root and foundation of our faith, and without the admission of which the whole scheme of Christianity would appear to be without end or object, and instead of an important reality, become like the baseless fabric of a vision. On such a point as this, Mr Combe and the theologians seem to have exactly changed places. Galileo will afford him no assistance here. In fact, he is as much in error, in assailing the divines on such points, as the Pope and the Cardinals were in their attack upon poor Galileo. He has not taken the right method to arrive at the truth, nor resorted to the only source from which a knowledge of it can be derived.

Mr Combe observes,* that “all existing interpretations of Scripture have been adopted in ignorance of the facts, that every person in whose brain the animal organs preponderate greatly over the moral and intellectual powers, has a native and instinctive tendency to immoral conduct, and *vice versa* ; and that the influence of organization is fundamental—that is to say, that no means are yet known by which an ill formed brain may be made to manifest the moral and intellectual faculties with the same success as a brain of excellent configuration.” To this I answer, that the facts here stated with regard to the brain have nothing to do with the interpretation of Scripture, and can have no influence whatever upon such interpretation. Apart from the

* Constitution of Man, p. 89. col. 2.

mere physical facts of cerebral configuration, and the correspondence between it and mental manifestation, there is no information yet gained on the subject of the human mind that was not equally known to the divines who framed our existing systems of theology, or which has not been known to all practical purposes since the beginning of the world. It has always been known that men were variously endowed with natural gifts; that some had natural propensities to evil and immoral conduct, and that others were either naturally inclined to goodness, or, at all events, were much more easily trained to the practice of virtue. There is nothing in Scripture contrary to this, and various quotations may be made to shew that this is exactly the representation of human nature which is there given. In the descriptions of human character given in Scripture, there is none exhibited as absolutely perfect, and I have yet to learn that Phrenology shews us any thing that contradicts this. All have some imperfection, but still some are represented as much more favourably constituted than others. The different characters described in the historical portions of the Bible shew as great a diversity of natural propensity and sentiment as can be contended for by any phrenologist. In the parable of the good Samaritan this diversity is admitted, and the highest character attributed to a member of an alien and a hostile tribe. It is admitted, even with respect to some of the heathen, that "these not having the law, are a law unto themselves."* And to go no farther, it is admitted to be the case even with regard to the effect of spiritual influences, and moral and religious instruction, in the parable of the Sower, where some of the seed is stated to have fallen by the way side—some upon stony places—some is said to have fallen among thorns, and some upon *good ground*.

* Romans, ii. 14.

I am aware that in this instance it will be contended, that even the latter, the good ground, would require the preparation of spiritual influence before it was ready for reception of the seed ; but even here a natural difference is acknowledged, in as much as we are told that it produced “ some thirty, some sixty, and some an hundred fold.” There is nothing in this contrary to phrenological observation ; nor has Phrenology added any thing to our knowledge, so far as regards the more or less favourable constitution of the human mind and character which can at all affect our interpretation of Scripture.

One thing, however, may be stated as certain, that whatever the natural character, and the cerebral organization may be, there are no human means of improving either besides those of *moral and religious instruction*. There can be no doubt whatever, that these, if properly, judiciously, and steadily applied, particularly at the earlier periods of life, have a very great effect in improving the natural character ; and there is also great reason to believe that they produce a corresponding effect in *altering the cerebral organization*.* There are no

* Mr Deville of London has begun a series of most interesting observations on *progressive development*, an entirely new department of phrenological investigation, and one on which neither Gall, Spurzheim, nor Mr Combe, has furnished us with any information. Mr Deville already possesses several examples of *successive* casts of the same individuals, taken at different periods, and some of them in middle life, — shewing an evident progress, and an alteration of the form of the head, which in these cases, he assures us, was accompanied with a corresponding change of character, resulting from intellectual and moral training, the influence of good example, good society, and religious instruction. These examples make it probable that the cerebral development is never at a stand, and that it may be improved, or the contrary, at any period of life, according to the circumstances in which the individual may be placed. I have no hesitation in saying, that this, if it shall be ultimately verified by subsequent observations, is the most important

other means of effecting this. What does Mr Combe mean, then, in the following passage? "I have heard it said, that Christianity affords a better and more instantaneous remedy for human depravity than *improvement of the cerebral organization*." How does he propose to improve the cerebral organization? Can we reduce, for instance, an inconveniently large organ of *Destructiveness*, by the application of physical pressure? Can we, by any new or unheard of phrenological operation, open the cavity of the skull, and insert into it an additional ounce or two of *Benevolence*, *Veneration*, or *Justice*? If we could do this, we might institute a comparison between the influence of Christianity, and such an "instantaneous improvement of cerebral organization." But I have not heard of any cases of this kind, except some which have been proposed in derision of the whole doctrine. The whole passage is a specimen of utter nonsense, and sheer downright absurdity.

Another point may be mentioned, to which Mr Combe seems to pay no attention, and that is, that there have been many cases of individuals of excellent development, possessing a large endowment of the higher sentiments and intellectual faculties, who, for want of having directed those faculties to their proper objects, have lived and died without a spark of devotional feeling, or without ever seeking, or being at all conscious of the want of any religious influences; and who, even on their death-beds, shewed an utter disbelief in, and dislike of all mention of Christian doctrines. I could name individuals of this class, who have, in our own day, adorned the walks of literature and philosophy, who, in point of mere cerebral organization, did not yield

fact that has been added to our knowledge, and the most important contribution to the science of Phrenology, since the period of the discoveries of Gall.

even to such men as Luther and Melancthon. There are many examples of others, who, up to a certain period, were perfectly careless on the subject of divine truth, but in whom some circumstance, apparently accidental, such as the death of a favourite companion, the listening to an impressive sermon, a conversation with a friend, or even the casual remark of a stranger, has awakened a train of totally different feelings, which have rendered them from that time forward, serious, pious, and prayerful Christians, and induced upon them a change of character, well known and obvious to the whole world. There are other cases of individuals, far from possessing any refined sentiments or superior intellect, but who have early imbibed and firmly maintained through life a portion of true Christian principles; and amidst many lapses into sin, and much weakness and imperfection, have kept fast the faith, and died in a state of genuine penitence and firm reliance on the merits of a Saviour. There are many other varieties; but this may be said of all, that whatever the character may be, however high and noble, or the contrary, Christianity will improve it, and that, without it, there is none which approaches, within a thousand degrees, even our poor and defective ideas of perfection. This is the doctrine of divines, and I can see nothing whatever in the facts disclosed by Phrenology, or in any just inference from these facts, which is at all at variance with it.

Mr Combe concludes his observations on this subject as follows :—" My inference therefore is, that the Divine Spirit, revealed in Scripture as a power influencing the human mind, invariably acts *in harmony with the laws of organization* ; because the latter, as emanating from the same source, can never be in contradiction with the former, and because a well constituted brain is a condi-

tion essential to the existence of Christian dispositions." I am by no means sure that I understand the meaning of this passage. There appears, at first sight, something presumptuous in attempting to set bounds to the operation of the Holy Spirit. We are told by the highest authority upon this subject, that its operation is altogether inscrutable by our understandings. "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh and whither it goeth. So is every one that is born of the Spirit."* This is a subject which lies beyond the reach of human reason, and it is quite unphilosophical, and altogether absurd and foolish for us to pretend to predicate any thing whatever respecting it. If the Divine Spirit acts upon and influences the mind, who shall set bounds to its influence in so acting?

If, in the passage quoted, it is intended to be said, that the Spirit influences those, and those only, who possess the highest and best endowment of natural sentiments and intellectual qualities, it is not true. Experience shews that many possessing the very best natural sentiments, continue through life utter strangers to Christian principles. Some with high feelings of veneration, never once raise their minds to the adoration of their Maker and Saviour, never put up a single petition for the sanctifying aid of the Spirit: while many a poor, weak, erring, and offending mortal, conscious of manifold failings and sins, has, through divine influence, been brought to a true sense of his state, and has applied for and obtained a comforting assurance of mercy and pardon. Christianity is the religion of sinners. Christ himself declared, "I come not to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance."† The meaning is, I came not

* Gospel of St John, iii. 8.

† St Matthew, ix. 13.

to call those who *think* themselves righteous,* but those who are sensible of their manifold sins and imperfections, and willing to apply to a higher power than their own for light and assistance to guide them.

But if, on the other hand, it is Mr Combe's meaning in the above passage, that the Spirit, in its operation on the mind, only influences and directs, but does not alter its natural constitution, or if it at all alters that constitution, does so gradually, and in the same manner as any other moral agent, — that, in short, it does not destroy the personal identity of the individual, but leaves the distinguishing traits of character nearly as it found them,—then I would admit that the representation is a true one. The Apostles of our Lord were originally men of very different characters, — St Peter, ardent, hasty, and sanguine, with rather a want of firmness — St Thomas, slow and cautious — St John, benevolent, affectionate, and modest—St Paul, vehement, and fiery, and zealous for what he conceived to be the truth, even to slaying. After they were called, and after they had received the Holy Ghost, in a measure, and to an extent, of which, in the present days of languid faith, we have no experience and hardly any conception, — they still continued to display the same distinctions of natural character as they did in their unregenerated and unconverted state. We find, in the epistles of St Peter, the same ardent and sanguine temperament as he had formerly evinced, but chastened by the remembrance of his former weakness, and relying not so much on himself, as on his Divine Master. We find in St Paul, still as before, the same uncontrollable vehemence and fire, bringing all his natural talent, and all his acquired human learning, to bear upon the minds of his hearers,

* It cannot mean those who are *actually* righteous and sinless, for we are elsewhere informed, that “there is none righteous, no not one.”

and evincing powers which induced the inhabitants of Lystra to think that the god of eloquence himself had descended among them ; while in the writings of St John, with no display of learning, and even a comparative rudeness of phraseology, we see indubitable marks of the same kind and benevolent disposition, the same warm and affectionate heart, which had procured for him the peculiar friendship and love of his Divine Master, and pointed him out to be chosen to heal the sorrows, and comfort the declining years of the mother of our Lord. These characteristics are such as can never be mistaken. The individuals remain the same individuals still, though, doubtless, the characters of all of them were influenced, improved, and altered, as far as moral and spiritual influences can alter, in a degree greater perhaps than has ever taken place with any other individuals on earth. In all this, there is nothing, so far as regards the doctrine of the Spirit's influence, at all contrary to the view which any rational phrenologist would take of the same doctrine.*

Mr Combe observes, that "it is a common accusation against philosophy, that the study of it renders men infidels." He has only quoted the half of the saying. According to Lord Bacon, a *little learning* is apt to make men infidels, but a higher degree of knowledge leads them back again to religion. The most distinguished philosophers of whom modern times can boast, have been believers in Christianity ; and while we can rank on this side the names of Bacon, and Newton, and Locke, and Butler, we can afford to leave to its opponents

* See on this subject, an Essay on the "Harmony of Phrenology with the Scripture doctrine of Conversion," read before the Phrenological Society, 27th November, 1823. By George Lyon, Esq. Published in the *Christian Instructor* for December, 1823.

those of Hume, Gibbon, and Voltaire. Mr Combe may decide for himself, in which of these lists he would wish his own name to be inscribed.

Mr Combe, in his anxiety to get rid of inconvenient Scripture doctrines, has resorted to the old sceptical arguments of the alleged diversity of opinions among religious sects, and of the various readings and difficulties in the interpretation of Scripture. "Nothing," he observes, "can afford a more convincing proof of the necessity of using all the lights in our power, by which to ascertain the true meaning, and the soundness of our interpretations of it, than the *wide diversity* of the opinions which even the most learned and pious divines have based on the Bible."*

In another passage he remarks, "The diversities of doctrine in religion, too, obviously owe their origin to ignorance of the primitive faculties. The relative strength of the faculties differ in different individuals, and each person is most alive to objects and views connected with the powers predominant in himself. Hence, in reading the Scriptures, one is convinced that they establish Calvinism; another, possessing a different combination of faculties, discovers in them Lutheranism; and a third is satisfied that Unitarianism is the only true interpretation," &c.†

I am not at all aware what the faculties can be to which Mr Combe here refers, as having this effect in altering or modifying our opinions in matters of faith, or as affecting our interpretations of Scripture. In passages which relate to plain matters, and which are plainly and distinctly expressed, the correct interpretation never can be a matter of difficulty; and this never can be affected, in the smallest degree, by the relative strength of faculties

* Constitution of Man, p. 92. col. 1.

† Ibid, p. 95, 96.

in different individuals; and all the most important doctrines of Scripture are of this description, and so plainly expressed, that he who runs may read. Accordingly we find, that there is no difference of opinion upon any point of real importance — any of the essential articles of faith, among any of the Reformed Christian Churches. Upon the great fundamental doctrines, of the original perfection, the fall, and subsequent depravity of man, and the method of salvation opened to us in the Gospel, there is not only no material difference, but there is no difference whatever between the Calvinistic and Lutheran creeds; and all Christians of every class, whether of the Reformed Churches abroad, or the different denominations and sects among ourselves, are entirely agreed upon these material points. They only differ in matters of minor concern, not essential to faith, or in their systems of church polity and government. Only one exception occurs, in the case of the *Unitarians*, who are a mere handful, in comparison with the great body of the Christian Churches. It is not fair, therefore, to speak of the wide differences of opinion and doctrine, as existing between the different churches, or to represent the whole Christian world as at sea, in matters of faith, in regard to the great essentials of religion; for, with the single exception above mentioned, they are, on all such essential points, perfectly unanimous.

On the subject of the difficulty of interpreting Scripture, Mr Combe produces certain passages from the writings of Bishop Jeremy Taylor, of which it is not too much to say that they are *partial* and *garbled* extracts, and that they do not fairly represent Bishop Taylor's views. The work referred to is the "Discourse on the Liberty of Prophesying." This work is an earnest pleading for toleration, but only in *things indifferent*, or in matters not truly essential to the Christian faith.

In the first section of his work, Bishop Taylor states what he conceives to be “the nature of faith, and that its duty is completed in believing the articles of the Apostles’ creed.” In the first paragraph of the section from which Mr Combe makes his quotations (vol. vii. p. 496) he states, that all those articles of faith which are necessary and essential, “are clearly and plainly set down in Scripture, and the Gospel is not hid, *nisi per-euntibus*, saith St Paul, and that so manifestly, that no man can be ignorant of the foundation of the faith without his own apparent fault. And this is acknowledged by all wise and good men, and is evident, besides the reasonableness of the thing, in the testimonies of St Austin, Jerome, Chrysostom, Fulgentius, &c. And God hath done more: for many things which are only profitable are also set down so plainly, that, as St Austin says, ‘*Nemo inde haurire non possit, si modo ad hauriendum devote ac pie accedat.*’* But of such things there is no question commenced in Christendom;† and if there were, it cannot but be crime and human interest that are the authors of such disputes; and, therefore, these cannot be simple errors, but always heresies, because the principle of them is a personal sin.”

Having disposed of those points about which he conceives there can be no question, Bishop Taylor proceeds to mention those which *are really* of difficult interpretation. “*But besides those things which are so plainly set down, ‘some for doctrine,’ as St Paul says—that is, for articles and foundation of faith; some for instruction, some for reproof, some for comfort—that is, in matters practical and speculative, of several tempers and consti-*

* Nobody is unable to drink from thence, if he only applies to it devotedly and piously.

† At the time when Bishop Taylor wrote, there were no congregations of Socinians.

tutions, — there are innnumerable places containing in them *great mysteries*, but yet either so enwrapped with a cloud, or so darkened with umbrages, or heightened with expressions, or so covered with allegories and garments of rhetoric, so profound in the matter, or so altered or made intricate in the manner, in the clothing, and in the dressing, that God may seem to have left them as trials of our industry, and arguments of our imperfections, and incentives to the longings after heaven, and the clearest revelations of eternity, and as occasions and opportunities of our mutual charity and toleration to each other, and humility in ourselves, rather than the repositories of faith, and furniture of creeds, and articles of belief.”

It is these latter parts of Scripture alone, the darker and more mysterious, because less necessary parts, not containing any essential article of faith or precept of morality, to which Bishop Taylor refers in the 4th, 5th, and 6th paragraphs, in the passages quoted by Mr Combe. The quotations are, therefore, *garbled quotations*, not fairly made, and by the suppression of what I have now quoted, are made to convey a meaning the very reverse of that which Bishop Taylor actually held. It is impossible here to admit the excuse, that this has occurred *per incuriam*. Mr Combe must have been aware of it, even though he had not read the entire section; for the very title of the section shews it plainly. The section is entitled, “On the difficulty and uncertainty of arguments from Scripture *in questions not simply necessary, not literally determined*.” Had Mr Combe quoted this, or even the running title on the margin of the section, namely, “THE SCRIPTURE DIFFICULT IN UNNECESSARY POINTS,” his extracts would have borne a totally different meaning.*

* Since the publication of the first edition of this work, in which the

It will be seen in the *Life of Taylor*, by Bishop Heber, published in the first volume of his works, that his notions of toleration were not only strictly limited to *matters not essential as points of faith*, but that, in regard to these last, he even argued in favour of the interference of the civil magistrate, “to punish whatever he may be taught to consider as blasphemy, or open idolatry.” This is the law of England at the present day, though undoubtedly there is much caution and circumspection to be used in putting it in force.

Taylor was the first writer in modern times who contended for the principles of toleration ; and as it was his object to shew, from the difficulties in the interpretation of Scripture *in points not essential*, grounds or reasons for mutual forbearance and charity in regard to such points,—in his anxiety to enforce these, he has stretched the argument from the difficulties of Scripture to the utmost, and even (as is generally the case with eloquent writers, when employing their eloquence on a favourite topic,) he has *a little exaggerated* these difficulties. The science of biblical criticism has made great advances since the days of Taylor, and no one would now be warranted to adopt the strong language contained in the third section of his “Discourse.”

In regard to the “various readings,” the following account is given by Mr Hartwell Horne in his “Introduction to the Critical Study and Knowledge of the Holy Scriptures,” a work of immense labour and research, and now considered as a book of established authority.

unfairness of these quotations was pointed out, Mr Combe has sent forth, as he states in various advertisements, a new impression of *ten thousand copies* of his “People’s Edition,” in which these garbled and unfair quotations remain unaltered, without one word of explanation or retraction.

“ Of this formidable mass of various readings, (amounting, as some say, to thirty, or according to others, an hundred and fifty thousand,) which have been collected by the diligence of collators, not one-tenth—nay, not one-hundredth part, either makes or can make any perceptible, or, at least, any material alteration in the sense of any modern version. They consist almost wholly either of palpable errors in transcription, grammatical and verbal differences, such as the insertion or omission of an article, the substitution of a word for its equivalent, and the transposition of a word or two in a sentence. Even the few that do change the sense, affect it only in passages relating to unimportant historical and geographical circumstances, or other collateral matters; and the still smaller number that make any alteration on things of consequence, do not, on that account, place us in any absolute uncertainty. For either the true reading may be discovered by collating the other manuscripts, versions, and quotations found in the works of the ancients; or should these fail to give us the requisite information, we are enabled to explain the doctrine in question from other *undisputed* passages of holy writ. This observation particularly applies to the doctrines of the divinity of Jesus Christ, and of the Trinity, which some persons of late years have attempted to expunge from the New Testament, because a few controverted passages have been cited in proof of them; but these doctrines are written as with a sunbeam in other parts of the New Testament. *The very worst manuscript extant would not pervert one article of our faith, or destroy one moral precept.** All the *omissions* of the ancient manuscripts put together could not countenance the omission of one essential doctrine of the Gospel, relating

* To this extent, it will be seen, Bishop Taylor entirely accords with what is stated by Mr Horne.

either to faith or morals ; and all the additions countenanced by the whole mass of manuscripts already collated, do not introduce a single point essential either to faith or manners, beyond what may be found in the Complutensian or Elzevir editions. And though for beauty, emphasis, and critical perfection of the *letter* of the New Testament, a new edition, formed on Griesbach's plan, is desirable ; yet, from such an one infidelity can expect no help — false doctrine no support — and even true religion no accession to its excellence, as indeed it needs none. The general uniformity, therefore, of the manuscripts of the New Testament, which are dispersed through all the countries in the known world, and in so great a variety of languages, is truly astonishing, and demonstrates both the veneration in which the Scriptures have uniformly been held, and the singular care which was taken in transcribing them ; and so far are the various readings contained in these manuscripts from being hostile to the uncorrupted preservation of the books of the New Testament, (as some sceptics have boldly affirmed, and some timid Christians have apprehended,) that they afford us, on the contrary, an additional and most convincing proof that they exist at present, in all essential points, precisely the same as they were when they left the hands of their authors.”*

Mr Combe has quoted, as an instance of the insufficiency of mere theological knowledge to preserve from practical error without the aid of science, the atrocities committed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in the prosecution of witches. This is a subject of itself sufficiently lamentable, as shewing the proneness of mankind to error and superstition ; and certainly Mr Combe has

* Horne's Introduction to the Critical Study and Knowledge of the Holy Scriptures. 2d edition, vol. i. p. 129.

availed himself of it to the utmost as a weapon of attack against the teachers of religion. In regard to this, it may be observed, that the error was certainly not imputable to the clergy alone—they only erred in common with the whole body of the people. The error, too, did not arise from any ambiguity or difficulty in the interpretation of Scripture, but from gross superstition acting on the fears and prejudices of an ignorant people. Nor was the evil cured by philosophy, or any new discoveries in science, but by the gradual diffusion of intelligence through the mass of society. It was neither Galileo, nor Copernicus, nor Kepler, nor Newton, nor any disciple of any philosophical school, who interfered by their remonstrances to put a stop to the burning of witches; it was to the good sense of our judges and lawyers,—men not generally considered as the most enlarged in their views—men immersed in the technicalities of their profession, and, for the most part, lying under the trammels of custom and precedent,—that we owed our deliverance from this crying evil.

Mr Combe says, that this abomination continued for a century after the Reformation, and after the Bible had been freely put into the hands of the people; and hence he argues against the sufficiency of the Bible to preserve from error without the aid of science. He totally forgets, or rather he chooses in this instance to forget, the very slow progress which truth, even when most clearly and distinctly revealed, makes its way to any considerable or useful extent among the masses of society, or even among those who stand highest in learning and philosophy. Mr Combe is the first to see and lament this, when the question regards the progress of his own favourite science, but he makes no allowance for it in regard to the dissemination of Christian principles, in an age of comparatively far greater ignorance.

Upon the whole, I would say, that the fact of the extinction of trials for witchcraft within a century after the Reformation, is one of the most decisive proofs that could be adduced, of the salutary effect which the Reformation has produced in removing the clouds of superstition and error.

But even granting that science had some share in putting an end to the belief in witchcraft, this can hardly be adduced as an *instance* of the aids which science can afford to religion, for I am not aware of any other example of a similar kind, where this praise can be fairly claimed. Has science improved the condition of the female sex? Has science put an end to slavery? Has science raised our charitable institutions? It has done none of these things, which are all the result of a general improvement in the character of the people produced by Christianity.

Mr Combe takes hold of every occasion he can to lower, if he cannot altogether deny, the influence of Christianity in producing moral improvement. In the title to this chapter he states, "History demonstrates that Christianity, while unaided by arts and science, was corrupted itself, and had *little influence in improving the human race.*" From this, he obviously leaves it to be inferred, that the whole, or the greater part, of the improvement which has taken place in modern times, is to be attributed to the arts and to science, and not to Christianity. This is a gross misrepresentation. Christianity was corrupted, no doubt, by the mixture of heathen rites and heathen philosophy in the earlier centuries of our era, and latterly, by the interested inventions of a worldly and ambitious priesthood; but what did either art or science do towards the removal of these corruptions? It is quite absurd to attribute the

Reformation to science. The Reformation was begun, carried on, and brought to its completion, without the least aid from science, by a careful study, and accurate interpretation of the unadulterated word of God, and by no other means. At the time when the Reformation took place, science was still at a very low ebb; and instead of attributing the Reformation to science, the true state of the matter unquestionably is, that the vast improvements in science, which have taken place within the last three centuries, have been mainly attributable to the Reformation, and to the general improvement in mental and intellectual culture, which Christianity has diffused wherever it has been taught in its purity. It will be observed, that even in countries where the Roman Catholic errors still prevail, the Reformation has not been altogether without some indirect influence, by the reflex light, which all the efforts of a bigoted priesthood have not been able entirely to shut out, and, therefore, science has not been altogether excluded from these countries; but still the reformed countries have been by far the most distinguished for scientific discovery, and every species of improvement in art.

The truth undoubtedly is, that wherever pure Christianity has been effectually taught, the arts and sciences, and every species of knowledge, and every kind of moral and intellectual improvement, have invariably spread in its train. It is in Christian countries, and in them alone, that these have permanently flourished, or are now making any progress; and among Christian countries they have flourished most, and produced most abundant fruit in those where the churches have been most thoroughly reformed. If, then, we are to judge in this case by ordinary rules, what conclusion can we draw but this, that it is Christianity which has improved the moral and intellectual character of the people, wherever

it has been fairly established, and that from this improved intellectual state have arisen all our boasted improvements in science. This I have no hesitation in affirming to be the true state of the connection between science and Scripture. I defy Mr Combe to point out any material or effectual aid which science has ever afforded to the cause of Revelation ; but, on the other hand, for the last three hundred years, science has been advancing with the most rapid strides in those countries, and in those only, where Christianity has produced its salutary and ennobling effects on the mind and character of the people. Can there be any doubt here as to which is the true fountain of light, and the real and originating cause of intellectual and moral improvement ?

The next subject adverted to by Mr Combe is that of Prayer. He mentions, that “an objection has been stated against the doctrine of the Divine Government of the world by established laws, that it is inconsistent with belief in the *efficacy of prayer*. This objection, he observes, has been often urged and answered ; *indeed, it has been deliberately settled by the Church of Scotland itself, in harmony with the views advocated in this treatise ;*” and then he proceeds to mention the case of the Rev. William Leechman, D.D. Professor of Divinity in Glasgow, who, he states, was prosecuted for an alleged heresy on the subject of prayer, before the Presbytery of Glasgow, in the year 1744, but afterwards acquitted by the Synod and General Assembly. On examining the documents connected with this case, as they appear in the printed acts of the General Assembly, it will be found that the above statements are entirely erroneous. The Church of Scotland has never settled the question in the manner stated by Mr Combe. Even though the General Assembly had pronounced an opinion on the

question, (which they never did,) they have no power to bind the Church in this, or any other matter of faith. The province of the General Assembly is confined strictly to matters of discipline and ecclesiastical polity. The doctrine of the Church in regard to prayer is stated in her standards—in the Confession of Faith and the Larger and Shorter Catechisms. To the doctrine, as there stated, every member of the Church is bound to conform, and no opinion has ever been sanctioned by the Church contrary to what is there set down.

The true state of Dr Leechman's case was as follows : He certainly did publish a sermon, containing the passage quoted by Mr Combe, the substance of which is to this purpose, that prayer *has no effect* except by its reflex influence upon the mind of the suppliant, and accordingly that "the true efficacy of prayer does not lie in the mere asking, but in its being the means of producing that frame of mind which qualifies us to receive."

It will be seen from the acts of Assembly, (and Mr Combe, when he quoted the case, ought to have known,) that when the subject came before the Assembly, Dr Leechman made such explanations and admissions to the committee to whom the matter was referred, (and which, it is believed, he had previously done to the committee of the Synod,) as to remove, in a great measure, the objections stated by the Presbytery. The ground of the Presbytery's complaint was not so much what Dr Leechman had said, as what he did not say ; and particularly, that he had avoided all reference to the necessity and influence of the intercession of Christ, and to his mediation, — all of which, when he found the matter becoming serious, he expressly admitted.*

* The following is an extract from the paper of explanations given in by the Professor to the Assembly's Committee :— " One main occasion of publishing this sermon on prayer, was, to prevent the bad effects of a

It will be observed from the documents referred to, 1st, That the *objection* taken by the Presbytery of

late pamphlet, which represents prayer as absurd and unreasonable, nay, as an impious and blasphemous practice ; for that wicked pamphlet being spread in the part of the country where I live, and having had observable bad influence upon young and unthinking minds, I was persuaded by some friends, who are zealous for the interests of religion, to publish this sermon, (which they had occasionally heard me preach,) as a proper antidote to the poison of it. As the pamphlet which occasioned the publication of this sermon did attack only one part of prayer, namely, offering up our desires to God, but did not attack the other part of it, namely, the offering them up in the name of Christ, the discourse is therefore mainly limited to the explication and vindication of this first part of prayer, without explaining and vindicating the second part of it, which I considered as a separate, or at least as a different branch of the same subject ; so the omissions complained of in that performance did not proceed from any disregard of those important and fundamental parts of Christianity, the offering up of our desires to God in the name of Christ, and the merits and satisfaction of the Mediator as the only grounds of our acceptance with God, and of our obtaining the pardon of sin ; but from a persuasion that it is necessary to convince men of the reasonableness of offering up their desires to God, *before* you can convince them that it is a reasonable thing to offer them up in the name of Christ : and from a persuasion that it might be of some use, (through the Divine blessing,) to endeavour to do the first of these, at the time when, and in the place of the country where I attempted it.

“ If, therefore, any passages of this sermon have been so incautiously expressed, as naturally to lead any one to think (which I am not yet convinced they are,) that I meant to assert that the necessity of the Christian religion itself is superseded by the light of nature, or that the light of nature is sufficient to give that knowledge of God and his will which is necessary to salvation—that praying in the name of Christ is not the duty of Christians, or a foreign or superfluous circumstance—or that the merits and propitiation of Jesus Christ are not the only grounds of a sinner's acceptance with God, and of his obtaining the forgiveness of sins, and that the only end of punishment is the reformation of the offender,—I honestly declare that I had no such intention in these passages, &c. ; and as I have already subscribed the Confession of Faith, where these doctrines are taught in the strongest manner, as the confession of my faith, I am still willing to do the same again.”

The report and overture of the Committee were to the effect, “ That the Professor has given abundant satisfaction concerning the orthodoxy of his sentiments, and that there is no ground or occasion for any farther trial of the said Professor in respect of that sermon.”

Glasgow was not that alleged by Mr Combe, namely, that the doctrines stated by Dr Leechman were heretical; they did not object to what he had said, (although some parts of what he said were very objectionable,) but to what he had not said; he was *charged* with a sin of omission, not of commission. And it will be particularly observed, that both the Committee and the Assembly carefully guard against its being supposed that they had considered or approved of the sermon generally.

2d, That Dr Leechman's statement bears that he had printed and published the sermon, not as a complete account of the doctrine of prayer, but for the purpose of meeting and answering an infidel objection on the Deist's own principles.

3d, Mr Combe says the objection has been "deliberately settled by the Church of Scotland itself in harmony with the views contained in this treatise." This has been shewn not to be the fact. The General Assembly is not the Church of Scotland, and therefore their decision could not settle the question; but in point of fact, they gave no decision upon it at all. They acquitted Dr Leechman, because he conceded and admitted all the points *in respect of which any objection had been stated*. The doctrines of the Church are to be found in her Confession of Faith, and the views of prayer there stated

The decision of the Assembly is as follows:—"The General Assembly, having heard the said report and overture, did, without a vote, agree to approve thereof, with this explanation, that by the expressions in the narrative, namely, 'and particularly the passages so excepted against,' no more was intended by the Committee, (as by several members thereof was declared,) nor is intended or meant by this Assembly, in approving their overture above inserted, than that the Committee, and thereafter the Assembly, considered the passages in the said sermon that had been remarked upon by the Presbytery of Glasgow, and another passage taken notice of by some members of the Committee of Assembly; but not that either the Committee or Assembly had read over or considered the whole of that sermon," &c.

will not be found to be "in harmony" with those contained in Mr Combe's treatise.

4th, At the same time, there is no doubt that Dr Leechman's views of prayer are essentially erroneous and defective. There appears to have been a disposition in the Assembly to screen him, and therefore they accepted his explanation. But certainly no such decision would have been pronounced in the purest periods of the Church.

Mr Combe says, that since this decision, the views delivered by Professor Leechman have been unhesitatingly taught by Scottish divines. If it is intended here to intimate that this is the doctrine *usually taught* by our divines, it is a misrepresentation. It is not true. It appears that Mr Combe has been seeking for authorities, and the only one he is able to produce out of hundreds of sermons by Scottish divines, on the subject of prayer, is a quotation from a sermon of Dr Blair, who certainly has never been regarded as an authority in theological questions. If he could have found another instance to the same purpose, he would doubtless have quoted it, but it may be safely said that none such is to be found. As to the quotation from Lord Kames, it shews how hard he is pushed, when he refers to the opinion of a layman of known latitudinarian principles. But Mr Combe had the best reason to be fully aware, that this is not the doctrine taught by our most distinguished divines. An article appears in the *Phrenological Journal* for June, 1832, which Mr Combe could not fail to have *seen*, in which particular notice is taken of a sermon of Dr Chalmers on the subject of prayer, containing a view of the subject directly opposed to that advocated by Mr Combe. The writer of that article attempts to refute Dr Chalmers's theory; but the attempt only shews that he neither understood the

theory itself, nor those laws of philosophical investigation which must for ever limit our inquiries on subjects of this nature. The doctrine of the Church, as understood and taught by Scottish divines, may be found stated in Dr Gordon's two Sermons on Daniel's Prayer, being the seventeenth and eighteenth sermons in his printed volume, and in Dr Chalmers' Treatise on Natural Theology, book v. chap. 3, where he treats of the *rationale*, or philosophy of prayer, and of a special providence.

Dr Gordon's general idea is, that prayer is to be regarded as one, and one of the most important, of those secondary agencies which God employs to bring about the events of providence. The Jews were to be restored to their own land, but not only was it determined in the councils of heaven that they were to be so restored, but that they were eagerly to desire this event—that their hearts were to be turned to God, and that they were to pray to him for their restoration, and that when they so prayed he would hear them. The words of the Prophet Jeremiah, in reference to this, are express: "Thus saith the Lord, that after seventy years be accomplished at Babylon, I will visit you, and perform my good word towards you, in causing you to return to this place. Then shall ye call on me, and ye shall go and *pray unto me*, and I will *hearken unto you*; and ye shall *seek me* and *find me*, when ye shall search for me with all your heart." The promise was conditional, and one of the conditions was, that the event so much desired was to be the object of earnest prayer and supplication. The Jews were to be restored,—that was decreed; but it was also decreed that their prayers, and particularly the prayer of Daniel, were to be among the means of their restoration.

I cannot state here the whole of Dr Gordon's

reasoning on this subject. To understand it thoroughly, the whole sermons should be attentively read; but the general idea will appear in what follows:—"Throughout the whole period of that protracted captivity, he (Daniel) had been honoured to vindicate the power, and assert the supremacy of the Lord God of Israel; by the wisdom of his counsels and the weight of his personal character, he had paved the way for that decision, in favour of the people of God, to which the King of Persia was soon to be brought; and the whole business of his active and most laborious life was made to bear on the interests and the liberation of his afflicted brethren; and if God had thus assigned to the *outward* actions of his servant an important place in carrying into effect his thoughts of peace towards his penitent people, is it conceivable that he had no place in that scheme to assign to the holy and *spiritual* efforts of the same servant? or that the aspirations of a sanctified spirit, the travailing of a soul intent upon the accomplishment of the divine will, and the manifestations of the divine glory, should be less efficient or less essential in the execution of the divine councils, than the outward and ordinary agency of human actions? The whole tenor, and the most explicit declarations of Scripture, stand opposed to such a supposition; nor can I understand how a devout mind should have any difficulty in conceiving that it must be so. *The agency of prayer* is indeed a less obvious and palpable thing than that outward co-operation whereby mankind are rendered subservient to the accomplishment of the divine purposes. But is it not an agency of an unspeakably loftier character? Is it not the co-operation of an immortal spirit, bearing the impress of the divine image, and at the moment acting in unison with the divine will? Is it not befitting the character of God to set upon that co-operation a special mark of

his holy approbation, by assigning to it a more elevated place among the *secondary causes* which he is pleased to employ? *And must there not be provision made, therefore, in the general principles of his administration, for fulfilling the special promise of his word, 'The Lord is nigh to all that call upon him, to all that call upon him in truth?'* ”

Dr Chalmers takes a view nearly similar. His argument is long, and I must be extremely short in my quotations; but the following, I think, will sufficiently shew the general scope of his doctrine :

“ Every thing has its philosophy, which is neither more nor less than the *rationale*, or the true state of that thing. It may perhaps be felt as rather an adventurous expression, when we speak of the philosophy of prayer; nevertheless, it is a subject which, like every other possible object of contemplation, admits of academic treatment. And

“ First of all then, let it be observed, that the doctrine of the efficacy of prayer but introduces a *new sequence* to the notice of the mind; whereas it seems to be quarreled with by philosophy, on the ground that it disturbs and distempers the regularity of all sequences. It may add another law of nature to those which have been formerly observed; but this, surely, may be done without invading on the constancy of nature. The general truth may be preserved, that the same result always follows in the same circumstances, although it should be discovered that prayer is *one of those influential circumstances* by which the result is liable to be modified. The law of magnetism does not repeal, it does not even interrupt the law of gravitation, although the loadstone should keep the iron weight that is suspended beneath it from falling to the ground. There is still a certain and invariable effect produced in this instance by the action

of two forces, each of which is certain and invariable. There is nothing in this to disturb the actual mechanism of nature, but only to complicate it. Nature, after this discovery, may appear a more complex, but not a more capricious mechanism than before. It may disclose to observation a new train of sequences, which must interfere occasionally with other trains, when it will modify, but in no way derange, the workings of a sure and regular economy. What, then, if prayer, and the fulfilment of prayer, are but the two terms of a sequence, having the effect, like every other effect, to complicate the processes of nature, but not to bring them under the misrule of a fitful and wayward contingency, insomuch that the doctrine of the efficacy of prayer may be no more in conflict than the doctrine of the composition of forces with the steadfastness of nature, and the regularities of a harmonious universe?"

This is the leading idea, which Dr Chalmers follows out to all its consequences, stating and meeting all the objections which are likely to occur to a philosophical mind. Into this disquisition I cannot follow him here, but must refer the reader to the work itself, which deserves and will repay an attentive perusal.

These quotations will sufficiently shew that the doctrine of prayer, as taught by our most distinguished divines, is not in unison with the views of Mr Combe.

There are, no doubt, limitations to the doctrine. We know that in this world all events proceed apparently by invariable laws; and a rational believer never asks in prayer, that any of these laws should be suspended on his account. He never expects to obtain by prayer alone, that which he knows is made dependent on his own exertions, but after using these exertions, he is justified in petitioning that they may be accompanied with a blessing, and made effectual towards obtaining

the object of his desires. Farther, in every thing relating to external events, the true believer will accompany all his petitions with this reservation, that they be granted only so far as may be consistent with the Divine will. But there is one class of petitions in regard to which no reservation is necessary, because we know beforehand that they are conformable to the Divine will. Such are the petitions in the Lord's Prayer, all of which we know to be such as God has declared his willingness to grant, although he may not grant them to us unless we earnestly and faithfully pray for them. Such are in general all our petitions for the influences and assistance of the Divine Spirit to produce in us an amendment of heart and life. In regard to these, the most express assurances are given, that, if we ask them, we shall not ask them in vain : — “ Ask, and it shall be given you ; seek, and ye shall find ; knock, and it shall be opened unto you : for every one that asketh, receiveth ; and he that seeketh, findeth ; and to him that knocketh, it shall be opened.”*

In regard to that illumination of mind, which is of the Spirit, and which is necessary to understand the truths of the Gospel, it is declared, — “ If any of you lack wisdom, let him ask of God, that giveth to all men liberally, and upbraideth not ; and it shall be given him. But let him ask in faith, nothing wavering : for he that wavereth is like a wave of the sea driven with the wind and tossed. For let not that man think that he shall receive any thing of the Lord.”†

And, again, it is said,—“ If ye, being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more shall your Father which is in heaven give good things *to them that ask him.*”‡

In regard to spiritual blessings and divine influences,

* Matt. vii. 7, 8.

† James, i. 5, 7.

‡ Matt. vii. 11,

it seems to be according to the ordinary procedure of God, that they are granted to those, and to those only, who ask them in prayer. It is the will of God, generally, that they should be granted to all, but it is also his will, that they should be asked for, earnestly desired, fervently prayed for. There may be, and there certainly is, in the first motions of this desire leading to prayer and earnest petition, a kind and merciful interposition of divine influence inclining and disposing us to make such petitions; but this does not hinder, that the petition itself is necessary as in part a procuring cause of that full measure of spiritual influence which is required and finally granted to the believer. Even in the case of St Paul, whose conversion was the effect of a direct miracle, he fasted and prayed in darkness for three days, before Ananias was authorized to baptize him, in token of his having received the Holy Ghost.

The true phrenological view of prayer would seem to be the following: Three faculties have been bestowed on man, which prompt him to worship a Supreme Being, and to pour out his desires to him in prayer. *Veneration* and *Wonder* directly dispose us to this, while *Hope* leads to the expectation and belief that our prayers will not be altogether ineffectual, but that if they are put up in a manner agreeable to the divine will, they may be favourably *heard* and *answered*. That these are the *legitimate* promptings of the feelings now mentioned seems evident from this, that the higher and more perfect the character becomes, the more intense is the desire of the individual to engage in such acts of worship, and to *pour out his petitions to God in prayer*. It thus appears that this disposition to pray, and to expect an answer to prayer, is “not a factitious feeling,” (as Mr Combe expresses it in reference to another

subject) “or a mere exuberance of an idle and luxuriant imagination, but is the result of certain primitive faculties of the mind, which owe at once their existence and their functions to the Creator.”*

On taking a survey of the other faculties and feelings of the human mind, we may observe, that for all of them there are objects and circumstances prepared in the external world, which exactly meet their several wants and desires. We have feelings of love and attachment, and fellow beings exist, who are the objects of these feelings. We have a desire of offspring, and a love of the young and tender of our species, and children exist to gratify these. We have a feeling and a love of music, and we have the means of producing harmony and melody. We have a sense of grandeur and beauty, and the world is full of objects in which these qualities are conspicuous. For every faculty there is an object, and we find preparation made to gratify, in fitting time and manner, every expectation. And is there to be only one exception to this rule? Is this disposition to prayer, and the expectation of an answer to prayer, the only case where such feelings and expectations are to be deceived and disappointed? Why have we been prompted to pour out our desires to God, and to expect that he will hear and answer us, if all this is a mere delusion? And a delusion it undoubtedly is, unless there is a *real answer* to prayer,—a putting up of a petition to an intelligent hearer on the one side, and a granting of that petition on the other. It is undoubtedly a delusion, if the *only* effect of prayer begins and ends in its reflex influence upon our own minds. It is as if we were prompted or commanded to exert our bodily force to lift an object which is immovable, or which it is altogether beyond our limited strength to stir from its place, and

* Combe's System of Phrenology. Second Edition, p. 208.

where the *only* effect of our exertions would be the improvement and strengthening of our own *muscular frame*. We cannot believe that the Author of nature would so deceive us, or implant in us desires and expectations which are never to be gratified. Does not this afford a strong argument, that there is more in prayer, and in the effect of prayer, than its mere reflex influence upon our own minds? and that as our natural feelings, implanted by God, lead us to expect that he will hear and answer us, hence it must be true that he will, when he sees fit, actually hear and vouchsafe an answer? Of course such answer may not *always* be the granting of the specific request made by us at the time. All that is necessary, and all that is contended for is, that there may be a *real* hearing, and a *real* answer.

When, in addition to this argument from natural feeling, we take into view the confirmation afforded by the express injunctions of Scripture to "make our requests known unto God," and the numerous express declarations, that if we pray in faith he will send us an answer in peace, there seems nothing wanting to establish the point on grounds that cannot be shaken.

It signifies nothing that we are unable to shew how the answer is sent, consistently with our belief of the constancy of the laws of nature. Into that question it must for ever be needless for us to inquire, otherwise than hypothetically, as its solution depends upon elements that lie beyond the reach of our limited faculties. Surely, if we believe that there exists a God, the creator and ruler of the universe, it requires no additional stretch of faith to admit that his resources must extend to many things far above our most exalted conceptions, and which our imperfect powers of combination are altogether incompetent to fathom. I, therefore, enter into no reasoning on this part of the subject. Our

belief here does not rest upon reasoning, but upon feeling; and any argument that can be adduced against it, mounting as it must do to a sphere beyond the reach of our intellect, and attempting no less than to ascend to the very throne of Omnipotence, is not *philosophy*, it is the acmé of gross and arrogant presumption.

In regard to the influence of the Spirit, it is no objection to its reality that some persons are not conscious of its operation in their own particular case; neither is it an objection that some pious, but mistaken individuals have attributed to its operation certain feelings which are clearly the result of physical causes affecting their bodily organs. We are not to be moved by the incredulity of one class of persons, or the mistakes of another class, to reject what is unquestionably true, what is clearly and unequivocally declared to be true in the Scriptures, and what many thousands have attained the full assurance of being verified in their own personal experience. As to the possibility of the thing, we have the express opinion of a late distinguished antagonist of revelation, that our inability to explain the manner in which it is effected is no just objection against it. Lord Bolingbroke observes, that "an extraordinary action of God upon the human mind is not more inconceivable than the ordinary action of mind on body, or body on mind, and that it is impertinent to deny the existence of any phenomenon merely because we cannot account for it."*

In regard to the Spirit's influence, it may be remarked, that it is not to be expected to manifest itself by any outward throes or convulsions of the body, or any sensible internal motions of natural feeling. It is seen only in its effects upon the life and conversation. St John informs us how we should know that we have

* Bolingbroke's Works, vol. ii. p. 468, 4th edition.

received the gift :—“ *Hereby* we do know that we know him, (Jesus Christ,) if we keep his commandments. He that saith, I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him. But whoso keepeth his word, in him verily is the love of God perfected ; *hereby know we that we are in him.*” * If, then, we would know and be assured that we have in reality received the true influence of the Spirit, let us examine ourselves, whether we do, or anxiously endeavour to do, the will of God, and to keep his commandments. If our consciences answer us that we do, happy are we. There may be many lapses and shortcomings, but if we still hold fast the faith, and earnestly endeavour after new obedience, we shall not fail in the end to obtain our reward.

In regard to all points connected with revelation, I may now remark, once for all, that there is nothing whatever in Phrenology, more than any other system of the human faculties, that either affords an objection to any of the conclusions to which we arrive on the ordinary principles of reasoning, or which furnishes any great additional light to guide us to a right conclusion respecting them. It is a perfect delusion to suppose, as Mr Combe seems to do, that this new science is to produce a total revolution in our theological creeds, and place the Bible and its doctrines in an entirely new light. There is no truth or feasibility in such a supposition. Those parts of Scripture, which were before clear and indisputable,* remain clear and indisputable still, and derive no additional clearness from phrenological illustration ; and, on the other hand, there is no fact revealed by Phrenology which is at all at variance with any of those points. Mr Combe admits this with regard

* 1 John, ii. 3—5.

to the moral precepts. I have endeavoured to shew that the same is the case with several of the doctrinal parts of Scripture. It is perhaps possible, that when Phrenology has been more fully established as a science, it may throw more light upon some of those dark and obscure parts of Scripture which Bishop Taylor speaks of, which appear at present covered with clouds and umbrages; but these, as he observes, occur only in matters of inferior moment, not necessary to be known as points of faith or practice. In regard to such points as we have been now considering, the doctrines respecting prayer and a special Providence, it may be safely averred, that Phrenology affords no data whatever affecting in the smallest degree our reasonings respecting them. The two subjects never once came into contact with one another. Phrenology leaves all such questions where it found them, and has no more to do with their right solution, than the principles of mathematical calculation, or the doctrine of the solar system.

In regard to such a point as the operation of spiritual influences upon the mind, we know nothing, and never can know any thing, except what is revealed in Scripture, or verified in our own experience. It affords no aid to explain this operation, when we are told, that the different faculties and feelings of which we are conscious, are connected with and dependent for their manifestation upon certain cerebral organs. After we are informed of this, we are just as far as ever from understanding *how* the mind, or the mental faculties, or the material organs of these faculties, are operated on by spiritual influence. It is a subject totally out of the sphere of reason, and it is useless for us to speculate upon or to form any theory with regard to it. We have no data for such speculations, nor any means either of verifying or disproving any such theory. Upon such subjects as

these, it is the only safe and the only philosophical course, to adopt the advice of Lord Bacon, not to "mix divine things with human," but to "give unto faith that which unto faith belongeth."

CHAPTER XII.

ON CRIMINAL LEGISLATION.

I SHALL now make a few remarks on Mr Combe's system of criminal discipline, in regard to which he seems to me to have erred as much as in any other part of his speculations. And here I must confess myself utterly unable to imagine of what stuff Mr Combe's feelings of justice are composed, when he can see the most perfect justice in the case of a child, who has inadvertently swallowed arsenic, perishing in the most excruciating tortures, and at the same time denies the justice of inflicting *retributive* punishment on an atrocious criminal. Mr Combe's views upon this subject are such as to confound utterly all our notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice. According to him, the greatest criminals are to be regarded as the least. Crime, with him, is merely a misfortune, and criminals to be looked upon as objects of compassion, and *only* as objects of compassion. It follows, that those who commit the greatest crimes, being the most unfortunate, are entitled to our compassion in the greatest degree. Accordingly, Mr Combe seems to regard all criminals whatsoever, and particularly those who are guilty of the most atrocious offences, with a tender, and almost a fatherly affection, and he reserves his whole indignation for mere errors in judgment; for our divines, who, in place of teaching Phrenology from the pulpit, prefer preaching

the Gospel ; and for all those who neglect, or disobey, or speak lightly of, the *natural laws*. The conclusion of the whole is this, that there is to be no punishment inflicted, *as punishment*, in the case of any crime whatsoever ; and that all we are to do, even in the worst cases, is to take up the offenders, put them into penitentiaries, that is to say, comfortable houses, where they will be sheltered, fed, and preserved in safety, and properly instructed in their duty, all at the public expense, and then sent abroad again into society to practise the lessons they have so learned. “ Why this is hire and salary,” and not punishment. Many may be tempted to commit crimes, if this is to be the mode of dealing with criminals.

The plan, I admit, might perhaps be tried by way of experiment, if it were at all practicable ; and perhaps in some other country, or in some other society than that of Britain, or in some other planet than this earth, it may be practicable. But in this country, at the present time, taking the people as they are, with their present development, and in the present state of improvement of their faculties, it is altogether impossible that such a system can be executed with any hope of tolerable success ; and if he would only apply his own principles consistently throughout, there is no one that should be more fully satisfied than Mr Combe that this is the case.

Mr Combe observes, “ The leading fact which arrests our attention in this inquiry, is, that every crime proceeds from an abuse of some faculty or other ; and the question immediately arises, Whence originates the tendency to abuse ? Phrenology enables us to answer, From three sources ; *first*, From particular organs being too large and spontaneously active ; *secondly*, From great excitement produced by external causes ; or, *thirdly*, From ignorance of what are uses or what are abuses of the faculties.”

All these causes, Mr Combe states, subsist *independently of the will of the offender*. This is perhaps not entirely true of any of these causes. It is not necessary to resort to Phrenology, to prove that a man has not the choice of his own original disposition and character. But if the organ of any particular propensity is too powerful, it may be asked, has it not been indulged and cherished in a culpable manner, before it came into this state of predominance and over activity? Again, the circumstances of external excitement which lead to crime, are generally of our own seeking. If evil example is alleged, has not evil company been sought rather than avoided? Had not the individual at first voluntarily chosen such society, he would not have been exposed to the contagion of their evil communications. If intoxicating liquors supply the stimulus, has not that stimulus been sought to a vicious excess before it excited to crime? If ignorance of what is right and just be alleged, have not the opportunities of knowledge, which are in this country held out and offered to all, been first despised and neglected? Has not the boy played truant, and the youth stayed from church? I enter not here into any subtle disquisitions about *free-will*; it is enough to say, that the above are as much dependent on volition and choice as any other circumstances in our condition; and that the voluntary nature of such acts must be admitted, unless we deny the existence of free agency in any case whatever. All writers on this subject, whatever side they may have taken in the question about liberty and necessity, agree in this, that whatever be the nature of the necessity to which our wills and actions are subjected, it is not such as to take away our responsibility, or to render us unaccountable for our misdeeds, either in the eye of God or man. Cudworth maintains, that we are so far the principals and originators of our own

thoughts and actions, as to be accountable for them, and as justly to be punishable for such as are wrong. Butler has written a chapter, to shew, that this is confirmed by the whole analogy of nature. Edwards, the great champion of necessity, holds the very same doctrine. So does Locke. Mr Combe himself, though he virtually denies the justice of punishment, admits, in the fullest manner, the necessity of stopping the career of the criminal, and, by the most effectual means, of putting an end to crime. He considers the system of penitentiaries to be the most effectual means, as well as the most agreeable to benevolence and the other higher sentiments; and we only differ from him on these points. Let us consider them a little more minutely.

Mr Combe is fond of considering the mental faculties and feelings separately, and of representing them as in a state of perpetual war and opposition, instead of taking the mind as a whole, made up of consistent and harmonious parts. He represents the present system of curbing crime by punishment, as originating entirely in the propensities. "The latter," he says, "blindly inflict animal resentment, without the slightest regard to the cause which led to the crime, or the consequences of the punishment. They seize the aggressor, and worry, bite, or strangle him; and there they begin and terminate their operations.

"The moral and intellectual faculties, on the other hand, embrace even the criminal himself within the range of their sympathies. *Benevolence* desires to render him virtuous, and thereafter happy, as well as to rescue his victim. *Veneration* desires that he should be treated as a man; and *Conscientiousness* declares, that it cannot, with satisfaction, acquiesce in any administration towards him, that does not tend to remove the motives of his misconduct, and to prevent their recurrence," &c.*

* Constitution of Man, p. 75, 2d col.

I shall consider both these points in their order. *First*, I conceive Mr Combe to be wrong in supposing our present system of curbing crime by punishment, as entirely suggested by the propensities, without sentiment or intellect. I shall go back to the first establishment of our criminal laws, and suppose a legislator, like Alfred, promulgating, for the first time, his code of criminal legislation. He finds himself surrounded by a savage race, in whom the propensities are wofully predominant,—men who would rob, murder, ravish, burn, and destroy, with little or no scruple, whenever it suited their inclination, or whenever opportunity occurred. He would willingly, if he could, have them all restrained from crime, and instructed in their duty,—but his intellect shews him that this is impossible. He has difficulty in procuring instruction for himself, or for his children—how shall he provide these for his whole subjects? External restraint is out of the question, for the number of the well-disposed among his subjects would be unable to do the duty of jailers to those who are otherwise. What then can he do? Intellect informs him that *Fear*, and the *Love of Approbation*, are two of the strongest feelings of the mind, and that many who are deficient in *Conscientiousness* and *Benevolence* may be addressed through these feelings. He therefore promulgates a law, that whoever wilfully and deliberately puts another man to death, or robs him by force on the highway, or sets fire to his house, or violates the chastity of his wife or daughter, shall be hanged upon a gibbet until he be dead. In promulgating this law, there is not, and cannot be, the slightest indulgence of the propensity of *Destructiveness*, merely as such. It is a strong measure, to be sure, and in order to put it in force, will require a considerable endowment of that species of energetic power which has received the name of *Destructiveness*. But there is not, and

cannot be, the least anger against any individual. The law is not directed against any individual, but intended for the benevolent purpose of preventing evil, and with the hope that it will be effectual : and in a great many cases, there is no doubt that it must be effectual. Whenever there is a hesitation or a struggle between the lower propensities and the better feelings, the first movements towards crime may and must be checked by the consideration that this act—which is only thought of—will probably lead to a shameful and ignominious death. There is, therefore, kindness in the very severity of the law, — which is such as to keep the greater part of the community even from thinking of such crimes. But in some cases, the law will be violated ; and, in this event, what is the lawgiver to do ? Mr Combe says, *Benevolence* desires that the culprit may live and be reformed. But a higher and more enlightened benevolence pleads for society, and says, that if the law be not executed, it will thenceforth be despised ; and if this criminal escapes with life, not only may he afterwards commit other crimes, but others, whose evil thoughts are yet in embryo, expecting the like impunity, will indulge inclinations which would otherwise be suppressed, and commit offences which a more strict and vigorous administration would afford the best means of preventing. *Benevolence* itself, when enlightened by these considerations, is more swayed by the good of the community, than the good of one only. *Conscientiousness* sees it to be just, that he who has infringed the law, should suffer by the law ; seeing that, but for this infringement, he would have enjoyed the benefit of that security which this very law was instituted to afford. The *duty* of the magistrate to preserve the public peace, is paramount to his own individual feelings, even though he should think that there was a hardship in the case of

the offender. *Firmness*, enlightened by intellect, sees that a law that is not executed is worse than no law at all ; and therefore, it rejects all solicitations of mercy, represses all useless feelings towards the unhappy culprit, and sternly proceeds to the execution of that, without which all laws must be nothing more than empty threats. And he does so without an atom of that merely animal feeling of rage which Mr Combe thinks the only one which dictates the punishment.

With regard to the effect of capital punishments upon the spectators, I utterly deny Mr Combe's position, that it merely addresses itself to the propensities. I have sometimes witnessed executions, and I never observed, even in the lowest of the mob, any thing like gratification of the feeling of *Destructiveness* on such occasions, or any thing like a love of bloodshed for its own sake. On the contrary, the feelings generally excited, seem to be those of deep compassion. Towards a person in such unhappy circumstances, all anger is completely suppressed. Intellect sees that his punishment was not decreed to gratify *Destructiveness*, but to satisfy the law—to prevent the law becoming of no effect—to be a beacon and a warning to those who might be inclined to do the like. *Justice* and *Firmness* are alike satisfied that this should be the case ; and *Benevolence*, enlightened by intellect, sees that mercy to the guilty would be cruelty and injustice to the innocent. “*Judex damnatur cum nocens absolvitur.*”

It thus appears, that, both in the case of the legislator who frames the law, the judge who condemns, and the spectator who witnesses its execution, the sentiments and intellect are principally, if not entirely, concerned in the matter, and the propensities not at all ; or if the latter have any share, it is merely in enabling them to give effect to what the former see to be just, benevolent, and necessary.

Now, if this was the case in the ruder states of society, is it less the case now? For whom are such laws enacted? Not for the good, the well-constituted, or the well-educated. These do not require a law of this kind to prevent them from committing such crimes. It is intended to restrain those whose lower propensities are too powerful and active, and whose intellect and higher sentiments are not sufficiently strong, or sufficiently educated. In short, it is intended for those who still remain in the rude uncivilized savage state, as the generality of the people were in the age of Alfred. For them, such laws are as necessary now as they were then; and the unfortunate prevalence of such crimes shews, that this class of society is still only too numerous.

But Mr Combe says here, Why do you allow people to commit crimes, and punish them afterwards? would it not be better to put them at once under such restraint as to prevent all crimes from being committed? I think upon this point Mr Combe will be best answered by Mr Combe. In page 22d of the "Constitution of Man," I find the following passage, which appears to me so applicable that I shall make no apology for quoting it entire. "The problem is solved by the principle, that *happiness consists in the activity of our faculties*, and that the arrangement of punishment *after* the offence, is far more conducive to activity than the opposite. For example, if we desired to enjoy the highest gratification in exploring a new country, replete with the most exquisite beauties of scenery, and the most captivating natural productions; and if we found in our path, precipices that gratified ideality in the highest degree, but which endangered life, when, neglecting the law of gravitation, we advanced so near as to fall over them; whether would it be more bountiful in Providence to send an invisible attendant with us, who, whenever we are about to approach the

brink, should interpose a barrier, and fairly cut short our advance, without requiring us to bestow one thought upon the subject, and without our knowing when to expect it, and when not; or to leave all open, but to confer on us, as he has done, eyes fitted to see the precipice, faculties to comprehend the law of gravitation, and *Cautiousness* to make us fear the infringement of it,—and then to leave us to enjoy the scene in perfect safety, if we used these powers, but to fall over and suffer pain or *death*, if we neglected to exercise them? *It is obvious that the latter arrangement would give far more scope to our various powers; and if active faculties are the sources of pleasure, as will be shewn in the next chapter, then it would contribute more to our enjoyment than the other.* Now, THE LAW punishing after the fact is analogous, in the moral world, to this arrangement in the physical. If *Intellect, Benevolence, Veneration, and Conscientiousness*, do their parts, they will give intimations of disapprobation before commission of offences, just as *Cautiousness* will give intimations of danger at sight of the cliff; but if these are disregarded, and we fall over the moral precipice, *the punishment decreed by the law follows*, just as pain is the chastisement for tumbling over the physical brink. The object of both institutions is to permit and encourage the most vigorous and unrestrained exercise of our faculties, in accordance with the physical, moral, and intellectual laws of nature, and to punish us only when we transgress these limits.”

This is all so good that I positively can add nothing to it. It appears to me to be irrefragable and unanswerable, and indeed to be much more applicable to the case of *human criminal legislation* than to the subject to which it was originally applied. I do not see how it is possible for Mr Combe to evade the force of his own arguments. What is there in our criminal law, even

that part of it to which Mr Combe has the strongest objections, namely, capital punishments,—that is different in principle from this procedure of the Creator in the physical arrangements here referred to? In fact, the principle is precisely the same—its application the same—its necessary and unavoidable effect the same. It is more *benevolent* that men should be allowed to commit crimes, and be afterwards punished for doing so, even though that punishment should be death, than that they should be deprived of their personal liberty by being shut up in penitentiaries. The former mode affords much greater scope than the latter for the exercise of all the human faculties, and is therefore more conducive, upon the whole, to human happiness. On his own principles, the only objection Mr Combe can state to our present system is, not that it is too severe and indiscriminating, but that it is not severe and indiscriminating enough; for, if it were sufficiently so to deprive the guilty of all chance of escape, it is clear that it would then be more assimilated to the Creator's physical arrangements, though it is not certain even then if it would have the effect to prevent all infringements against its provisions.

Much more might be stated on the subject of criminal legislation, did time and space permit to institute a comparison between Mr Combe's proposed penitentiaries and our present method of ridding the country of disorderly characters by transportation. I think it may be distinctly demonstrated, that the latter is by far the most beneficial in its effects, both to the country, the culprits themselves, their posterity, and the general fortunes of the world. It is more consistent with personal liberty than the penitentiary system, and, therefore, more benevolent to the criminal, as permitting the fuller exercise of his faculties, upon which, as Mr Combe states, happiness mainly depends.

Various other arguments remain, but I must have done. Such an extensive subject would require to be treated in a separate work.

CONCLUSION.

I SHALL now recapitulate shortly the results we have come to in the foregoing examination of Mr Combe's Essay.

1st, I think it is shewn, that he has completely failed in establishing that the moral world has been originally constituted on the principle of slow and gradual improvement, *by the development of its own elements*. The analogy he refers to in the case of the physical world not merely fails him, but affords a powerful argument the other way. By his own account, in the *physical world* four or five successive creations of plants and animals (that is, four or five successive interferences of Almighty power) have taken place, before the earth was fitted for the reception of man as its inhabitant; and in strict analogy to this we find that, in the *moral world*, and *since* the creation, there have been five miraculous interpositions of the same Almighty agency, at the respective establishments of the Adamic, the Noahic, the Abrahamic or Patriarchal, the Mosaic or Jewish, and the Christian dispensations. Instead, therefore, of its being true, that "the world, including both the physical and moral departments, contains within itself the elements of improvement, which time will evolve and bring to maturity, it having been constituted on the principle of a progressive system, like the acorn in reference to the oak," it would appear, on the contrary, *that the world, including BOTH the physical and moral*

departments, has NOT contained within itself the WHOLE elements of its own improvement, but that it has required IN BOTH successive interpositions of divine power to carry into effect the designs and purposes of the Deity respecting it.

2d, I conceive that Mr Combe has failed completely in proving from history the march of moral and intellectual improvement generally throughout the world; that, on the contrary, it is proved by history, and by existing monuments, that the earliest empires were as far, if not farther, advanced in arts and sciences, than any that succeeded them previous to the introduction of Christianity. And as to the improvement which has taken place since that period, and which is now rapidly progressing, *it is entirely confined to those countries which have been blessed with the light of Christianity*, the remainder of the world being either *stationary or retrograde*.

3d, I conceive that he has entirely failed in his argument upon philosophical grounds against the Scripture doctrine of the degeneracy or depravity of human nature. The whole analogy of nature leads to the belief that man was created in a *state of perfection*, and his present state sufficiently shews that he has everywhere *degenerated* from that perfection.

4th, Without in the least disputing the uniformity and constancy of nature's operations, of which I am as well aware as Mr Combe, I think he has completely failed in eliciting from thence a system of *natural laws* which shall be sufficient for the regulation of man's conduct in the present life; or in shewing that it is possible for man, in his present state, either to discover or to obey all these laws, so as to remedy the disorders that have crept into the world.

5th, I conceive that Mr Combe, and other writers who maintain the sufficiency of the *natural laws*, have

failed in giving any intelligible view of these laws, even in the department of morals ; that the view they give is utterly defective and unsound, and rests on no foundation of philosophical principle ; and that no means exist, or at least, that they have not pointed out the means, of discovering a perfect rule of conduct by the lights of natural reason.

6th, On the other hand, that the *moral law*, as revealed in the Scriptures, is absolutely perfect, and comprehends in a few simple and intelligible precepts a complete system of human duty,—that this law is “ *universal, invariable, unbending, harmonious* in itself, conformable to the most *perfect moral feeling*, and the most *perfect reason*, and in the strictest sense *divine*.”

7th, I conceive that the account given by Mr Combe of the special faculties, propensities, and sentiments, (in which I believe he closely follows Dr Spurzheim,) is defective in several respects, and offers an erroneous view of our nature, by making too marked a distinction between the faculties peculiar to man, and those which are common to him and certain of the animals, degrading the latter beneath their just rank,—that the faculties and their organs cannot be correctly exhibited, as Mr Combe does, in a *tabular view*, as divided into distinctly marked sections,—but that the whole hang together as a harmonious scheme, nicely adjusted and balanced by a great variety of minute and curious adaptations and dependencies, and evidently bearing marks of divine contrivance.

8th, I conceive that Mr Combe has completely failed in establishing the principle of the *supremacy* of what *he calls* exclusively the *moral sentiments*. That, on the contrary, *all* the feelings and sentiments of our nature have their uses and abuses, their proper and improper modes of action, their moral or immoral tendencies ;

and that each particular instance of such conduct is approved or disapproved by the general power of moral judgment called *Conscience*, being the combined dictate of the whole feelings enlightened and guided by intellect.

9th, I conceive Mr Combe has failed in establishing any sound philosophical objection to the Scripture doctrine of the depravity of human nature; and that, on the contrary, that doctrine is strictly in harmony with what Phrenology reveals with regard to the faculties of man, and with the present state and whole manifestations of his faculties.

10th, I conceive Mr Combe has entirely failed in his objection to the paradisaical state, founded on the existence of certain organs in the brain, and certain faculties in the mind, which he supposes to be inconsistent with such a state—that such an objection is quite unphilosophical—but at any rate that the faculties in question were necessary to man in every state, and might have received full employment and gratification in a world where there was neither sin, sorrow, pain, nor danger.

11th, I conceive it has been shewn, that Mr Combe's objection to the Scripture doctrine, that death was brought upon man as the punishment of sin, is an unphilosophical objection—that he has no grounds, in fact or in philosophy, for maintaining that man, at his creation, and anterior to his fall from innocence, must have been liable to death—that the state in which man was then placed was totally different from the present, and one as to which natural reason affords no light, and as to which we are as little entitled to draw conclusions, as we are with regard to his condition in a future state beyond the grave—and that it is transgressing the plainest rules of philosophical inquiry to attempt to investigate a subject where *no data* exist for enabling us to come to any certain conclusion.

12th, I conceive that Mr Combe is wrong in omitting to take any notice of a future state, or of the arguments from natural reason, and especially from Phrenology, for supposing such a state to be probable : that this is particularly inexcusable in a treatise professedly of a practical and popular nature, intended as a guide to individual conduct.

13th, I conceive Mr Combe has completely failed in his attempts to prove, that the pains of parturition are not an institution of the Creator ; or that they may be evaded or removed, by obeying certain unknown *natural laws*.

14th, I conceive Mr Combe has been completely unsuccessful in his attempts to shew the necessity or propriety of bringing Science in aid of Scripture—that his views on this subject exhibit the most glaring inconsistency—that the authority of Lord Bacon is most express against mixing divine and human knowledge—that the case of Galileo, which he is eternally quoting, is against him, it being equally improper to bring Science into collision with Scripture, as to bring Scripture into collision with Science—that he has failed in making out a case against Scripture, from differences of doctrine, various readings, and difficulty of interpretation—that by his garbled and partial quotations from Jeremy Taylor, he has represented that divine as stating opinions the very reverse of those he actually entertained—that he has misrepresented the doctrines held by the Church of Scotland concerning Prayer, and has given a defective and erroneous account of the case of Professor Leechman in relation to that subject—that his own view of prayer is radically defective and absurd—and lastly, that it is impossible, upon any grounds drawn from Phrenology, either to subvert or materially to support any theological doctrine that is clearly revealed in the Scriptures,—the

two subjects lying perfectly distinct, and their spheres being divided by an impassable boundary.

Lastly, I conceive that Mr Combe's views on the subject of criminal legislation have been admirably refuted by Mr Combe himself, and that on grounds which, on his own principles, it is impossible for him to controvert.

There are various other subjects treated of in Mr Combe's work, into which at present I have neither leisure nor inclination to enter. I cannot prevail upon myself, for instance, to engage in any discussion as to the laws of propagation, which, as it appears to me, it would be better to leave to be treated of scientifically and separately, as an object of medical inquiry. The details to which it leads appear to me unutterably disgusting in a work like the present. Some of them may have a foundation in nature, but many others are pre-eminently absurd, and some of them, as I think, demonstrably false. It appears to me that the knowledge which mankind in general possess on this subject is already quite sufficient for any practical or practicable purpose; and that, in relation to the intercourse between the sexes, matters are better ordered by leaving them to be regulated by natural taste and natural feeling, than by attempting to subvert these, and to put them under the dominion of any set of hard philosophical rules. I am not prepared on this subject, to sacrifice the retiring graces of female modesty, or the hallowed flame of virtuous love, to the cold calculations of a harsh and unbending philosophy.

Neither am I disposed to follow Mr Combe through his speculations on politics and political economy, which appear to be equally crude and undigested, as those upon the subjects which have been already touched upon. In these speculations he seems to have taken no enlarged,

statesmanlike, or truly philosophical survey of any question, but to have adopted, in the lump, the prejudiced, and sometimes illiberal views of one particular party, which he does his utmost to support by an application of phrenological principles ; and that all this is done in such a way as to shew, not that the political views naturally or necessarily follow from the philosophical, but that the former have been adopted in the first place, and that he has afterwards set himself to bolster them up, by arguments, often of the weakest description, drawn, or attempted to be drawn, from the latter.

It would be endless to follow him through the interminable cases he produces of the evils, or punishments, which men bring upon themselves by what he calls disobeying the *natural laws*. What is the use of appalling us with such details, until he first informs us *what are the laws* that we are called upon to obey. I have as yet seen no code of these laws, however imperfect ; certainly there is none contained in Mr Combe's book. I have heard of some of them, particularly one, that people should sit for an hour or two after every meal, in total idleness, in order to allow the nervous energy of the brain to expend itself in the proper digestion of the food ; and another, (which is particularly new,) that it is necessary to walk a certain number of miles every day before dinner, for the purpose of procuring an appetite. Then we have long stories about shipwrecks, and fires in Edinburgh ; about retired tradesmen, and weavers out of work, and ill ventilated rooms, and flannel jackets, and colds caught by exposure after being warm, and feminine tales of "unaired shirts, catarrhs and toothach got with thin soled shoes." What utter drivelling is this ! Does not every individual, possessing the most limited portion of sense and information, know all these things almost, if not altogether, as well as Mr

Combe? And what is the use of writing interminable books to prove what is perfectly obvious to every old woman in the parish? If Mr Combe thought that the world at large stood in need of this sort of information, he might have communicated all that he has done, and ten times more, to ten times better purpose, without all this fuss — the parade of conjoining such commonplace trash with what appears to be intended as a philosophical system.

Taking a general view of Mr Combe's System as a whole, I must be forgiven for saying, that it is a low and grovelling system. It is grovelling in respect of its objects, — in respect of the motives it presents to us, — and in respect of its excluding all that can serve truly to elevate the views, and exalt the character of man.

It is low in respect of its objects,—which are confined to the paltry details and insignificant concerns of the present life; leading, if it should ever be practically followed, to the devotion of our whole time and attention to remedying evils which it is often better to despise, and to procuring accommodations which add nothing to the happiness of a noble mind.

It is low in respect of its motives,—which are uniformly selfish throughout. It calls us to cultivate our higher sentiments and intellect, not from high, disinterested, or elevating considerations, but solely as the best means of increasing our own enjoyment. In respect of the motives which it offers, it seems to be exactly on a level with the system of Epicurus; and, like that system, leads us to consider the “supreme good” to consist in “ease of body, and tranquillity of mind.” It is infinitely inferior, in this respect, to the systems of Plato or the Stoics, and many others that might be named. I shall not insult the reader by stating any comparison between it and Christianity.

It is a low system, because it leaves out all the motives that most effectually tend to exalt and ameliorate the human character. It presents us with no object of love and reverence—no being who can be the object of worship or adoration,—exhibits no character removed above the most ordinary level of human mediocrity — none the least approaching to individual excellence — none that can be pointed out as an example for imitation.

The systematic exclusion of a future state—the prime circumstance in our condition which elevates us above the “brutes that perish;” the limiting our views to the present unsatisfactory life — unsatisfactory, unless considered in reference to another; the refusing to *Hope*, the only object on which it can rest with full satisfaction, — all these circumstances are quite enough to bear out the proposition, that it is a low and grovelling system.

Let it not be supposed for a moment, that I object to the cultivation and proper use of scientific knowledge. On the contrary, I hold, with Lord Bacon, that it is impossible to go too far in the study of natural truth, or in the study of revealed truth.* All truth, when discovered, and when its proper limits and applications have been fully investigated, will in due time be applied to its own legitimate uses. It is impossible to prevent this, and it would be eminently absurd to object to it. But what I object to is, the rash, premature, and ill advised use of a knowledge that is but half scientific; attempting to force into practical

* “To conclude, therefore, let no man, upon a weak conceit of sobriety, or an ill applied moderation, think or maintain that a man can search too far, or be too well studied in the book of God’s word, or in the book of God’s works — divinity or philosophy; but rather let men endeavour an endless progress or proficiencie in both: only, let men beware, that they apply both to charity, and not to *swelling*; to use, and not to *ostentation*; and again, that they do not unwisely *mingle or confound these learnings together.*” Bacon’s Works, vol. ii. p. 13.

use a crude and imperfect knowledge, or applying real knowledge to uses which it never can be fitted to serve.

This, however, has been the fate of almost every science at, or soon after, its discovery. In almost every case, the original discoverers, or first cultivators of a new science, have mistaken the true ends which it was ultimately destined to achieve, and endeavoured to apply it in a way and to purposes which could never lead to any successful result. The first cultivators of the science of Astronomy were astrologers, and attempted, by studying the motions of the heavenly bodies, to arrive at the knowledge of future events. This was not the mere superstition of the ignorant vulgar, but was reduced into regular method, and the calculations made by rules, which are treated of in many elaborate works. This extraordinary misapplication of the most perfect and sublime of all sciences, even continued to bewilder the understandings of men down to the age of Bacon and Galileo. Tycho Brahe was infected with it; and Kepler, who paved the way for the discoveries of Newton, was, for a great part of his life, employed in pursuing phantoms equally unsubstantial. Astronomy had been studied in one country or another for three thousand years before its true uses were discovered, and before it was applied practically and efficiently to the improvement of navigation and geography—for ascertaining the true figure of the earth, and the relative situation of places on its surface.

The original students of Chemistry were the alchemists. They had not the least conception of the important results which have since arisen from this science; they aimed at discovering the elementary qualities of substances, for the purpose of enabling them to convert the baser metals into gold,—an object which, if attained, would have been useless to the world, and infinitely pernicious to the discoverers. This pursuit also was not

a mere whim or fancy of the ignorant, but was followed with the greatest eagerness by those who were comparatively learned, and who looked upon themselves as philosophers. Their processes were reduced to rule, and formed the subject of voluminous works. The dreams of the alchemists were not thoroughly banished in the days of Bacon, or even in those of Boyle; and it was not till the middle of the last century that the true objects of chemical research, and the proper mode of conducting it, came to be understood by its cultivators.

The original Geologists were not satisfied with examining the strata and other appearances on the surface of the earth, in order to discover the successive changes it had undergone. Their objects were far more lofty and magnificent. They attempted nothing less than to discover the mode of formation of the universe. They aimed at constructing, not geologies, but cosmogonies, and speculated regarding the time when this globe, and all the other planets, were formed from masses of matter in a state of fusion, detached from the sun, and afterwards brought by their own centripetal and centrifugal forces into the regular and beautiful forms and motions which they exhibit at this day. These speculations were of course mere idle reveries, and never could lead to any solid conclusion; but this was the method, even so late as the days of Buffon, which was pursued by philosophers in studying the theory of the earth.

I am far from wishing to represent Phrenology, as at present cultivated, as a fantastic speculation like those now mentioned, or to consider Doctors Gall and Spurzheim as visionaries, like the ancient alchemists and cosmogonists. I look upon the discoveries of these great men as real and substantial discoveries, offering the most important and interesting objects of investigation that, perhaps, ever have been exhibited to the world, and likely in time to lead to the greatest results. But it

is just the deep sense I entertain of the importance of this science, that leads me to remind its cultivators of the evils of rash and immature speculation, and to point to the examples of this that have occurred in other sciences.

I would remind them, that it is only by gradual steps, and much patient investigation, that those sciences which are now most firmly established, and which have been followed by the richest harvest of practical usefulness, have been brought into their present state of perfection. I would remind them of the warning given by Lord Bacon against “the over-early and peremptory reduction of knowledge into arts and methods, from which time, commonly, sciences receive small or no augmentation;”^{*} also of his condemnation of those who “disdain to spell, and so by degrees to read, in the volume of God’s works; and who, contrariwise, by continual meditation and agitation of wit, do urge, and, as it were, invoke their own spirits to divine, and give oracles unto them, *whereby they are universally deluded.*”[†]

It is no disparagement to Mr Combe, to say that he has not yet succeeded in reducing the discoveries of Gall and Spurzheim into a complete and perfect system. To have done so from the materials he possessed, would have required an intellect altogether superhuman. Phrenology is a subject so vast and important — so new in the mode of its cultivation — it opens up so many subjects of interesting investigation — and these have been as yet so imperfectly explored — that no created intelligence could be capable at once of comprehending its details — penetrating its mysteries — unravelling its intricacies — enlightening its dark recesses — and bringing it forth and exhibiting it to the light in all its aspects, physical, metaphysical, social, moral, and

^{*} Bacon’s Works, ii. 48.

[†] Ibid. ii. 49.

political. If Mr Combe has failed in doing this, he has only failed in that which no human intellect in the present state of the science could have succeeded in accomplishing.

Though it would perhaps be unjust to say that the science is yet in its infancy, we may at the least safely venture to maintain that it has not yet passed the years of its nonage. It exhibits a favourable promise of what it may be in the time of its maturity, but much yet remains to be done, and many labours to be undergone, before it shall reach the perfect stature, and full and beautiful proportion, which I am quite satisfied it will one day attain. Much has yet to be done in the field of observation — much in the judicious comparing and careful induction of facts — much also is to be done in the metaphysics of the science, in ascertaining correctly the true functions, and limits of the faculties, their mutual dependencies, and their various combinations. The harvest in all these particulars is undoubtedly great, but the labourers have been miserably few; and many of those who ought to have assisted in the work have stood aloof, and not merely refused to enter the field themselves, but have hindered those who were willing to enter.

This, then, is the difference between my views of the science and those of Mr Combe. He seems to regard it as already complete and full grown; I look upon it only as in an early period of its growth to maturity. It is yet but a very few years since some of the more important points relating to it could be considered as settled. There are many more not settled yet, and many on which we have but a mere glimmering of the truth. We know a good deal on the subject of the correspondence between the development of the brain, and the natural character; very little on the differences arising from internal organization, and the effects of different

bodily temperaments ; still less of those resulting from the successive growth, and development or diminution of parts, and of the action of moral and physical causes in producing these ; and we are equally in the dark on various other points.

Is it advisable, then, in this imperfect state of the science, to rush headlong into experiments, and to talk of overturning the old opinions, institutions, and usages of society—to tamper with education, legislation, marriage, politics, civil and criminal jurisprudence, and above all, religion ; or even to speak of these things as likely soon to be accomplished or attempted ? As I differ from Mr Combe as to the clearness of that light which he supposes Phrenology, in its present state, to be capable of throwing on all those subjects, so neither can I admit the depth of that darkness which he supposes the world to have universally lain under in regard to them up to the present time. Shakespeare lived and wrote before Phrenology was discovered, and he understood human nature as well as Mr Combe. Sir Walter Scott did not avail himself of the lights of Phrenology, yet his representations of character are, in many cases, such as no phrenologist could presume to mend. These are but two instances out of many. Various others might be cited, among our dramatists, poets, historians, and moralists, of writers who possessed an intuitive perception of the motives and springs of human action, and whose analysis of mental feelings agrees almost entirely with that which would be given by a phrenologist. Almost the only exceptions to this among our great writers, occur in the case of the metaphysicians ; and the reason seems to be, that they have studied human nature in their closets, and not in the world. But many of our eminent divines, in their sermons and other compositions, shew a thorough practical knowledge of the human heart ; and sometimes


hold up a glass, in which the sinner may see his character portrayed with fearful accuracy. Upon the whole, therefore, I am inclined to anticipate, that when Phrenology has been brought to a higher state of cultivation than it has hitherto reached, there will be found much less difference between the views which it offers, and those which have been hitherto entertained by men of *practical good sense*, than Mr Combe seems to suppose. That it will prove of essential benefit to society I entertain not the least doubt; but that it will ever, as he supposes, reach to revolutionize, reform, and regenerate the world, I look upon to be a dream as vain and unsubstantial as the wildest chimeras of the alchemists.

In taking leave of Mr Combe and his work, I cannot help intimating my fixed impression that he has in it abandoned that sobriety and humility of mind "*which laboureth to spell, and so by degrees to read, in the book of God's works ;*" and that he has been rather "*urging and invoking his spirit to DIVINE, and give forth ORACLES;*"—and that he has farther forgotten the warning so expressively given by Lord Bacon to all who would be interpreters of nature, that "*it is a point fit and necessary, without hesitation or reservation, to be professed, THAT IT IS NO LESS TRUE IN THIS HUMAN KINGDOM OF KNOWLEDGE THAN IN GOD'S KINGDOM OF HEAVEN, THAT NO MAN SHALL ENTER INTO IT EXCEPT HE BECOME FIRST AS A LITTLE CHILD.*"

THE END.

EDINBURGH :

Printed by ANDREW SHORTREDE, Thistle Lane.







3 1197 00658 7684

DATE DUE

JAN 14 1982	JAN 04 2011	
JAN 03	DEC 14 2010	
MAR 21 1984		
MAR 19 1983		
JAN 21 1987		
JAN 26 1987		
JAN 05 1998		
DEC 30 1997		
MAR 1 1999		
MAR 1 1999		
JUL 17 2004		
FEB 10 2004		
FEB 20 2007		
APR 1 2007		
APR 8 2007		

